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Executive summary  
Background 
Introduced by the President of Sierra Leone in 2010, the FHCI abolished health user fees for 
pregnant women, lactating mothers and children under five years of age. This action was taken in 
response to very high mortality and morbidity levels among mothers and children in Sierra Leone – 
some of the worst in the world – and reports that financial costs were a major barrier to health 
service uptake and use by these groups.  
This report presents an independent review of the FHCI. The main users of the review findings will 
be the MoHS, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), and their development partners. DFID 
funded the study, which has been coordinated with the MoHS and key stakeholders. The findings 
of the review remain relevant not just in terms of assessing this important policy initiative 
retrospectively but also to inform the rollout of the current post-Ebola investments in Sierra Leone. 
Methods 
This review covers the period 2010 to 2015, although to establish trends earlier data points are 
included where relevant. It assesses the extent to which the FHCI has contributed to saving lives 
through improved health outcomes for the target groups, as well as the extent to which the 
initiative represents value for money (VfM). It also responds to questions on how effectively the 
FHCI was implemented, whether it addressed the right interventions, other barriers still remaining, 
equity effects, unintended consequences and how to sustain the FHCI in the future. 
There are a number of important features of the intervention that influenced the design of the 
review: 
 The FHCI was a complex intervention, involving not only changes to charging of the target 
groups but also actions to strengthen all health system pillars. The review is therefore of this 
whole package of health system reforms. 
 The FHCI was implemented in a dynamic way, triggering and responding to changes over 
time. This review is therefore not based on a snapshot in time but is of an evolving story.  
 The FHCI was a ‘whole system’ change, introduced in all regions simultaneously. This 
means there is thus no ‘control group’ to provide a counterfactual. No baseline was done and 
many data sources were only introduced after the FHCI, which are major constraints to 
before/after assessments. 
The study used a theory-based evaluation approach. A theory of change (ToC) was developed in 
2014 by the evaluation team to map out how the FHCI might produce impact and what would need 
to be examined to understand whether it had done so and, if so, how and why. An evaluation 
framework mapped possible information sources against each domain. We then drew on mixed 
methods to populate the framework, triangulating between sources where possible to come to 
judgements about the plausible contribution of the FHCI. 
Analytical approaches included interrupted time series analysis of national survey data to examine 
mortality and morbidity trends and draw inferences about the contribution of the FHCI to observed 
trends, as well as modelling of impact using the Lives Saved Tool (LiST) and modelling of future 
revenues and expenditures for the fiscal space analysis. Other data sources include key informant 
interviews (KIIs) at national and district level, focus group discussions (FGDs) in four districts, 
extensive document review across all health system pillars, and analysis of routine information 
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systems (for financial, staffing, logistics and health output data). The review also incorporated key 
findings from other relevant research projects, such as ReBUILD (for analysis of human resources 
(HR) and some health financing indicators). Beyond constraints derived from the nature of the 
intervention, the main study limitations derived from data sources that were in some cases absent, 
partial or weak. Information from these sources is presented with suitable caveats. 
Structure of this report 
In order to assess the changes introduced by the FHCI, an understanding of the health system 
prior to its launch is needed. The report starts by describing health indicators and the health 
system in Sierra Leone before 2010. It then gives a narrative for the launch of the FHCI, including 
the preparatory activities in the run-up to April 2010. A chronology of changes under the different 
health systems pillars is provided, examining for each the key changes, their implementation and 
effectiveness, and what challenges remain. The analysis then returns to the ToC framework to 
document changes to coverage of key maternal and child health (MCH) services, quality of care, 
barriers to service uptake, outcomes (maternal and child mortality and morbidity) and wider 
impacts, including possible unintended consequences. The health outcome changes are assessed 
in the context of wider changes in Sierra Leone. A summative VfM assessment is given, looking at 
economy, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, equity and sustainability. The sustainability aspect 
incorporates a more forward-looking fiscal space analysis to assist government with financial 
planning for the FHCI. The report ends by briefly comparing Sierra Leone’s experience with other 
countries in the region and drawing out recommendations for strengthening the FHCI and the 
wider health sector. 
Findings 
We present a summary of the findings here in relation to the seven original evaluation questions 
posed in the terms of reference (Annex A). 
1. Are the seven priority interventions the right ones to ensure continued and increased 
utilisation of services by the target beneficiaries? 
 
This question focuses on the relevance and comprehensiveness of the seven pillars - health 
financing, governance, human resources, drugs and medical supplies, infrastructure, monitoring 
and evaluation and communication - that formed the focus of the FHCI. The evaluation team 
concludes that each of the pillars was relevant and appropriate – even essential – to making the 
FHCI potentially effective, and that the FHCI itself responded to a clear population need. It was in 
fact one of the distinguishing features of the FHCI, compared to previous user fee removal policies 
in the region, that a systematic approach was adopted, proactively identifying the health system 
pillars needing strengthening.  
We have also considered whether any important elements were missed, during the inception 
phase, which should have been included. As the health pillars adopted were very comprehensive, 
this is not a major concern. Within pillars, some elements should have received more focus and 
across the board there have been issues of how reforms were effected. The cross-cutting area that 
was relatively neglected from the start was quality of care, incorporating crucial elements that have 
not received sufficient attention, such as improving staff performance and responsiveness, clinical 
supervision in support of evidence-based practice and monitoring of core quality of care indicators. 
Community engagement was also limited to monitoring by civil society groups. 
2. How and to what extent were the priority interventions that were put in place effective in 
enabling the FHCI to be operationalised? 
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The breadth of ambition of the FHCI was a risk, especially given the weak starting position of the 
health system in Sierra Leone. We find (see section 4) that there was differential effectiveness of 
implementation across not only the pillars but also over time. Some real gains were achieved 
initially, notably in terms of revitalising structures for sector governance, increased staffing, better 
systems for staff management and pay, and for getting funds to the facilities. New monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) systems were introduced, facility audits conducted, infrastructure improved from 
very weak starting points, and a communication campaign initiated. Underlying these measures 
was an increase in health financing resources, including a prioritisation of MCH programmes and a 
switch from household to donor spending to some degree. However, some important areas such 
as improvements to pharmaceutical procurement and distribution were not effective, and in other 
areas, such as human resources, reforming momentum was lost over time. With the benefit of our 
long lens (six years on from the start of the FHCI), we see problems that were tackled just prior to 
the FHCI, like cleaning the payroll, re-emerging as problems now. 
Some see the weak response to Ebola in 2014/15 as an indictment of the health system and of 
prior attempts to improve it, such as the FHCI. We do not endorse that view. Most low-income 
health systems would have struggled with the Ebola epidemic, and the slow response of 
international organisations was a major contributory factor. However, the sad story of the Ebola 
epidemic does highlight ongoing institutional weaknesses, which need to be addressed in the next 
phase. 
3.  What are the socio-cultural issues that affect the uptake of free health care among the 
target beneficiaries? 
 
Studies undertaken since 2013 highlight that health care-seeking in Sierra Leone is a socially 
negotiated process where factors such as cultural norms, beliefs about disease aetiology, 
acceptability of interventions, perceptions on quality of care, household power relations and social 
networks are all very influential. Distance from clinics is one factor influencing uptake of care, with 
more distant households more likely to follow alternative and traditional routes. Gender roles are 
also important, with fathers typically deciding on most health care decisions that involve taking a 
child outside the home and which involve payments. Knowledge of danger signs (when to take 
mothers and children in to facilities) is another factor that influences uptake of care and health 
outcomes. 
We have examined five barriers to health care utilisation and health gain (the 5 ‘A’s): affordability, 
access, awareness (of the policy and danger signs for mothers and children), attitudes (toward 
health seeking) and accountability (see sections 5 and 9.4). All show improvements over the 
period, though some are modest and the data that are available make it hard to link changes to the 
FHCI (for example, for the reductions in out-of-pocket (OOP) spending overall and for the FHCI 
groups). Awareness of the policy is high among all population groups and there is evidence that 
the FHCI contributed to increased awareness of danger signs by the community, greater 
willingness to seek health care for children and, to a small extent, greater accountability on the part 
of services. All of these barriers need continued focus and improvement as the health system 
moves ahead. 
4. What contributions to health outcomes, among the target groups, did the FHCI make 
and how were these achieved? 
The picture on changes in mortality following the introduction of the FHCI is mixed (see section 6). 
This is partly due to the difficulty in measuring maternal mortality in the absence of a robust vital 
registration system. No efforts were made prospectively to establish impact evaluation measures. 
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The latest UN estimates of maternal mortality put the levels in Sierra Leone at the highest in the 
world. Their central estimates do show declining levels but these are accompanied by wide 
uncertainly intervals that make it difficult to draw firm conclusions on the trend. It is not possible to 
measure directly if maternal mortality has changed as a result of the FHCI. 
The situation for child mortality is more positive. The UN-modelled estimates show a declining 
trend. The UN has also produced annual estimates of under-five mortality using the 2013 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). These show a sharp reduction in rates immediately after 
the start of FHCI. The levels fell from 187 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2009 to 147 in 2010. The 
level continued to fall in the following years, reaching 126 per 1,000 live births in 2012. The bulk of 
this fall relates to children aged between one month and five years. The fall in neonatal mortality 
(deaths under the age of one month) has been slower. 
Information is available in the DHS for prevalence rates of acute respiratory infection (ARI), fever 
and diarrhoea for children under the age of five years. Overall, there was little change in the 
prevalence of these symptoms in under-fives comparing before and after the FHCI, despite an 
increase in interventions that should have improved these, such as reported bednet use. In 
contrast, the nutrition indicators for these children did show large improvements, with the 
proportion of underweight children falling sharply.  
There have been clear improvements in the coverage and uptake of services in recent years (see 
section 5.1) and we would expect these to have a positive impact on the outcomes described 
above. Some of these appear to have started before the launch of the FHCI, but there have also 
been positive changes after the start of the initiative. In many cases the gap in coverage between 
geographical areas and wealth groups has closed significantly. These reflect a combination of 
contributions (see section 8). 
Basic antenatal care (ANC) is now near universal in Sierra Leone, reaching 98% in 2010/11, up 
from 88% in 2004-9; however, the improvement in overall coverage appears to have been 
predominantly before the FHCI.  
Protection from malaria during pregnancy has increased greatly from before the FHCI. The 
proportions of pregnant women using insecticide treated bed-nets (ITNs) and taking protective 
treatments (intermittent preventative treatment: IPTp) for malaria both more than doubled, going 
from 21% in 2009 to 53% in 2013. 
Births in a health facility remain low by international standards but there have been improvements. 
These started before the FHCI but there has also been growth in the numbers since 2010, from 
36% in 2004-9 to 57% of all births in the period 2010 to 2013. The picture is similar for births that 
are attended by a skilled health worker, with improvements both before and after FHCI.  
Coverage of postnatal care (PNC) has improved since the start of the FHCI, with the HMIS data in 
particular showing strong growth: numbers of first PNC appointments rose by 50% between 2010 
and 2014. The survey showed coverage up from 60% in 2009 to 73% in 2013.This suggests that 
the quantity of PNC has increased as a result of the FHCI. 
The FHCI brought a surge in the number of consultations for under-fives at health facilities. The 
numbers more than tripled immediately after the launch to over 300,000 consultations in one 
month in May 2010. Numbers then declined rapidly, probably as the facilities struggled to cope 
with the increased demand. By 2014, the number of under-five consultations was once again 
approaching the 300,000 per month mark. 
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The picture for child immunisation rates shows improvements, although the size of these is less 
clear. The survey data show strong growth in fully vaccinated children under one following the 
FHCI, from 41% in 2009 to 68% in 2013. 
The use of ITNs by children under five years old more than doubled between 2009 and 2013 from 
a quarter of children in 2009 to half in 2013. 
Treatment rates for children under five for pneumonia, malaria and diarrhoea all appear to have 
improved in the years following the FHCI. In particular, the proportion of children under five with 
symptoms of ARI (a proxy for pneumonia) that were treated with antibiotics doubled to 45% in 
2013 compared to 2009. 
The gains are clear but the attribution is less so as: (1) the 2008 DHS was the first of its kind, and 
so it is hard to assess whether the improvements in coverage accelerated after 2010 compared 
with earlier growth; and (2) other developments also contributed. Ebola has clearly had a major 
impact on health outcomes, although this is masked in our evaluation by the fact that the main data 
sources analysed for health outcomes predate Ebola, unlike the qualitative tools that capture part 
of the Ebola and post-Ebola story. Social determinants of health are an important part of the 
picture too, although in general they have improved slowly over the period and so are not likely to 
be major explanatory factors behind any health improvements seen. External investments have 
played a part, especially support to infrastructure and the major disease programmes such as 
malaria and vaccination. There have been some improvements in poverty rates and the overall 
economy, albeit subject to recent shocks. In addition to these areas there are no doubt other 
important influences, such as national road-building programmes that may have increased access 
to health care, for example. All these are part of the contribution story (see section 8). 
The overall conclusion that we can draw from our review is that the FHCI is likely to have 
contributed to the gains in under-five mortality reduction, increased coverage of MCH services and 
equity of MCH service coverage, which were significant in absolute terms. 
Clearly, the changes to inputs and processes described in the analysis of health systems pillars tell 
part of the story of how the FHCI may have affected coverage of key services for mothers and 
children. The improvements in the health system will only be effective, however, if they result in 
reduced barriers for users, particularly increased affordability of services and increased 
acceptability and quality of care. We examine the evidence gathered to date on these aspects. In 
relation to affordability, there is evidence (see section 4.1) at the macro level of a shift in funding 
from households to donors. Household funding as a proportion of total health expenditure has 
gone from a high of 83% in 2007 to 62% in 2013, with donor funding ranging from a low of 12% in 
2007 to a high of 32% in 2013. However, the absolute expenditure remains low per capita and 
households are still the predominant source of health care finance. The best available data show a 
modest reduction in real OOP expenditure from 2003/04 to 2011 (see section 5.3.1). Data from 
various sources suggest that chance of payment and amount of payment has reduced for FHCI 
groups, although evidence also consistently shows that a minority of those in FHCI groups 
(estimates vary but a recent study found 12%) are still paying for health care. The attribution of any 
of these changes to the FHCI is, however, constrained by data limitations. 
From these various studies and estimates, we can draw a conclusion that financial barriers have 
reduced but not to the extent targeted by the policy, while enforcement of FHCI eligibility and 
realisation of rights remains to be improved. 
Quality of care (both technical, in terms of effective delivery of evidence-based practice, but also 
as perceived by patients) is not only affected by the FHCI and its implementation but is also a 
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determinant of its success. In Sierra Leone the challenges to quality of care in the delivery of MCH 
services continue to be wide-ranging, with both supply- and demand-side factors as well as 
underlying social determinants exerting influence. Some progress from a weak base had been 
made prior to the Ebola outbreak, largely catalysed by the FHCI but also by other programmes 
focusing on reproductive, maternal, neonatal and child health (RMNCH), according to documentary 
evidence and KIIs, but the health services remain weak (see section 5.2). In addition, the evidence 
base to track changes to care-giving in facilities is exceptionally weak. Information on inputs and 
outputs has been collected but to examine the effectiveness of services, more information is 
needed on indicators such as case fatality rates (CFRs), re-admissions, sepsis and fresh still 
births, as well as on some of the influencers such as adherence to protocols and staff 
competences and responsiveness. 
Information from before the FHCI on user satisfaction is not available. However, a survey in 2013 
found that the average satisfaction score at primary care level was 7.3 out of 10. Patient 
satisfaction was generally higher for care received at lower-level facilities (MCH posts, compared 
to health centres). Our FGDs highlight concerns about the state of the health care infrastructure, 
staffing levels, skills and attitudes, and the non-availability of drugs in particular. 
5. Did the FHCI have a differential impact on different socioeconomic groups or 
marginalised groups? 
 
The evidence for changes to the gaps in coverage between socioeconomic groups from DHS data 
is encouraging for the period 2008 to 2013 (section 5.1). For almost all indicators inequalities 
reduced, and for some coverage is now either equal or even positively pro-poor (such as use of 
treated bed-nets for pregnant women, and childhood immunisation). The gap between 
geographical areas and wealth groups has narrowed for PNC. The growth in use of ITNs for under-
fives was particularly noticeable among those in rural areas and the bottom four wealth quintiles 
(this was not a direct component of the FHCI but may have been assisted by higher facility contact 
rates). The lowest wealth quintile group for child immunisation has seen the most improvements: 
before the FHCI rates were fairly even across groups but the latest figures show the bottom wealth 
quintile now has higher rates than others. Skilled attendance at delivery and facility deliveries 
remain a challenging area, as is the case in many low-resource settings globally. It is plausible that 
the FHCI has been a significant contributory factor to increasing facility deliveries at a faster rate 
for the lower wealth quintiles, although significant differences in coverage still remain in absolute 
terms. 
There have also been some improvements in equity across regions in terms of coverage of 
services. Eastern Region in particular showed great improvements moving from the worst region to 
the best during this period for treatment with antibiotics of children with ARI symptoms. This 
pattern for Eastern Region was also seen in improvements in malaria treatment for children. 
Combining analysis from the Poverty Profile with reported utilisation rates by district from the 
District Health Information System (DHIS) suggests interesting dynamics. In 2011, Moyamba was 
the second poorest district and had one of the highest proportions of rural households. However, it 
is generally reporting the largest use of Peripheral Health Unit (PHU) services. This would need 
further investigation before it is concluded that the FHCI is well targeted. However, the analysis of 
the Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey (SLIHS) 2011 also suggest more significant 
improvements in MCH care utilisation in rural areas compared to urban ones (Edoka et al., 2015). 
Western Area Urban shows the lowest level of poverty but, when combined with Western Area 
Rural, also some of the lowest levels of PHU service use. This may reflect higher use of the private 
sector and hospitals, and matches with evidence from our FGDs. 
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Analysis of per capita funding of health through local councils suggests relatively equal distribution 
(section 9.4). The same is true of performance-based financing (PBF) funds. However, other 
general health system resources such as staff are very unequally distributed, which is a long-
standing pattern. 
It is also possible to use HMIS data to look at the equality of utilisation by gender of children under 
five, although only from 2011 onwards (section 9.4). Overall, the ratio of girls to boys visiting a 
PHU for outpatient care has changed in the favour of girls since 2011: in that year slightly fewer 
girls visited a PHU than boys, whereas by 2013 it was slightly more. In 2011, girls in Bonthe visited 
facilities far less than boys (0.9:1) and in 2012 the same was true in Koinadugu (0.85:1). However, 
by 2013 more visits were by girls than boys in all districts other than Bombali. 
Other access barriers include physical ones, such as distance to facilities and the transport 
required to reach them. As indicated in the health system pillar analysis, there have been 
investments in improving infrastructure and referral systems, such as ambulances, and transport 
under the FHCI but distance and transport cost remain significant barriers, especially for remote 
communities. 
One study provides insights into access by disabled mothers, who might be expected to have 
greater difficulty reaching and using services. However, access to maternal care for disabled 
mothers was slightly higher than for non-disabled mothers. Access to ANC, a skilled birth attendant 
(SBA), a facility for delivery, use of condoms and emergency obstetric care were all roughly 
equally accessible. This does not indicate any change relating to the FHCI as we lack baseline 
data, but is an encouraging finding in relation to barriers for the disabled. 
In regard to disaggregated analysis of utilisation changes and OOP levels, initial results from 
ReBUILD suggest a mixed picture. Overall, they find no discernible impact of the FHCI on 
utilisation of health facilities and OOP expenditure for children under five, and this result holds 
when the sample is disaggregated for household location and median household expenditure. 
However, they do find a positive effect for utilisation of maternal services, particularly for women in 
rural areas. We should, though, note that this analysis relates to 2011 when the HMIS data show 
that the number of under-five consultations dropped dramatically after the initial surge. It is quite 
possible that if we had data for other years it would show a more optimistic picture. 
 
6. Were there any unintended consequences of the FHCI? 
We examined 10 possible unintended consequences of FHCI on the health system and society but 
only found evidence to support one of them, which was a squeeze on non-salary expenditure 
within the MoHS budget (section 7). 
One concern expressed by informants was that the policy would contribute to a rise in teenage 
pregnancies, presumably because of falling costs of maternal health care. However, the DHS data 
do not back this up. Fertility rates for 15 to 19 year olds fell from 146 per 1,000 women in 2008 to 
125 in 2013. All other age groups showed much smaller reductions in fertility. 
A second concern, and one which was expressed in some early reports on the FHCI, was that it 
had contributed to a drop in preventive services (through diversion of resources to curative care). 
However, analysis of the DHS data suggests that this has not been sustained beyond, for 
example, a known fall in community immunisation rates for children in the early months of the 
FHCI. 
It is also reasonable to monitor trends in utilisation of public services by non-targeted groups such 
as general adult outpatient visits and those for older children. However, while there might be some 
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risk of providers focussing on target groups, it seems more likely that general utilisation is driven 
by demand-side factors, and here the FHCI might have positive effects too, if funds are liberated to 
pay for non-target group members (as the household data hints). The lack of HMIS data before 
April 2011 has made it difficult to assess this issue completely and we do not know how relative 
utilisation rates changed in the year after the start of the initiative. However the trends from 2011 to 
2013 appear to show that the number of outpatient consultations has been rising for both FHCI 
and non-FHCI groups. 
On the positive side, it is possible that the FHCI could have had an impact in terms of women’s 
empowerment. Women in Sierra Leone face discrimination in virtually every aspect of their lives, 
with unequal access to education, economic opportunities and health care. Given their low status 
and lack of economic independence, women were rarely able to decide for themselves to go to a 
health care facility, whether for family planning, ANC, deliveries or emergency services, as such a 
decision was normally in the hands of the husband and often dependent on his assessment of 
whether they had or could raise sufficient money. However, we found no evidence that a strong 
shift in gender roles has occurred. 
Other changes to the health care market might be expected to result from the FHCI. For example, 
private and faith-based facilities will have had to respond to changing prices in the public sector, 
though this is mediated by perceptions of quality and convenience. There is qualitative evidence 
that the private sector continues to be important for health seeking, especially in the Western Area. 
In the DHS, there is virtually no change between 2008 and 2013 in terms of private sector use for 
delivery care: just over 2% of births take place in a non-government health facility in both years. 
In the informal sector, traditional birth attendants (TBAs) can no longer make the living they used 
to, although there is clear evidence from a number of sources that TBAs have been given the new 
role of linking communities and facilities, in part funded through the PBF funds at facility level. This is 
potentially a positive consequence, as it follows a wider global pattern of changes to the role of TBAs. 
Participants in our FGDs expressed confidence in the skills of TBAs and also reported using alternative 
services like ‘traditional healers’ because, according to them, they are cheap and the medication they 
provide works effectively. It seems overall, therefore, that other sectors remain resilient. 
A number of potential unintended financial consequences were also explored. One was that there 
might be a crowding out of other budget lines in the MoHS budget by the increase in salaries 
awarded in 2010, which was linked to the FHCI. Looking at a breakdown of MoHS expenditure, 
there were significant absolute and relative decreases in HR management, secondary, and tertiary 
expenditure in 2011, the first budget that included FHCI expenditure. This may reflect a declining 
non-payroll recurrent budget (with significant increases in the payroll budget). This is a risk that 
requires careful management, as expectations of continuing salary increases are easily 
established.  
Another concern was whether other programmatic areas were squeezed by the allocation of 
funding to the FHCI. There were large increases in funding to MCH in the 2011 budget. Although 
there was the potential for displacement of funding to vertical programmes through funding the 
FHCI, this does not seem to have materialised and in any case may have been minimised by some 
of this funding being off-budget and subject to existing donor programmes. MCH expenditure 
increased from 8% of non-salary recurrent MoHS expenditure in 2008 to 28% in 2014. 
Government prioritisation for drugs and medical supplies also increased greatly, doubling from 
2010 to 2014.  
Analysing National Health Accounts (NHA) data by type of expenditure shows that there were 
significant expenditure increases in public health programmes in 2010 (even in real terms). This 
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was most notably with respect to MCH, consistent with the FHCI, but also occurred in relation to 
malaria prevention. This latter finding is perhaps important giving the potential displacement effect 
of the FHCI on other health programmes. Inpatient expenditures also reduced, potentially 
suggesting better first-line treatment. 
A third financial concern related to the increasing salaries of health workers was that other public 
servants would demand similar increases (wage increase contagion to other sectors). While it is 
extremely hard to link the causes of salary decisions, aggregate data suggest there may be some 
cause for concern here. Wages have increased significantly in Sierra Leone since 2010, making up 
a growing share of the economy, from around 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 to a 
projected 7% of GDP in 2015. However, the increases do appear to be driven by other factors, 
such as the minimum wage, which was brought in in 2014. 
A final possible unintended consequence that was posited in advance as a potential risk was 
opportunistic responses by facility managers to the FHCI, which would include changing the prices 
for other services to cope with lower or more irregular funds for FHCI target groups. This was 
examined in the district KIIs, and no evidence found to support it. The PBF funds have acted to 
buffer the losses from FHCI. If they diminish or become more irregular, this risk would be likely to 
become more real again. 
7. Does the FHCI represent VfM generally? 
 
Cost of the FHCI 
The direct cost of the FHCI for large known items, as an increase on previous funding to similar 
groups, is around US$ 25 (2010) to US$ 40 million (2013). These are not far off the estimates 
provided by the MoHS in 2012. These are much higher at US$ 40–90 million if all additional 
expenditures on these groups are included (section 4.1). 
Direct financing of the FHCI (e.g. payroll, drugs, PBF) equated to an increase of an additional 
US$4 (2010) to US$ 6.2 (2013) per capita in government and donor funding. Broader indirect 
reproductive and child health (RCH) expenditure adds US$ 2.5 (2010) to US$ 8 (2013) per capita 
spend per year. 
Economy 
HR and drugs were the two largest expenditure items, accounting for about 50% and 30% of direct 
FHCI costs, and 25% and 15% of the broader increases in expenditure on RCH as a whole. 
For staffing, we cannot comment on changes but can say that doctors are very well paid now. 
Primary care doctors/DMOs and specialist doctors (public health) received closer to SLL 15million, 
or 52 times the average, and generalist/medical officers and public health sisters received close to 
SLL 5 million, which is 18 times the average (section 9.1). However, 78% of health workers 
providing reproductive or contraceptive services were either state enrolled community health 
nurses or MCH aides. They received between SLL 700,000 and 800,000 per month, between 2.4 
and 2.8 times the average income. The relative wages in comparison to average national income 
were more spread out in Sierra Leone, with doctors receiving much more and nurses receiving 
much less in Sierra Leone than Ghana. In 2013, 60% of general government expenditure on health 
(GGEH) was spent on health worker remuneration – up from 35% in 2008. 
Unit costs for drugs are not available for the pre-FHCI period. However, it appears that up to 76% 
of the drugs procured for the FHCI were available at a lower price elsewhere, indicating that 
greater economy could be achieved through stronger purchasing. 
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) xii 
Efficiency  
If outputs rise, as has been the case in Sierra Leone, then efficiency can be maintained or 
increased even as core input costs increase (section 9.2). In total, it is estimated that the cost of 
the FHCI rose from SLL 357 billion in 2010 to SLL 635 billion in 2013. Total expenditure on the 
FHCI per visit of all kinds fell from SLL 151,164 to SLL 106,606. This was equivalent to a fall from 
£22 to £16 per visit. However, the changing case mix (a shift toward less intensive activities such 
as ANC and relatively smaller increases in deliveries) may mean an increase in expenditure per 
hour of staff time. 
In relation to drugs, there are certainly improvements in efficiency that could be made to the public 
drug supply system. An independent assessment of the FHCI stock control in 2016 expressed 
grave concerns regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of logistical arrangements. It revealed 
poor storage and stock management, 6% missing stock and 31% of drugs expired or within six 
months of expiry. 
Cost-effectiveness 
Using the LiST tool, we estimate a likely marginal effect of between approximately 1,500 and 1,600 
maternal deaths averted over 2010 to 2013 due to coverage of key maternal health interventions 
being higher than it would have been if it had remained at 2009 values or if the pre-2009 trend line 
had continued (section 9.3). Assuming no change from 2008 DHS coverage values is more 
generous and results in an estimate of 1,900 maternal deaths averted. 
We estimate a likely marginal effect of between 6,300 and 7,600 newborn deaths averted over this 
four-year period. Assuming no change from 2008 DHS coverage values is much more generous 
and results in an estimate of 10,400 newborn deaths averted. 
We estimate a likely marginal effect of between 13,600 and 13,800 child deaths averted over this 
four-year period if only child interventions directly linked to the FHCI are included (i.e. curative 
interventions for which user fees were previously charged). The estimate is even higher at 
between 18,200 and 18,400 child deaths averted if ITN ownership and vaccinations are included 
(i.e. interventions that more under-fives receive because of increased health facility utilisation but 
that were actually already free). 
The cost per life year saved of the FHCI is between US$ 420 and US$ 444. This estimate uses the 
marginal cost, including the increase in all donor financing to RCH, and the more conservative 
assumptions for the maternal and newborn intervention coverage counterfactuals. 
In 2013, the GDP per capita in Sierra Leone was US$ 680 according to the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. On these thresholds, our estimates of cost per life year saved indicate 
that the FHCI was a very cost-effective intervention. These findings, though modelled, are 
consistent with the estimates generated by our outcome analysis. 
Sustainability 
Sustainability was examined in a number of domains, including financial, political and institutional 
(sections 4.1, 5 and 10). Donors have provided between 60% and 80% of the new funding to the 
FHCI, outside of household financing. The main funder for the FHCI’s direct costs is DFID, making 
up between 40% and 55% of new direct FHCI funding. Other important funding streams, such as 
PBF, are donor-dependent. These will only be sustainable with a mix of continued donor funding, 
large reprioritisation of government spending for health, additional resource mobilisation strategies 
and improved efficiency (including strengthening of public financial management (PFM) and 
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bringing more donor funding on-budget). Apart from some DFID and Global Fund support to 
salaries through budget support, much of the external financing in the sector is off-budget and 
outside public control. 
The changing composition of expenditure raises some concerns for sustainability, particularly in 
relation to expenditure on salaries, which has increased from 26% of the health budget in 2009 to 
49% in 2010 and 60% in 2013. While this remains within the international range for expenditure on 
salaries, it is on the high side and the trend cannot continue. Over the period, there has been a 
proportional reduction in expenditure on goods and service, and capital expenditure remains a 
small part of the budget (2% in 2013, though this was higher at 10% in 2010 and 16% in 2011, 
correlating with FHCI facility investments). In the last three years, foreign financing capital 
expenditure has made up over 95% of total budgeted capital expenditure. 
Other areas of concern in relation to sustainability include the dependence on short-term external 
technical assistance for some of the reforms described under the pillars. While this was effective in 
bringing in changes quickly, the concern is that momentum has slowed as these ‘enablers’ pull out, 
with the MoHS pursuing multiple priorities with limited staff. 
Political commitment to the FHCI remains strong – the policy is still a presidential flagship 
programme and there is strong public demand and expectation, such that reversing the policy 
would be extremely problematic. However, new areas of emphasis in the post-Ebola period raise 
the risk that improving and deepening the FHCI could be neglected. In addition, longer-term 
institutional challenges remain, such as establishing an effective new National Pharmaceutical 
Procurement Agency (NPPU), as well as strengthening the MoHS capacity overall. 
Conclusion 
Despite the difficulties with data and counterfactuals, we can say with confidence that the FHCI 
responded to a clear need in Sierra Leone, was well designed to bring about needed changes in 
the health system to deliver services to the target beneficiaries (under-fives, pregnant women and 
lactating mothers), and did indeed bring funds and momentum to produce some important 
systemic reforms. Underlying this achievement was strong political will, which has been sustained, 
enhanced donor cooperation, the deployment of supportive technical assistance, and consensus 
among stakeholders that the FHCI was significant and worth supporting. However, weaknesses in 
implementation have been evident in a number of core areas, such as drugs supply. 
We conclude with reasonable confidence that the FHCI was one important factor contributing to 
improvements in coverage and equity of coverage of essential services for mothers and children. 
Other important contributors have probably been the other RMNCH investments that would have 
continued in the absence of the FHCI and broader economic changes. Clearly Ebola in 2014/15 
also plays a major role in eroding previous gains. 
Whether the FHCI contribution fed through into improved health is less clear from the data, 
although there was a very sharp drop in under-five mortality associated with the start of the 
initiative. Modelled cost-effectiveness is high. However, it is important that efforts are made to 
monitor and very likely improve the quality of care provided in public facilities. In addition, there 
needs to be continued efforts to overcome residual barriers, including lack of transport and socio-
cultural barriers, to ensure gains are fairly distributed. On the supply side, efforts to improve the 
economy and efficiency of key resources – especially staffing and drugs – will be critical, as will 
addressing some of the harder-to-reach underlying systemic challenges, such as strengthening the 
MoHS and the devolved health functions at district level and improving PFM. The sustainability of 
the FHCI is not assured without such a focus and increased public investment in health care in 
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general. This requires the efforts of all stakeholders, including the development partners, to 
enhance performance and accountability in the sector. 
It is instructive to compare the FHCI with similar policies adopted in post-conflict countries in 
Africa, such as Burundi, and with neighbours such as Ghana. Both have prioritised free care for 
mothers and under-fives over the past decade. In the case of Burundi, like Sierra Leone, it used 
PBF funding to replace resources lost at facility level, with some success (at least until recent 
unrest), although the policy has not been systematically evaluated. In the case of Ghana, the use 
of a VAT levy to support the National Health Insurance Scheme enabled free care to be extended 
to all pregnant women in 2008. This provides some insights for Sierra Leone as it considers future 
financing options, though Ghana as a middle-income country is in a somewhat different position to 
Sierra Leone. 
What Sierra Leone attempted was more ambitious than both of those countries, in that it did not 
approach fee exemption as a ‘vertical programme’ focused solely on finance but understood that, 
for fee exemption to work, the whole health system had to be upgraded. This ambition, the 
relatively short preparation period (four months from announcement to implementation) and the 
weak starting point are part of the context in which our evaluation findings have to be situated, 
along with the subsequent shock of the Ebola epidemic. Our findings have relevance also for 
neighbours – for example, Burkina Faso, which in March 2016 has announced free care for 
pregnant women and children under five1. 
Recommendations 
The FHCI was a concerted effort to strengthen the overall health system, focusing on particular 
vulnerable target groups but potentially benefiting all. In this respect, there is one central 
recommendation, which is to renew and deepen that commitment by continuing the reforms 
that were started in 2010. The investment that is coming in to Sierra Leone – not just in financial 
terms but also wider political and technical support – can be harnessed to take this forward from 
both government and development partner sides. 
More specifically, we make the following recommendations, based on the evaluation findings. A 
number of these dovetail with recent plans, such as the Health Sector Recovery Plan 2015–2020 
(MoHS, 2015). 
1.1 Cross-cutting recommendations 
Bring a relentless focus to bear on quality of care. Quality of care drives perceptions of 
services as well as their effectiveness, and this review has highlighted the failure to focus on 
quality of care in the original FHCI, as well as before and since.  
 All recommendations here link to quality of care, which should be specifically built into each 
pillar. 
 Clear clinical standards and protocols for the basic package should be developed and 
incorporated into training to support the implementation of the basic package of essential 
health services; a critical component to roll out in support of this is supportive supervision. 
 Indicators to monitor technical quality of care are lacking and should be built into routine 
systems. 
 Indicators of responsiveness and respectful treatment should also be incorporated into 
surveys. 
                                               
1 http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article69912 
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 It would also be useful to repeat the EmONC needs assessment carried out in 2008 (UNFPA, 
2008) in order to assess progress in key domains. 
Address wider barriers to access. While there has been some reduction in household costs and 
some improvements in the supply of care, this review highlights the need to address other barriers 
too, such as engaging communities in supporting transport to facilities, spreading information 
about entitlements and the benefits of health services, and raising awareness of danger signs for 
women and children. A stronger inter-sectoral collaboration with other ministries such as the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs would be 
fruitful here. 
Deepen decentralisation. This includes long-term work around some of the structural PFM issues 
for funding of districts, including timeliness and capacity to report on funds. Strengthening the 
decentralised components could include both work to consolidate and improve PBF (with an 
examination of the governance roles at different levels), as well as strengthening capacity of 
DHMTs to plan, supervise and monitor donor and public programmes and close the policy-to-
practice gap. 
Strengthen community engagement. Community engagement is an important part of this 
process and has hitherto been weak. Our research indicated that there is a demand for this and a 
limited sense of engagement by communities at present in terms of the running of public health 
services. To ensure that future spending is well used, the mechanisms of local accountability 
should be reviewed and reinforced. The use of civil monitors was a useful innovation in the early 
days of the FHCI but appears, like many of the reforms, to have lost momentum since. There is a 
chance now for the lessons learned from communities’ engagement in the Ebola response to be 
applied to more mainstream health interventions, including to the FHCI. 
1.2 Governance 
Invest in institutional and leadership development of the MoHS to steward the policy and 
health system. Short-term measures, crises and Ebola have reduced the ability of the MoHS to be 
able to provide long-term leadership. While delivering on priority outputs for the population, all 
stakeholders should ensure they support institutional development in the MoHS and not undermine 
it through parallel programmes and systems. This balance is of course difficult, perhaps most 
apparent in the supply chain, where the necessity to get life-saving drugs to those in need 
confronts the more messy requirement of trying to work through GoSL procurement systems and 
the challenges these provide. However, while donors should continue to balance these concerns, 
there are easier actions that could also be achieved, for example through boosting planning 
capacity and the staffing, capacity and role of the health financing unit and the key directorates.  
The development of a health financing strategy is desirable to provide coherence between 
the FHCI and other policy strands. This should look at risk pooling, revenue raising and strategic 
purchasing, as well as how to improve the volatility of funding and institute mechanisms for funding 
facilities. Moreover, clear guidelines on residual charging policies at facility level, among other key 
areas, also need to be provided. 
Specifically on the FHCI, there needs to be better communication and planning between the 
Cabinet, MoFED and the MoHS, including clear leadership on the policy, estimates of its 
resource needs and financing, and a plan for taking the policy forward. Conversations have been 
held but not in a joined-up way with all of the key stakeholders in government. Whether the FHCI 
will be extended, whether it will be rolled out to other groups, whether other sectors (such as NGO 
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providers) will be included in the future – all of these matters require a clear forward plan, based on 
projected needs and resources, for which our fiscal space analysis can serve as a starting point. 
Introduce greater accountability. The focus for all parties should be on implementation and 
delivering agreed outputs. This applies to donors that have not delivered on their promised 
investments as much as NGOs, districts and government. Parties should agree plans and 
commitments, with incentives and sanctions incorporated. Information on funding and performance 
should be made open and transparent in order to encourage good performance. 
1.3 Health financing 
Provide additional funds to the health sector to reduce OOP spending. Sierra Leone is a low-
income post-conflict fragile state. Health is essential for strong economic growth and social 
development. The scale of household OOP expenditures is too high and the risk of catastrophic 
health expenditure must be brought down. Addressing the systemic problems with HR and 
provision of drugs and supplies are among the important ways to reduce the need for household 
OOP spending. 
Tax revenue collection is a priority and will continue to require reform over the next 10 
years. However, there is not expected to be a short-term fix for the lack of general domestic tax 
revenues for budgetary allocation to health and the FHCI. 
There is some evidence that earmarked taxes could be supported by the Sierra Leone public 
to fund health initiatives. Levies in support of the FHCI could be implemented as near-term 
solutions to the funding gap (there is certainly fiscal space for this, with a current tax-to-GDP ratio 
of 9%, compared to the low-income average of 17% or even the fragile state average of 14%). Five 
types have been analysed and three have potential in Sierra Leone: sin taxes (earmarked taxes on 
tobacco and/or alcohol), withholding taxes (in this case taxes on contracts) and an airline 
levy. More focused research would need to be carried out to provide country-specific industry risks 
and sensitivity analysis on the levels of tax deemed appropriate before one was chosen to be 
implemented. As it stands, however, the withholding tax being considered for implementation will 
not cover FHCI costs. The issue of how it is to be managed and used also requires more 
discussion and agreement between stakeholders. 
There are not enough domestic resources to pay for the requirements of the FHCI, or UHC, 
in the next 10 years so continued and increased donor support is needed. Over the next 
decade Sierra Leone is projected to remain a low-income country. Trends suggest that Sierra 
Leone’s proportion of donor monies to GDP is less than the average low-income country receives. 
As serious health plans have been established, the implementation of these will require external 
funding over the foreseeable future. Without external support the FHCI is unlikely to continue 
effectively. 
However, there is also a strong argument for improving PFM to encourage on-budget 
external funding. Notwithstanding fiduciary concerns regarding MoHS systems, given the extent 
of external funding over the foreseeable future efforts must be made to build local financial 
management systems where possible. If this does not mean actually putting funds through the 
GoSL budget, other hybrid solutions such as using common and mutually agreed indicators for 
release of funding and using GoSL supply and procurement systems for donor-financed goods 
should proactively be explored. 
Provide more flexible financing to the local level. Issues with central MoFED/MoHS allocations 
and weaknesses in drug supply have meant that local facilities struggle to access enough flexible 
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resources to be able to ensure continuous service delivery. PBF is a good start in terms of 
enhancing this flexibility and autonomy at local level, and despite difficulties should be 
strengthened, sustained and eventually expanded. However, plans to expand the number of 
indicators significantly seems risky, and represent an added burden on weak monitoring systems.  
There is a need for investment in improving data on health financing so these 
recommendations for sustainable financing can be fine-tuned to the Sierra Leone health and fiscal 
environment. In particular, two areas stand out: 
 Improved M&E for capturing the true costs of the FHCI; and 
 Improved methods for measuring OOP payments. 
1.4 Planning, monitoring and evaluation 
The FHCI belongs in the MoHS and while its scope does warrant a whole health system – and 
hence MoHS – approach, this policy should continue to be led at the RCH Directorate level or 
be clearly housed in a MoHS directorate that takes ownership of it. This ownership is essential 
considering the complexity of the policy and the difficulties in its implementation. The renewed 
coordination with health implementation partners and donors brought about by the Ebola outbreak 
could support the MoHS in its effort to lead the continued and renewed support for the FHCI.  
The main challenge in terms of M&E is to develop and implement a robust and 
comprehensive M&E strategy for health. This should include the monitoring of the whole results 
chain (inputs, outputs, outcomes) and also specifically those strategic areas where data have been 
weak until now, i.e. quality of care, staffing, drugs and financing. This will be important to assist in 
evaluating future health system reforms. The M&E strategy should cover the following key areas: 
 Consultation with key data users on what to collect and how frequently; 
 Improving the quality and coherence of the various data sources; 
 Publishing and distributing health data analysis in user-friendly formats such as dashboards of 
indicators, regular health bulletins and more extensive research and analysis; and 
 Increasing the demand for and use of health information, particularly through health sector 
reviews and accountability processes. 
1.5 HR 
Improve the management of the payroll, bringing people who are recruited into the system in a 
more timely way and ensuring that the payroll remains up to date without the need for periodic 
externally led cleaning exercises, such as have happened repeatedly over the last decade. 
External consultants have been tasked with making the payroll more locally manageable – this 
needs to be a priority. 
Decentralisation of HR functions to the district level is needed to ensure greater 
responsiveness to district needs and a greater ability to performance manage staff effectively. 
At the same time, HR management capacity at central level should urgently be 
strengthened to allow the MoHS to lead the process of reforms that are planned (including new 
HR strategies, modelling of HR needs, development of a scheme of service, an HR information 
system, improved communication with staff, and review of training needs and standards). The 
HRH Directorate has very few staff and remains dependent on external support. 
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Given the inequalities in distribution of staff and staff shortfalls in some key cadres, the MoHS 
should develop integrated and sustainable packages to retain qualified staff in remote 
areas and in shortage cadres (or those with high attrition levels, such as midwives), including 
accommodation, remote allowances and access to training opportunities.  
There also needs to be a clearer definition of the role and funding of the different types of 
staff and close-to-community providers such as TBAs and CHWs, whose role and 
remuneration is being managed in an ad hoc way at facility level. As a part of this, there needs to 
be clarity on how they function in relation to existing cadres such as MCH aides. 
Revising training policies for existing and new staff, including revising curricula and 
strengthening training institutions (including to improve staff ability to control infectious diseases, 
as illustrated in the Ebola epidemic) is another challenge facing the MoHS. This was put on the 
back-burner during the launch of the FHCI and work during Ebola around IPC should continue to 
be prioritised. Linked to this could be an assessment of staff competences and support for 
continuous professional development, which are lacking to date. This would help to rebuild 
confidence in the health staff and system among communities. 
Supportive supervision should be promoted and resourced, not only to motivate and support 
staff but also to ensure they are responsive and respectful to their clients, and to reduce 
incidences of informal charging. This would address a complaint that was frequently made in our 
community research, especially in relation to nurses. Streamlining supervision and reporting will 
also be important, given the limited staffing at facilities and the time that such reporting takes. 
1.6 Infrastructure, drugs and supplies 
Urgent investment is needed to bring key health infrastructure up to acceptable standards 
and maintain it – not just in terms of capital spend, which has been highlighted as low in recent 
years, but also to enable flexible funding at facility level to cover routine maintenance costs. This 
should include continuing to increase the number of EmONC facilities and upgrading PHUs, as 
well as addressing all seven ‘enablers’ – especially water and electricity.  
Connect rural health posts with district hospitals and improve the referral system by 
reconditioning dozens of Ebola ambulances donated by aid agencies, and continuing to 
explore the feasibility of a national ambulance service. 
Implement a ‘pull’ system across all hospitals and PHUs to reduce the likelihood of stock-outs 
of drugs and medical supplies. This should be complemented by a timely delivery of commodities 
from the port to CMS and from CMS to DMS. Even with a ‘pull’ system in place, stock-outs will still 
occur if commodities are not available at key distribution points and transport systems do not work. 
Support the simplification of forms to be filled in by hospitals and PHUs. CHAI has designed 
forms for each type of facility (MCHP, CHP, CHC and hospitals), so that they reflect the drugs and 
medical supplies for the type of services they provide. A new LMIS system (‘M Supply’) is also 
being piloted, which seems to be addressing some of the issues identified in CHANNEL. 
Investment in developing an effective monitoring system is essential for an adequate 
management of the supply chain at all levels. 
Build adequate storage facilities and ensure the SOP Manual is implemented. The manual 
developed by UNICEF is comprehensive and although it would need to be updated to reflect 
changes in the LMIS system it follows WHO standards for drugs storage and for stock and quality 
monitoring. A first step could be enforcing the FEFO policy so as to minimise wastage. 
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Allocate a fixed budget for the supply chain. Lack of or sporadic funding leads to variability in 
the timeliness of procurement and, ultimately, to stock-outs. Both GoSL and donors (until GoSL 
has sufficient capacity) need to make fixed financial commitments to fund the supply chain and 
ensure a continuous supply of commodities to hospitals and PHUs. Budget allocations from 
government will eventually allow for the new NPPU to fully take over. The new NPPU will require 
transparent governance and sufficient human and financial capacity to function effectively. 
1.7 Communications 
Since a lack of communication can have a negative impact on the success of any policy, it is 
recommended that a communications budget is allocated at the very start of any future 
reform. While an original budget of US$ 3 million was promised, it was not forthcoming and this 
hampered the breadth of communication activities. Since then, the energy to support 
communication has dwindled.  
Communications need to be integrated across all initiatives and a longer-term approach to 
information, education and communication developed. The understanding of communication 
activities as linked to a specific activity that has been seen so far in relation to the FHCI neglects 
the need for broader communication capacity at national and DHMT levels to address disease 
outbreaks and chronic health challenges, such as non-communicable diseases.  
Engaging the implementers and addressing their concerns should always precede 
communication to the public. The FHCI was communicated to the population before it was 
communicated to health workers. This was a grave mistake because, as a result of this misstep 
and due to a lack of understanding of the reform, health workers went on strike – such a situation 
would not be repeated were communications initiatives given due importance. 
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2 Introduction 
2.1 Objectives 
The removal of user fees in Sierra Leone in April 2010 for pregnant women, lactating mothers and 
children under five, referred to as the FHCI, has attracted enormous political attention at the 
national and international level. The UK government provided financial, technical and political 
support to the FHCI throughout the preparation and implementation stages of the reform. 
Evaluating the impact of this support as well as the reform itself is therefore crucial. 
The HEART/OPM team has been working on this review since April 2014. This final report 
presents all analysis undertaken, final conclusions and recommendations. 
2.2 Background 
The President of Sierra Leone introduced the FHCI for pregnant women, lactating mothers and 
children under five in April 2010. This targeted removal of user fees was supported by earlier 
evidence (MoHS, 2008) that showed health-related financial costs were a major deterrent to 
mothers and children using health services in Sierra Leone, a fact consistent with evidence at the 
international level. 
Higher levels of utilisation of health service by mothers and children have been reported (MoHS, 
2011; Maxmen, 2013) since the introduction of the FHCI. To date, the relationship between 
changes in the uptake of services and the FHCI has not yet been fully researched or evidenced. 
Moreover, whether the FHCI (and a series of supporting health systems strengthening reforms) is 
translating into saved lives and improved health outcomes among mothers, newborns and children 
has yet to be assessed. This review is meant to fill this knowledge gap. 
2.2.1 What is free health care in Sierra Leone? 
As was noted above, the FHCI was launched in April 2010 by the President of Sierra Leone in 
response to high maternal and child mortality rates, which were among the worst in the world. The 
programme aimed to make health services free at the point of delivery for the target populations of 
expectant and lactating mothers and children under five years of age. It aimed to treat up to 
230,000 pregnant women, 230,000 lactating women and 1 million children under five every year, 
saving lives and improving health outcomes (GoSL, 2009a) . 
The programme was complemented by seven ‘supply-side’ interventions intended to strengthen 
health services in order to meet the additional demand created (see Box 1). 
  
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 2 
Box 1:  The FHCI and its seven supporting health system interventions 
 Drugs and medical supplies: The continuous availability of equipment, drugs, and other 
essential commodities; 
 Health workforce: Adequate number of qualified health workers; 
 Governance: Strengthened and effective oversight and management arrangements;  
 Infrastructure: Adequate infrastructure to deliver services; 
 Communication with the general public: More and better information, education and 
communication to stimulate demand for free high-quality health services; 
 M&E: A comprehensive M&E system;  
 Financing: Sufficient funds to finance the FHCI. 
 
In sum, the FHCI constitutes a package of interventions, namely user fee removal (the core 
intervention) augmented by seven2 supporting intervention areas that seek to strengthen vital 
areas of the health system’s function and delivery. 
Two features of the FHCI in Sierra Leone are particularly important to note:  
First, from the outset a more comprehensive approach was taken to realising it, i.e. not just 
focusing on announcing the end of charging at the point of use (as had happened in some 
countries of the region) but also working from an early stage on some of the health system support 
measures that would be required to respond to greater patient demand, and thereby deliver 
results. The fact that the FHCI was a more comprehensive approach implies a degree of foresight 
and innovation that may influence results. Health system strengthening efforts illustrated via 
activities undertaken in the ‘seven pillar’ areas will be examined to assess how the various 
components work together, and whether this systemic approach is effective and illustrates 
important explanatory variables that influence the attainment of results. Moreover, findings and 
lessons from the FHCI will be compared and contrasted to user fee removal experiences in other 
countries, including where hand-in-hand efforts to strengthen health service supply have been less 
forthcoming. 
Second, unlike the cases of some other free health care reforms in the region and, indeed, 
previous reform attempts in Sierra Leone,3 the FHCI was able to capitalise on donor support and 
assistance, reinforcing political will. The combination of these two factors has led to the FHCI 
catalysing a rolling programme of reform. This has substantial implications for the evaluation: in 
this case, what is being evaluated is not a one-off change but rather a rolling series of health 
system reforms. These can then be linked to changes in outputs and outcomes – as a package – 
rather than as individual actions. Using a contribution analysis approach, factors driving the 
process and barriers/facilitators have been identified from the chronology and tracked (2010–
2015), with findings corroborated or triangulated against other available relevant data sources.  
2.3 The evaluation questions 
Assessing the impact of the FHCI has been defined as answering, to the extent possible, the 
following evaluation questions: 
 What contributions to health outcomes, among the target groups, did the FHCI make and how 
were these achieved? 
                                               
2 Although the original MoHS policy reform papers talk about ‘six pillars’, there were in effect seven working groups created, including 
financing. 
3 There was an attempt to eliminate user fees in Sierra Leone in 2005, which failed because the government could not enforce the law 
and informal fees replaced formal ones (Scharff, 2012). 
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 Does the FHCI represent VfM generally, and specifically in terms of disability-adjusted life 
years (DALYs), lives saved/deaths averted, and illnesses treated? 
 How and to what extent were the six priority interventions that were put in place effective in 
enabling the FHCI to be operationalised? 
 Are the six priority interventions the right ones to ensure continued and increased utilisation of 
services by the target beneficiaries? 
 What are the socio-cultural issues that affect the uptake of free health care among the target 
beneficiaries? 
 Did the FHCI have a differential impact on different socioeconomic groups or marginalised 
groups? 
 Were there any unintended consequences of the FHCI? 
To do this, research methods and study designs were developed in 2013/14 and further refined 
based on observed data quality and availability.  
2.4 Research methods 
The research methods have been described at length in the inception report. However, some 
amendments to the original methodology proposed have become necessary, for example as a 
result of lack of data or poor quality data.  
2.4.1 The ToC for the FHCI 
The intention of the FHCI is clear. Health-related financial costs have been identified by target 
groups as a major reason for suboptimal use of health services; therefore, providing free health 
care to these target groups should increase their access to health care, which in turn is expected 
to reduce morbidity and mortality. This logic underpins the ToC driving this evaluation. 
Figure 1 illustrates the ToC that has been used to review the FHCI as a whole. The FHCI results 
pathway (i.e. the middle column) illustrates relationships and progression in a linear manner. Of 
course, the health system is not a simple linear process and often different aspects of ‘outputs’ and 
‘outcome’ can be circular over time, which is recognised implicitly by the framework. The FHCI is 
identified through the funding at input level and the increased patient throughput at output level. 
The package of seven complementary interventions is identified in terms of their implementation at 
process level and results at output level. The health system pillars are unpacked in more detail in 
the evaluation matrix (see Annex B). The overall impact is taken to be the saving of lives of 
mothers and children, across all income groups but especially the poor, together with both the 
reality and perception that the policy is appropriate and fair to all. Factors identified as part of the 
‘policy process and drivers’ in Figure 1 are considered ingredients that vitally support and drive 
results attainment. To the contrary, other factors identified as ‘risks’ will inhibit or block results 
attainment. The action of these ‘push/pull’ factors will be closely examined over the duration of the 
evaluation because they are key explanatory variables that define the operating context within 
which the FHCI is being implemented, and the extent to which results are achieved. It is also 
important to consider other explanations (beyond the FHCI) that may also account for observed 
‘impacts’. 
 
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 4 
Figure 1: Evaluation ToC
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In order to achieve the goals of the FHCI, the basic prerequisites are as follows: 
1. The FHCI is being implemented: This means that health services are free at the point of use 
to eligible target groups. Corruption or rent-seeking behaviour can damage the reputation of 
the system and weaken support among the general public and development partners. 
2. Availability of key inputs: The right staff, in the right numbers, in the right places, with the 
right equipment and drugs, and a minimum level of funding to be able to operate, at the right 
time, with the right management and oversight, in order to meet the needs of those seeking 
health services. Put simply, quality health service provision is required in order to reduce 
mortality and morbidity. 
3. Addressing other barriers: Other social, cultural, knowledge and physical barriers to 
treatment are overcome, including any additional and/or perceived costs.4  
4. Commitment and governance: Political will, managerial skill and effective prioritisation of 
scarce resources is needed, not just at the start of a change process but continuously so as to 
secure improvements year on year, and at different levels of the system.  
5. Minimal unintended consequences: For example, teenage pregnancies do not increase as a 
consequence of readily available free health care (i.e. given teenage pregnancies are a risk 
factor for complicated deliveries and maternal death).  
The linkages, relations and assumptions along this pathway (including result ‘drivers’ and 
‘inhibitors’) have been tested and analysed, not only by triangulating internal evidence and logic 
but also by corroboration with what is known and established from other evaluations and relevant 
research in the wider literature. Details of the progress in each of the areas will be highlighted in 
the ‘unpacking effects’ sections of the report (Sections 5 and 6).  
This review is testing: 
 Whether the expected results occurred; 
 Whether we have evidence for the links in the ToC chain moving in the directions predicted; 
and 
 Whether there is plausible connection from these links to actions triggered by the FHCI, taking 
into account other possible contributory factors. 
While the different nodes are potentially important in terms of producing the outcomes and 
impacts, we should note that many have their own intrinsic value too and we should therefore not 
be reductionist in our assessment. A reduction in OOP payments, for example, or enhanced 
awareness of the need to seek medical health in specific circumstances, are valuable in their own 
right, even if barriers at other points in the chain prevent their full impact on mortality at this point in 
time. 
2.5 Design 
The design reflects the decision that the team would be reviewing the impact of the FHCI. Although 
initially established as an impact evaluation, it was agreed that an experimental or quasi-
experimental design that compares the impact of the FHCI on maternal and child mortality and 
health outcomes could not be conducted. From a feasibility perspective, the intervention was 
introduced in 2010, and simultaneously at national scale, which means the opportunity for an 
‘intervention’ and ‘control’ comparison was not possible. 
                                               
4 See ‘Barriers to the Utilisation of Maternal and Child Health Services in Africa’ (a paper produced as part of the inception phase 
activities by the FHCI evaluation team). 
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Nonetheless, it was deemed possible to conduct a review to examine how, and to what extent, the 
FHCI has contributed to saving lives and improving health among target groups. The design we 
are using is that of a mixed evaluation that triangulates evidence using a blend of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. This means: 
 Using a pre-/post-evaluation design: where we were able to obtain sufficient time series data 
before and after the introduction of the FHCI we used interrupted time series methods. This 
approach imputes the counterfactual from modelled data and draws causal inferences, to the 
extent possible, based on trend data. Where time series data are more sparse, we used 
simpler methods to analyse the trends before and after 2010 and assess the impact of the 
FHCI. Poor data availability and/or quality (especially related to the HMIS pre-2010) have 
constrained the extent to which we were able to conduct this type of analysis as much as we 
originally planned. In these instances, we rely on simple before/after analysis or analysis of 
post-FHCI trends. These methods require much stronger assumptions to claim a causal impact 
of the FHCI; we will therefore have to rely more strongly on qualitative methods for assessing 
contribution. 
 Theory-based evaluation: The theory-based evaluation relies on contribution analysis to test 
the evidence, logic and assumptions around the ToC. In this way, if/how the FHCI has made a 
notable contribution to observed mortality and morbidity levels among target users is 
examined. The proposed evaluation matrix (see Annex B) sets out the areas within the 
intervention logic model that will be examined, how they will be measured, and via what 
methods. The links and interactions between these multiple ‘building blocks’ have been 
explored (Marchal et al., 2013). 
This hybrid evaluation design has generated different strands of evidence that can be triangulated 
to draw inferences about the contribution of the FHCI to saving women’s and children’s lives and 
strengthening the health system in Sierra Leone. 
2.5.1 Overview of research tools and sources 
A summary of data sources is given in Box 2 below. These are mapped to the different evaluation 
domains in more detail in the evaluation matrix in Annex B, which also links to different sections of 
our report for the findings. The only element not described in the inception report is the fiscal space 
analysis, which was added to assist with forward planning later in the evaluation process. 
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Box 2:  Main data sources 
For service coverage, morbidity and mortality, we have used a mixture of household survey data and 
administrative data. The main survey used is the DHS, two rounds of which were conducted in 2008 and 
2013. A similar survey was also conducted in 2009: the District Health Services Baseline Survey 
(DHSBS). 
The administrative data comes from the HMIS. This uses the DHIS2 to collate and store the information. 
The data are collected from monthly forms that each health facility completes. 
Financial data comes from the MoHS, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) and 
Ministry of Local Government sources, as well as the NHA and interviews. A fiscal space analysis was 
undertaken – for details of the methodology, see (OPM 2016b). The core of the fiscal space analysis 
takes the form of a ‘funding gap analysis’, under scenarios of ‘business as usual’ and ‘maximised fiscal 
space’. The analysis is underpinned by a macroeconomic framework to project forward key economic, 
fiscal and health funding variables (health here refers to both the FHCI and universal health care 
(UHC)). We embed the results of the quantitative projections of fiscal space for health within a discussion 
of health and macroeconomic policy in Sierra Leone. 
The business as usual scenario projects health financing from the current policies and plans. The 
maximised fiscal space scenario assumes that the GoSL adopts policies to prioritise health to meet 
resource needs over the next 10 years. Four policy options are discussed: increased government 
allocations to health (including mandatory health insurance), implementation of an earmarked levy for 
health, efficiency savings, and borrowing. 
Cost-effectiveness is modelled using the LiST tool. Annex F contains an explanation of the methodology.  
We also undertook 137 KIIs (see Annex C), as well as reviewed all available documentation pertaining to 
each of the health systems pillars under analysis. A rapid literature review of regional experiences was 
also undertaken to set the Sierra Leonean experience in context. 
A series of FGDs was undertaken in four districts to collect the community perspective on the FHCI (see 
Table 1 below), as well as interviews of health workers and managers in those same four districts at 
facility level (see Table 2 below for further details). 
We also report on regression analysis conducted by the ReBUILD group, whose methods are reported in 
draft papers (Edoka et al. 2015). 
Table 1: Distribution of FGDs by participant category, district and region 
Source: Review of the FHCI in Sierra Leone – Focus Group Discussion report (OPM and Focus 1000, 2016) 
Region District 
Young people  
( 18–24yrs) 
Adult females  
(25+yrs) 
Adult male 
(25+yrs) 
Community 
leaders 
Total 
West Western Area 3 3 3 3 12 
East Kono 3 3 3 3 12 
North Koinadugu 3 3 3 3 12 
South Bo 3 3 3 3 12 
Total FGDs 12 12 12 12 48 
Total participants 90 85 87 89 351 
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Table 2: Type and distribution of district interviews 
 Bo Koinadugu Kono Western Area 
Local council 1 1 1 1 
District Health 
Management Team 
(DHMT) 
1 1 2 1 
Hospital 2 1 1 2 
Community Health Post 
(CHP) 
1 2 1 2 
Community Health Centre 
(CHC) 
4 3 2 2 
MCH Post  2 2 1 
Civil society 1 1 1  
Drug store   1  
 10 11 11 9 
2.6 Note on data limitations and how they were addressed 
In addition to the caveats on design noted in the inception report (Witter et al., 2014), a number of 
additional limitations emerged in the course of the review. These included the following. 
Our examination of the quantitative data sources, particularly the HMIS and DHS, showed more 
data-quality problems than we were expecting (see Annex E for details). This has restricted the 
range of analyses that we could do and the conclusions that we could draw. 
1. The HMIS had the following issues: 
 The micro data from before April 2011 have been lost. 
 An independent review by Options Consultancy (2015) showed that, in many cases, there were 
significant inconsistencies between the data recorded in the database and the actual situation 
recorded in health facility registers. 
 Although overall response rates for HMIS are high, with over 90% of facilities reporting each 
month, the level of non-response for individual variables is much higher. The sample of 
facilities and variables we checked showed missing values for between 20% and 40% of 
cases. 
These weaknesses mean we can only look at pre-2011 HMIS trends using the few tables that have 
already been published. In addition, results from the HMIS analysis need to be triangulated with 
other sources before we can draw conclusions. 
2. The DHS had particular quality concerns in the 2008 survey. These are evident from the 
distributions of ages of the participants in the survey, which do not match the known population 
profiles from the census. The problems arose from poor supervision of the fieldwork, and it is 
likely that this is the reason for the apparent inconsistent results between the 2008 and 2013 
rounds in, for example, the area of child mortality. 
As a result of the weaknesses in the 2008 DHS, we have focused on the 2013 DHS as our main 
source. We have only used the 2008 survey where necessary, for example to look at changes in 
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relation to equity issues using the disaggregations by wealth quintile and where the 2008 survey is 
judged the best available baseline. 
3. Concerns about the accuracy of NHA data, especially for household expenditure, which could 
suggest biases in opposing directions (see Box 3).  
Box 3:  Limitations of sector trend analysis using NHA data 
The expenditure data for the sector analysis in the report have certain limitations, and caution should be 
exercised in their interpretation. Issues affecting the NHA trend analysis include: 
1) The three sets of NHA data (2004–2006, 2007–2010 and 2011–2013) use different methodologies 
and vary in their scope and quality.  
2) NHA data for 2011 and 2012 are not yet available and thus estimated annualised growth rates 
were used for these years, potentially missing any yearly variation. 
3) Household expenditure changes are largely a reflection of price movements, with figures in the 
NHA for 2005 to 2010 taken from the 2004 Living Standards Survey and adjusted for inflation (the 
2013 NHA uses the 2011 Living Standards Survey). Therefore, any change in donor or GoSL 
financing that is different to inflation will automatically change the composition of health 
expenditure in the sector. 
4) Expenditure figures for GoSL in 2004 to 2006 are three times higher than government accounts 
report for those years, which are more in line with 2007–2013 NHA data. If these NHA figures are 
not correct, and the NHA reports do not comment on this anomaly, it artificially suggests a 
slowdown in health expenditure pre-FHCI for the period 2004–2009. This would therefore 
overestimate the change that FHCI created when comparing 2004–2009 trends with post-2010 
trends. 
5) Anecdotal evidence suggests the quality of the NHA in the period 2007–2010 is limited, with some 
suggestions that double counting occurred. This would suggest that the increase in expenditure 
post-2010 is underestimated. 
There is also missing data for donor expenditure in 2008; for example, two large donors – the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the Global Fund – are missing entries for NHA expenditure. This 
therefore artificially suggests a large rise in expenditure between 2008 and 2009 pre-FHCI, thus limiting 
comparisons with post-FHCI trends. 
We have retained and used these data sources but with appropriate triangulation of results, where 
possible, and cautious interpretation.  
In addition, there were data sources that we hoped to use but which were simply not available for a 
variety of reasons. Issues surround this included the following: 
 Some of the quality of care indicators, which were not available in the HMIS or other sources, 
had to be replaced by more qualitative assessments of changes to quality of care.  
 The same is true of staff competence – there are no national sources for this indicator, which 
cannot therefore be integrated into our analysis and constitutes an important gap. 
 We planned to integrate findings from a PhD thesis on informal payments but due to Ebola that 
PhD was transferred to another setting. 
 We had also hoped to use the data collected by the Health For All Coalition (HFAC). The data 
provided by HFAC were very incomplete both in terms of the months and modules covered. 
The figures also did not match published tables and included very erratic and unlikely trends 
that could not be explained.  
A third type of limitation to note is the assumptions that are built into particular models. In 
particular, for the LIST tool, inbuilt assumptions of the effectiveness of core maternal, newborn and 
child health (MNCH) interventions are used to convert coverage to outcome changes. These are 
based on international literature. In the absence of Sierra Leonean evidence, we have used these. 
However, they may overstate gains if the quality of care provided is below expected levels to 
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ensure effectiveness (as suggested by the evidence of this evaluation). The infeasibility of 
disaggregating DHS coverage data for under-five interventions into individual years also meant 
that we could not do incremental trend analysis here (despite this being important for the LiST 
model counterfactual). Box 4 sets out further details on the limitations relating to the cost-
effectiveness estimates. 
Box 4:  Limitations of the cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) 
There are two key limitations to the CEA. First, drawing boundaries around what interventions—and their 
associated costs and outcomes—are, or are not, linked to the FHCI is challenging. Our approach is to try 
to ensure that what is included on the cost side is matched on the effect side; however, this is inevitably 
determined to some extent by the available cost and outcome data. 
Second, limitations to data sources on both the costs and outcomes of the FHCI means that the true 
incremental costs and effects of the FHCI are difficult to isolate. The lack of 2011 and 2012 NHA data is 
the key limitations on the cost side. On the effect side, coverage data is used to model the effect on 
maternal, newborn and child mortality using the LiST. It is important to acknowledge that LiST is a tool that 
allows for the modelling of impact, not the actual estimation of impact using data on the impact variables 
and an appropriate impact evaluation technique. The conclusions that can be drawn from such an 
exercise are different from those that could be drawn from an actual impact evaluation. It is also worth 
highlighting a few key limitations of LiST: 
 LiST uses inbuilt assumptions about the effectiveness of MNCH interventions to convert increased 
coverage estimates to mortality reductions. These are based on international literature. In the 
absence of evidence from Sierra Leone, we have used these. However, they may overstate gains 
if the quality of care provided is below expected levels to ensure effectiveness.  
 Family planning is a difficult intervention to model in terms of maternal lives saved. This is 
essentially because of lack of data on abortion practices. We take the approach of modelling 
maternal deaths averted in the context of the increased contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) of 
Sierra Leone from 2008 to 2013. To the extent that the FHCI contributed to the increase in family 
planning over the period (family planning was free before 2010 but increased utilisation of health 
facilities by women of reproductive age likely increased its use), we are therefore underestimating 
the demographic impact of the FHCI on maternal deaths.  
Finally on the effect side, there are important limitations to the DHS data used to estimate increases in 
coverage due to the FHCI. Incremental trend analysis cannot be undertaken for the child interventions and 
for a number of the maternal and newborn interventions. This is because the recall variable for the 
indicator is too short to allow for annual disaggregation of the data. When incremental trend analysis is 
possible, the gradient of the projected counterfactual line is very sensitive to the jump in coverage 
estimates between 2008 and 2009. This is the point between the two rounds of the DHS and is more likely 
a product of data quality problems in one or both surveys and not a real increase at this point. 
There is therefore inevitably some uncertainty around our estimates. A sensitivity analysis is performed to 
understand how the estimate changes when some key assumptions are varied. Comparison with other 
reductions in mortality estimates are also made to understand whether the modelled estimates are 
credible in terms of their level. However, it should be acknowledged that not all our assumptions can be 
tested, and the point estimates for the cost-effectiveness ratio should therefore be interpreted within this 
understanding. 
 
The fiscal space analysis is presented in more detail in terms of its methods and assumptions in a 
separate report (OPM, 2016b). In particular, it lays out assumptions relating to future revenue flows 
and to the expected costs of the FHCI.  
2.7 Approach of this report 
In order to understand the changes introduced by the FHCI, an understanding of the health system 
prior to its launch is needed. The report starts by describing health indicators and the health 
system in Sierra Leone before 2010. It then gives a narrative for the launch of the FHCI, including 
the preparatory activities in the run-up to April 2010. A chronology of changes under the different 
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health systems pillars is provided, examining for each the key changes, their implementation and 
effectiveness, and what challenges remain. This is summarised across the pillars. The analysis 
then returns to the ToC framework to discuss drivers and inhibitors and contributory factors. The 
report addresses changing outputs, outcomes, impacts and VfM. In the conclusions we highlight 
the summary judgements generated by our data in relation to evaluation questions. This section is 
followed by the recommendations that arise for the FHCI and the broader strengthening of Sierra 
Leone’s health system in the current post-Ebola phase. 
This report integrated findings from all study components. However, more detailed sub-reports are 
available and can be consulted. These include: 
 Evaluation of the FHCI – Inception Report (OPM, 2014) 
 Witter, S., Wurie, H. and Bertone, M. (2014) The Free Health Care Initiative: how has it 
affected health workers in Sierra Leone? Report for ReBUILD 
https://rebuildconsortium.com/media/1014/the-free-health-care-initiative-how-has-it-affected-
health-workers-in-sierra-leone.pdf 
 Review of the FHCI in Sierra Leone – Focus Group Discussion report (OPM and Focus 1000, 
2016) 
 Review of the FHCI in Sierra Leone – Facility-based interviews at district level (OPM, 2016a) 
 Review of the FHCI in Sierra Leone – Fiscal space analysis report (OPM, 2016b) 
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3 The starting point: Challenges for the health system in 
Sierra Leone prior to the FHCI 
Assessing the impact of the FHCI requires a detailed understanding of what the health situation in 
the country was prior to the implementation of the reform. Having identified the key areas upon 
which the government focused its intervention (health financing, HRH, drugs and medical supplies, 
governance, infrastructure, communication and M&E), we have also analysed the state of each of 
these pillars prior to the implementation of the FHCI.  
3.1 Overall timeline prior to the FHCI announcement 
The decade prior to the FHCI’s announcement 
    
2001  Ten-year civil war ends  
2002 
 The government adopted a presidential decree that exempts 
pregnant and lactating women (and certain other groups) from 
having to pay for health care. However, these exemptions were not 
implemented in practice and costs continued to be a major barrier 
to accessing health care 
 
2004 
 The process of decentralisation of functions from the MoHS to 
district-level bodies begins  
2008 
 February 2008: the President endorsed a RCH Strategic Plan to 
reduce maternal, under-five and infant mortality rates by 30% 
between 2005 and 2015. The main elements were as follows: 
 significantly increasing the number of trained health staff; 
 ensuring that facilities have essential equipment and are 
functioning; 
 increasing the utilisation of RCH services; 
 ensuring that appropriate laws, regulations and guidelines 
are developed and enforced; 
 contributing to effective M&E; 
 ensuring effective government and management across the 
health care system; and 
 ensuring adequate coordination of work at all levels of the 
health system 
The Agenda for Change: Sierra Leone’s second poverty reduction 
strategy paper launched 
 
2009 
 Making it Happen programme starts, with three main components: 
 competency-based training packages in emergency obstetric 
care and newborn care; 
 strengthening of data collection and use in the facilities and 
for research; and 
 introduction of a quality improvement methodology  
30 November: National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSP) 2010–
2015 launched 
 
2010  27 April: the FHCI launched  
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3.2 Health indicators 
Prior to the introduction of the FHCI in 2010, health indicators in Sierra Leone painted a stark 
picture as a result of the previous decades of conflict, mismanagement and scarce resources with 
extremely low usage. MCH outcomes were close to being the worst in the world, although the 
situation was slowly improving both in terms of maternal and under-five mortality rates (see Table 
3). 
Table 3: Key health indicators in Sierra Leone prior to the FHCI 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Population (millions) 4.0 3.9 4.1 5.1 5.8 
Life expectancy at birth1 (years) 37.4 35.8 38.1 42.1 44.8 
HIV prevalence (% population aged 15–49) 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.5 1.6 
Fertility rate1 (births per woman) 6.5 6.2 5.9 5.5 4.9 
Use of contraception (% women aged 15–49) - - 4 5 11 
ANC2 (% women aged 15–493) - - 68 91 93 
Births attended by a skilled health worker4 (%) - - 42 43 63 
Exclusive breastfeeding (% children under 6 months) - - 4 7 32 
Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR5) (per 100,000 live births) 2,300 2,400 2,200 1,600 1,200 
DPT immunisations (% children 12–23 months) - - 44 65 86 
Measles immunisations (% children 12–23 months) - - 37 71 81 
Use of ITNs (% children under 5) - - 2 5 30 
Underweight children (% children under 5) 25 - 25 28 21 
Under-five mortality5 (per 1,000 live births) 268 251 232 202 175 
Access to improved drinking water1 (% population) 37 42 47 53 58 
Access to improved sanitation1 (% population) 11 11 12 12 13 
Notes: 1. Latest figure relates to 2012. 
2. The World Development Indicators database does not include this variable. Data source for 2000, 2005 and 2010 is 
the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS).  
3. Receiving at least one ANC appointment from a doctor, nurse, midwife or MCH aide.  
4. Doctor, nurse, midwife or MCH aide (Note: MCH aide is not an SBA by international definitions.) 
5. Modelled estimates from the UN. 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank 
3.3 Barriers to access 
A key source on information on the barriers to health care before the implementation of the FHCI is 
the 2008 DHS (Statistics Sierra Leone (SSL), 2008). 80% of women reported that getting money 
for treatment was a major problem, 50% reported that distance to a facility, the need to take 
transport and the possibility that no drugs would be available were major problems, and 37% of 
women reported that whether or not there would be a health worker available was a major 
problem. 8% reported that getting permission from their husband was a serious problem. In total, 
89% of women reported that at least one of these concerns was a serious problem in regard to 
their accessing health care. 
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Younger women, women who were not employed, women who had no children and women who 
had never married were less likely to report problems. Women in the Western Area and in urban 
areas were less likely than those in rural areas and women with lower education or wealth were 
more likely to report serious problems. Problems accessing the necessary funds for health care 
were more of a barrier in the Northern and Eastern regions, and drug availability considered more 
of a problem in the Southern and Eastern regions. 
The National Public Services Survey (NPSS) also asked people about barriers to access before 
the rollout of the FHCI. The 2005 survey estimated that, of those that used a government clinic in 
the past year, 88% of them walked to it (IRCBP, 2007). By 2008, 62% of respondents had access 
to a government clinic within one hour’s travel. This was up from 48% in 2005 and 53% in 2007 
(see Table 4). Over this period the largest increases were in Moyamba (40–53%) and Port Loko 
(64–77%) (IRCBP, 2010). Questions about access to care were also asked in a community module 
of this survey. Of the communities surveyed, 22% had a clinic or hospital in the village. 
Table 4: Access to health care providers, 2005–2008 
Time to government clinic/hospital 
Percentage of respondents 
2005 2007 2008 
Less than 15 minutes 18 18 22 
15–30 minutes 12 16 17 
31–60 minutes 19 19 23 
1–2 hours 18 24 22 
Over 2 hours 33 21 14 
None nearby 1 2 2 
Source: IRCBP (2010) 
These barriers were part of the context and rationale for the FHCI and the way in which it was 
rolled out. 
3.4 Health financing 
Pre-FHCI, there were a number of structural weaknesses in Sierra Leone’s PFM that impacted on 
all public service delivery (GoSL, 2010; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2009): revenue was 
often overestimated, leading to underspends against budgets; high levels of discretionary 
expenditure weakened budget execution; long-term budget planning was absent;5 sector strategies 
were not costed; there was limited alignment between recurrent and development budgets; and 
there were significant weaknesses in the Treasury’s cash management systems, affecting the 
predictability of resources available to Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs).6 In terms of 
external financing, significant donor support was provided off-budget, reducing the ability to 
coordinate and strengthen government systems. Moreover, where budget support was provided, it 
was often unpredictable. Notwithstanding significant PFM progress in the years before the FHCI, 
these weaknesses limited the ability for MDAs, such as the MoHS, to plan and implement their 
budgets effectively. 
                                               
5 Although it should be noted that a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework does exist. 
6 At this point quarterly allotments were made to all MDAs based on expenditure plans but there are often reallocations of line items 
during the year, and allocations were provided late. 
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 15 
3.4.1 National health financing issues 
Figure 2 and Box 5 set out some of the main characteristics of health financing in Sierra Leone. 
The main aspects to note are the centralisation of payroll within MoFED and, following changes in 
2007, the funding of local councils (non-payroll) and through them district hospitals and PHUs. The 
MoHS also funded various vertical programmes, although often with support from development 
partners, as well as tertiary hospitals and administrative functions.  
Figure 2: Heath sector financing flows in Sierra Leone 
 
Source: Adapted from Ensor et al. (2008) 
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Box 5:  Budget process pre-FHCI 
 MoHS receives a budget allocation from MoFED for administrative funding, tertiary hospitals and 
vertical programmes. Salaries at all levels in the health sector are funded centrally, through 
MoFED. 
 There is vertical allocation from central government (MoFED) to the districts through the Local 
Government Department of MoFED.  
 Each district is then provided with a budget ceiling. This is decided based on a national formula 
accounting for population, number of PHUs, etc. The split between primary and secondary 
allocation is also decided nationally.* This is approved by MoFED. Primary care devolved in 2006 
and secondary in 2008. 
 The Chief Superintendent (in relation to hospitals, curative care) and the district medical officer 
(DMO) (in relation to districts, preventive care) are then asked to prepare a workplan that fits 
within this budget ceiling. The workplan is developed in close collaboration with the District 
Council Health Committee. 
 District health interventions are in theory guided by the ‘one district health plan’, which coordinates 
the activities of all of the different actors – government, donors and NGOs. In reality a number of 
activities are funded outside of these plans. Donors provide project support both through MoHS 
vertical programmes and direct to facilities. They also provided some general budget support 
linked to supporting health outcomes (through the budget support performance framework).  
*There was a 2010 change to this formula as the formula previously worked on existing infrastructure, and therefore 
increased inequalities by channelling money to better off facilities 
 
The structure of health financing in Sierra Leone was poor pre-2010: McPake and Shumba (2012) 
note that during the decade preceding the FHCI, Sierra Leone had a very high proportion of OOP 
expenditure on health (around 10% of GDP, and over 80% of total expenditure), far worse than 
most, if not all, low-income countries.7 Sierra Leone was also outperformed by 95% of low-income 
countries in terms of government expenditure on health. The high level of OOP payments means 
that access was either not possible or required catastrophic health expenditure,8 i.e. a reduction in 
other basic necessities and/or risky coping strategies by households (Xu et al., 2005).  
The health sector also had a number of other financing weaknesses, with failures by MoHS to 
execute their budget (see Figure 3) and reports of significant delays in receiving funds from 
MoFED (Amnesty International, 2009).  
Figure 3: MoHS budget execution, 2006–2009 
 
Source: MoHS expenditure accounts 
The volatility of funding (from MoFED and development partners) was also a challenge, reducing 
the ability and incentives for health agencies to plan. For example, on average, from 2004 to 2007, 
less than 25% of the overall (non-wage) allocation was received in the first two quarters of the year 
                                               
7 It was so high that it was outside the range of the analysis. See Xu et al. (2010) for a full analysis of global figures. 
8 Three factors for catastrophic payments to arise (Xu et al., 2005) were all present in Sierra Leone: the availability of health services 
requiring OOP payments; low household capacity to pay; and lack of prepayment mechanisms for risk pooling. 
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(Ensor et al., 2008). Funding delays resulted from both limited capacity for making timely allocation 
requests within MoHS and the slow release of cash from MoFED, reflecting limitations in cash 
management and fiscal pressure.  
3.4.2 Financing local facilities  
Despite limitations in the available data, resources from cost-recovery fees on drugs and services 
were estimated to be a significant component of financing at local level, made even more important 
by the difficulties in receiving central funds. KIIs with officials in PHUs confirmed that they relied on 
such financing before the FHCI. Indeed, such flows were relatively timely and predictable when 
compared to financing from other sources, which is consistent with evidence globally (McPake and 
Shumba, 2012). Furthermore, national and district KIIs suggested there can also be difficulties in 
allocating resources, within the district level, even when grants are provided to the districts from 
central funds.9  
There are few studies that have robustly estimated the volume of user fees at facility level pre-
FHCI, although a study in 2008 estimated that they constituted between 4% and 8% of total 
government funding for district hospitals, and between 44% and 95% of the government budget for 
PHUs at district level.10 This is consistent with international literature (e.g. Witter, 2009) that 
highlights the dependence of lower-level facilities on user fees (a reflection of the limited support 
they receive from government, among other factors). 
The cost-recovery policy implemented in 2002 allowed for 60% (albeit later revised downwards to 
40%) cost-recovery on certain drugs (there was a list of exemption groups): local facilities were 
permitted to retain 60% of the revenue raised and remit the remainder to the district,11 although in 
reality little revenue was actually remitted back to the district (OPM, 2008).  
There was also considerable discretion exercised by health workers over which groups received 
exemptions and therefore how much strain was placed on local financing. While in some cases it 
was calculated that exemptions accounted for up to 70% of utilisation in PHUs (Ensor et al., 2008), 
most evidence suggests that the exemptions were not enforced. For example, a survey in 2007 
found between 60% and 70% of pregnant women, lactating women and children under five being 
charged for services, although all these were exempt categories of users (IRCPB, 2007). Service 
charges remained important to facility financing,12 as is commonly found in wider regional literature 
(McPake et al., 2011). Again, the requirement to return 10% of user charge revenue to the 
consolidated fund appears to have been only very partially observed (Ensor et al., 2008). 
In summary, although the previous cost-recovery policy exempted the groups that tended to use 
the most services, it seems that in practice the need to raise local revenue tended to override the 
requirement to exempt groups. This means that expanding and enforcing the exemption list 
                                               
9 Although two prominent World Bank programmes (the Decentralized Service Delivery Program (DSDP) (working in a number of 
sectors in districts) and Reproductive and Child Health Program (RCHP)) worked at this level, starting in 2009 and 2007 respectively, 
and stakeholders felt that both their financial resources (which tended to be disbursed more predictably) and technical assistance were 
effective 
10 At PHU level, users report charges ranging from on average SLL 2,800 for a child contact to SLL 3,400 for a family planning contact 
and SLL 12,500 for a delivery (2008 MoHS Health Facility Survey). An MSF study puts the average cost at government health centres 
that charge for services at around SLL 8,700 (Latreille et al., 2006). An average fee of somewhere between SLL 4,000 and SLL 8,700 
would provide total revenue of between SLL 5.2 and SLL 11.3 billion for PHUs based on the 1.3 million PHU contacts recorded by the 
HMIS in 2006 (Ensor et al., 2008). 
11 In terms of the mark-up that could be charged on drugs, the National Cost-Recovery Strategy specifies 30% from Central Medical 
Stores (CMS) to District Medical Stores (DMS) or hospitals, 15% from DMS to PHUs, and 15% from PHUs to patients or 30% from 
hospitals to patients. Mark-ups on the value of drug supplies of a total of 60% are meant to be applied to the original CMS procurement 
value. 
12 At PHUs these usually amount to fixed charges for adult and child consultations set by local communities or clinic staff. Charges 
varied considerably across the country, with some districts choosing to levy no charges, at least at PHUs (Ensor et al., 2008). 
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through the FHCI was likely to have important implications for facility financing. Without new forms 
of financing at the facility level the hypothesis would be that the FHCI would not greatly reduce the 
use of unofficial fee systems and might lead to a fall in the quality of services (given increased 
utilisation). 
3.5 Governance 
In 2008, the Agenda for Change set out the priority areas of the newly elected President Koroma: 
transformation of the economy through investments in supportive infrastructure, improved delivery 
of social services and private sector development (GoSL, 2008a). In 2009, a National Health 
Sector Strategic Plan 2010–2015 was also developed that set out the vision for the health sector.  
Since the end of the country’s 10-year civil war, the GoSL had also pursued a decentralisation 
strategy that sought to invest greater authority and responsibility for governance and service 
provision in district structures, steered by a central-level coordination mechanism (see Figure 4 
below). 
Figure 4: Structure of the health system in 2010 
 
Source: shared by Yayah Conteh, MoHS 
However, within the health care system, this process had been incomplete and generated 
confusion over which structures were responsible for a range of management functions (MoHS, 
Health Sector Performance Report, 2012. The central government, for example, failed to provide 
sufficient and regular financial support to the DHMTs and district councils (ibid). 
Coordination between the MoHS and development partners was also poor, according to national-
level KIIs, as was their mutual level of trust (the Minister of Health for example was accused of 
corruption and dismissed in 2009).  
The MoHS was generally seen as a struggling ministry given little political attention: 
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‘Prior to the FHCI announcement, the MoHS was a rather lethargic place where not very 
much happened. Development meetings were lacklustre and there was little energy’ (MoHS 
official present prior to FHCI implementation). 
According to district-level KIIs, information transmission within the sector was always top-down, 
and did not involve input from the districts. 
3.6 HRH 
The post-war context presented many challenges, particularly the absence of staff, who had fled, 
and the proliferation of NGO-supported services, with limited control by the MoHS overall. 
Gradually, during 2002 to 2009, the MoHS re-established some leadership and a series of HR 
policy documents and plans were produced, which presented clearly the challenges but without 
having much traction in terms of funding and momentum toward implementing the measures they 
identified as needed. There were substantial gaps in posts filled and poor working conditions for 
staff, including low pay and difficulties getting on to payroll (Witter et al., 2014). Many workers were 
considered ‘ghosts’, claiming salaries for work that was not undertaken13 or working without a 
regular civil servant contract (and sometimes charging patients)14 (Ensor et al., 2008; Amnesty 
International, 2009; IGC, 2011). Even for those getting paid, the overall conditions of service were 
poor, which provided incentives for additional informal charges. For example, estimates in 2009 
were that midwives earned about US$ 60–80, compared to a 50-pound bag of rice costing close to 
US$ 40 (Amnesty International, 2009).15 Pre-FHCI, there was low utilisation of facility deliveries, 
and heavy reliance on TBAs trained by NGOs. 
Despite the decentralisation of primary and secondary health service provision to the district level, 
recruitment, termination, promotion and wage decisions were managed centrally (Simson, 2013). 
Incentives were therefore undermined, with those officials who had information of performance, 
such as managers at the facility level, lacking the authority to sanction absence or other poor 
performance (IGC, 2011). Districts had however reported that at least they now had greater control 
over resources for non-staff expenditure after the decentralisation process (2004 for district 
councils, and in 2008 for secondary care, both being managed by DHMTs) (Simson, 2013).16 
More detailed analysis of the situation of HRH in Sierra Leone before, during and after the FHCI is 
provided in a report undertaken with ReBUILD (Witter et al., 2014). 
3.7 Drugs and supplies 
Prior to the implementation of the FHCI, there was no structured chain of procurement and 
distribution for drugs and medical supplies. Cost-recovery drugs17 were predominant, which limited 
access to essential medicines, especially among those with a limited ability to pay. Their 
procurement was also carried out on an ad hoc basis, which reinforced availability issues. Around 
70% of medicines and supplies were provided by the private sector, with limited participation of the 
                                               
13 A 2008 survey found 18% of surveyed clinics were closed on inspectors’ arrival, and an average of only 71% of staff positions filled 
(IGC, 2011). 
14 This often resulted from delays between training and hiring, with sometimes as much as a three-year period for doctors (Amnesty 
International, 2009). It was estimated that 48% of the MCH aides and community health officers were not being paid in one district, as at 
the end of 2008 (interview with a DMO, cited in Amnesty International, 2009). 
15 A comparison between payments by some faith-based hospitals and the public sector carried out during this study found that while 
the difference among low-skilled occupations was relatively small, sometimes even negative, there is a four to seven-fold difference 
between the salaries of faith-based medical and senior medical officers and their public sector equivalent (Ensor et al., 2008). 
16 Tertiary care remains managed by the MoHS. 
17 Through cost-recovery, 40% of the resources were transferred to districts/central level, with 60% remaining at the facility to subsidise 
drugs for those who did not have the ability to pay. 
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public sector due to the limited financial resources and lack of a designated government body to 
lead the procurement of drugs and medical supplies at the central level (MoHS, 2009). 
Indeed, the Anti-Corruption Commission Report (2008, cited in Amnesty International, 2009) found 
that there was an inadequate quantity of drugs and medical supplies; drugs were illegally sold and 
administered in hospitals and PHUs; and no information was available about goods procured and 
distributed by local councils or MoHS – record-keeping was deemed to be in a ‘scandalous state’ 
and most procurement committees lacked the technical expertise to determine the type of drugs 
and medical supplies to be procured. The Performance Audit Report on Anti-Malaria Interventions 
also noted that costs involved for anti-malaria treatment were very high, even though drugs should 
have been provided for free to under-fives and pregnant women and at a minimal fee to other 
patients (Audit Service Sierra Leone, 2012). Although the cost-recovery system allows health 
facilities to have a source of income for subsequent drug and medical supplies purchases, it also 
prevents access to those segments of the population who potentially need them the most. Thus, 
people relied on the illegal drugs market or ‘pepper doctors’, without any quality guarantees and 
increasing the likelihood of drugs misuse. 
Limited access was not only determined by the cost of drugs and medical supplies but also by 
ineffective distribution chains. Distribution was hindered by the unavailability of vehicles to 
transport drugs from Freetown to districts, and from districts to hospitals and PHUs. Even if 
transport was available, the poor road network caused additional delays in the delivery system. 
Even key hospitals did not receive a regular stock of drugs and medical supplies. Data from 2008 
suggest that only 39% of PHUs reported having an uninterrupted supply of essential medicines 
(EU, 2012). 
The accessibility of drugs and medical supplies was further limited by the lack of accurate data 
about morbidity and mortality at all sub-national levels, as well as about stocks and inventories, 
which led to the misallocation of drugs and medical supplies. Gaps in national health information 
were partly due to poor monitoring and enforcement on the part of national and district-level 
authorities, but also to the lack of a unified information system – according to the National Data 
Management Procedure Manual, there were multiple donor-driven parallel information systems 
and poor recording of health data, among other issues. The Health Information System prior to the 
2010–2015 National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP) relied solely on manual recording and 
consolidation, increasing the margin of error and untimeliness of the information collected. 
Finally, in regard to infrastructure, there were no adequate storage facilities at any level. As 
documented in the 2010–2015 NHSSP, these were basically non-existent before the FHCI (MoHS, 
2009; Steering Group Meeting Notes, 2010). This was compounded by the absence of or outdated 
comprehensive regulatory and policy frameworks – for instance, the last update of the National 
Medicines Policy (NMP) and associated documents was in 2004. Guidance on the use of various 
medicines for different illnesses (i.e. a National Formulary) was also non-existent. 
3.8 Infrastructure 
Prior to the FHCI, the country’s overall and health-related infrastructure were devastated, 
particularly those relating to water supply, sanitation and roads.18 The Emergency Obstetric and 
Newborn Care (EmONC) Assessment Report (2008) highlighted, for example, that six districts had 
no facilities that qualified for EmONC status. There were only 14 hospitals (of 38) providing 
                                               
18 Sierra Leone – AfDB World Bank Joint Assistance Strategy 2009–2012. 
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maternal health services that were able to offer EmONC and they were all Comprehensive 
Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care (CEmONC) facilities.  
Furthermore, the available EmONC services were inequitably distributed; for example, three 
hospitals provided emergency obstetric care in Bombali district, with a population of 400,000, 
compared to the entire Eastern or Southern regions each with 1.2 million people to only one 
EmONC facility (Amnesty International, 2009; UNFPA, 2008). Only 4% of hospitals or emergency 
rooms had adequate antimalarials, 2% adequate analgesics and 4% emergency medicine drugs. 
Only 45% had adequate IV fluids and 58% had adequate antibiotics. Sufficient night-time light was 
available in only 36% of hospitals and CHCs, with running water in 44%.  
An assessment of the status of the Basic Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care (BEmONC) and 
CEmONC facilities in February 2010 was undertaken by a team of public health experts who 
visited a number of facilities across the country. The assessment focused on what was referred to 
as the seven enablers: water, electricity, blood (only for CEmONC), referral systems, equipment 
for special procedures, staffing and drugs.  
For each enabler a traffic light system was devised (Infrastructure working group presentation, 
February 2010): the ratings under each enabler are as follows: Green – the standards have been 
met; Yellow – the standards have been mostly met; Amber – the standards have been partially 
met; and Red – the standards have not been met. The table below shows that, across the seven 
enablers, the situation was unsatisfactory (see Table 5 below). 
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Table 5: Assessment of preparedness of hospitals for EmONC 
    
Capacity of the 
facilities 
Bo, Kenema, Kono, Kabala, PCMH, Lumley 
Port Loko, Rokupa, Magburaka, Moyamba, 
Bonthe 
Kailahun, Pujehun, Makeni, Kambia, Mattru 
Condition of the 
facilities 
Kono, Rokupa, Kabala, PCMH 
Bo, Kenema, Port Loko, Pujehun, 
Moyamba, Makeni, Kambia, Lumley, Mattru 
Kailahun, Magburaka 
Staff  
Kenema, Kailahun, Kono, Rokupa, 
Pujehun, PCMH, Makeni, Lumley 
Bo, Port Loko, Kabala, Magburaka, 
Moyamba, Kambia, Mattru 
  
Water Bo, Kono, Kabala, Pujehun, PCMH, Lumley 
Kenema, Kailahun, Magburaka, Moyamba, 
Makeni 
Port Loko, Rokupa, Kambia, Mattru,  
Electricity 
Bo, Kenema, Kono, Rokupa, Kabala, 
Pujehun, Magburaka, PCMH, Makeni, 
Kambia, Lumley 
Port Loko, Moyamba Kailahun, Mattru 
Equipment for 
EmONC 
Bo, Kenema, Kono, Rokupa, Kabala, 
Makeni, Kambia 
Port Loko, Kailahun, Pujehun, Magburaka, 
PCMH, Moyamba, Lumley, Mattru 
  
Drugs for EmONC  
Kenema, Port Loko, Rokupa, Pujehun, 
PCMH 
Bo, Kono, Kabala, Magburaka, Moyamba, 
Makeni, Kambia, Lumley, Mattru 
Kailahun 
Environmental 
sanitation 
Bo, Port Loko, Rokupa, Kabala, Pujehun, 
PCMH, Kambia 
Kenema, Kailahun, Kono, Moyamba, 
Lumley, Mattru 
Magburaka, Makeni 
Transportation for 
referrals 
Kenema, Port Loko, Kailahun, Kabala, 
Makeni 
Kono, Rokupa, Pujehun, Magburaka, 
Moyamba, Kambia, Mattru, Bo 
PCMH, Lumley 
Communication with 
PHUs 
Bo, Kenema, Port Loko, Kailahun, Kono, 
Kabala, Pujehun, Magburaka, Moyamba, 
Kambia 
PCMH, Makeni  Rokupa, Lumley, Mattru 
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Source: Infrastructure working group presentation, February 2010, MoHS 
 
Laboratory Pujehun, Makeni 
Bo, Kenema, Kailahun, Kabala, 
Magburaka, PCMH, Kambia, Lumley 
Port Loko, Kono, Rokupa, Moyamba, 
Mattru 
Blood bank Bo, Kenema, Kabala, Makeni, Kambia  Port Loko, Kono, Magburaka, PCMH 
Kailahun, Rokupa, Pujehun, Moyamba, 
Lumley, Mattru 
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Finally, various interviewees in the national-level KIIs reported that during the presidential visits to 
the districts in 2010, prior to the launch of the FHCI, the President was appalled by the lack of 
facilities, and particularly by the fact that many facilities that existed on paper and were supposed 
to have been finished and up and running were not ready. 
3.9 M&E 
Before the start of the FHCI in 2010, Sierra Leone’s M&E system for health was weak. There was 
a limited amount of survey data, a basic collection of management data from health facilities and 
some printed reports. It appears there was little overall system or strategy as such and we have 
found little evidence that the M&E information was used to review, inform or develop policies and 
programmes. 
In terms of survey data available in 2010, there were three rounds of the UN’s MICS (MICS 1995, 
2000 and 2005), the 2008 DHS and the 2009 DHSBS. The DHS in particular covered a range of 
variables on reproductive health, child health and maternal and child mortality. There were, 
however, some concerns about the quality of the 2008 DHS, in particular in the area of child 
mortality, where the estimates were out of line with the MICS series and the UN-modelled figures. 
For the HMIS data from health facilities, the situation was basic. They were not computerised, 
many facilities did not provide data and the system was not well developed. Despite this, some 
analysis was done and a few health bulletins were produced. However, only a small number of 
these bulletins have been retained and there is only a limited amount of data available from these 
health facilities from 2010 and earlier. 
There was a small group of staff in MoHS who were working on data and M&E issues, but there 
was little additional analysis of the surveys beyond the standard reports and there is no evidence 
that there was a systematic or deliberate attempt to link the results of the M&E work to policy and 
accountability processes. In short, there was little use of the M&E outputs and the system had little 
impact.  
3.10 Quality of care 
Although quality of care was not one of the health system interventions that were conceptualised 
as part of the FHCI, it is important to understand the situation prior to the FHCI in terms of quality 
of service provision, resulting from the constraints in the various health system pillars documented 
above. Data on care processes themselves were lacking. 
In 2008 only about 10% of all expected births were seen in health facilities and only 2% of births 
were seen in an EmONC facility.19 This suggests that up to 90% of pregnant women may have 
been delivering outside the health service – in their homes or at TBAs’ facilities. Many of these 
women had complicated pregnancies and no doubt contributed to the high maternal and neonatal 
mortality at this time in Sierra Leone. The low level of utilisation observed by the EmONC Needs 
Assessment was 'partly explainable by the concerns raised about the cost of services, attitudes of 
staff and general client satisfaction.' The poor uptake of institutional delivery services, the lack of 
BEmONC services, including the absence of skilled attendance at birth, coupled with the spatial 
inequities in the distribution of CEmONC facilities, all point to low met need for EmONC services. It 
is ideal that 100% of complicated pregnancies are managed in EmONC facilities, yet in 2008 only 
7% of them were.  
                                               
19 Nationwide Needs Assessment for Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care Services in Sierra Leone, MoHS (2008). 
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In 2008 the caesarean section rate according to the DHS was 1.5% and was 3.5-fold higher in 
urban areas than in rural areas. Between July 2007 and July 2008 (UNFPA, 2008), only 0.9% of 
births in Sierra Leone were by caesarean section, with the highest proportion in the Western Area 
at 1.4% and none in the southern district of Pujehun. These numbers imply that a very high 
percentage of women who needed life-saving surgery did not obtain it. 
The EmONC needs assessment found that MCHPs and CHPs were under-resourced in terms of 
equipment, supplies and HR to contribute to EmONC provision. There was a chronic shortage of 
trained midwives in the country, with public and private health institutions depending largely on 
MCH aides to provide delivery services in health institutions. With their inadequate midwifery 
training it was felt that their services were bound to be of low quality. 
The UNFPA Country Programme Action Plan (2008–2010) supported these findings. It described 
most health facilities as having inadequate supplies of reproductive health commodities and as 
lacking appropriate equipment and basic requirements for laboratory services, including safe blood 
transfusion services, electricity, drugs and water supply to provide obstetric care. It stated that ‘the 
health system also suffers from inadequate capacity to undertake planning, implementation and 
coordination of family planning, emergency obstetric care and other maternal-child health services 
including [reproductive health] demand creation. The number of trained midwives and skilled 
medical personnel to provide obstetric care, especially at lower level health facilities, is highly 
inadequate’. 
Infection prevention and control measures were likely not adequate due to the widespread lack of 
a safe water supply. The EmONC needs assessment found that only 10% of hospitals had 
electricity and 60% some form of water supply. Out of the 56 hospitals and CHCs visited that had 
water, the source of water for 31 (55%) of them was outdoor plumbing, while 11 (20%) had indoor 
plumbing from a borehole or well and 14 (25%) had indoor plumbing from a municipal source. 
There is little information about how facilities were organised to deliver services to particular client 
groups. However, up to 37% of hospital and CHC maternity wards provided food, 82% had beds 
for the next patient and 76% of them had clean and laid-out beds. 
Figure 5: CHC and hospital maternity wards with selected amenities 
 
Source: UNFPA (2008) 
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Figure 6: Proportion of hospitals and CHCs by signal functions performed 
 
Source: UNFPA (2008) 
The EmONC coverage for Sierra Leone was 1.2 per 500,000 in 2008 (compared to the UN norm of 
one CEmONC facility and four BEmONC facilities for every 500,000 people). The regions with the 
lowest coverage were Eastern and Southern regions while the highest was Northern Region. The 
BEmONC coverage was zero for every district, region or the country at large. In the absence of 
BEmONC facilities, CEmONC coverage was therefore the same as EmONC coverage. There were 
only 14 hospitals that qualified to be considered EmONC facilities and they were all CEmONC 
facilities. There were three facilities that would have qualified as BEmONC facilities except they did 
not perform assisted vaginal delivery. All MCHPs and CHPs were non-EmONC facilities (UNFPA, 
2008). 
Figure 7: The 24-hour availability of maternity services in CHCs and hospitals 
 
Source: UNFPA (2008) 
Up to 67% of hospitals and CHCs did not have the services of a midwife and over 95% of facilities 
did not have the services of an anaesthetist or a paediatrician. 
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The EmONC needs assessment looked at the skills, training and experience of MCH cadres. In 
66% of the sites visited active management of the third stage of labour was performed and 39% of 
them gave oxytocin immediately after the delivery of the placenta. 
Figure 8: Selected health cadres trained to perform signal functions 
 
Source: UNFPA (2008) 
The health provider knowledge tool was administered to midwives and to any health cadre who 
was most likely to take charge of a delivery. Only 14% of respondents mentioned all the 
components that should confer quality on an antenatal service and about 76% of respondents 
mentioned the two signs that signify the onset of labour, but only 16% of respondents mentioned 
all the required parameters for monitoring labour, with 12% of respondents claiming they 
documented their observations only on a partograph. Almost 17% of respondents mentioned all 
the signs required for the prompt diagnosis of post-partum haemorrhage (PPH), with only about 
20% of respondents mentioning all the vital interventions required when asked ‘when a woman 
comes with or develops heavy bleeding after delivery what action do you take?’ 
Out of the 87 partographs reviewed, only five (6%) showed that there was an intervention when the 
alert line was crossed. Over 54% of the respondents had been trained to use the partograph but 
only 22% had used it in the previous three months. Similarly, over 64% of respondents had been 
trained to use magnesium sulphate but only 30% had used it in the last three months. Only 7% and 
4% had been trained to perform vacuum extractions and manual vacuum aspirations respectively. 
For the performance of services such as breech delivery, early initiation of breastfeeding, provision 
of IPTp and resuscitation of the newborn, higher proportions of MCH aides than medical officers 
had received training. Higher proportions of medical officers had received training in the provision 
of anaesthesia and the care of the pre-term or low-birth-weight baby.  
Significant numbers of facilities performed obsolete procedures such as routinely bathing the baby 
within 24 hours of birth or suctioning the baby at birth (up to 53%).  
Even though magnesium sulphate is on the national essential drug list for use at all the tiers of the 
health service, only about 52% of labour and delivery rooms had it in stock. There was poor 
medical record-keeping, especially for complications of pregnancy and maternal death. Maternal 
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death audits were done in many of the health facilities visited but the records of such exercises 
were not obtainable. 
The EmONC needs assessment looked at the modes of transport to the health facility for most of 
the maternal deaths where records were retrieved (100% =174). Only 13 (7%) were said to have 
walked from home to the facility while ‘private vehicle’ (42%) was most used, or some form of 
health facility ambulance (26%). Other modes of transportation mentioned were hammock and 
motorbike. Of the maternal deaths reviewed, 58% were referred from another facility and, aside 
from the complication, they were transferred ‘for blood’, ‘for operation’ or because there was ‘no 
doctor’. Up to 24 (26%) of the 93 hospitals and CHCs visited said there was the presence of a 
community referral system and 11 (46%) reported the existence of a byelaw supporting the 
community referral system. 
In 2008 the national maternal CFR was 7%. 
Figure 9: Case fatality rate in EmONC facilities, 2008  
 
Source: UNFPA (2008) 
Poor record-keeping for obstetric complications and even poorer maternal death records make it 
very difficult to rely on the CFRs from this survey. 
Only 11% of the health care providers asked were aware of all the signs that would enable prompt 
diagnosis of postpartum sepsis (Figure 10). Respondents were asked for the main interventions 
required for its management and only about 10% of respondents mentioned all that is required. 
Up to 22% of the respondents were able to mention all the signs of newborn sepsis but only about 
13% of respondents were aware of all the interventions needed for the prompt and successful 
management of neonatal sepsis. 
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Figure 10: Provider awareness of danger signs, EmOC assessment 2008 
 
 
 
Source: UNFPA (2008) 
According to the EmONC needs assessment, 43% of CHPs and MCHPs had witnessed at least 
one stillbirth in 2007. The stillbirth rate was 30 per 1,000 total births in 2009 (WHO, 2013). 
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4 The preparation of the FHCI 
The objectives of the FHCI were clear: to ensure that the barrier seen as most important to 
accessing health care – user fees – was removed for the most vulnerable groups (identified as 
pregnant women, lactating mothers and children under five) so as to ensure that these target 
groups would be able to access quality care free at the point of use. The ultimate objective was 
and still is improving maternal and under-five morbidity and mortality rates. How this decision was 
taken, and implementation of the reform prepared for, offers useful insights for any country wishing 
to go through a similar reform. 
4.1 What triggered the decision to announce the FHCI? 
As previously highlighted, prior to the FHCI of 2010 a presidential decree was issued in 2002 that 
exempted various vulnerable groups – including the three groups who would become the targets of 
the FHCI – from paying fees when seeking care.20 However, this policy announcement had little 
impact at facility level. 
The renewed drive in 2009 to remove fees for these target groups seems to have been the result 
of both national and international factors.  
At the national level, we have identified the following factors: 
1. Appalling health outcomes in general, and specifically for MCH, which were identified in the 
Agenda for Change as a priority for the health sector. 
2. Sierra Leone had extremely low utilisation of health facilities (0.5 visits per person per year) 
(MoHS, 2008). 
3. In the 2008 NPSS, and as previously mentioned, lack of finance was cited by 88% of 
respondents as the major reason as to why their household members could not access health 
facilities even though they needed to. 
4. There was pressure on the GoSL from national NGOs to remove user fees. 
The international level also played a role in facilitating the introduction of the FHCI: 
1. There was strong support from some key international partners, including backing from the UK 
government and more specifically Gordon Brown, for example, who wrote letters to various 
African presidents, including President Koroma, promising financial support if user fees were 
removed. Gordon Brown also offered his political weight when Sierra Leone was faced with 
disapproval from the IMF as a result of the decision to remove fees (according to participants in 
the international KIIs).  
2. Extensive lobbying from INGOs. 
3. International pressure was focused on MCH as two of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) most lagging behind (i.e. MDGs 4 and 5). 
There was therefore a strong incentive to focus on MNCH and provide a concrete policy reform 
that could improve MDGs 4 and 5. The process through which this was realised is also of interest. 
4.2 Launch and preparation process  
1. September 2009: At the United Nations General Assembly President Koroma announced that 
all health care services would be free for pregnant women, breastfeeding mothers and children 
under five years of age. 
                                               
20 See www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8410.pdf  
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2. September/October 2009: Discussions were held between donors and the GoSL as to potential 
backing and practical impacts of the FHCI. 
3. November 2009:  
 launch of a strategy document entitled ‘Free Healthcare Services for Pregnant and 
Lactating Women and Young Children in Sierra Leone’. 
 the President announced the launch date of 27 April 2010, giving the MoHS five months to 
prepare for the forecasted increase in utilisation of health services by target groups. 
 setting up of working groups and a steering committee to drive preparation of the FHCI. 
The themes of the working groups set up were chosen by a group of key stakeholders who 
discussed the most pressing priorities that needed to be addressed on the supply side to 
ensure that the health system would cope with the increase in demand expected as a result 
of the removal of user fees. These themes, and working groups, were: 1) Financing; 2) 
Infrastructure; 3) Drugs and Logistics; 4) M&E; 5) HR; and 6) Communications. 
Governance, oversight and vision was not organised as a working group per se (further 
details are given in Section 2.5 on this).  
In contrast to many other countries that have introduced free health care policies, often quite 
hastily and apparently driven by electoral cycles, there was a time-lag of five months between the 
official announcement of the policy reform and its launch. This allowed for intense preparations 
organised through the technical working groups. Again in contrast with other countries, such as 
Burundi (Nimpagaritse and Bertone, 2011), this ensured that key partners such as the MoHS, 
MoFED, donors, health implementation partners, civil society, etc. could prepare for the removal of 
fees. The question addressed in the next section is how this preparation was undertaken and with 
what results. 
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5  Consequences of the FHCI for the health system 
As previously described, the GoSL and its health partners chose to focus their efforts on seven 
priority areas. In this chapter we will review each area in turn, asking what changes the FHCI 
introduced, how these were implemented, what the impact of these efforts was and what 
challenges remain in relation to each pillar. At the end, we summarise the overall health system 
effects, across the different priority areas. 
5.1 Health financing 
Health financing timeline 
    
2009  
September 2009: Announcement of the FHCI 
November 2009: Financing committee working group set up 
November 2009 (presented in FHCI Nov. 2009 Policy Document): 
Compiled the costing of all FHCI implementation activities and 
identify funding gaps: shortfall identified 
Mobilise GoSL and donor resources to fill the short-term funding 
gaps 
Salary discussions with DFID late 2009/early 2010 
 
2010  
Negotiations in early 2010, uplift of salaries in April 2010. Salary 
increase negotiations and change 
Global Fund discussions in mid-2009 to fund MoHS, with decision 
eventually made to fund salary shortfall in 2010  
April 2010: User fees removed for targeted groups (pregnant, 
women, lactating mothers and children under five). 
Set up bank accounts in PHUs (2010) for ‘cash at facilities’ grant 
Line item for FHCI included in budget documents 2011 
Development of Joint Programme Work Funding (published in 
2011) 
‘Cash at facilities’ provided through MoFED local government 
financing (supported by the World Bank). 
 
2011  PBF starts  
2014  
GoSL funds used to purchase FHCI drugs through newly formed 
NPPU 
 
2014/15  Reprioritisation of expenditure to Ebola efforts   
 
The most notable change to health financing of relevance to the FHCI was the removal of user 
fees (on drugs and consultations) for its target groups.21 This has four direct implications for 
changes to the supply of health financing:  
                                               
21 As noted in Section 2.3, although some of these groups were already exempt this was often not enforced. 
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i) Loss of a revenue source for the health system – there was a reduction in those 
services and drugs that were provided on a cost-recovery basis;22  
ii) The increased utilisation rates would increase pressure on existing budgets (most 
notably for salaries and drugs);  
iii) The availability of cash at local facilities would be reduced; and 
iv) A reduction in OOP payments should be experienced by households. 
Effective implementation of the policy would therefore require alternative sources and increased 
magnitudes of financial resources, as well as new mechanisms to provide cash at the facility level 
for their operations. Increases in utilisation meant new expenditure on health worker salaries (both 
increasing the number of health workers and their earnings), capital expenditure to upgrade 
facilities, and new drug financing (to provide free drugs for FHCI target groups). Finally, reflecting 
the huge scale of the policy initiative and the subsequent governance mechanisms put in place, 
changes in institutional health financing processes may also be expected (e.g. budget planning 
and disbursement at central and district level, coordination between government and non-
government financing, and the monitoring of expenditure). 
We assess if these changes eventuated and their effectiveness below. Expenditure trends are 
largely based on government expenditure figures from the MoHS and MoFED and donor and 
household expenditure from the NHA.23 Process-related changes are based on a review of 
government and development partner documents, as well as KIIs with some of the relevant 
stakeholders (at central and district level) involved in these changes.  
Two types of expenditure analysis are undertaken: 
i) Total health sector financing: reflecting both the comprehensive nature of the FHCI 
reforms, as a ‘systems change’ and the superior data at the sector level; and 
ii) FHCI-specific financing: costs are disaggregated, where possible, to those changes 
specifically related to the FHCI. 
The other fundamental change to health care financing is at the household level, with target groups 
exempt from charges. How household spending has changed following the FHCI is discussed in 
more detail later in the report when we examine changes to barriers facing households.  
5.1.1 Short-term implementation issues 
The FHCI required two immediate financing changes: first, ensuring that there was sufficient 
quantity of finance; and, second, that there was sufficient liquidity for it to go where required. More 
specifically, the removal of user fees (for the FHCI targeted groups) created cash management 
challenges at local facilities and deficits in the financing of salaries and drugs, given increased 
utilisation (Amara, 2010).  
The FHCI finance subcommittee was set up to look at these issues. Its four main responsibilities 
were to: 1) compile the costing of all FHCI implementation activities and identify funding gaps; 2) 
                                               
22 The health care system is largely financed from three main sources: the consolidated fund, donor finance and direct funding by 
patients. Community financing is limited to loan schemes while employer-based social insurance is restricted to a small number of 
private companies. 
23 Government expenditure figures provide more up-to-date and disaggregated data than the government expenditure data reported in 
the NHA. 
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develop funding mechanisms for the implementation of the FHCI policy; 3) mobilise GoSL and 
donor resources to fill the short-term funding gaps; and 4) consider the long-term sustainability of 
financing for the policy.  
5.1.1.1 Anticipated financing needs 
The estimated cost (GoSL, 2009a) for the FHCI at the time was US$ 90 million for year 124 (2010), 
decreasing to US$ 50 million in year 2 (although a later estimate from the GoSL put this at US$ 35 
million (MoHS, 2011).25 As the stakeholders interviewed acknowledged, these estimates (see 
Table 6) were ‘rough’, with limited data to plan more accurately. However, they provide a useful 
description of where the government saw the main cost items resulting from the FHCI, namely 
salaries and drugs, as well as the magnitude of funds required. These estimates also provided the 
government with an indication of the expected financing gap – US$ 20 million – they would need to 
bridge in order to implement the FHCI (see Section 4.1.5 below for ex-post calculations of the cost 
of the FHCI). To put this US$ 20 million financing gap into context, this was double the total health 
expenditure (THE) by MoHS in the preceding year, 2009.26 
Table 6: Estimated financing required for Year 1 of FHCI (2010) 
Cost items  US$ (millions) 
Committed funds by 
development partners 
to RCH 
 
Government structures put in place 2 GoSL 12.5 
HR (salaries and performance-based 
scheme) 
38 GAVI 5.6 
Logistics (including drugs and 
medical consumables) 
44 Global Fund 12 
Communications 3 
Multilateral (World Bank; 
African Development 
Bank (AfDB)) 
12.8 
M&E  4 
Bilateral 10 
UN 6 
NGOs 12 
Total  91 Total 71 
Total funding gap (US$ millions) 20 
Source: GoSL (2009a) 
The late introduction of the FHCI in 2009 meant that its additional costs were not reflected in the 
2010 Budget. For example, there was a significant gap in the funds available for paying for health 
worker salaries that was not resolved until after the FHCI’s start (Witter et al. 2014, 2010; Amara, 
2010). Donors were reluctant to provide further funding given the problems of ghost workers in the 
sector but, as Donnelly (2011) documents, the perseverance of the government (and their own 
increased financing), alongside the acceptance of donor-financed payroll assistance, had the effect 
of convincing donors to commit further funds.  
Significant resources were subsequently mobilised, with donors providing funds for salaries (DFID 
and Global Fund) and drugs (DFID).27 DFID provided £10.3 million in support of health worker 
                                               
24 An early estimate, which did not include the salary uplift or some drugs, put the figure at US$ 33 million (Amara, 2010). 
25 Second year costs included US$ 20.5 million for salaries and US$ 20.7 million for drugs and supplies.  
26 Although this figure does not include some of the donor financing off-budget, which the FHCI estimated costs did.  
27 Drug costs are financed by DFID through a grant to UNICEF, which handles the procurement, although ‘Funding Agencies’ reports 
from MoHS in 2012 also suggest that GAVI and Global Fund have contributed to drug procurement for the FHCI. 
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salaries over five years on a gradually diminishing basis, complemented by roughly £6 million from 
the Global Fund28 from 2010 (Stevenson et al., 2012). This was paid out in two-monthly 
instalments after certification confirming that the government was remaining on track with its HR 
management performance targets (Simson, 2013). They did so on the condition that the payroll 
stayed clean and absenteeism was reduced.29  
Donor drug financing was also increased although provided off-budget, with the majority being 
funded through a grant from DFID to UNICEF to procure and manage their distribution to district 
medical stores and facilities (see Section 4.4 for further details of this process). 
5.1.1.2 Financing at the facility level 
From a process perspective, it was relatively straightforward to replace cash for tertiary and most 
secondary hospitals as they had their own banking facilities and existing government systems for 
transferring resources. For PHUs, a SLL 1million transfer each quarter was provided in 2010 to 
replace the cost-recovery funding.30 This arrangement was more complicated, with facilities 
needing to set up bank accounts to access this central funding (i.e. it was not intended to pass 
through district councils but go straight to PHUs, through bank accounts that were accessed in the 
district town). However, even a week after the FHCI’s launch many of these had not been set up 
(MoHS, 2010c), and there were issues in accessing accounts given the limited outreach of banking 
facilities. There were plans to make future payments to facilities conditional on the proper 
implementation of the FHCI policy, i.e. PBF, but this did not materialise until 2011, in part reflecting 
disagreements between development partners on whether PBF was appropriate and how quickly it 
could be introduced.  
The faith-based organisations that were providing health care services to target groups throughout 
the country were not part of the government system for the FHCI, as no financing had been 
identified for their sub-contracting.31  
5.1.2 Medium-term effects on heath financing 
The health financing system remained relatively unchanged post-FHCI, with the main change 
being fewer user fees being charged (and remitted back to districts, or held at facility level), and 
the introduction of PBF, which flowed straight from MoFED to facilities.32 The PBF indicators were 
closely tied to FHCI target groups.33 
What follows explores how the initiative has changed the overall resources devoted to health in the 
sector, as well as expenditure on particular areas. First, it looks at THE, reflecting the ‘systemic’ 
nature of the FHCI, and the more comprehensive data at this sectoral level, before focusing on 
specific FHCI expenditure. This analysis feeds into the VfM assessment set out in Section 9.  
                                               
28 Provided through the HIV Secretariat up until 2015.  
29 As described in Section 4.3, a revised Scheme of Service was introduced, involving a substantial increase in the pay of health workers, 
i.e. the ‘salary uplift’ scheme. The salary increase applies to all health technical and clinical staff. The pay increases were highly skewed 
toward staff on higher grades (Witter et al., 2014).  
30 There is some discrepancy in the documentation regarding what this involved and the mechanisms through which is worked.  
31 This was considered in early FHCI meetings (in early 2010) but no formal mechanism was agreed, with largely informal short-term 
contracts being used. 
32 Funded by the World Bank, this used MoFED budget systems to account for transfers from a World Bank fund to PHU accounts.  
33 It focuses on improving a number of indicators from the Basic Package of Essential Health Services (BPEHS), which are part of the 
FHCI: 1. Women of reproductive age using modern family planning (BPEHS 7.2); 2. Pregnant women receiving four antenatal 
consultations (ANC–IV) (BPEHS 7.1.1); 3. Deliveries conducted under safe conditions (BPEHS 7.1.2); 4. Women receiving three 
postnatal consultations (PNC–III) (BPEHS 7.1.4); 5. Children under one year of age receiving full and timely course of immunisations 
(BPEHS 7.6); 6. Outpatient visits with curative services for children under five years old according to Integrated Management of 
Newborn and Childhood Illness (IMNCI) Protocol (BPEHS 7.7). 
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5.1.2.1 Trends in heath expenditure 
To assess the adequacy of expenditure on health, the most common international benchmark (as 
regularly cited in MoHS planning documents) is the Abuja Declaration level of 15% of total 
government (public) expenditure on health.34 However, reflecting limitations in this target,35 we also 
use alternative benchmarks (McIntyre and Meheus, 2014). These are: 
 domestic government spending on health care of at least 5% of GDP;36  
 at least US$ 86 per capita to provide a minimum level of key health services in low-income 
countries. This is especially important in low-income countries in which domestic government 
spending of 5% of GDP would be insufficient to provide such access;37 
 a related focus on the level of OOP payments, given the finding that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of THE provided by OOP payments is associated with an average 
increase in the proportion of households facing catastrophic payments of 2.2 percentage points 
(McIntyre and Meheus, 2014). 
NHA data are used to examine THE in the sector: these include government expenditure, 
development partner expenditure (‘donor’), household expenditure (which is used for examining 
OOP payments), and private health insurance. Where possible we have tried to present figures in 
both nominal and real (i.e. factoring in inflation) terms in order to provide an overall picture of the 
total value of resources in the sector. However, as Box 6 explains, some caution should be taken 
when considering inflation, and thus real expenditure, in this context. 
Box 6:  Adjusting expenditure for inflation 
As various figures in the report show, factoring inflation into expenditure trends greatly changes the 
picture of health financing in Sierra Leone, with nominal spending failing to keep up with the high inflation 
experienced at the time of the FHCI. Given this, this box outlines the rationale for using inflation-adjusted 
data, as well as some limitations in its use. 
Overall, it is important to present expenditure figures in real terms, as this is a better reflection of the value 
of financing in the sector, i.e. how many goods and services those resources are purchasing. For 
example, if infrastructure spending has risen but the price of materials has increased even more then less 
infrastructure work may actually be completed. Alternatively, the presumed motivational increase for 
health workers caused by salary increases may be tempered in the context that those goods and services 
they buy have also increased in price.  
Ideally we would adjust to real terms (deflate) using a price index that is specific to the expenditure in the 
health sector in Sierra Leone. However, this type of health price index is not routinely available or easily 
used. In cases such as this, the usual practice would be to deflate using a general index such as the 
Consumer Prices Index (CPI) or the GDP deflator. In this evaluation, we have used the CPI to adjust 
prices to real terms, with the difference between using this index and the general GDP deflator relatively 
minimal. The pragmatic assumption is that this is a reasonable proxy for changes in health sector prices, 
but this is not certain. Therefore, we have also compared the price increases in the health component of 
the CPI with the overall CPI change (see below). The health component of the CPI relates to household 
expenditure on health items, rather than the much wider expenditure of the health sector (which will 
                                               
34 As per Witter et al (2013), we examine this in the context of discretionary funds the government controls, thus including budget 
support in both the nominator and denominator sides of the ratio. 
35 It has been noted that finance ministries globally have been dismissive of the target and tend to ignore it in their decision-making. 
Another difficulty is that specifying a target for increasing the share of government expenditure on the health sector implies that 
spending on other sectors should decline, which could mean less expenditure on other social services, which could, in turn, adversely 
affect other social determinants of health. 
36 The range for developing countries is currently between 1.8% to an average of 8.2% of GDP (McIntyre and Meheus, 2014). This 
proposal is based on cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between government spending on health services and health status 
indicators. It is also supported by the World Health Report 2010 and is in line with the global average of government health care 
expenditure.  
37 Further, if public spending on health at a level of US$ 86 per capita were to be funded entirely from domestic government sources, it 
would account for an average of nearly 15% of GDP in low-income countries; this is clearly unrealistic. 
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include salaries, infrastructure, equipment, drugs, etc.). However, over the last five years the general 
pattern between the health CPI component and the overall CPI is broadly similar. 
 
 Apr-10 Apr-11 Apr-12 Apr-13 Apr-14 
CPI health component (rate of price increase) 27% 11% 7% 7% 6% 
CPI 18% 16% 13% 10% 7% 
Source: SSL 
There are limitations in placing too much emphasis on real term financing in terms of the FHCI so some 
caution is advised. 
 Price changes that relate to consultation charges or drugs costs would not be that relevant to 
FHCI target groups, as in principle they do not pay for these goods.  
 Much of the donor funding is in foreign currency and then spent directly in foreign currency on, for 
example, drugs, or foreign salaries of INGOs. As a result, price changes related to these foreign 
currency transactions are likely to be less when compared to those for local expenditure (with the 
Leone exchange rate responding to high inflation).  
Table 7 and figures 11, 12 and 13 provide an overview of expenditure trends (before and after the 
FHCI) in the sector, incorporating both domestic and external resources.38 There is only available 
data from the 2013 NHA with data for 2011 and 2012 not yet collated, although estimated figures 
have been provided, based on annualised trends. 
Table 7: THE (nominal), 2004–2013 
SLL billions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2013* 
THE  815.9 966.8 968.4 923.4 1098.8 1443.9 1811 2517 
THE per capita (US$) 60.70 65.67 62.67 57.83 67.13 75.26 78.71 96.47 
Source: NHA 2004–2006, 2007–2010, 2013  
Both nominal and real expenditure increased after 2010, but the growth rate of expenditure 
levelled off in nominal and real terms during 2011–2013 (Figure 11). 39 The growth rate in 2010 
was actually slightly lower than that of 2009, a year before the FHCI, although as Box 3 notes this 
is as much likely to reflect missing expenditure data in 2008 as a significant financing change in 
2009.  
In per capita terms, THE per capita in US$ rose from US$ 60 in 2004 to US$ 96 in 2013 with the 
main increases occurring in 2008 (16%), 2009 (12.5%) and 2010 (5%). Indeed, the growth 
between 2009 (US$ 75) and 2013 (US$ 96) does suggest a significant jump in expenditure, in line 
with recommendations for a basic package of health. However, as shown below, the vast majority 
of the overall financing, and the jump from US$ 75 to US$ 96, was still provided by households, 
meaning that this basic level of care being provided is causing undue distress.40 
Using the same data as above but annualising trend rates it is possible to analyse whether the 
FHCI provided a step change in expenditure in the sector.41 For THE, the picture is somewhat 
ambiguous, depending on whether it is inflation adjusted, and the periods with which FHCI is being 
                                               
38 It should be noted that each year represents total expenditure for that year, and thus the first year of the FHCI is expenditure to the 
right of the 2009 data point. 
39 As data from 2011 and 2012 are missing we do not know for certain if expenditure can be attributed to the FHCI in 2010 or a later 
change, but as it was the major policy initiative during this period it is reasonable to assume this was the main policy factor. 
40 This ‘high’ level of per capita expenditure is driven by the extremely high level of household funding, which is above the level that 
would be expected given Sierra Leone’s economic characteristics. See Box 3 on the limitations relating to the NHA data. 
41 These graphs take the annualised average growth rate pre-FHCI and compare to the average growth rate 2010–2013, i.e. they 
smooth the fluctuations in figures 11 and 12 for illustrative purposes. 
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compared.42 Figure 12 below compares post-FHCI trends with 2004–2009, showing a significant 
step change in the growth rate of expenditure in the sector; however, once this is adjusted for 
inflation this change disappears, showing a moderate declining trend in health expenditure over 
time both pre- and post-FHCI (see Figure 13).43 In the sections below we will explore further if this 
is also the case for those targeted expenditures to FHCI groups. 
                                               
42 Whereas trend rates in 2007–2009 compared with 2010–2013 show a decrease in real expenditure following 2010. This reflects both 
the low levels of expenditure in the sector 2004–2006, as well as the significant apparent expenditure in 2009, which was pre-FHCI. 
43 NHA data is patchy with some significant donors, such as Global Fund and WHO, showing zero funding in 2008, with 2009 figures 
therefore showing a rapid increase in funding. This therefore limits comparisons of growth rates before and after FHCI. 
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Figure 11: THE: 2004–2013 
 
 
Figure 12: THE average trends 
pre/post-FHCI, 2004–2013, 
in nominal terms 
 
Source: NHA 2004–2007, 2007–2010 and 201344 
Figure 13: THE average trends pre/post-
FHCI, 2004–2013 in 2007 
prices 
 
 
 
A more nuanced picture emerges when household expenditure is removed, allowing us to focus 
only on public (government and public insurance45) and donor financing – a better indication of 
whether the burden of health care is moving away from poorer households.46 Figures 14 and 15 
                                               
 
45 Although once again note that the latter is very small. 
46 This is particularly important given some of the limitations in household expenditure figures as explained in Box3. 
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show that public financing experienced strong increases in 2010, the first year of the FHCI, but 
levelled off over time and reduced in real terms. 47 Donor financing continued to increase.48 In 
terms of both composition of spend and per capita spend, donor financing has become particularly 
prevalent since the FHCI. 
Figures 16 and 17 show similar conclusions when analysing if the FHCI led to a step change in 
financing in the sector, with the first year’s impetus waning somewhat over time. Taken together 
(i.e. donor and government), it appears that non-household resources largely continued post-FHCI 
along a similar growth trajectory to that seen previously. This is a perhaps surprising conclusion, 
although partly explained by limitations in pre-FHCI expenditure data (see Box 3), and the fast 
expenditure growth as Sierra Leone recovered from war pre-FHCI. It is also worth noting that this 
continued growth was at a healthy 5% in real terms. 
                                               
47 Although it is important to note that with high inflation during this period it is perhaps slightly less surprising that government 
expenditure was unable to increase as quickly. 
48 This is still significant given the high growth rate of donor expenditure before the FHCI (given the low starting point) and high inflation 
after. 
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 41 
Figure 14: Nominal and real public 
financing of health, 2004–2013 
 
Figure 15: Public health financing 
pre/post-FHCI (2007 prices) 
 
Figure 16: Nominal and real donor 
financing of health, 2004–
2013 
 
Figure 17: Donor health financing 
pre/post (2007 prices) 
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Figure 18: Donor and government financing pre-/post-FHCI (2007 prices) 
 
 
Source: NHA: 2004–2007, 2007–2010, 2013*49 
Overall, the FHCI can be argued to have catalysed donor funding with Sierra Leone having one of 
the highest donor-financed health systems, when compared regionally (with the exception of 
Liberia). 
Figure 19:  External resources as a proportion of THE 
 
Source: WHO: Global Health Expenditure Database 
5.1.2.2 Household and OOP financing 
The composition of financing has changed significantly in the last few years (see figure 20 and 
table 8 below), particularly in regard to household and donor funding. Household funding as a 
proportion of THE has gone from a high of 83% in 2007 to 62% in 2013, with donor funding 
                                               
49 Public estimates for 2004–2006 have been taken from GoSL accounts rather than NHA given the data issues for those years. 
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ranging from a low of 12% in 2007 to a high of 32% in 2013. Indeed, there is an almost inverse 
relationship between household funding and donor funding.50 
Table 8:  Sources of financing per capita, US$ per capita (nominal) 
US$ per 
capita 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2013 
THE  60.70 65.67 62.67 57.83 67.13 75.26 78.71 96.47 
Donor  12.14 13.79 13.35 6.94 8.73 18.06 19.68 30.46 
Household 46.13 48.59 51.39 48.00 55.04 52.68 52.73 59.43 
Government 2.43 3.28 3.13 2.89 3.36 4.52 5.51 6.92 
Source: NHA 2004–2006, 2007–2010 and 2013 
Figure 20:  Financing sources 2004–2013 
 
Source: NHA 2004–2006, 2007–2010 and 201351  
The decline in the proportion of household expenditure since the FHCI began is a positive, with 
donor financing boosting non-household financing and therefore reducing OOP payments and 
catastrophic payments. However, again this partly represents a continuation of a trend that started 
before the FHCI. Moreover, both as a proportion of THE and in per capita terms household 
expenditure is still very high. To put the 62% of household financing in context, the World Health 
Report of 2010 stated that it is only when direct payments fall to 15–20% of THE that the incidence 
of financial catastrophe and impoverishment falls to negligible levels (WHO, 2010a).  
As Box 3 earlier outlined, we should be cautious in how much we interpret household expenditure 
from NHA data. Simple comparisons with regional countries suggest they are artificially high, with 
nearly three times the proportion of the economy being spent on OOP payments than elsewhere 
(Figure 21), with the absolute value of these payments being higher than far richer countries (see 
Figure 22).  
                                               
50 This also reflects limitations in the NHA data collection process, which relied on extrapolating household financing in 2004 adjusted 
for inflation, and thus any increased financing from donors above inflation will invariably lead a change in overall proportion. 
51 Public estimates for 2004–2006 have been taken from GoSL accounts rather than NHA given the data issues for those years. 
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Figure 21:  OOP payments as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: WHO: Global Health Expenditure Database 
Figure 22:  OOP payments per capita (US$) 
 
Source: WHO: Global Health Expenditure Database 
Later in the report, we examine evidence on changing affordability and incidence of catastrophic 
payments at the household level (section 5.3.1).  
5.1.3 Government expenditure  
The World Health Report 2010 unambiguously states that in order to move toward UHC, 
mandatory prepayment financing mechanisms must form the core of domestic health care 
financing (WHO, 2010a). This section therefore analyses in greater depth the role of government 
expenditure following the FHCI.  
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Overall government health expenditure52 increased significantly, from around SLL 75 billion in 
2009 to SLL 129 billion in 2010, and then SLL 165 billion in 2011. Figure 23 shows that even in 
real terms this is exceptional growth – 44% in 2009 and 46% in 2010. However, as noted above, 
the growth rate in real expenditure declined in 2011 and was even negative in 2012. Government 
expenditure on health per capita increased from US$ 3.1 in 2009 to US$ 5.2 in 2010 and US$ 6.5 
in 2011. This still remains very low given the needs in the country.  
These figures suggest that increases in government expenditure were occurring before the FHCI, 
but that there was no additional prioritisation after the first year ‘big bang’ of FHCI. Table 9 
supports this, showing fairly minimal reprioritisation of government resources toward the health 
sector in terms of actual expenditure as a proportion of total government expenditure or revenue in 
2010, although this picked up slightly in 2011.53  
At between 1% (2008) and 2% (2010) of GDP, the level of government expenditure is still far less 
that the 5% GDP recommended by Xu et al. (2010) to provide an essential package of health 
interventions.54  
Table 9:  Government expenditure trends, 2008–2013 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual 
Health expenditure* as a 
percentage of total domestic 
revenue 
7.2% 10.0% 8.3% 9.8% 8.4% 7.2% 
Health expenditure* as a 
percentage of total expenditure  
6% 7% 8% 9% 7% 7% 
Health expenditure* as a 
percentage of GDP  
0.8% 1.2% 1.7% 1.3% 1.1% 1.0% 
* Expenditure figures do not include foreign-financed capital expenditure given the paucity of data 
Source: MoFED and MoHS 
                                               
52 Including development funds that are allocated to the national budget, e.g. though budget support. However, this does not include off-
budget expenditure, such as individual projects in the health sector that are not funded through GoSL systems.  
53 This pick-up in 2011 is relevant given that the FHCI was introduced in the second quarter of 2010 and the 2011 Budget was the first in 
which the FHCI could be included. The increase in expenditure as a percentage of domestic revenue in 2010 while trends in 
expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure stayed similar potentially reflects the additional donor resources being provided (but 
that are not captured in government revenue estimates). 
54 Although if donor financing is included, this figure does rise above 5%. 
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Figure 23: Government health 
expenditure, nominal and real, 
2007–2013 
 
Figure 24: Government expenditure vs. 
Abuja target 
 
Source: MoHS figures 
Progress toward the Abuja target, a target indicator as part of the FHCI (GoSL, 2009a), improved 
in 2009 to 2011, although it decreased significantly in 2012. There continues to remain a significant 
gap to the overall target (Figure 24). As a Save the Children (2012) report noted, ‘with only three 
years to go, the government needs to double the current allocation to meet the Abuja Declaration 
by 2015, and provide a 100-fold increase in funding to meet [the government’s] own target by 
2015.’ 
5.1.3.1 Changes to expenditure, by budget line 
The composition of the health budget has changed drastically since the FHCI. There are four main 
budget lines within the MoHS: personnel (salaries), recurrent, capital, and transfers to local 
councils (primary and secondary service delivery).55 As Figure 25 shows, there was a particularly 
large increase in the GoSL’s payroll expenditure in 2010, and to a lesser extent in capital 
expenditure. This reflects the Global Fund and DFID’s reimbursement of significant amounts of 
health worker salaries to accompany the introduction of the FHCI. 
                                               
55 Recurrent budget funds administrative issues as well as drugs and vertical programmes whereas local council transfers are used by 
DHMTs to fund day-to-day care at local facilities.  
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Figure 25: Main items of MoHS expenditure, 2008–2013 
 
 
Source: MoHS figures  
Transfers to local councils largely remained the same, and decreased as a proportion of 
government expenditure. To that end, it appears that some centralisation of expenditure occurred.  
5.1.4 Changes to expenditure, by programme area 
Analysing NHA data by type of funding expenditure, Figure 26 shows that there were significant 
expenditure increases in public health programmes in 2010 (even in real terms). This was most 
notably with respect to MCH, consistent with the FHCI, but also can be seen in regard to malaria 
prevention and preventive health care. This latter finding is important given the potential 
displacement effect of the FHCI on other health programmes, as well as providing another 
contributory cause to changing health outcomes. 
Inpatient expenditures have also reduced, potentially suggesting better first-line treatment. The 
NHA of 2013 revealed that three-quarters of all costs associated with visits are outpatient visits. 
This is in line with data from the SLIHS 2011/2012, which indicates that only 2% of survey 
respondents were hospitalised in the last four weeks (GoSL, 2015). This significant increase in 
MCH expenditure was financed by new external financing in this area (going from 0% in 2009 to 
70% in 2010). However, these results suggest that some reclassification of data is likely to have 
occurred, with the potential that stakeholders would increasingly label financing as ‘maternal health 
care’ following the high-profile introduction of the FHCI. 
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Figure 26: Expenditure by function, 2007–201356 
 
 
Figure 27: Expenditure by public health, 
2007–2010 
 
 
Figure 28: Expenditure on maternal 
health, 2007–2010 (real 
terms) 
 
Source: NHA 2004–2007, 2007–2010 and 2013* 
While the composition between public and private providers of health has remained broadly similar 
from 2007 to 2010, in 2010 expenditure through public providers increased at a slightly higher rate. 
Expenditure in the category ‘other’ (made up of pharmacies, providers of public health 
programmes and health administration) also increased significantly.  
There was a very large increase in expenditure through PHUs in 2010 (both in nominal and real 
terms), which supports the suggestion that although overall resources in the sector may not have 
increased significantly FHCI-specific expenditure did increase. The 2013 results show that this 
increase continued in both normal and real terms. The majority of this financing through PHUs was 
                                               
56 A number of categories in 2013 are not consistent with 2010 and are therefore not included in the estimates (e.g. pharmaceuticals 
and capital formation). 
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managed by non-government entities (mostly individual households, as well as NGOs and other 
donor programmes).  
Figure 29: Trends in financing providers, 
2007–2010 
 
 
Figure 30: PHU expenditure, 2007–2013 
 
 
 
The 2013 NHA, which included more in-depth analysis related to recipients’ age of expenditure, 
reveals that donor interventions focus mainly on MCH. Donors are contributing 60% toward under-
5s, which is positive and can probably be attributed to the FHCI. The general picture is strongly 
influenced by OOP expenditures, which are largely spent on adults. This is also an indication that 
the FHCI is reaching part of its goals with less expenditure of households on the FHCI target 
groups (GoSL, 2015).
Table 10:  THE by age, 2013 (SLL) 
  Age under 5 Age above 5 
Other age / not 
specified 
Total 
Government 58,474,103,449 92,741,639,036 20,474,321,555 171,690,064,040 
Donor 141,444,225,731 93,951,121,070 55,936,794,997 291,332,141,797 
NGO 119,697,696,208 198,057,508,130 122,083,100,791 439,838,305,129 
OOP 286,950,520,339 1,264,146,362,851  1,551,096,883,189 
Source: NHA, 2013 
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Figure 31: THE – age distribution according to source (%) 
 
Source: NHA, 2013 
5.1.5 Marginal expenditure on the FHCI 
It is also possible to see how much additional expenditure was directed toward the FHCI 
specifically.57 This provides estimates of FHCI financing by calculating the increased funds going 
to FHCI target groups, compared with years previous to FHCI.58 Two costs are provided, one 
which includes all donor financing to RCH59 and one which only includes only the direct FHCI costs 
associated with new drugs, payroll increases and PBF. The assumptions used to overcome 
limitations in the data are explained in Annex F.60  
To note, these estimates are not the full cost of providing health care to the target groups. This 
would focus on all expenditure to those groups, rather than the additional expenditure as a result of 
the FHCI. This full costing is provided in Annex D. A complete costing would also include 
expenditure undertaken by households (see section 5.3.1), but the focus here is on what additional 
expenditure GoSL and the international community mobilised for this initiative.  
A few observations to make (with the range in estimates indicative of the two methods of 
calculations) include: 
 The direct cost of the FHCI for large known items, as an increase on previous funding to similar 
groups, is around US$ 25 (2010) to US$ 40 million (2013). These are not far off the estimates 
provided by MoHS in 2012.61 These are much higher at US$ 40 to 90 million if all additional 
expenditures on these groups are included. 
 FHCI direct financing (e.g. payroll, drugs, PBF) equated to an increase of an additional US$ 4 
(2010) to US$ 6.2 (2013) per capita in government and donor funding. With broader indirect 
RCH expenditure proving an additional (i.e. on top of direct FHCI expenditure) US$ 2.5 (2010) 
                                               
57 Where there have not been new sources of funding that can easily be attributed to the FHCI, we have sought to compare expenditure 
post-FHCI with the trend rate previously to understand the additional cost. 
58 i.e. each year is compared with an average of the two years preceding the FHCI to estimate new funding in the sector. 
59 This uses data from the NHA in 2013, which are of better quality and more granular, to estimate the proportion of THE going to 
maternal and under-five groups, and then applying a similar proportion to other years. The Muskoka methodology was also used as a 
cross check but was discounted as it appeared to underestimate the expenditure on these groups in the Sierra Leone context.  
60 This includes the input nature of the budget, meaning programme-based budgeting is weak, limited data distinguishing between 
promised and actual expenditure, incomplete foreign aid financing information, and differences between fiscal years between donors 
and GoSL. 
61 The figures in MoHS (2012) do not explain how they were calculated with donor pledges rather than disbursement being used.  
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to US$ 8 (2013) per capita spend. Donors have provided between 55% and 75% of the new 
direct funding to FHCI, outside of household financing.  
 Taking RCH expenditure as a whole (i.e. not just direct FHCI expenditure), donor financing 
contributed even more – from 79% to 88%. 
 The main funder for the FHCI direct costs is DFID, making up 40–55% of new direct FHCI 
funding. 
Table 11:  Increased costs directly associated with the FHCI 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total incremental costs FHCI (SLL, millions) 148,688 228,891 285,031 395,562 
Total incremental costs FHCI (SLL, millions) 
without 'other donor funds' 
91,870 127,619 129,235 172,889 
     
GoSL FHCI cost (SLL, millions) 31,155 43,227 34,928 82,408 
Salary expenditures of GoSL as recurrent 
expenditures 
20,739 19,320 29,515 70,860 
Drugs and medical consumables  0 0 0 0 
Key expenditures for service delivery 0 -218 5,678 10,506 
Domestic funded capital expenditure 
(incremental) 
10,416 24,125 -265 1,042 
Donor FHCI cost (SLL, millions) 117,533 185,664 250,103 313,154 
Payment of health workers’ salary supplement 
as part of FHCI 
19,413 33,811 36,601 12,112 
Drugs and medical consumables  32,424 37,910 37,682 52,823 
Key activities for direct service delivery 8,878 11,725 13,374 14,752 
PBF (World Bank) - 947 6,649 10,794 
Estimate of other donor funds going to 
maternal health care and under-five children 
56,818 101,271 155,796 222,673 
Source: Estimates based on data from MoHS data, and NHA 
DFID in 2010 and 2011 contributed significant expenditure for commodities procurement through 
UNICEF and UNFPA. To what extent this is all additional financing is often unclear, with some 
drugs for the FHCI groups already being funded before the FHCI (given the existing exemption 
list). However, all stakeholders agreed that the level of funding, and amount of drugs procured on a 
non-cost-recovery basis, was a significant step change, and it has therefore been classified as 
‘new’ expenditure. In 2014, there was a notable change in that some funding was provided by 
GoSL, through MoFED, for FHCI drugs through the newly established NPPU. However, given that 
2014 data are affected by the Ebola outbreak, and the lack of NHA data for 2014, the estimates 
above related to the years 2010–2013. 
The salary uplift undertaken in Sierra Leone was a large multiple of the preceding salary bill. On 
average, health worker salaries in Sierra Leone rose by a factor of two to three times their original 
level (through both increases by grade and grade advancement). How much of the further increase 
in 2011 was attributable to the additional recruitment and how much to other factors, including a 
possible redefinition of those entitled to salary uplift, was unclear to an earlier evaluation team 
(Stevenson et al., 2012).62 In terms of estimating new payroll costs as a result of the FHCI, we 
                                               
62 It is known that the original intention was to restrict the salary uplift to ‘frontline’ health workers, a concept that would have excluded 
laboratory technicians (despite the fact that they were in a position to charge patients for laboratory tests). The line of demarcation 
eventually adopted was whether a staff member was liable to transfer from the MoHS, in which case they would not be eligible for the 
increases. What is not known is when this change in defining eligibility was implemented. 
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have added this new donor funding to the marginal increase of GoSL funding above the GoSL 
trend rate pre-FHCI. This shows that the government also greatly increased its contribution to 
salaries alongside that of donors. DFID will have contributed an average of 27% to the total cost of 
health worker salaries over the first three years of the scheme, the Global Fund will have 
contributed almost exactly 20%, with GoSL having contributed 55% of the total. The DFID 
contribution was particularly important in the first year, when it accounted for 40% of the total cost. 
Payroll budget now makes up a significantly higher proportion than spending on goods and 
services (e.g. vertical programmes, drugs, maintenance, etc.) in contrast to the year before. 
Moreover, there was a massive reallocation against the original budget, with payroll 159% higher 
and goods and services 39% lower than the original 2010 budget. This increase continued in 2011, 
although it levelled off in 2012 and 2013.  
Figure 32: Payroll, 2008–2013 
 
 
Figure 33: Capital expenditure, 2008–2013 
 
Figure 34: Budget execution – payroll, 
2008–2013 
 
Figure 35: Budget execution – capital 
expenditure, 2008–2013 
 
Source: MoHS figures 
Capital expenditure also increased in 2009 from a very low base, with substantial increases in real 
terms in 2010 and 2011 (280% and 110% respectively), linked to the need to develop and upgrade 
facilities to be used for the FHCI (see sections 2.5 and 4.4.). However, there were also dramatic 
decreases in capital expenditure in 2012, with KIIs at facility level also supporting the idea that 
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after the initial refurbishment of facilities only minimal expenditure had occurred. Officials in 
facilities noted poor maintenance and refurbishment in recent years. Development partner 
financing of this capital budget is significant: it grew from SLL 23 billion in the 2008 budget to SLL 
140 billion in 2014. In the last three years, foreign financing of capital expenditure has thus made 
up over 95% of total budgeted capital expenditure, although in reality the poor execution of 
projects would suggest that some of this expenditure did not materialise. 
As Table 12 below shows, there were large increases in funding to MCH in the 2011 budget, the 
first that included the FHCI.63 Although there was the potential for displacement of funding to 
vertical programmes through funding the FHCI, this does not seem to have materialised and in any 
case may have been minimised by some of this funding being off-budget and controlled by donors. 
But there were significant absolute and relative decreases in HR management, secondary, and 
tertiary expenditure in 2011, the first budget that included FHCI expenditure. This reflects a 
declining non-payroll recurrent budget (with significant increases in the payroll budget). 
Table 12: MCH expenditure, Budget, 2008–2014 
SLL (millions) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
of which: MCH/Expanded 
Programme of Immunisation (EPI) 
2,044 2,495 2,995     
of which: FHCI    6,819 6,052 13,500 20,100 
Growth rate  22% 20% 128% -11% 123% 49% 
% of overall MoHS recurrent (non-
payroll) budget64 
8% 6% 7% 21% 20% 35% 28% 
Source: MoHS budget data 
5.1.6 Impact on local funding  
Were user fees still being collected?  
Before considering the effects of removing user fees from facilities, it is necessary to understand 
the actual extent to which the FHCI was enforced. There are a range of sources on which to draw 
in relation to assessing whether user fees were still being collected: these range from stand-alone 
studies that sampled a number of facilities to studies based on nationally representative samples 
that assess expenditure within the household. However, in all cases some caution should be used 
when assessing their conclusions given the patchy availability of data and lack of comparable 
baselines and methods. Nonetheless, overall most of the evidence suggests that there was some 
continuation of payments but at a significantly lower level (see section 5.3.1).  
All the KIIs undertaken during the evaluation pointed to two major issues in this regard. First, the 
payroll increases, which would potentially have mitigated the continued use of informal fees, only 
covered those in the formal payroll system. Throughout our research there continued to be health 
care workers operating outside the payroll system, leaving open the potential for them to be 
remunerated through other means.65 Another issue, regularly cited by officials in the KIIs, was the 
removal of remote allowances for rural health care workers reducing motivation, and again opening 
up the risk that incentives would be provided in other ways. Second, problems with the availability 
of drugs led to potential charges for patients, with a range of coping strategies adopted by facilities 
                                               
63 Note that actual data are limited at line-item level, with various estimates having been provided to the evaluation team. 
64 This only measures government budget expenditures and does include donor financing. There is also a risk, although no evidence 
has been found of this, that expenditures were increasingly labelled as MCH given the prominence of the FHCI and the requirements to 
report performance in that area.  
65 In our research, while officials said they did not charge FHCI target groups, many expressed dissatisfaction with having not been paid 
for years. 
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found during the evaluation teams’ interviews, including giving cost-recovery drugs for free, 
charging FHCI groups for cost-recovery drugs, sending FHCI target groups to private pharmacies 
(where they had to pay), and officials buying and selling (or providing for free in some cases) drugs 
out of their own pocket. 
Have replacement funds been adequate? 
The initial replacement of funds at the facility level outside of the salary increases was provided 
through a ‘cash-to-facilities’ programme, which transferred funds into facilities’ accounts (once they 
had been set up).66 This was set up as a uniform amount per facility of SLL 1,000,000 to each PHU 
account, per quarter against submitted returns. There were difficulties in this: as one senior MoHS 
official said, ‘there was a vacuum’ at local level. Some delays related to practical challenges, such 
as setting up bank accounts for local facilities,67 whereas other issues were governance related, for 
example in districts passing on local council resources to facilities.  
A more obvious issue, as noted by DHMTs, was that while there were some replacement funds the 
system needed increased funding to cope with higher utilisation. The health tracking study of 2012 
found that all facilities visited reported inadequate funding (Save the Children, 2012). Figure 36 
shows local councils did receive significant increases in health transfers, growing in real terms in 
2009 and 2010, although remaining largely static thereafter despite increases in utilisation.  
The expenditure split of local council transfers between primary and secondary expenditure has 
remained about even. However, as Table 14 shows, despite these overall increases, expenditure 
was significantly lower in 2010 than that budgeted, with a particular underspend on primary health 
care – a concern given the increased utilisation at this level following the FHCI. The weakness in 
government financing was partly offset through significant World Bank programmes (i.e. the DSDP 
and RCHP) that provided funding to the local councils (and facilities through PBF) for health-
related expenditures. Similarly, a number of PHUs reported during interviews that they approached 
NGOs when urgent financing was required (e.g. for fuel or equipment). 
Figure 36: Budget execution – health transfers to local councils, 2008 – 
13 
 
Source: MoHS figures 
                                               
66 Note that drugs for the FHCI were also provided centrally. 
67 It was noted that reporting can be challenging as PHU in-charges only travel to the district towns once a month; dates by which 
reports are demanded should reflect these constraints. 
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Table 13: Local council health expenditure 
SLL millions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Primary 7,882 6,205 7,919 7,764 7,900 7,412 
Secondary 6,391 7,078 7,705 7,501 8,300 7,704 
Tertiary  - - 14,942 14,253 17,300 15,414 
Total 14,273 13,283 30,565 29,518 33,500 30,530 
Growth rate (real – 2007 prices) 18% 7% -2% 0% -17% 
Source: MoHS figures 
Table 14: Local council health budget allocation 
Variance (bud. Exe.) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Primary  30% 134% -48% -1% 6% -11% 
Secondary -79% -80% -18% -8% 7% -11% 
Tertiary     -11% 13% -11% 
Source: MoHS figures 
A further issue was the timeliness of these resources. The Save the Children Health Tracking 
study reported that all facilities visited reported delays in receiving funds in a predictable manner. 
Undertaken in quarter four of 2012, the study found that facilities had still not received quarter 
three allocations from district councils, who highlighted delays from MoFED. This finding is 
supported by the Sierra Leone Health Sector Tracking Study (2013), which found that none of the 
local councils received their allocated funds in the first quarter of 2013. This too was supported by 
interviews with the Budget Advocacy Network, which suggested that little funding, apart from the 
World Bank’s PBF (see below), was reaching remote areas, and when it does it has significant 
delays.68 Hospital and district staff noted in the KIIs that the infrequency of fund disbursement 
affected the ability to plan for activities such as outreach or supervision in districts.  
This reflects the following issues:  
1. A general weakness around planning and cash management between central and local 
governments with weak governance arrangements;  
2. A reduction in overall heath financing by government in 2012; 
3. The centralised decision-making; and  
4. That districts are only reimbursed once after the Local Government Finance Department has 
received all returns from all the councils in all the sectors. This creates disincentives for those 
councils that are monitoring and sending their financial returns back on time (Save the Children 
Health and Sanitation Budget Tracking, 2012). This is exacerbated by weak financial 
management capacity at the DHMT and hospital levels.  
Even when disbursed, little of the local council funds are provided to PHUs, which have to rely on 
other sources of funding. PBF has become the main source of revenue given the reduction in cost-
recovery drugs, particularly in those facilities that did not hold cost-recovery drugs or had few 
patients outside the target groups. However, there were consistent complaints during the research 
that the PBF money is not frequently forthcoming (a finding supported by an independent 
evaluation by Cordaid (2014)), and without the direct cash that cost-recovery provided on a daily 
basis, the facilities lacked liquidity (i.e. when PBF is paid, it is paid into a back account quarterly, 
                                               
68 The World Bank also supports local government through the RCHP and DSDP, the first of which provides PBF-based on achieving results related 
to the FHCI, as well as some financing for inputs such as vehicles and drugs. The allocation is integrated with the allocation of 
government funding, and uses the same allocation formula as the Ministry of Local Government (although from a budget 
perspective it is reported as part of the development expenditure, and requires the use of separate bank accounts).  
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which still requires a trip to access this cash). Other sources of funding frequently cited by officials 
were from donors, which included equipment and small stipends for volunteers. This had the 
added bonus of being quite flexible and responsive to particular needs, for example fuel for the 
generator, drugs to replace the FHCI drugs when there are stock-outs (especially in the early part 
of FHCI) or new lights for emergency deliveries, etc. The flexibility of the PBF has also allowed for 
PHUs to fund TBAs, who were focusing on private business pre-FHCI. 
A survey conducted in 2012 highlighted that priority expenditures by PHUs went beyond informal 
salary top-ups, including facility maintenance, incentives to health care volunteers (who would not 
be part of the payroll system), support to community outreach programmes, and support for 
medical consumables (Save the Children, 2012 – also backed up by interviews with MoHS, and 
PHU stakeholders in national and district KIIs). The 141 PHUs that responded to the survey stated 
that they spent SLL 618 million on such expenditure, significantly more that the SLL 271.6 million 
they were reported to receive from cost-recovery. Interestingly, over one-third was spent on 
volunteer incentives and community outreach, highlighting the role of non-formal staff at PHU level. 
5.1.7 PBF 
As noted above, PBF was one strategy adopted to fill in the gaps of local cash financing, reduce 
the incentives to charge informal fees and improve the quality of service delivery. Its objectives 
(GoSL, 2011) were to:  
1. Provide cash at facility level to cover the local costs of delivering services and remove the need 
for ‘informal’ fees – and filling the ‘vacuum’ noted above; 
2. Provide financial incentives to facilities in order to increase productivity and quality of care, 
especially for the identified key indicators; and 
3. Increase the equity of distribution of resources with funds from PBF allowing facilities to hire 
contractual workers and finance outreach activities.  
Although discussions of the implementation of PBF were occurring before the FHCI’s introduction, 
PBF can be viewed as part of the FHCI series of interventions, given its focus on service delivery 
related to health outcomes for women and children.69 It was financed by the World Bank under the 
RCHP’s Phase 2. The PBF system was intended to be additional to existing financing mechanisms 
for health care services, and in effect it took over from the first year of financing provided to local 
facilities for the FHCI. Whereas this financing was uniform across facilities, the PBF is incentive 
based (GoSL, 2011). PHUs receive PBF funds according to their achievement of six output-based 
measures and performance.70 Up to 60% of PBF funds can be allocated for incentives for technical 
health staff and the rest is to be used for payments to non-technical staff, operational costs and 
minor investments at the facility. In general, hospitals do not receive PBF.  
There are a number of potential advantages and concerns with PBF that are well documented in 
the global literature, with advocates arguing that it can lead to improved incentives, improved 
efficiency, use of data, greater participation, and a focus on quality (Loevinsohn and Harding, 
2005; Eichler, 2006; Soeters et al., 2006; Naimoli and Vergeer, 2010; Perrot et al., 2010), whereas 
                                               
69 The idea of incentive-based payments was also included in the original FHCI policy documentation (GoSL, 2009). The six indicators were part of 
the BPEHS: 1. Women of reproductive age using modern family planning methods for protection against unwanted pregnancy and to achieve 
desired birth spacing (BPEHS 7.2); 2. Pregnant women receive four appropriate antenatal consultations for protection against pregnancy risks 
(BPEHS 7.1.1); 3. Deliveries are conducted under safe conditions: in an appropriately equipped health facility, attended by a suitably qualified health 
professional (BPEHS 7.1.2); 4. Women receive three postnatal consultations for protection against post-delivery risks (BPEHS 7.1.4); 5. Children 
under one year of age receive full and timely course of immunisations against communicable diseases (BPEHS 7.6); 6. Outpatient visits with curative 
services for children under five years old delivered according to IMNCI protocol (BPEHS 7.7). 
70 For example, of a full immunisation they receive SLL 6,000 whereas for treating a new patient they would receive SLL 1,000. 
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others have suggested that the evidence for these improvements is still weak and it may lead to 
perverse incentives such as facilities focusing on higher reward procedures (Witter et al., 2012). 
In the early part of PBF, there were limits in awareness at facility level about these new forms of 
financing. One study noted that facilities expected the SLL 1,000,000 in ‘cash at facilities’ to arrive 
on a regular basis on top of the PBF (Save the Children UK, 2012). However, another early 
assessment – albeit one with a fairly limited evidence base – suggested that PBF has resulted in 
attitudinal change in health workers. The health facilities are cleaner and health workers are using 
innovative strategies to reduce the challenges in services utilisation and quality of care (MoHS, 
2012a). Indeed, during our research some health officials expressed confusion regarding how the 
PBF is split between functions but overall there was good awareness of its main mechanisms.  
The most comprehensive monitoring to date was by conducted in 2014 by Cordaid, the external 
validation team. The resulting report contained a number of important conclusions: 
 PBF was providing cash at facility level to cover the local costs of delivering services and 
removing the need for 'informal' fees, although around 12% of patients are still paying for free 
services. PBF provides around US$ 0.5 to 1 per capita funding. The income from PBF is much 
higher than from patient fees.  
 The team concluded that to some extent PBF provided financial incentives to facilities in order 
to increase productivity and quality of care, especially for the 12 identified key indicators, 
although there were signs that this was levelling off at the time of Cordaid’s report. The 
requirement to do a quarterly verification of the data improved attention to quality and also 
resulted in an improvement in the amount of data provided by health facilities. This was backed 
up by officials, with one official noting the increased attention to detail when filling in various 
registries at the facility.  
 The PBF programme provided an equity bonus to health facilities and personnel in remote 
districts.71 This has the potential to be important given the lack of remote allowance payments 
through the central payroll process, but the PBF evaluation was not able to measure its impact 
given data limitations.  
 The incentive system was not transparent enough and payments came so late that they are no 
longer seen as reward for good performance.  
 However, it has also been suggested that some innovations have occurred as part of PBF, 
such as the use of PHUs paying fees to TBAs to refer clients to PHUs for deliveries and other 
medical help (MoHS, 2011).  
 Payments can take up to a year to arrive at PHUs, leading to health workers becoming 
frustrated and losing motivation. Late transfers of PBF funds may also have forced PHUs to 
ask for contributions from patients when funds dried up. This was supported in the KIIs at 
facility level, with most facilities not receiving PBF for over a year (with further delays during the 
Ebola crisis). Having previously been receiving funding, and promising such funding to TBAs 
and others, this cut-off from funds does seem have heightened dissatisfaction. 
 The monitoring team also questioned if the amount of PBF was too low to directly incentivise 
improved performance, especially given the issues with late payments and increased utilisation 
post-FHCI. 
 Significant differences existed between aggregated numbers in the internal and external 
verifications. With the exception of deliveries, the aggregated internal verification figures are 
12%–73% higher than the monitoring team’s results. This suggests that the reporting, 
monitoring and verification systems are not as robust as they should be.72 
                                               
71 The equity bonus ranged from 0% (e.g. Freetown and Bo), 20% (e.g. Port Loko and Pujehun), 30% (e.g. Kailahun) and 40% (e.g. 
Kenema and Koinadugu) to a maximum of 50% (Bonthe). 
72 While the obvious conclusion from this is a systematic over-reporting of indicators, the evaluation suggests interpretation errors in 
relation to case definitions may be a more significant factor. For example, condom distribution was to be excluded but some DHMTs 
included it. 
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In the last couple of years these funds were also diverted to Ebola purposes, potentially further 
reducing trust in the regularity of PBF and thus the overall incentive system. 
5.1.8 Sector coordination mechanisms 
The FHCI provided an opportunity for increased coordination in the sector between government 
and development partners as well as between government agencies. For example, it stimulated a 
number of meetings between the MoFED, MoHS and development partners that had not 
previously occurred (centred on delivery mechanisms such as traffic light reporting, regular high-
level tracking meetings, etc.). In part, this seems to have been incentivised by MoFED worries that 
other sectors such as education would be requesting similar salary increases and the large 
financing gaps present in 2010 (see section 7). It also led to new types of financing such as PBF. 
The provision of budget support by donors, and their increased funding for the FHCI, also led to 
more focus on the nature of governance and PFM systems. This was formalised by the preparation 
in 2011 (published in January 2012) of the Joint Programme of Work and Funding (JPWF) (2012–
2014), which was to support the NHSSP, and which preceded the Health COMPACT.73 The 
COMPACT provided a framework outlining the roles and responsibilities of the GoSL and its 
partners in implementing the NHSSP. The framework was based in part on concerns regarding the 
sustainability of the FHCI and the need for a coordinated government and development partner 
response.  
However, effectiveness in implementation has been mixed. While some planning structures were 
in place and new types of financing used (e.g. PBF), structural weaknesses remained. Limitations 
in relation to PFM have meant that the potential opportunities for the FHCI to bring about greater 
budget certainty and coherence between the GoSL and developments partners have not been fully 
realised, as evidence by weak budget execution (see Table 15 below). 
Table 15: Health expenditure as percentage of government revenue and expenditure 
 Budget 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Health expenditure* as a 
percentage of total expenditure** 
7.45% 7.94% 7.22% 9.52% 6.57% 7.13% 
Health expenditure as a 
percentage of total domestic 
revenue 
9.41% 9.07% 10.73% 9.78% 11.54% 11.19% 
 Actual 
Health expenditure as a 
percentage of total expenditure 
5.83% 7.47% 7.69% 8.76% 7.13% 6.98% 
Health expenditure as a 
percentage of total domestic 
revenue 
7.20% 9.99% 8.31% 9.78% 8.39% 7.19% 
* Does not include foreign-financed development funding, which was only included in MoHS accounts in 2012. 
** Includes budget support as per methodology proposed by Witter et al. (2013) 
Source: MoHS 
There was a continuation of the previous trends of volatile funding (from government and donors), 
different templates for reporting, and development partners continuing to provide significant-off-
                                               
73 The JPWF was intended to provide a basis for harmonisation of departmental activities and work plans, the alignment of stakeholder 
activities to government priorities, and to facilitate in-country and external development partners to direct funds for this policy initiative 
transparently (GoSL, 2012). 
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budget funding. Indeed, there continued to be a lack of overarching financing policy and of costed 
medium-term plans. For example, how elements of the cost-recovery would continue post-FHCI or 
how new types of risking pooling mechanisms should be considered were not clearly articulated. 
Stakeholders at the time also noted that, despite joint government–donor working groups, 
development partners tended to be quite vocal, in part reflecting the sizeable financing they were 
providing. Further, aside from the budget support tied to payroll supplements much of this funding 
occurred off-budget. Many of these working groups also became fairly inactive after a year. 
Simson (2013) reports, based on interviews with country stakeholders, that the level of attention is 
waning, with more junior officials taking roles on steering committees,74 and worries about 
sustainability are prevalent, given the continued high level of donor funding, particular for routine 
but time-sensitive tasks (which require available cash), such as monitoring trips, stationery and 
printing, fixes to quirks in the database system, etc.  
Indeed, a recent review (Green, 2014) cited the lack of progress on the JPWF, with around only 
5% of the JPWF outputs fully achieved and only 25% of the JPWF outputs partially achieved. 
Other planning challenges mirror those well known in the literature on health financing (Moon and 
Omole, 2013), including poor data on development assistance, external financing that may 
displace rather than augment domestic financing (as shown above), and the proliferation of actors.  
There are also challenges at local level, with disconnects between plans at central and local level, 
and the release of funds still slow (or not reaching people as intended). As noted above, despite 
decentralisation in 2004, the financing for the health sector is quite centralised, with the HR 
function, salaries, and the purchasing and distribution of key inputs such as drugs controlled 
centrally. While this can lead to economies of scale, it requires robust planning, management and 
supervision in order to work well.  
At the local level, the FHCI has increased the reliance on a top-down supply of inputs. In the past, 
health clinics levied fees and used these resources locally for discretionary spending with the tacit 
approval/acceptance of the MoHS. In place of this, salaries have been increased significantly and 
staff added to the payroll – this may have narrowed the space for local decision-making and 
problem solving, although it is of course hard to evaluate the counterfactual (Simson, 2013).75 This 
corresponds to Green (2014) arguing that there is a need to improve the district and PHU planning 
process.  
In contrast, PBF distributes funding to health care service providers according to the outputs 
(health care service provision) that they provide at the local level. However, as noted above it 
needs to be improved, with the performance-based grant having been disbursed irregularly. 
 
5.2 Governance 
Governance timeline 
    
2010  27 April 2010 – Launch of the FHCI  
                                               
74 Indeed, the MoHS Health Financing Unit does not appear to have a particularly prominent role in decision-making, and has had 
limited staffing in the last couple of years. 
75 Simson goes on to suggest that this centralised decision-making could work given the strong political commitment to health care 
reform from the President and development partners creating pressure from the top to improve health worker discipline. But there is 
good reason to suspect that both the President and donor attention to health worker performance will wane with time as new 
development initiatives seize the spotlight. 
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2011  
May 2011 – Launch of the Health COMPACT  
July 2011 – Launch of the Reproductive, Newborn and Child 
Health Strategy 2011–2015 
 
2012  
January 2012 – Launch of the JPWF 2012–2014, of which the first 
of six focus areas was the strengthening of leadership and 
governance. 
January 2012 – Launch of the Results and Accountability 
Framework (for implementation of the NHSSP) 
 
2013  
June 2013 – GAVI funding scandal: many MoHS directors 
removed  
2014  January 2014 – Launch of the NHSSP 2015–2020  
2015  
Launch of the six to nine month Ebola Recovery Plan 
Launch of the 10 to 24 month Ebola Recovery Plan 
 
5.2.1 What changed and why? 
The FHCI led to a revival and strengthening of the existing accountability structures, which had 
previously been inactive. While the existing working groups had been dormant until November 
2009 (according to national-level KIIs), after the announcement of the FHCI by the President each 
working group met weekly and reported weekly to a newly formed steering committee, which was 
attended by development partners and other ministries of the GoSL and chaired by the Chief 
Medical Officer (CMO) of the MoHS. Each working group presented a tracker update of progress 
on each of the planned reforms. This steering committee reported monthly to the President of 
Sierra Leone on impact, progress, risks and possible mitigation actions (see below for the 
governance structure of the FHCI). 
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Figure 37:  Governance structure of the FHCI 
 
The health sector received vocal and sustained political support from the President, who saw the 
FHCI as his ‘baby’ (as noted by various government officials). The President chaired weekly 
meetings of the strategic working group, undertook various tours of the country to check on 
progress, and was personally involved in communication with health workers and the population. 
This support boosted the MoHS and the FHCI immensely. 
Figure 38: The President visiting a hospital  
 
Source: Faye Melly 
There was also a marked shift in donor coordination, as mentioned in the financing section. The 
working groups were very well attended, and included all health implementation partners (NGOs, 
INGOs, donors) as well as various ministries (including MoFED). This level of collaboration and 
coordination was unprecedented in Sierra Leone (national-level KIIs). 
Civil society groups such as HFAC and Health Alert also starting to play an important role in terms 
of holding the government to account through monitoring at facility level of the arrival of drugs, 
presence of health workers and the effective removal of user fees. For the independent HFAC data 
collection, a network of 300 monitors was initially recruited to cover all health facilities. The aim 
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was to collect information including on patient satisfaction, user fees, drugs supply, staff 
attendance and ambulance services.  
Furthermore, a free complaints line was set up to allow patients to report any abuses in terms of 
the implementation of the FHCI. While we have not been able to obtain any data in relation to the 
number of calls made and how these were followed up, the existence of this complaints line did 
represent real progress in ensuring the accountability of service providers in relation to patients, 
although it ceased operations in 2012 due to funding issues.  
5.2.2 Implementation and effectiveness  
Mixed results in terms of coordination between donors and the MoHS 
The working group meetings were initially very well attended and set in place an unprecedented 
level of accountability between MoHS, the GoSL and its development partners as well as civil 
society. These accountability structures remained, however, top-down, with FHCI reforms being 
driven at central rather than DHMT or community level (national and district KIIs). Furthermore, 
after the launch of the FHCI, these working groups and this accountability structure seem to have 
collapsed rapidly, with working group attendance dwindling and the MoHS left to its own devices. 
However, while there was a marked reduction in the catalytic nature of the FHCI in terms of 
governance from 2011 onwards, a series of strategy papers were developed to consolidate the 
cooperation between MoHS and its development partners (through the COMPACT in 2011 and the 
JPWF in 2012 in particular). Whether this was a direct result of the positive experience of the FHCI 
coordination is unclear. The 2013 GAVI corruption scandal, however, which led to the dismissal of 
numerous key staff members in the MoHS, eroded the working relationship between donors and 
the MoHS.  
The Ebola crisis in 2014 revived the coordination mechanisms through the six to nine month and 
now 10 to 24 month recovery plans. This increased collaboration between donors and the MoHS is 
a positive sign in terms of governance. The creation of the Health System Strengthening (HSS) 
Hub in 2015 is meant to further strengthen this collaboration, through service-level agreements 
signed with donors and health implementation partners for example, and should hopefully bring all 
health actors back around the same table, as in the days of the FHCI preparation. 
Lack of cross-governmental integration 
The realisation of the ambitions of the FHCI should have implied the involvement of many 
ministries, including of labour, finance and social affairs, at the very least. Yet only the MoFED was 
part of the initial working groups, while other ministries remained uninvolved.  
Despite the involvement of MoFED, the lack of costing information on the FHCI also reduced the 
ability of civil society to hold the overall government to account, as identifying how much was 
allocated and thereafter spent on the FHCI has remained an extremely difficult exercise (see 
Section 4.1).  
The involvement of the President and of State House also appears to be a mixed blessing: while 
the political support given to the FHCI has proven essential in its sustained implementation, the 
continued involvement of the Presidency may undermine the owenership of MoHS initiative.  
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Reduced involvement of civil society 
As to civil society, the HFAC monitoring was slow to start and comprehensive coverage was not 
achieved until 2012. In 2013, the number of monitors was reduced to around 200 due to funding 
constraints and since then not all health facilities have been covered. The work was scaled down 
further in 2014 according to national-level KIIs. Also, the complaints line set up in 2010 to allow 
people to report any abuses in the FHCI was discontinued after two years for lack of funding.76 
5.2.3 Outstanding challenges 
 Lack of clear leadership for the FHCI: the FHCI remains a presidential project, which until 
2014 had been clearly supported and driven by the RCH directorate of the MoHS. However, 
since the Ebola outbreak, there has been a lack of ownership of the FHCI on the part of the 
MoHS. The current director argues, probably rightly, that the FHCI touches upon the entire 
health system and as such should be driven by the MoHS as a whole rather than the RCH 
directorate specifically. However, this lack of clear leadership undermines the future 
sustainability and drive of the FHCI.  
 The FHCI still relies on a presidential decree. The FHCI continues to rely legally on the 2002 
presidential decree. Various initiatives have attempted to secure its future through its 
integration into the revised constitution being prepared at the moment, but this has to date 
failed. Indeed, with the next presidential elections in 2018, and the fact that the current 
president should not be able to stand again, there is a risk that the FHCI could be scrapped by 
a new party or president. While this is recognised as unlikely as it would be too unpopular a 
reform, the risk nonetheless exists.  
 The lack of capacity at the MoHS, across many directorates and in terms of limited depth in 
technical staff, further puts limits on the ability of the MoHS to realise the ambitions of the FHCI 
and leaves it dependent on external technical assistance. The repeated corruption scandals (in 
2010 and 2013) have also weakened the ability of the MoHS to drive policy reforms and make 
by-passing through parallel stewardship functions more likely. 
 The weakened engagement of civil society and communities. The reduced civil society 
monitoring and abandonment of the FHCI complaints line remain an issue as reports 
outline numerous actual or perceived abuses to the implementation of the FHCI. There is as of 
now no clear mechanisms for patients to report any abuses.  
  
                                               
76 Note that the line had an interesting after-life as the Ebola emergency call-in number, as it was well known throughout the country. 
Options for its use post-Ebola are now being studied. 
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5.3 HRH 
Source: adapted and updated from Bertone et al. (2014b). 
HRH timeline 
pre-2009 
 2002: National Health Policy 
2004–2008: HRH Development Plan 
2006: HRH Policy 
Review of the Scheme of Service 
Definition of allowances as percentage of salary 
PRPS II – An Agenda for Change 
 
2009  
September 2009: FHCI – Announcement 
December 2009: NHSSP 2010–2015 
 
2010  
January 2010: Payroll cleaning 
February 2010: Basic Package of Health Services 
March 2010: Fast-track recruitment 
April 2010: FHCI launch 
May 2010: Salary increase 
 
2011  
January 2011: Staff Sanction Framework and Performance 
Management Contracts 
April 2011: Performance-based incentives 
July 2011: Establishment of the Health Service Commission 
November 2011: Health COMPACT 
 
2012 
 
 
2014 
2015 
 
January 2012: JPWF 
January 2012: Remote allowance 
July 2012: HRH Policy (2012) and HRH Strategic Plan 2012–2016 
March 2014: Ebola epidemic: risk allowance introduced in autumn 
Post-Ebola, revival of HRH working group; new round of technical 
assistance including for payroll cleaning, review of scheme of 
service, and developing new HRH strategic plan 
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5.3.1 What changed and why? 
When the FHCI was announced in September 2009, and as previously discussed, HRH was 
picked out as an area needing immediate reinforcement as part of the policy’s implementation, and 
a specific HRH working group was created in November as a result. 
The logic behind the HRH reforms was that if health care utilisation was to increase then a number 
of chronic HR problems needed addressing, including: 
 Fast-track recruitment and deployment to fill gaps in staffing; 
 Payroll cleaning to ensure that ‘ghost workers’ were taken off the payroll (and those who were 
working unpaid – the many ‘volunteers’ – were added); and 
 Salary uplift to ensure that health workers were adequately paid and motivated to handle 
increased workload without imposing informal charges on users. 
These innovations were all introduced early in 2010 to prepare for the launch of the FHCI. In 
addition, in 2010 a policy was issued that deliveries should not be done by TBAs alone. A training 
assessment was done, showing the need for more midwives and the first training school was set 
up in Makenyi.  
In a second round of HRH reforms, in 2011/12, a system of monitoring staff absences, linked to a 
new staff sanction framework, aimed to ensure that the now more generously paid staff were 
actually at work. The two other main policies introduced during this period were PBF to facilities, 
which could meet the dual needs of providing some small flexible funding at facility level to replace 
lost user revenues and providing a direct incentive to staff to provide priority services. Finally, a 
remote allowance was introduced in January 2012 to encourage staff to take up postings in more 
rural, hard-to-serve areas. 
Since then the pace of change has slowed, although prior to the Ebola crisis work had been 
ongoing on revising the training curricula and other longer-term reform measures. These are now 
being picked up again in the wake of post-Ebola investment. 
5.3.2 Implementation and effectiveness 
The more detailed report produced in association with ReBUILD presents details on the rationale, 
design, implementation and funding of these reforms, all of which were important in regard to 
‘protecting the investment’ in the FHCI. Broadly speaking, the first wave of reforms and the staff 
sanction framework were implemented effectively. The fast-track recruitment and deployment filled 
many gaps in staff, although it was a one-off process. Staff numbers doubled that year, which 
represents a big increase on previous years’ trends, even allowing for the fact that some of these 
new recruits were already working but simply not on payroll. According to a nationwide monitoring 
exercise in 2013 (Save the Children and Health Alert, 2014), staff trained in Life-Saving Skills were 
found in 82% of the districts, all the DHMTs (100%) visited investigated maternal death cases, 
96% of the hospitals had a mechanism to support emergency obstetric care services, and 85% of 
hospitals had staff able to perform caesarean sections.  
The payroll system was also more robust, producing savings, although it should be noted that 
more people were added than removed (the issue of people working without being on payroll 
having been quite a severe one prior to the FHCI). Salary uplift contributed to better motivation and 
retention, especially for higher-level staff (the top grades seeing an increase of more than 700% in 
their salary). Absenteeism reduced and people were sanctioned for non-attendance. However, the 
later reforms were apparently less effective. Monitoring, feedback and payments under the PBF 
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scheme have been erratic and it remains poorly understood, although staff would welcome it if it 
could be strengthened. Of those surveyed by ReBUILD at PHU level, a third had received no 
payment over the previous year, while others had received from one to three payments. The rural 
allowances were even more erratic and opaque, and were stopped around 2013, albeit without 
there having been any formal announcement or explanation of the reason for them stopping (Witter 
et al., 2014). 
Staff highlight benefits to themselves, in terms of pay and working conditions, as well as to the 
health system in general, in terms of increased use by patients and more investment in the 
services and facilities. They also highlight the strains, for example, of managing with too few staff, 
and perceive some negative effects, such as patients visiting repeatedly to seek free drugs and, for 
themselves, of having less time to pursue other activities, like private business (Witter et al., 2014). 
The overall consensus from our district KIIs in October 2015 was that the FHCI had increased the 
number of staff, especially through recruitment around the time of the launch and with an emphasis 
on getting at least one trained staff member per PHU. However, the situation has deteriorated 
since inasmuch as the recruitment drive has not continued and many staff who joined in recent 
years are not on payroll. Some new facilities have also opened, which stretches staffing more 
thinly. 
The role of staff has also changed over the period, with community health workers CHWs taking on 
wider roles and TBAs being involved mainly to support women coming in to facilities for ANC and 
delivery care, though there were some reports from district KII of wider roles (e.g. administering 
malaria tests when the MCH Aide is absent). Home deliveries are no longer legal and the creation 
of proscriptive by-laws has in a number of areas made home delivery a finable event. Both groups 
are unpaid but receive some support from PBF funds. NGOs sometimes help by supplying training 
and transport for CHWs. 
All district key informants who spoke of training felt that this had improved since the FHCI, with 
more training being made available and staff skills improved. 
In the survey, salary is the dominant source of official income for all groups, which may be one of 
the legacies of the FHCI (other sources are relatively low – the next in overall importance are per 
diems for training, etc.). Only 4% reported any revenues from user fees or any gifts from patients, 
which suggests the FHCI is being relatively effectively implemented, although this finding needs 
cross-checking with patient reports. According to Bertone et al. (2016), PBF contributed 10% to the 
income of primary health workers and was seen as unreliable but highly appreciated (a windfall 
payment, as opposed to salaries, which were seen as an entitlement). In our district KIIs, PBF 
payments were reported to be motivating, when received, although many reported a long delay 
since they had last received any PBF. PBF is particularly important to motivate the unsalaried staff, 
such as CHWs and TBAs. At lower-level facilities, the availability of drugs and PBF payments are 
two key facilitators to work. 
Many FGD participants had condemnatory comments to make about the behaviour of health care 
workers, especially the nurses. The attitude of the nurses was mostly described as negative across 
the four districts and groups. Though this was the case in all the districts, the nurses in Western 
Area had the worst review as a majority of participants had disapproving remarks to make about 
them. Most complaints revolved around assertions that the nurses shouted at patients who sought 
treatment and demanded money for free services: 
“My experience when I gave birth to this child; I took my child to the hospital. The nurse I 
met was playing with her phone so I said ‘I’m here to see you’. She told me she was busy 
and that I should sit aside and be patient because as a patient, you should be patient. I was 
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still feeling some pain but I went to her for the second time. This time she asked me ‘how 
you kam’ (What did you bring?). Another woman had to shout at the nurse and said ‘bo dis 
na young kombra’ (Come on! She is a young lactating woman) that’s the time she attended 
to me. I was charged SLL 50,000 but because I had SLL 30,000 she gave me half the 
drugs and said when you buy the rest, we will treat your child” (Adult female, Kono). 
However, not all participants were critical of the behaviour and attitude of the nurses, particularly in 
Bo, Koinadugu and Kono, with a few giving positive feedback about them. They said that the 
positive attitude of health care workers was one of the reasons that encouraged them to visit the 
health centre. A number of participants also raised the issue of the lack of skilled and inadequate 
number of nurses, especially out of hours: 
“The nurses, the MCH aides and state enrolled community health nurses (SECHNs) are not 
enough and some of them are not trained and qualified” (Adult male, Koinadugu). 
A few participants mentioned that they feared to go to the hospital because the only people 
available are TBAs and untrained and unqualified nurses. They mentioned that most of the nurses 
are volunteers who did not undergo basic nursing training and who cannot even spell the names of 
patients. Other participants mentioned that the nurses could not do proper diagnoses. They said 
that it is uncommon to meet a qualified health worker at the health centre so they preferred 
seeking health services at private clinics or directly buying drugs from pharmacies. 
A female participant raised the issue of misdiagnosis, which she thought was due to unqualified 
nurses at the health centre and that fact that the majority of health care workers (especially nurses) 
are not experienced in administering medication to babies. However, a few participants in 
Koinadugu confirmed that there had been issues of wrong medication even before the FHCI. They 
believed that with the existence of the FHCI the problem was being addressed gradually. 
Participants thought that a code of conduct and ethical training should be implemented for health 
care workers. 
Figure 39: Staff and TBAs in Bo CHP (October 2015) 
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5.3.3 Outstanding challenges 
Health workers were very badly affected by the Ebola epidemic. Hundreds died from Ebola, out of 
a small workforce, and many were stigmatised by their communities – seen as vectors of the 
disease, or shunned for contributing to combating the disease.77 Their numbers, which had been 
growing, have dropped back again, and there are now plans to revive mobile recruitment to fill the 
gaps. Many of the activities seen in the run-up to the FHCI are being repeated: in 2015/16 
international consultants are helping to do a headcount and clean the payroll; the scheme of 
service is being reviewed; a new HRH strategy is being developed; and the HRH working group is 
up and running again, helping to coordinate the new and old actors in the HRH space. 
Some reforms that are recognised to be important and that were planned for in the NHSSP are still 
outstanding, perhaps because they require more institutional and deep-rooted transformations. 
Most sources agree that recruitment and deployment are too centralised and that HR management 
should be devolved to district level. Recruitment is done centrally, with requests made via the 
DHMTs. Only untrained staff can be recruited locally.  
Within the MoHS, better coordination of HR policies is needed in order to avoid ‘silos’ managed by 
different directorates. The performance management contracts are not fully operational. The HRH 
Directorate is still under-staffed and there is a recognised but unfulfilled need for HRH officers at 
regional and district levels. The HR information system needs to be developed and payroll 
management improved. The attendance monitoring system which was brought in post-FHCI has 
lost momentum – reports are being filled but not checked systematically, and may therefore not be 
reliable, according to national-level KIIs. 
Measures to encourage and retain staff in rural areas require comprehensive packages, including 
housing and promotion and training opportunities. Rural health workers face particular challenges, 
some of which stem from the difficult terrain, which add to common disadvantages of rural living 
(poor social amenities, etc.). Poor working conditions, the emotional and financial costs of 
separation from families, limited access to training, longer working hours (due to staff shortages) 
and the inability to earn from other sources make working in rural areas less attractive (Wurie et 
al., 2016). Moreover, rules on rotation that should protect staff from being left too long in rural 
areas are not reported to be respected. It is particularly difficult to attract and retain specialists and 
doctors. In Koinadugu, there were only two doctors in the whole district in October 2015, one of 
whom was the DMO. In some areas, respondents report gaps in nursing, even in the district 
hospitals. 
By contrast, poor management had more resonance in urban areas, with reports of poor 
delegation, favouritism and a lack of autonomy for staff (Wurie et al., 2106). Tensions within the 
team over unclear roles and absenteeism are also significant demotivating factors in general. 
Revised training and measures focused on boosting competency and quality of care are all part of 
the unfinished agenda.  
There are still too few of some key cadres, such as midwives, and attrition remains high (13% in 
2011, across all cadres). Self-reported working hours averaged 54 hours per week across the staff 
surveyed by ReBUILD in 2012, who reported seeing an average of 117 patients per week, which is 
relatively high. High workload was also reported in our district KIIs, which has ambiguous effects 
on staff motivation. Various health workers argued that having more patients is motivating because 
they are actually able to do their job and feel satisfaction because they are saving lives. They also 
                                               
77 See http://blogs.lshtm.ac.uk/hppdebated/2014/11/12/ebola-suppporting-health-workers-front-line/ 
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now see more complicated cases who would otherwise have been dying at home, which in itself is 
motivating. However, in rural areas, the workload results in long shifts for staff. 
In our district KIIs, the ratio of trained to untrained staff was strikingly low, especially at lower-level 
facilities – for example, an MCHP visited in Kono had: one MCH aide, one vaccinator, 16 CHWs, 
and 22 TBAs (covering 17 villages). CHWs provide health education and distribute drugs around 
the villages, which needs close supervision to ensure that they are distributing them appropriately 
and without charging. Staffing roles appear to have shifted, such as many cadres are working at 
the level above that for which their role was designed (e.g. MCH aides who were meant to be 
doing outreach were staffing PHUs, SECHNs who should be serving in PHUs were in hospitals, 
etc.). This ‘task-shifting’ is an informal response to gaps in the numbers of doctors, nurses and 
midwives, presumably. Training and other activities also mean that the real numbers present are 
even lower than those in theoretical attendance. The situation may not get better quickly as a 
hiring freeze was imposed in 2015. 
The most substantial concerns related to HRH issues raised in district-level KIIs were to do with 
pay (i.e. low pay, no pay, difficulties getting on payroll, etc.) and inadequate numbers. Related to 
this was the problem of volunteers and how they can be managed and motivated, given that they 
are not on payroll. More limited concerns were expressed on the need to upgrade staff skills, to 
provide promotion opportunities, to motivate staff, to manage their workload, to improve their 
working conditions and to protect them from the unreasonable expectations of patients.  
The issue of unpaid staff – ‘volunteers’ – which was documented prior to the FHCI and was 
supposed to have been banished has very clearly returned. Many staff are not on the payroll, 
presumably due to restrictions in funding for salaries rather than technical problems with payroll. 
They continue to volunteer – even though the policy is that volunteering is not allowed. This 
causes difficulties for staff management and accountability. In some areas visited for district KIIs, 
the volunteers are reported to outnumber paid staff. In others they were one-third to half of the 
staffing in facilities visited by the team. The volunteers are often trained staff who are allocated by 
the DHMT to facilities, which sits at odds with the fact that it is actually illegal to recruit volunteers. 
All were hoping to eventually get an official position and a backdated salary. The accountability of 
those volunteers within the facility is also difficult to assess: some said they worked as normal staff 
and had the same responsibilities and accountability mechanisms, while some said there was 
none. Despite much probing, it was also impossible to understand how these volunteers survived 
financially: some did get a share of the PBF and some did not. They all denied charging under the 
counter, although one facility did state that patients gave fees to volunteers voluntarily. 
There are now 10,000 CHWs across all districts, mostly supported by UNICEF but with 
implementing/supporting NGOs in most districts too. A CHW policy is under debate – most 
controversial is whether CHWs should be taken onto the public payroll, something which would be 
very challenging for the public purse (given the difficulties hiring and paying more highly trained 
staff). 
According to analysis by the MoHS in early 201678, the bulk of employed staff are nurses (55%), 
with only 2% doctors. In addition, a significant number are approaching retirement (one-quarter of 
staff and one-third of midwives are over 50). Regionally, 36% of staff are deployed in Western 
Area, compared to 14% for Eastern, 21% for Northern and 17% for Southern Region. These 
disparities mask more serious ones when we consider more trained staff (doctors, state registererd 
nurses (SRNs), midwives, etc.), which are highly concentrated in Freetown. Community health 
officers (CHOs) are more evenly distributed, but all districts fall short of the minimum staffing 
                                               
78 Presentation to ReBUILD meeting on HRH, January 2016, HRH Directorate, MoHS 
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numbers recommended by WHO to cover an essential package of care (22.8 per 10,000 
population). Only MCH aides’ posts are filled to planned levels. For midwives, only 30% of posts 
are filled. Limited training capacity but also financial constraints are the main bars to reaching 
desired levels of staffing. Training places for specialists are particularly lacking in Sierra Leone. 
Competency is another area where there are believed to be challenges, although according to 
national-level KIIs no skills audit has been carried out to verify the extent of the need. Better on-
the-job training, supportive supervision, and continued professional development are recognised 
needs. Regulatory functions also need to be strengthened. The nurses and midwives professional 
board, for example, aims to become an independent council, with better processes for licensing 
nurses, coordinating training and disciplining non-compliant nurses. 
Questions on remuneration revealed substantial differences between doctors and the rest of the 
staff, with doctors’ salaries more than four times those of registered nurses (a differential that 
increases when other sources are added) (Witter et al., 2014). This may require attention, 
particularly given the low number of registered nurses and midwives and their apparently high 
attrition rate. PBF is also unevenly distributed across districts, which may in part relate to the 
different degree of assistance provided by NGOs (Bertone and Witter, 2015). Lack of clarity on 
how PBF is divided up was also mentioned in district KIIs. The perceived randomness of which 
facility gets PBF and which does not means that it is also creating resentment in those facilities not 
receiving PBF. There were also concerns about the effects of removing the hazard allowances 
introduced during the Ebola outbreak. Since the salary increase of 2010 there had been no 
increase in salaries until 2015, when an across-the-board 15% rise was given.  
We know that some degree of charging for services continues but data sources are too patchy to 
be able to comment on what the charges are for and how they have changed over time (and why). 
As a result of the pay difficulties described above and the proliferation of poorly controlled staff, 
incidences of staff making a living from selling drugs and also charging patients were reported in 
the district KIIs. It is not possible from this qualitative investigation to tell how common these were, 
but the mechanisms for controlling them were clearly felt to be inadequate: 
“The result is that staff often sell the FHCI drugs to provide an income. There doesn’t seem 
to be a plan to tackle this” (district KII, Bo). 
“Non-payroll staff make money by asking for payment and treating people outside the 
facility. There have been many complaints to civil society groups about this, and it has been 
covered on radio, TV and in the newspapers. The government says people should report 
incidents to the Anti-Corruption Commission. However, the prosecution process is very 
long and it is unclear what if anything is done when corruption is found” (district KII, Bo). 
Inadequate supplies are another challenge. Health workers feel a lot of pressure from patients with 
the FHCI: the government says one thing (free care, free drugs) yet it does not send enough of 
these drugs, enough instruments, etc. for health workers to be able to do what is expected of them: 
“We as the health workers are targeted – when patients go to facilities they expect free 
drugs – but we often don’t have them, especially with ANC. If you have 1,000 tablets of iron 
that’s supposed to last for three months based on the supply given by government – so we 
use our discretion” (district KII, Western Area). 
As mentioned in the governance section, presidential support for the FHCI was recognised by all 
as being critical to its success. The fact that donors were able to coordinate to support the FHCI 
was also of the highest importance. This also brought in a large number of short-term technical 
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assistants, who played a role in enabling quick reforms in time for the launch. All of these factors 
remain important and represent risks in relation to sustainability. As previously highlighted in 
Section 4.1, for the first three years of funding the salary uplift, for example, DFID paid 22% of the 
costs and the Global Fund 20%. For the PBF scheme, the World Bank is the funder. None of these 
sources are secure. 
5.4 Drugs and medical supplies 
Drugs and medical supplies timeline 
2010 
 February 2010 – Central Medical Stores opened 
April 2010 – Drugs and medical supplies distribution begins 
October 2010 – Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Manual for 
the Integrated Logistics Management of Health Commodities is 
published 
 
2011  
April 2011 – Distribution of medicines is suspended by UNICEF 
due to leaks in the supply chain 
August 2011 – Pilot distribution of medicines with new risk control 
matrix in place, regional logistics officers (RLOs), district logistics 
officers (DLOs) and an International Logistics Officer 
September 2011 – Contract with IPA begins 
November 2011 – National distribution of drugs and medical 
supplies launched 
December 2011 – First Quarterly IPA Review 
 
2012  
February 2012 – Second Quarterly IPA Review 
March 2012 – King Tom warehouse operational 
May 2012 – Third Quarterly IPA Review 
July 2012 – The NPPU Act is approved. NPPU is created as an 
autonomous public entity 
August 2012 – Revised Risk Control Matrix signed-off by MoHS 
September 2012 – Fourth Quarterly IPA Review (contract ends) 
December 2012 – NMP, National Formulary, Essential Medicines 
List, and Standard Treatment Guidelines for Primary Level 
Prescribers are launched. 
 
2013  
April 2013 –Crown Agents (contracted by UNICEF) arrive in 
Freetown to support the NPPU for the next three years 
October 2013 – Fawaz Stores operational 
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5.4.1 What changed and why? 
Given the challenges described above and to ensure that increased demand for services through 
the FHCI was met with good quality standards, the 2010–2015 NHSSP encompassed a 
complementary supply-side intervention associated with the provision of drugs and medical 
supplies. The main objective of the drugs and medical supplies pillar was to guarantee the 
availability, accessibility, quality and safety of all drugs and medical supplies at all times and all 
levels (national, district, hospitals and PHUs). Specific targets for the supply of drugs and medical 
supplies included79: 
1. A strengthening of the procurement and supply chain management system by improving 
the coordination mechanisms between different partners, guaranteeing an efficient and 
transparent procurement process, and implementing a strict control and monitoring system; 
2. Setting up an efficient storage and distribution chain to prevent stock-outs through the 
construction of the CMS in Freetown and DMS in all districts and the establishment of the 
Logistics Management Information System (LMIS); 
3. Providing necessary equipment to all health facilities; 
4. A strengthening of the SOP by establishing adequate management of the Essential 
Medicines List and building the capacity of facilities and maintenance personnel. 
To support the activities outlined above, a Procurement and Supply Chain Management Working 
Group (PSMWG) was set up to coordinate and oversee all planning and implementation of the 
supply chain. Specific activities included: (1) the review and updating of the lists of drugs and 
medical supplies to be procured and distributed by districts; (2) monitoring the availability of tracer 
medicines;80 and (3) coordinating capacity development at Local Council and DMS (Health Sector 
Working Groups – Draft Terms of Reference, 2010). 
The procurement (purchase, shipment and port clearance) and distribution of drugs and medical 
supplies was initially granted to UNICEF,81 with support from AfDB, DFID, the EU, IRC, the World 
Bank and UNFPA, with the intention of progressively transferring this responsibility to the NPPU. 
Procurement was undertaken by UNICEF Headquarters in Copenhagen, based on consumption 
data from LMIS and morbidity data from HMIS, with all goods subsequently shipped to Freetown 
(by sea or air). Once drugs and medical supplies arrived at the CMS, goods were distributed to 
                                               
79 Based on GoSL (2009). 
80 Tracer medicines include Albendazole, Amoxycilin, Ampicillin, Artesunate/Amodiaquine, Cotrimoxazole, Ferrous Sulphate and Folic 
Acid, Magnesium Sulphate, Methyldopa, Metronidazole, ORS, Oxytocin, Paracetamol, Sulphadoxine and Pyrimethamine, Zinc Sulphate, 
Sodium Lactate, and Dezamethasone. 
81 UNICEF worked under two programmes: (1) Provision of Essential Medicines and Medical Supplies to Reduce Maternal and Child 
Morbidity and Mortality in Sierra Leone; and (2) BPEHS. 
2014 
 
 
April 2014 – All responsibilities for Procurement and Supply 
Management of FHCI drugs and medical supplies are transferred to 
the NPPU 
July – August 2014 – Distribution of drugs and medical supplies 
managed by NPPU / Crown Agents with technical assistance from 
UNICEF. Several capacity gaps identified 
 
2015  
November 2015 – Crown Agents leave Sierra Leone before 
contract termination  
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DMS and hospitals. Distribution to all districts was based on a ‘push’ system – supplies to be 
distributed are centrally determined, based on DMS reported consumption data and stock on hand 
(BDO LLP, 2015). UNICEF and KIIs suggest that although originally a ‘pull’ system was 
envisioned, through which hospitals and PHUs make explicit requests for the drugs and medical 
supplies needed, human, physical and technological capacity was insufficient at the time of the 
FHCI’s launch to guarantee its effectiveness. Drugs and medical supplies were to be distributed to 
DMS and hospitals on a quarterly basis, and to PHUs on a monthly basis, with 80% of drugs to be 
delivered to DMS and 20% kept at CMS as a backup. 
To support the forecast and organise and supervise the delivery of goods from DMS to PHUs, as 
well as provide assistance to DHMTs, UNICEF contracted 14 DLOs. Three international RLOs, 
covering three regions and the Western Area, were also contracted to ensure transparency and 
accountability in the supply chain. 
An LMIS called CHANNEL was introduced by UNFPA to be operated by CMS and DMS. As 
mentioned in the SOP Manual, the objective of the LMIS was to ‘ensure that the right commodity in 
the right quantity of the right quality is available at the right place and at the right time for the right 
cost’ (UNICEF, 2010, p. 2). CHANNEL was designed to collect information on the quantities of 
usable stock, the quantities of drugs and medical supplied dispensed to users, and the losses 
(quantities removed for other purposes rather than dispensing) and adjustments (quantities 
received from other sources rather than DMS or CMS) on a monthly basis (ibid., 2010). Figure 40 
below shows the flow of commodities, as well as LMIS information across all levels. 
Figure 40 Pipeline for drugs and medical supplies 
 
 
Source: UNICEF (2010). 
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Regarding storage of drugs and medical supplies, the SOP Manual also specifies the requirements 
at all levels (UNICEF, 2010). Key elements include: 
 Ensuring storage rooms are secure and entry to visitors forbidden; 
 Ensuring storage facilities have specific rooms for offloading, storage and dispatch – 
depending on the size of the health facility, e.g. PHUs, one single room may be used for 
storage and dispatch; 
 Commodities should be stored in alphabetical order, by type of product (e.g. tabs, injections, 
etc.), and according to a ‘First-to-Expire, First-Out’ (FEFO) policy; and 
 Facilities should be dry, well-lit and ventilated, with a cold chain adequately maintained. 
Since April 2014, all responsibilities related to the procurement and distribution of FHCI drugs and 
medical supplies were transferred to the NPPU. This is a semi-autonomous organisation82 that will 
be in charge of the procurement, storage, distribution and management of drugs and medical 
supplies for all public health facilities in the country. Its main objective is to ‘provide an effective, 
efficient and transparent environment for the supply of medicines of requisite quality, efficacy, 
accessibility and affordability in public institutions’ (Koroma, 2010, p. 3). The NPPU was to be 
funded by budget allocations, contributions by donor agencies, and any other revenue that accrues 
to the Unit. 
Similar to UNICEF processes, the NPPU released an international ITT for the procurement of 
goods, and subcontracted the private sector for distribution to DMS, hospitals and PHUs, with 
potential increases in efficiency (e.g. by providing both quality assurance and managing the supply 
chain). However, limited funding from GoSL and support from major donors and international 
agencies83 have hindered the NPPU’s ability to become fully operational (BDO LLP, 2015). 
A partial ‘pull’ system, through which hospitals and PHUs determine the quantities of drugs and 
medical supplies to be distributed, was also introduced in the Western Area after the NPPU took 
over the supply chain. PHUs in other districts are increasingly submitting reports to DMS to inform 
distribution and have gained some flexibility to request drugs and medical supplies during stock-
outs (based on KIIs and BDO LLP, 2015). 
5.4.2 Implementation and effectiveness 
The main issue identified in the procurement and supply chain is the frequent stock-outs of basic 
drugs and medical supplies, preventing the target population from receiving adequate treatment. 
Stock-outs are explained by several elements, including delays in the release of commodities at 
the port of entry, limited trucks for transport from CMS to hospitals and DMS, and a poor road 
network. Other issues that contribute to the mismatch between supply and demand of drugs and 
medical supplies are ineffective and impractical monitoring systems and lack of adequate storage 
facilities. 
Frequent recurring stock-outs of essential drugs and medical supplies have been the major issue 
with the procurement and distribution chain since the beginning of the FHCI. During the first 
PSMWG meeting, chaired by UNICEF, members agreed that the initial procurement of drugs and 
                                               
82 The NPPU Act states that this Unit will be autonomous but in practice its Chairman will be appointed by the President of Sierra Leone. 
The Board of the Unit also includes representatives from the MoHS, MoFED, the Ministry of Justice, the National Public Procurement 
Authority, the Bank of Sierra Leone, DHMTs, international donors, NGOs, and civil society organisations. 
83 Lack of support from donors is mainly related to a lack of confidence in NPPU’s capacity to manage the supply chain in a transparent 
and effective manner. As explained by UNICEF (2014), the NPPU failed to complete its inventory stock-taking from the CMS, it did not 
review its key performance indicators and nor did it finalise the recruitment of key staff members. By July 2014, the NPPU could not be 
certified by donors as a fully functional institution, and thus UNICEF was requested to keep providing support and oversight to the supply 
chain. 
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medical supplies should cover 60% of total beneficiaries (i.e. 1 million children and 230,000 
pregnant women and lactating mothers), based on utilisation figures up to January 2010. Members 
also acknowledged that, while the CMS would open in February, there were few DMS, as 
construction was abandoned due to lack of funding. Given that storage facilities were not going to 
be completed for the FHCI launch in April, short-term options were assessed, including the use of 
empty spaces in district hospitals and the possibility of UNICEF staggering the delivery of goods 
until adequate storage facilities became available (Steering Group Meeting Notes, 2010). 
All of the above measures did not foresee the large rise in health care demand, especially during 
the first few months of the FHCI, as described in Section 5, leading to stock-outs at a much faster 
rate than anticipated. The HFAC monitoring report for the first quarter of FHCI implementation 
(April–August 2010) reported shortages during distribution from DMS to PHUs in Koinadugu and 
Port Loko.84 The Service Availability and Readiness Assessment (SARA) for 2011 also shows a 
high variation in the availability of some of the FHCI tracer drugs, ranging from 13% for Ceftriaxone 
to 85% for Co-trimoxazole. The Western Area generally had better drugs availability, as is the case 
with hospitals compared to PHUs, and private compared to public facilities – both public clinics and 
hospitals seem to have experienced the lowest rates of FHCI drugs availability (see Table 166 
below). 
Table 16: Availability of essential medicines by region, type of facility, ownership and 
type-managing authority, 2011 
 
Co-
trimoxazole 
suspension 
Amoxicillin 
Ceftriaxone 
injection 
Paracetamol 
suspension 
Diazepam 
Region 
Eastern 90% 64% 10% 68% 74% 
Northern 83% 49% 5% 63% 60% 
Southern 83% 46% 11% 42% 73% 
Western Area 90% 77% 44% 83% 77% 
Type of facility 
Hospital  86% 76% 54% 75% 90% 
Primary care 85% 54% 11% 60% 68% 
Ownership 
Public 85% 51% 6% 59% 68% 
Private 85% 81% 53% 73% 74% 
Type of managing authority 
Public hospital 77% 48% 21% 46% 89% 
Private hospital 92% 94% 75% 94% 92% 
Public CHC 90% 44% 8% 64% 47% 
Public CHP 90% 51% 7% 54% 80% 
Public MCHP 83% 54% 5% 59% 70% 
Public clinic 63% 35% 7% 64% 42% 
Private clinic 83% 78% 48% 68% 70% 
Total 85% 55% 13% 61% 69% 
Number of facilities: 207. 
                                               
84 HFAC also reported that 450 cartons of drugs were delivered in excess to hospitals and PHUs, which had to be returned to CMS as 
surpluses. 
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Source: MoHS (2012) 
Further evidence for 2012 shows that although almost 100% of drugs and medical supplies were 
received at DMS, 45% of the all PHUs surveyed experienced stock-outs (HFAC, 2012). Figure 41 
shows this data disaggregated by districts: the proportion of PHUs that experienced drugs stock-
outs varied from 29% in Kailahun to 62% in Koinadugu. Stock-outs for medical supplies were 
reported to be much lower, ranging from 3% in Bo to 8% in Bonthe. With regards to hospitals, out 
of the 12 facilities inspected by MoHS only five met all criteria, i.e. having adequate storage 
facilities and at least three months’ supply of all tracer consumables and all tracer drugs plus IV/IM 
ampicillin, gentamicin and calcium gluconate (MoHS, 2012d). 
Figure 41 Proportion of facilities experiencing stock-outs by district, 2012 
 
Source: HFAC (2012). Number of facilities: 274 
The most recent data prior to the Ebola crisis showed that, out of 607 facilities surveyed, only 38% 
received drugs in the last quarter, even though distribution was supposed to be occurring on a 
monthly basis from DMS to PHUs and on a quarterly basis from CMS to DMS, secondary and 
tertiary hospitals (see Figure 42). Only 21% of facilities received supplies in the Western Urban 
area as compared to 67% of facilities in Port Loko, which is further away. Although these data 
were not collected at the peak of the Ebola outbreak, the disease was already spreading at this 
time, which may explain the focus of the distribution in more distant and closer-to-the-border (with 
Guinea and Liberia) areas. 
Figure 43 shows the proportion of facilities that: (1) reported drugs stock-outs; (2) reported drugs 
stock-outs and made a request to DMS; and (3) made a request and received a response. Overall, 
82% of facilities reported having a stock-out. Out of these, 89% made a request to the 
corresponding DMS but only 34% received a response. Port Loko seems to have been in one of 
the most critical situations, with 88% of facilities reporting a stock-out and making a request to a 
DMS but only 16% of them getting a reply. On the contrary, Tonkolili, with only 65% of facilities 
reporting a stock-out, obtained a 46% response rate. 
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Figure 42: Proportion of facilities that received drugs in the last quarter by district, April 
2014 
 
Number of facilities: 607. 
Source: HFAC (2014). 
 
Figure 43: Proportion of facilities that reported stock-outs, made requests and received 
a response by district, April 2014 
 
Number of facilities: 607. 
Source: HFAC (2014). 
Figure 44 shows the proportion of facilities where the stock level for tracer drugs was less than 14 
days85 with no alternative drugs available. Oxytocin was the most wanting, with 46% of facilities 
reporting low stocks. For all other tracer medicines, between 21% and 29% of facilities reported 
having low stocks. 
                                               
85 It is important to note that 14 days is already below the minimum stock level of two months for PHUs, as determined in the SOP Manual 
(UNICEF, 2010). 
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Figure 44 Proportion of PHUs where the stock level for tracer drugs is less than 14 days 
and no alternative drugs are available, April 2014 
 
Number of facilities: 607. 
Source: HFAC (2014). 
Evidence from KIIs at the district level and community FGDs further confirms the issues faced with 
drugs and medical supplies shortages: 
“As far as they can tell there are no calculations of the type and quantity of drugs that might 
actually be needed, leading to people dying, because the drugs are free but they are not 
available” (District KII, Bo). 
“The only constraint is the drug supply – especially for under-5s – you can run out of drugs 
for more than three months. There have been drugs but not sufficient – we get drugs 
quarterly – how bad it is depends on the specific PHUs: some PHUs have a large number of 
people attending clinics so run out much faster. When we run out of drugs we just prescribe 
to patients” (District KII, Western Area). 
All of the evidence above shows that there still seem to be significant mismatches between the 
quantities of drugs and medical supplies received and the quantities effectively needed across 
districts, hospitals and PHUs. 
Besides a mismatch between supply and effective demand of drugs and medical supplies, stock-
outs have also been related to bureaucratic or administrative issues – in particular to delays in 
UNICEF being granted clearance at the port of entry. These delays are mainly attributed to the 
duty exemption sign-off with MoHS, MoFED and the National Revenue Authority, as signatures 
have to be provided by the ministers themselves or their first secretaries. Despite several 
complaints and even interventions from the President, who established a ‘No Delay, No 
Demurrage’ strategy in 2010, the time taken to get clearance at the port only improved after the 
Ebola crisis, with estimates indicating that the average time taken to get clearance before Ebola 
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was 27 days, with containers spending around 68 days at the port (under poor storage conditions). 
Besides risking the quality of commodities, delays at the port also result in high storage and 
demurrage costs – estimates suggest that between 2014 and 2015 costs amounted to US$ 
346,470 for DFID-funded containers, with clearance agent and other administrative costs coming 
to US$ 194,548 (BDO LLP, 2015). 
Delays in distribution are also related to the lack of trucks and vehicles to transport commodities 
from DMS to PHUs. There have been reports of DMS personnel having to hire private vehicles to 
transport drugs and medical supplies to PHUs, sometimes using their own financial resources. 
Transport was reported to be particularly difficult in riverine (Bonthe) or mountainous (Koinadugu) 
areas (HFAC, 2012). Given these issues, UNICEF signed long-term agreements with six private 
transportation companies to deliver drugs and medical supplies from CMS to hospitals and DMS, 
and then from DMS to PHUs (UNICEF Sierra Leone, 2014). KIIs suggest that private 
transportation has been crucial in the distribution of commodities. 
Another key issue is the lack of proper implementation of monitoring and accountability systems. 
The HFAC monitoring report for the first quarter of FHCI implementation in 2010 reported thefts 
and resale of FHCI drugs in Freetown, Kailahun, Kenema, Makeni, Port Loko and Tonkolili. 
Indeed, a stock-take by MoHS in 2010 revealed that 6% of drugs were being lost between the port 
of entry and the patient (MoHS, n.d.). As mentioned by one of the community members: 
“Initially the FHCI worked, the government put laws to report any defaulters for the drugs or 
misappropriation. However, that has changed now because there is no monitoring and the 
nurses are doing what they want” (District KII, Bo). 
Lack of proper monitoring systems and accountability have also allowed for informal charging for 
FHCI drugs, as reported by community leaders in Kono: 
“Some of us can read and write. They tell us at times there are no drugs, but if you give them 
money, the nurses will give you medicine with the inscription ‘Free Health Care’ on it. How 
come they still say Free Health Care drugs are not available is the big question” (District KII, 
Kono). 
Amnesty International also found that PHUs and hospitals have no proper record-keeping, with few 
health workers having an accurate understanding of official forms (i.e. Report, Request and Issue 
Vouchers (RR&IVs), Inventory Control Cards (ICCs), and stock cards). Forms are not user-friendly 
and they are homogeneous across all types of facilities (PHUs and secondary and tertiary 
hospitals), even though not all facilities receive the same types of drugs and medical supplies. 
These forms are extensive and time-consuming (see extract in Figure 45) – there is thus a 
misalignment between monitoring requirements and actual capacity at the facility level. As 
documented by BDO LLP (2015), CHANNEL is not a very practical system as: (1) it does not allow 
for communication across different medical stores; (2) DMS reports have to be rekeyed at CMS; 
and (3) it does not collect usage data nor does it provide real-time information on stock levels. The 
CHANNEL system has also been unreliable because of internet and electricity outages at district 
levels, limited the ability of DMS to upload information on a timely basis (Amnesty International, 
2011). This lack of adequate and timely monitoring makes it impossible to identify leakages or any 
other issues across the supply chain. 
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Figure 45: Extract from an RR&IV form 
 
Source: OPM consultants, October 2015 
Problems with monitoring are reinforced by very poor storage facilities, especially at PHU level. 
Generally, storage facilities are small, do not have shelves (commodities are stored in boxes) and 
so there is no logical system of organisation, lack temperature control, have cold chains that do not 
work properly, and are full of expired commodities that are stored for several months (BDO LLP, 
2015). In addition, there is no way to distinguish between cost-recovery and FHCI drugs and 
medical supplies, which has led to some FHCI patients facing charges and increases the risk of 
commodity losses (Amnesty International, 2011): 
“FHCI drugs are being mixed with cost-recovery drugs, with some FHCI drugs being 
charged for. FHCI drugs should be tagged. Lack of trained personnel also contributes 
to inadequate drugs distribution” (District KII, Kono). 
 Furthermore, lack of monitoring and accountability in the distribution of drugs and medical 
supplies has contributed to drug misuse. Evidence from FGDs suggests that some patients 
expressed disappointment as, in some instances, they only received one tablet when visiting a 
health facility. KIIs with Pharmacy Board officials also suggest that FHCI beneficiaries sometimes 
seek health care with their husbands to request drugs for them. Drugs mismanagement by staff 
has also been reported, which is likely related to a lack of knowledge of adequate dosage and 
treatment for different illnesses. 
Table 17 gives an idea of the overall performance of the supply chain under UNICEF between 
2012 and March 2014. None of the planned outputs have been achieved, with the exception of the 
proportion of PHUs submitting at least one LMIS report per quarter (90% achieved as compared to 
a 75% target). Despite this, there has been an overall improvement in the management of the 
procurement and distribution of drugs and medical supplies since the beginning of the FHCI. 
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Table 17: Progress against the UNICEF BPEHS logframe, 2012–2014 
 
Output Indicator  Baseline 2012 
June 
2013 
March 
2014 
To ensure the 
continued provision of 
the BPEHS through 
the provision of 
essential medicines, 
consumables and 
medical supplies 
% of facilities with no 
stock-outs of FHCI 
tracer drugs 
Planned 0% 45% 80% 80% 
Achieved  55% 28% 65% 
Adequate provision of 
essential medicines, 
consumables and 
medical supplies 
No. of target PHUs 
reporting no stock-outs 
of essential EmONC 
medicines and supplies 
Planned 0 52 65 65 
Achieved  35 28 52 
No. of target hospitals 
reporting no stock-outs 
of essential EmONC 
medicines and supplies 
Planned 0 14 21 21 
Achieved  8 12 16 
Adequate 
management of 
medicines and 
consumables, with 
secured storage 
facilities at Central, 
District and Peripheral 
levels 
% of DMS and district 
hospitals sending timely 
LMIS reports to CMS 
Planned 0% 60% 90% 90% 
Achieved  63% 78% 88% 
% of PHUs sending at 
least one LMIS report in 
a quarter to the district 
level 
Planned 0% 70% 75% 75% 
Achieved  65% 86% 90% 
Source: UNICEF BPEHS Progress Reports. 
5.4.3 Outstanding challenges 
Given the implementation issues and subsequent results described above, there are several 
outstanding challenges that need to be addressed in the near future: 
1. Existence of parallel supply chains. Given the lack of support from donors and financial 
resources from GoSL, responsibilities for the procurement and distribution of drugs and 
medical supplies lay with the NPPU and UNICEF (for some time, DFID was also procuring 
commodities through its own supplier). In addition, GoSL also procures cost-recovery drugs for 
non-FHCI beneficiaries, while the Global Fund supplies drugs for malaria, HIV and sexually 
transmitted diseases (Pharmacy Board, personal communication). Besides a duplication of 
functions, the existence of multiple parallel systems for drugs procurement and distribution 
hinders capacity building and institutional strengthening, which are key for the NPPU and GoSL 
to eventually take over the supply chain. 
2. The continued ‘push’ system that, besides creating rigidities in the supply chain by not giving 
enough flexibility to hospitals and PHUs to demand the commodity quantities they require, also 
contributes to stock expiration and wastage. This system also makes it harder to manage 
storage space as health facilities cannot anticipate the quantities of drugs and medical supplies 
to be received (BDO LLP, 2015). 
3. Poor monitoring systems. Although the SOP Manual describes CHANNEL as a 
comprehensive and relatively straightforward system, in reality health facilities lack the human 
and technological capacity to effectively implement it. 
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4. Poor storage facilities, especially at district and PHU levels. Estimations for 2015 indicate 
that around 20% of drugs stock throughout the supply chain are expired, accounting for around 
US $1.1 million in stock (BDO LLP, 2015). Poor storage also allows for mix-ups to be made 
between cost-recovery and FHCI drugs and medical supplies. 
5. Financial sustainability. There are important concerns about the capacity of the GoSL to 
finance FHCI drugs in the long run, which cost around US $15 million per year. During the first 
year of implementation, US$ 12,390,000 was used for commodities procurement, of which 68% 
was funded by DFID, 12% by AfDB, 10% by UNFPA and 10% by GoSL (MoHS, 2011). For the 
first NPPU procurement in 2014, GoSL allocated US$ 3 million, with US$ 10–15 million 
remaining unfunded. Moreover, there is no government budget clearly allocated to the supply 
chain, and there is no consideration of the required complementary investments in capacity 
building of HRH and infrastructure (BDO LLP, 2015). 
5.5 Infrastructure 
5.5.1 What changed and why? 
The importance of having a functioning health infrastructure was identified as a priority by all health 
actors and as such a working group was dedicated to devising and implementing health 
infrastructure reforms. The infrastructure working group planned (MoHS presentation, April 2010) 
to:  
 Assess the status of maternity, paediatric and five potential BEmONC facilities per district; 
 Identify areas that could be improved prior to 27 April 2010; 
 Undertake essential maintenance and renovation; 
 Provide essential equipment and supplies and completion of capital projects; and 
 Mobilise partner and government resources to address critical issues. 
Infrastructure timeline 
2010 
 February 2010 – assessment of hospitals and BEmONC and 
CEmONC facilities across the country – birth of seven enablers 
tracking system 
February / April 2010 – team of experts in North and South of the 
country undertook rehabilitation work 
April 2010 onwards – various infrastructure support projects led by 
health implementation partners (INGOs and UN institutions) 
November 2010 – first Facility Improvement Team (FIT) 
assessment report, followed by quarterly reports thereafter 
 
2011  
April 2011 – introduction of the PBF, of which 40% was meant to be 
allocated to facility improvement  
2012–
2015  
Implementation of the JPWF, in which facilities’ development was 
key (within service delivery focus)  
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 83 
The overall aim was to ensure that in each district at least one hospital would be able to provide 
the full range of CEmONC services and five PHUs upgraded to provide BEmONC services.  
The JPWF also supported an infrastructure plan led by donors (JPWF, 2012), which included: 
 Construction of 39 new PHUs to address equity of service accessibility; 
 Seventy BEmONC facilities and 13 CEmONC facilities rehabilitated and equipped;  
 Eighteen hospitals provided with functioning equipment for the provision of critical newborn 
care; 
 Cold rooms in all 13 districts constructed/rehabilitated and equipped; 
 Waste disposal units constructed in all hospitals and 25% of PHUs; and 
 Solar energy power supplies installed for ward, office and security lighting systems in all 18 
hospitals and 70 BEmONC facilities. 
5.5.2 Implementation and effectiveness 
The assessment of the status of the BEmONC and EmONC facilities that took place in February 
2010 revealed a struggling infrastructure unequally distributed across the country, with a series of 
underperforming enablers. Nonetheless, the transformation of the existing infrastructure following 
the working group and subsequently JPWF plans has had mixed success. First, the work 
contracted to prepare for the FHCI launch did not always materialise. The President’s inspection 
seven days prior to the launch showed that many of the planned upgrades had not been 
completed, with contractors reneging on their commitments.86 
Second, an analysis of the MoHS capital expenditure budget (see Figure 25) shows that there 
were substantial increases in real terms in 2010 and 2011 (280% and 110% respectively), linked to 
the need to develop and upgrade facilities to be used for the FHCI. Indeed, prior to the launch of 
the FHCI, districts were given resources to pay for rehabilitation and minor maintenance (such as 
tiling floors). However, there were subsequently dramatic decreases in capital expenditure in 2012, 
with KIIs at facility level also supporting the idea that after the initial refurbishment of facilities only 
minimal expenditure had occurred. Officials in facilities noted poor maintenance and refurbishment 
in recent years.  
Furthermore, since the end of 2011, PBF support to facilities was meant to cover all infrastructure 
rehabilitation and maintenance recurrent costs, with minimal budget allocated from the central 
ministry or DHMT. To what extent the resources allocated from 2012 onwards were sufficient is 
unclear, although the state of the infrastructure would clearly indicate that it is grossly insufficient.  
This is confirmed by district-level interviews: 
“The only budget for maintenance is the 40% from PBF” (District KII, Western Area). 
“Facilities were improved post-FHCI but the majority have not been maintained. PBF has 
been used for the little maintenance that has occurred (District KII, Kono). 
“Renovation was done at the maternity section as there was leakage. All that was paid for 
with the 40% of the PBF – in 2013” (District KII, Western Area). 
                                               
86 See www.statehouse.gov.sl/index.php/presidential-cabinet/65-president-koroma-admonishes-health-infrastructure-consultants-and-
contractors-one-could-be-   
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As to the implementation of the JPWF infrastructure reforms, evidence suggests that only about 
25% of the expected outputs have been produced (see Section 4.1). 
Identification of the scale of the problem 
First and foremost, the FHCI enabled the GoSL to clearly assess the state of the health system 
infrastructure. It was repeatedly noted throughout various interviews that the infrastructure 
problems were thus identified because of the FHCI: 
“These issues would have otherwise remained unnoticed. The FHCI brought these things 
under scrutiny and attention” (Government official at the time of the FHCI’s preparation, 
interview). 
“Through the initial assessment, it was established that a lot of the facilities that were to 
have been built through various projects (referred to as capital projects) were in fact still not 
ready (although they were meant to be finished in 2007/08). An essential maintenance 
programme was set up as a result. The President called up all contractors to explain why 
they had not finished the buildings. The President was furious and called them every week 
to know their progress of completion. The President then visited every single health district 
before the launch” (Government official, interview). 
A MoHS document also states that, ‘The assessment showed that the infrastructure [was] weak 
and this was made very evident during the nationwide tour of the hospitals by His Excellency the 
President in early 2010’ (MoHS, FHCI the way forward, October 2010). 
Sustained analysis of the state of the infrastructure 
The assessment of the capacity of the infrastructure system to provide EmONC continued to be 
undertaken through a tracker system and the FIT assessment reports that started in November 
2010, in continuation from the original assessment undertaken in February 2010. Further reports 
were published in 2012, 2013 and 2014. To date, 13 hospitals and 65 CHCs – five per district, 
roughly one per chiefdom – have been assessed on a quarterly basis (FIT Report, 2014). The 
initial driver for the FIT was therefore the FHCI and the continuation of these assessments is a 
positive outcome of the reform. 
Initial improvement although slower than hoped for and still insufficient 
Initial improvements in terms of overall scores were noted between November 2010 and March 
2011 (see figures 47 and 48 below). BEmONC and CEmONC facilities fared better overall, 
although the speed at which these improvements came about was slower than originally planned. 
The first FIT assessments show that the actual infrastructure improvements as measured by the 
seven enablers were much less than expected. The figures below, for example, show that while 
the hope was to bring at least 20% of the BEmONC facilities to good quality standards across the 
seven enablers, the results across drugs and supplies availability, water and sanitation, blood, 
equipment and staffing were still very poor. The picture is less gloomy for CEmONC facilities but 
remained unsatisfactory in 2011. 
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Figure 46: BEmONC planned vs. actual 
 
Source: Facilities report for RCH (MoHS, 2011) 
Figure 47: CEmONC planned vs. actual 
 
Source: Facilities report for RCH (MoHS, 2011) 
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If we look over a longer period of time, however, the number of government hospitals able to 
deliver BEmONC rose from 47% in November 2010 to 82% in July 2013, worsened as at July 2014 
(most probably because of the Ebola outbreak) but slowly recovered to 73% in June 2015 (see 
Figure 49 below). For CEmONC services, figures progressed from 63% to 89% (November 2010 – 
July 2013 respectively), worsening as at July 2014 and thereafter stabilising at around 80% as at 
June 2015. Whether this is solely as a result of the infrastructure reforms undertaken through the 
FHCI cannot be stated, although the increased level of scrutiny that infrastructure was subjected to 
as a result of the FHCI certainly contributed. 
Figure 48: Progress of selected government hospitals in achieving BEmONC status, June 
2015 
 
Source: http://www.mamaye.org.sl/en/evidence/facilities-improvement-team-assessments-2012-2013-2014-2015 
Figure 49 Progress of selected government hospitals in achieving CEmONC status, July 
2013 
 
Source: http://www.mamaye.org.sl/en/evidence/facilities-improvement-team-assessments-2012-2013-2014- 2015 
Our district-level interviews confirm that the FHCI brought improvements in terms of the number of 
facilities providing BEmONC and CEmONC care: 
“With the introduction of the FHCI five facilities were upgraded to BEmONC – four in the 
rural areas and one in an urban area” (District KII, Kono). 
“Pre-FHCI there were no BEmONC or CEmONC facilities. Now there are five and one 
respectively. The increase is definitely linked to the FHCI and the target groups. The 
improvements in infrastructure happened in the two years following the start of the FHCI” 
(District KII, Bo). 
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“Previously the buildings were old and in a poor state. This has improved slightly” (District 
KII, Bo). 
Nonetheless, the improvements remain insufficient as various health infrastructure assessments 
(e.g. SARA, 2011 and the FITs), our district-level interviews and community-level FGDs all show: a 
lack of electricity, running water, and blood for transfusions frequently makes emergency care 
unreliable for children with untreated malaria or severe diarrhoea, and for mothers in need of 
caesarean sections (Maxmen, 2013).  
Indeed, there is a persistent issue with the lack of electricity and water across the districts, limiting 
the ability of facilities to provide services at night and to provide hygienic conditions. There were 
protected water sources in only 67% of the health facilities visited and only 58% have functional 
refrigerators (Save the Children and Health Alert, 2014). As at June 2015, only 64.6% of the 
BEmONC facilities and 76.9% of the CEmONC facilities met the criteria for electricity (FIT 
assessment, June 2015). Similarly, for water and sanitation only 73.8% of the BEmONC facilities 
and 80.8% of CEmONC facilities have at least one source of water. In the BEmONC facilities, only 
Koinadugu and Kono districts have three facilities each that are compliant for water and sanitation, 
while Kailahun, Pujehun, Tonkolili and Bonthe districts have no BEmONC facility that is compliant 
(FIT assessment, June 2015). 
“The health centre has been classified as able to carry out BEmONC since 2012/13. They 
have a generator – but no fuel to run it (although there is solar lighting for the labour ward). 
The water pump has also been broken for three months and an old rain harvesting system 
doesn’t work” (District KII, Koinadugu). 
“We used to have water from a tap outside the facility but now it is not working so we get 
water from stream” (District KII, Western Area). 
Figure 50: Baoma station water pump, Bo District 
 
Source: OPM consultants, October 2015 
Participants in Kono were especially vocal in highlighting the poor state of health facilities and 
equipment in the district. They shared that some facilities were in deplorable conditions and were 
not well managed. The unavailability of medical equipment such as scanning machines and the 
lack of water and electricity posed a huge problem, especially in rural areas. In some communities, 
there is no electricity at the facility and patients would have to provide their own source of light if 
they went into labour at night. In some communities, the lack of electricity and a medical storage 
facility such as a refrigerator prevented them from having children under five immunised, given that 
the distance to the next available facility with a refrigerator may be too far for health workers to go 
and return with the vaccines in one day (OPM and Focus 1000, 2016). 
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Furthermore, the improvement in terms of the equipment used at facility level is insufficient. In 
2011, on average, facilities had six of the eight items, for an overall basic equipment readiness 
score of 75 out of 100. The most commonly available items were thermometers (93%) and 
stethoscopes (88%). Less than half of health facilities had a neonatal bag and mask and only 19% 
of facilities were fully equipped with all eight basic equipment items. Almost half of hospitals had all 
eight basic equipment items (48%) compared to 18% of primary care facilities (SARA, 2011). 
Figure 51: Percentage of facilities with basic equipment items 
 
Source: SARA (MoHS, 2012f) 
As at June 2015, only one hospital (Pujehun) and nine BEmONC facilities were compliant with this 
enabler. The greatest challenge for the CEmONC facilities are shortages of equipment to perform 
assisted vaginal deliveries and basic equipment for routine care and the lack of chlorhexidine 
spray for cord care (FIT assessment, June 2015). A key informant even stated that ‘the x-ray 
machine is as old as my grandfather’ (district-level KII, Bo) and many complained about the state 
of equipment. 
“We have a (non-standard) delivery bed that has been at the facility since it opened in 
around 2000” (District KII, Bo). 
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Figure 52: Delivery bed, CHC, Bo district 
 
Source: OPM consultants, October 2015 
Figure 53: Bo district CHP delivery room 
 
Source: OPM consultants, October 2015 
Finally, the lack of blood continues to be a problem. There is inadequate space, blood bags, 
equipment and reagents for blood screening and storage at regional centres (Save the Children 
and Health Alert, 2014). As at June 2015 the combined score for blood handling and laboratory 
in the BEmONC facilities is 48.8%, and only 6.2% met the green criteria (FIT assessment, 
June 2015). Our district-level interviews consistently highlighted the difficulty with blood across 
districts, with patients asked to come to the facility with family members in case of need for 
blood. 
“Availability of blood is very big issue. Donating blood is culturally not understood” (District 
KII, Koinadugu). 
Despite a recent effort to strengthen 13 hospitals and 65 CHCs nationwide and upgrade them to 
EmONC status, an assessment conducted in July 2014 suggested that not a single facility had 
been sufficiently upgraded to meet standards across the seven domains assessed – with a lack of 
necessary equipment, staffing, supplies, water and sanitation noted as frequent obstacles (MoHS, 
2014). 
5.5.3 Outstanding challenges 
There is an urgent need to recognise the importance of the state and readiness of the 
infrastructure to tackle MCH issues. In particular, it is necessary to increase the budget allocated 
for capital and recurrent expenditures with investments focusing on access to water and electricity, 
improvements in equipment, and investments in blood availability.  
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These continuing challenges erode the trust of the population in the services provided, and pose a 
serious threat to the quality of care provided.  
5.6 Monitoring and evaluation 
5.6.1 What changed and why? 
Before the start of the FHCI in 2010, Sierra Leone’s M&E system for health was weak. However, 
there have clearly been positive changes to the M&E system in the last five years and some of 
these are directly linked to the FHCI.  
During the preparations for the initiative in late 2009 and early 2010, the Directorate of Policy, 
Planning and Information (DPPI) within MoHS was given a much more explicit role in monitoring 
and data issues. It coordinated the M&E work within and outside MoHS and took the lead in the 
M&E working group that was formed for the pillar. 
The M&E working group was active immediately before and after the FHCI’s launch. Minutes of 
meetings and other documents show that the group contributed in the following areas: 
 An M&E strategy for FHCI was prepared in early 2010; 
 Regular reporting on key indicators was carried out for the first few months of the initiative; and 
 The HMIS system was developed, to incorporate revised data collection forms, the collection of 
a wider range of variables, and electronic transmission of data between districts and MoHS. 
M&E timeline 
2008 
 
DHS conducted   
2009  
Development of the DHIS to capture HMIS data (not specifically linked to 
FHCI) 
DHSBS conducted (not specifically linked to FHCI) 
M&E subcommittee set up 
 
 
2010  
Development of the FHCI M&E strategy 
Strengthening of the forms used to capture data at the health facility level 
Regular M&E reports submitted to the FHCI Steering Committee 
Production of the first quarterly health bulletins 
 
 
2012  
DHIS system freezes and data from 2010 to 2012 are lost 
Complete change of staff in the section dealing with health M&E and 
HMIS 
Production of health bulletins stops 
 
 
2013  
New staff recruited to work on HMIS and data from April 2011 put back 
onto the system from district back-ups 
DHS conducted (not specifically linked to FHCI) 
 
 
2015  
M&E subcommittee is re-established after a period of inactivity 
Proposals developed to re-introduce the production of health bulletins 
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In addition to the activities of the working group, there was also the development of independent 
data collection by the HFAC, as mentioned in Section 4.1. 
Our interviews with staff in DHMTs and health facilities confirm that they have seen changes to 
M&E practices in recent years. These have provided better structures for M&E and partly improved 
its effectiveness. 
“Monitoring has increased dramatically since the FHCI” (District KII, Kono). 
“Before the FHCI there was some M&E but it was not effective. But now it is really well 
structured. There is a really good system in terms of data collection” (District KII, Western 
Area). 
The start of the FHCI brought an increase in the number of people who were involved in data 
collection, a clearer indication of this in their job descriptions, and an increase in the level of priority 
for M&E work. The number and length of forms also expanded. 
“Before the FHCI there was no motivation to move around to collect the reports. Now it’s 
part of the job description and we’re given a motorbike and fuel” (District KII, Koinadugu). 
“The FHCI brought in a number of changes, including more data operators and a number of 
new forms” (District KII, Kono). 
Supervision and checks by the DHMT teams have also expanded since 2010. The additional 
supervision is seen as helpful by health facility staff. It also involves new consistency checks and 
unannounced spot checks that aim to improve data quality. There is also evidence that 
improvements in data collection are often discussed at the monthly district ‘in-charge’ meetings. 
“The system has consistency checks, e.g. to prevent wrong large or small values, and also 
to cross-check between, say, the number of vaccines used and the number of children 
vaccinated” (District KII, Bo). 
“We find errors by comparing figures with previous trends to see if they look right” (District 
KII, Kono). 
“We get supervision from DHMT every two to three months” (District KII, Kono). 
How the changes were implemented 
M&E was identified as an important area of work at the start of the FHCI. Despite this evidence 
arising in the national-level KIIs suggests that it was not a main focus of attention as the FHCI was 
being developed and launched. As a result, the M&E work was not implemented as effectively as it 
could have been. 
The M&E subcommittee was certainly active in 2010. This is clear from the minutes of the FHCI 
Steering Group, which mention their work on the M&E strategy and their regular reporting. 
However, we have found few references to the work of the M&E subcommittee from around 2011 
to 2014 and it does not appear to have been active during these years.  
Interviews with UNICEF suggest that aspects of the M&E strategy that were implemented included: 
continued strengthening of the HMIS/DHIS system and the improvement of the health facility data 
collection forms; quarterly health bulletins; monitoring of key tracer drugs; and two reviews of the 
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FHCI in 2010 and 2011. However, we have not been able to explore these areas in further detail 
due to the lack of institutional memory and missing documents.  
The HMIS was developed primarily by a small group of external consultants from the University of 
Oslo working with DPPI staff. These consultants are now no longer in the country, although DPPI 
staff can contact them. 
A series of data forms was developed for each health facility to complete each month. The forms 
are completed by the health workers at the facility and are collated at the district level and then 
transferred to the MoHS. The information is now transferred electronically from the districts to the 
ministry. According to MoHS there has been a rise in the proportion of facilities completing the 
forms to around 90% (Health Information Bulletin, Volume 4, Issue 2, MoHS, 2013). However, our 
exploration of the database shows that the amount of data present does not seem to reflect this. 
Interviews with HMIS staff suggest that the returns from many health facilities have missing values.  
Furthermore, although DPPI produced quarterly health bulletins starting in 2010 these stopped in 
2012. A new series is now planned and the first of these was produced in late 2015. 
5.6.2 Implementation and effectiveness 
M&E subcommittee and strategy 
In terms of its membership, there does seem to have been a broad range of government, NGO 
and development partner representation. There was, however, no representative from SSL. This 
would have been a significant weakness, particularly in the area of exploring how the survey data 
and the management information could be used together, as participants in national-level KIIs 
attested. 
At the ministry level, the DPPI has suffered significant levels of staff turnover among those working 
on M&E issues in the last few years. This has led to a large loss of institutional memory and 
expertise and hampered the creation of a robust M&E system. 
One potentially key piece of work by the M&E subcommittee was the FHCI M&E strategy. It was 
extremely difficult to track down a copy of this. There were also very few people who could 
remember its contents or its implementation, which is a strong indication that it was not effectively 
put into practice. In terms of its contents, its focus was in four areas: 
 improving the HMIS; 
 strengthening community monitoring through ward development committees; 
 establishing effective feedback and review mechanisms; and 
 developing supervision and audit systems. 
The proposals in each of these areas were generally weak and the evidence from our review 
suggests that the strategy was poorly implemented. 
For the HMIS, the focus of the strategy was on printing registers and cards for the health facilities 
to record information. Improved availability of these documents was, and remains, an important 
issue – but the strategy is missing discussion of much more significant areas. For example, there 
is no mention of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the system and addressing these, 
and nor is there any reference to assessing and improving data quality and relevance. 
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In terms of community monitoring, there are very few details on the proposed role of the ward 
development committees. In our district interviews, there was no mention of them being involved in 
FHCI M&E now or at a previous stage. 
Moreover, the strategy does recognise the importance of review and feedback mechanisms. It 
proposes a hierarchy of monthly, quarterly and annual processes at district and national level. 
However, there is little substance to the proposals and we have found little evidence that they were 
effectively implemented. 
On the fourth area – developing supervision and audit systems – our interviews at district level did 
find that supervision took place, that it was seen as useful and that it uncovered errors and 
weaknesses staff could then correct. But it was also clear that the amount of supervision 
undertaken is only a small fraction of what is needed to create a robust and good-quality data 
collection system. 
Data availability and quality 
The issue of collecting baseline data at the start of the FHCI was discussed before its launch but 
no action was taken. This lack of baseline data presents a significant hurdle in conducting a review 
of the FHCI’s impact. There were two key reasons for not collecting data at the start of the 
initiative: first, the speed at which the FHCI was introduced did not allow time for new data 
collection; and, second, there do not seem to have been the resources available to pay for a 
baseline assessment. 
In terms of wider data, there has certainly been an increase in the amount collected through the 
HMIS. There are, however, concerns with the quality of the data. Our explorations of certain 
variables show that health facilities have missing data for between 20% and 40% of cases. In 
addition, a review by Options Consultancy (2015) shows that there are large variations between 
the figures recorded in the health facility registers, the summary sheets at the district level, and the 
data recorded centrally in DHIS. The Options review looked at the impact of the Ebola situation on 
HMIS data quality but it found that these weaknesses existed both before and after the onset of the 
virus. Both the missing data and the inconsistent data mean that the HMIS dataset is likely to 
contain significant biases within it. 
HMIS data from before April 2011 are not available. The DHIS software used to hold the data was 
upgraded in 2012 but the system initially froze as a result. This led to a complete loss of data. 
DPPI staff were able to restore data from April 2011 onwards from back-ups but there is no HMIS 
information on the DHIS system from the early period of the FHCI or from before its start. 
The HMIS data collection system has been strengthened to use electronic transfer of data over the 
internet from districts to the MoHS. But poor access to the internet has made this process difficult 
in some areas and is likely to be behind some of the data gaps that have been observed. In 
addition, the districts currently use stand-alone versions of the DHIS and this also hinders the 
smooth transfer of data to the centre. 
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Figure 54: Hospital records drying in the sun 
 
Source: OPM consultants, October 2015 
Availability and use of monitoring outputs 
Regular reports were initially submitted to the FHCI Steering Group showing facility response rates 
and service utilisation. At the time, members of the Steering Group noted that the monitoring 
reports showed unusual and unexplained trends, but according to national-level KIIs there was 
little further discussion either about the data itself or what lay behind the trends. 
The M&E strategy does contain a table of indicators and targets for the FHCI; however, we have 
not been able to find evidence that there was ever any reporting of progress against these targets. 
Until recently there were very few regular reports produced by DPPI. Data have been provided to 
other parts of MoHS and external partners on request but this has not typically been accompanied 
by information on data quality or interpretation. According to national-level KIIs, staff at the DPPI 
are hoping to move forward in developing regular outputs, assessments of data quality and more 
interpretation in the next year. 
As noted above, there are issues with the completeness and consistency of the monitoring 
information collected by HFAC. Concerns have also been expressed about HFAC monitoring by 
other stakeholders:  
“HFAC does produce some reports but these are only shared with government. The 
process is not inclusive” (District KII, Bo). 
In theory there should be annual health sector reviews led by MoHS. These would be the 
appropriate time to review monitoring reports and assess progress against the original FHCI 
targets and objectives. These annual reviews do not seem to be happening regularly (only one 
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was produced, in 2011). So far it has also proved difficult to obtain any regular reporting of FHCI 
progress from the M&E system. 
Overall, we have found little evidence that there was a deliberate effort to link the results of the 
M&E outputs to policy and accountability processes. 
5.6.3 Outstanding challenges 
There remain significant outstanding challenges for the M&E system in the health sector. This has 
been recognised by MoHS and in 2015 DPPI reconvened an M&E technical working group with a 
wide range of stakeholders to take forward this work. Our review of the M&E pillar highlights 
outstanding challenges in the following areas: strategy and work planning; data sources; data 
quality; and encouraging the use of data. Ebola has also had an effect that needs to be taken into 
account. 
Strategy and work planning 
A new strategy is needed to provide an overarching framework for the M&E work in the health 
sector. It should start by looking at what is required in terms of M&E and then design/redesign the 
system to deliver this. A clear time-bound work plan is also required, including costs and 
indications of the relative priority of each component. The strategy and work plan need to be 
underpinned by consultation with current and potential users of the M&E outputs. 
Data sources 
The focus so far has been primarily on the HMIS data. Further work is necessary to design a 
coherent set of data sources including management data, surveys, censuses, vital registration and 
surveillance systems. Each of these types of data source will have different strengths and 
weaknesses and they need to be considered and designed together to produce a cost-effective 
and appropriate system. 
Data quality 
Poor data quality is one of the main weaknesses with the existing system. This affects both the 
administrative data from HMIS and the survey sources such as the DHS.  
Areas that require particular attention are improving the completeness and accuracy of the data at 
the facility level, increasing the amount and effectiveness of supervision by DHMT staff, developing 
and implementing robust quality control processes, and reporting on data-quality issues alongside 
data analysis. In addition, the quality of the various sources can also be assessed and improved by 
comparing and contrasting the pictures shown by the various sources. 
Encouraging the use of data 
In general, the main factors that drive improvements in the availability and quality of data are the 
level of demand for the data and how much they are used. A high demand for data provides a 
strong incentive for data producers to strengthen and expand their data collection. Intensive use of 
the information can highlight the strength and weaknesses of the various datasets, helps identify 
areas that can be improved and demonstrates where resources can best be directed. The use of 
data has been an area of weakness for Sierra Leone’s health sector. This should be a focus area 
in the future.  
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Impact of Ebola on the M&E system 
The Ebola situation has had both negative and positive effects on the health M&E system. Much of 
the data are collected by health staff at the facility level and collated and checked by members of 
the DHMT. During the Ebola period these staff will have been stretched and the data collection will 
almost certainly have suffered. Response rates from health facilities are not yet available for this 
period but it is likely that these will have dropped as staff resources were focused on addressing 
Ebola. The accuracy of the data is also likely to have suffered. 
However, our district-level interviews did show that Ebola has brought some benefits to the data 
collection system. Efforts to collect information on the number and causes of deaths were 
improved significantly during the Ebola period, and this process attempted to cover all deaths, not 
only those from Ebola. If this data collection is continued and improved in the coming years, it will 
fill a large gap in Sierra Leone’s Health Information System.  
5.7 Communications 
 
The communications pillar is unusual for two main reasons: first, national-level KIIs suggest it was 
not seen as a priority despite a working group being created to tackle FHCI-related 
communications. Second, this working group’s function was to prepare the launch of the FHCI, 
with little attention given to the post-launch side of communication. The MoHS did have a 
communication expert, but his capacity was limited due to lack of funding. As such, all the 
information provided below is related to FHCI-specific communications rather than the 
communications of the MoHS as a whole.  
5.7.1 What changed and why? 
Removing user fees for target groups has proven, in other countries undertaking a similar reform, 
to be a potentially controversial policy choice: health workers may worry about the loss of revenue 
and the increase in workload, non-targeted groups may resent being left behind, and target groups 
may not fully understand their entitlements. As a result, communication was identified as a vital 
element for the successful implementation of the FHCI. US$ 3 million was planned to be allocated 
to support all communication-related activities (GoSL, 2009a) and a communication working group 
was set up during the preparation phase. 
This working group’s aim was to communicate the policy widely to:  
Communications timeline 
2009 
 
November 2009 – communications working group created  
2010  
January 2010–April 2010 – series of communication initiatives 
 
April 2010 – FHCI launch event at Cottage Hospital and across various 
districts 
 
May 2010 – ‘One month on’ briefing 
 
October 2010 – six-month anniversary 
 
 
2011  April 2011 – One-year anniversary (followed by yearly anniversaries since 
then) 
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 Policy-makers/managers: Clearly communicate the policy change and implementation roles 
and responsibilities (duty bearers). 
 Health workforce: Clearly communicate about the change, eligible services and recipients, 
and support that will be provided for policy implementation (duty bearers). 
 General population: Inform about the change, eligible services and recipients, and signal that 
user fees removal is about valuing care seekers (rights holders). 
A full communication strategy was developed. This strategy identified four types of audiences 
(health care providers, the general public, policy-makers (non-MoHS) and community leaders and 
groups) (see Table 18 below for a summary of the audiences and channels used for each). 
Detailed activities and timelines according to audience were developed. However, this strategy 
was only partially implemented due to lack of funding. Indeed, the US$ 3 million originally promised 
did not materialise and the working group had to fundraise for each activity it wished to undertake.  
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Table 18: Audiences and channels  
CHANNELS Traditional media Outdoor media Partnership promotion Influential local/peer promotion Other 
 
 
AUDIENCES Radio 
News-
papers TV Internet Billboards 
Flyers & 
posters 
On-pack 
promotion with 
companies 
Promotion 
through 
community 
structures 
Peer-2-
peer word 
of mouth 
Community/ 
religious 
leaders 
Town 
criers / 
Court 
Barray 
Formal 
reports 
& 
surveys 
Lobby-
ing 
Policy-makers 
             
Donors 
             
Senior government / Other 
ministries 
             
Parliamentarians 
             
Senior religious leaders 
and judiciary 
             
Paramount chiefs 
             
Councillors 
             
Health providers 
             
1 - Freetown/senior 
             
2 - District management 
             
3 - District qualified 
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4 - District low-qualified 
MoHS 
             
5 – District non-MoHS 
             
Public 
             
Lactating, aged 12–20  
             
Lactating, aged 20+  
             
Pregnant, aged 12–20  
             
Pregnant, aged 20+  
             
Grandmothers 
             
Fathers 
             
Community 
leaders/groups* 
             
Religious leaders 
             
Traditional leaders 
             
Comm. groups rural 
             
Comm. groups urban 
             
Secret societies 
             
Source: FHCI communication strategy (final), January 2010. 
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Within this strategy, a long list of activities per target group was developed. Some of the key 
activities included: 
 Messaging to the population through various means including radio interviews and a jingle in 
local languages; 
 Launch events in Freetown and at district levels; 
 Three-month and one-year anniversary events; 
 District workshops with health workers; 
 FHCI brochure; 
 District letter from the President explaining the policy; 
 Organisation of district tour by chief nurse and eight other nursing staff in April 2010 prior to 
launch; 
 Film on the policy process developed by partners; 
 Letter to health workers explaining the reform; 
 Regular media round-ups to assess the extent of media exposure; and 
 Development of posters for patients at health facility level (see example below) 
Figure 55 Poster for patients 
 
5.7.2 Implementation and effectiveness 
Lack of funding 
Of the above list of interventions, all have been implemented according to informants in the 
national-level KIIs. However, the US$ 3 million that had been required to undertake these activities 
did not materialise, which meant that the MoHS was left scrambling for funds and making last-
minute requests to various donors. This was not conducive to a strategic approach to 
communications, and underlines the lack of support this pillar had throughout the preparation and 
after the launch. 
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Communication with policy-makers and managers 
The communication with health implementation partners and policy-makers across the government 
was a defining feature of the FHCI prior to its launch, and was facilitated for example through the 
working group meetings as well as the presidential letter referred to above and district-level visits 
by the Chief Nursing Officer and the president. However, the level of communication and 
integration across policy-makers dramatically reduced after the launch, when international health 
partners’ interest in the initiative seems to have dwindled (at least according to national-level KIIs). 
Indeed, these national-level KIIs also suggested that the communication interest of many 
stakeholders centred on the ‘branding’ opportunity the FHCI represented. Once the FHCI had been 
launched, partners were much less interested and abandoned the working group and its initiatives: 
“After the launch itself, all energy was lost and you would go to working group meetings 
and find them nearly empty, only with government staff. Most of the external stakeholders 
had lost interest – UNICEF and WHO stayed but focus was lost straight after. We all knew 
that might happen” (MoHS communications staff at time of preparation and launch). 
Communication with health workers 
The initial communication with health workers came after the presidential announcement in 
September 2009. As a result, and because of a fear of additional work and loss of revenue, health 
workers went on strike. After an increase in their salary (detailed in Section 4.3) and the 
implementation of a series of communication approaches (e.g. letter to health workers, district-
level workshops, training on the FHCI, district-level letter by the President explaining the policy, 
etc.), the situation settled. Our district-level interviews confirm that clear efforts were made in 
briefing health workers thoroughly before the launch and after the launch through workshops and 
training sessions, although some still heard the announcement over the radio. 
“The message about the FHCI came from DHMT around three months before the launch. 
The CHCs and DHMT then worked together to tell the communities” (District KII, Bo). 
“The Minister of Health came to Kabala and the SAS came too” (District KII, Koinadugu). 
“The first real information on the FHCI came from listening to the President’s April 2010 
speech. After this we were invited to a workshop in July 2010 at the DHMT in-charges 
meeting. This gave more information about how the FHCI would work and the target 
groups. The health minister visited several districts including Bo to talk about the FHCI 
around this time” (District KII, Bo). 
Effects and effectiveness of the communication reforms 
Based on the available evidence gathered, a number of conclusions on the effects of the 
communication work around the FHCI can be drawn:  
Successful communication with policy-makers and managers 
The evidence from both district- and national-level KIIs suggests that district-level managers were 
made aware mostly prior to the FHCI of the rationale for the FHCI and were on board in terms 
of its implementation. 
Good communication with the population 
Awareness-raising campaigns targeting the population were perceived as successful by some 
CSOs. There was indeed a substantial increase in communication through various means (e.g. 
radio programmes, newspapers, television and street theatre). Civil society groups also argue 
that they played a crucial role in the success of the awareness-raising and that without their 
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support communication with the community would not have been possible. As a result, 
attendance to facilities soared immediately after the launch. 
Figure 56: The main children’s hospital in Freetown on 27 April 2010 at 8am 
   
Source: SAS Kargbo 
Clear guidelines to health workers 
The communication with health workers was successful in that, as a result, all health workers were 
clear as to the target groups and what was or not included in the FHCI.  
5.7.3 Outstanding challenges  
Despite these successes, there are still, after five years, misconceptions as to the breadth of the 
FHCI: some members of the population believe that the FHCI is meant to benefit everyone (see 
Section 5.3.3).  
The approach to communication around the FHCI seemed to take it as a one-off event (although 
anniversary celebrations do take place), which meant that the need for constant strengthening of 
the message of the FHCI is lost. It is lost on the population but also on district managers, policy-
makers and donors, who all need a constant reminder of what the FHCI is meant to do and the 
reasons why it was introduced in the first place.  
Communication should therefore be recognised as essential to the success of any policy reform 
and an appropriate level of budget therefore allocated to it; it should be continuous and messages 
should be regularly reinforced, mainly through radio channels for the population and further district-
level efforts for managers and donors. This implies a need for capacity building across the MoHS 
at national and district level and integration of communication for all new programmes.  
5.8 Summary of findings on the implementation of core interventions 
5.8.1 Increase in resources 
One fundamental goal was to increase resources to support health services for target groups. 
Estimates of the amount needed ex ante were somewhat hastily assembled – it was estimated that 
US$ 20 million of additional funding was needed in year 1 of the FHCI, largely for logistics and 
staffing costs. According to the MoHS 2012 figures, US$ 51.5 million and US$ 85 million were 
disbursed for the FHCI in 2010 and 2011 respectively, with substantial contributions from DFID 
and the Global Fund, among other partners, although figures differ. Judging overall adequacy is 
hard, as the costing was not systematic and the nature of the FHCI makes judging it as a free-
standing package inappropriate.  
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To address this, we have looked at the additionality of funding for the sector as a whole over the 
period. Results vary according to whether nominal or real growth is analysed, the period of 
analysis and whether total or public health expenditure is included. Public financing shows strong 
increases in 2010, the first year of the FHCI, but falls in real terms over time, whereas donor 
financing continued to increase, albeit marginally in real terms. While an important result, it is 
important to note that with high inflation during this period it is perhaps slightly less surprising that 
government expenditure was unable to maintain this 2010 increase in real terms. Perhaps more 
interestingly, expenditure as a proportion of overall government expenditure increased slightly in 
2010 and 2011, although it declined again in 2012. The preliminary conclusion is that the FHCI 
probably contributed to an overall increase in public funding for health care, particularly in its early 
years, but may also have been a reaction to increased donor (and to a lesser extent government) 
support in 2009, which may have given the government the confidence to launch the FHCI. 
Government expenditure on health per capita increased from US$ 3.1 in 2009, to US$ 5.2 in 2010 
and US$ 6.5 in 2011 (although these were more modest increases in real terms), suggesting that 
the FHCI continued the upward progress from 2009, although expenditure remains very low 
compared to the recommended US$ 86 for an essential package of health care (McIntyre and 
Meheus, 2014). Progress toward the Abuja target – a key target indicator as part of the FHCI – 
improved in 2009 to 2011, although this decreased significantly in 2012, which potentially suggests 
that the initial commitment to health reduced somewhat.  
5.8.2 Timeliness, adequacy and reliability at facilities 
Prior to the FHCI, facilities were highly dependent on user fees, especially at primary level, which 
limited their ability and willingness to exempt users from fees. The FHCI led to an initial provision 
of funds to the hospitals to cover non-salary recurrent costs, but it took longer for bank accounts to 
be set up for PHUs. An initial disbursement of facility finance was followed in 2011 by PBF, which 
linked funding to primary care units to the meeting of targets relating to the quantity and quality of 
Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health (RMNH) services. 
Systematic before-and-after data on health financing at facility level are missing, but we know from 
a survey in 2012 and from our district-level KIIs that facilities were largely using funds for 
maintenance, incentives to health care volunteers, support to community outreach programmes, 
and support for medical consumables.  
Resources to local councils increased significantly, growing in real terms in 2009 and 2010, 
although they largely stayed static thereafter and actually represented a decline as a proportion of 
the MoHS total expenditure, given the massive increases in payroll. There was a very large 
increase in expenditure through PHUs in 2010 (both in nominal and real terms). Based on 
preliminary 2013 results it appears that this increase continued in both nominal and real terms. The 
majority of this financing through PHUs was managed by non-government entities (mostly 
individual households, as well NGOs and other donor programmes). The FHCI may have 
contributed to increasing resources to the primary care level, including through PBF, which is 
focused on PHUs.  
5.8.3 Improved resource management and planning 
In addition to concerns relating to the volume and quality of funding, the evaluation was interested 
in assessing whether the public financing system had been strengthened over the FHCI period. 
Delays in receiving funds from the MoFED, underspends by the ministry and volatility in funding 
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had been noted in the period before 2010. Budget execution has continued to be volatile since, 
suggesting that systemic weaknesses may still be present.  
Delays in the arrival of funds have continued through 2012 and 2013, according to tracking 
surveys, and these delays are linked to a number of systemic weaknesses, including weak 
planning and cash management, a reduction in overall heath financing by government in 2012, 
centralised decision-making, disincentives to report in a timely fashion for districts and weak 
financial management capacity at the DHMT and hospital levels. A number of operational 
constraints and inconsistencies relating to PBF payments were also picked up by a monitoring 
study in 2014. 
5.8.4 Governance 
The provision of budget support by donors, and their increased funding for the FHCI, also led to 
more focus on governance and PFM systems, initially through the working groups. This was 
formalised by the preparation in 2011 of the JPWF (2012–2014), which was introduced to support 
the NHSSP and preceded the Health COMPACT. This COMPACT provided a framework outlining 
the roles and responsibilities of the GoSL and its partners in implementing the NHSSP. The 
framework in part was based on concerns regarding the sustainability of the FHCI, and the need 
for a coordinated government and development partner response. To that extent, the FHCI 
accelerated this process. 
However, weaknesses in PFM have meant that the potential opportunities for the FHCI to bring 
greater budget certainty and coherence between GoSL and developments partners have been 
limited. There was continuation of volatile funding (from government and donors), different 
templates for reporting, and development partners continuing to provide significant off-budget 
funding.  
Although the reputation of the MoHS may have been strengthened – it is now seen as a ministry 
that can deliver on a core public policy commitment – the continued corruption scandals are 
testimony to continuing weaknesses in government and financial controls, which have disruptive 
effects and undermine donor confidence.  
5.8.5 HRH 
The HRH reforms linked to the FHCI took place in two waves – the first, in 2010, involved fast-
track recruitment and deployment to fill gaps in staffing, payroll cleaning to ensure that ‘ghost 
workers’ were taken off the payroll (and those who were working unpaid – the many ‘volunteers’ - 
were added), and a substantial salary uplift to ensure that health workers were adequately paid 
and motivated to handle the increased workload without imposing informal charges on users. In 
the second round of HRH reforms, in 2011–2012, a system of monitoring staff absences, linked to 
a new staff sanction framework, aimed to ensure that the now more generously paid staff were 
actually at work. Another policy introduced during this period were performance-based funding to 
facilities, which could meet the dual need of providing some small flexible funding at facility level to 
replace lost user revenues and providing a direct incentive to staff to provide priority services. 
Finally, a remote allowance was introduced in January 2012 to encourage staff to take up postings 
in more rural, hard-to-serve areas. Since then, the pace of change has slowed, although work is 
now ongoing again, in response to the Ebola crisis, including on revising the training curricula and 
other longer-term reform measures. 
Assessment of the effectiveness and effects of these changes, undertaken with ReBUILD, found 
that the first phase was effectively implemented but the second phase less thoroughly, with a loss 
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of momentum for reforms over time. Documented effects include: increased staff numbers; a more 
robust payroll, which generates savings; better motivation and retention of staff; and reduced 
absenteeism. These gains are attributed to the political will and coordinated donor support for the 
FHCI, along with the deployment of technical assistance to support the implementation of reforms 
in a timely way. 
However, a number of HR challenges remain to be tackled to ensure that the FHCI’s momentum is 
carried through. These include the decentralisation of HR functions to ensure greater 
responsiveness to district needs and ability to performance manage staff effectively, developing 
integrated packages to retain qualified staff in remote areas and in shortage cadres (or those with 
high attrition levels), revising training curricula (including to improve staff ability to control infectious 
diseases, as illustrated in the Ebola epidemic), and verifying staff competences. 
5.8.6 Drugs and supplies 
It was recognised that improved procurement, distribution and management of drugs was essential 
to the success of the FHCI. Given the weaknesses in the existing systems and the urgency of the 
launch, the procurement of drugs was contracted to UNICEF, with a longer-term plan of 
establishing the NPPU. This was enacted in 2012 but is still not operational. 
Results show that drugs shortages have continued to varying degrees, although the supply chain 
is better than before the FHCI. Although the FHCI allowed for a general improvement in access to 
drugs and medical supplies, monitoring systems, and storage facilities, the procurement and 
distribution system is still ineffective and faces important challenges in the near future. 
Outstanding challenges include (1) the handing over of procurement and drugs management to the 
NPPU, which is clearly needed for longer-term sustainability; (2) improving the LMIS data; (3) 
addressing ongoing delivery and storage issues, and (4) improving regulation to prevent informal 
transactions, have some level of oversight over the private sector and more importantly, to 
guarantee the quality of the drugs and medical supplies that are procured and delivered. Both 
improved monitoring and regulatory frameworks should enhance accountability of supply and 
distribution processes and thus provide the necessary conditions for a smooth transition towards 
an effective “pull” system. 
5.8.7 Infrastructure 
No systematic assessment of the state of health infrastructure had been undertaken prior to the 
FHCI and significant problems were noted in the survey done in February 2010 in preparation for 
the FHCI. FIT assessment reports show linear progress in 2010 to 2013, with the number of 
government hospitals able to deliver BEmONC rising from 47% in November 2010 to 82% in July 
2013, and from 63% to 89% in the same time period for CEmONC services. The FHCI contributed 
to this through its focus on the need for service readiness for the target groups, although 
independent projects were already investing in RMNH before and after the launch (see section 8).  
Outstanding challenges include the need to complete the work to meet the standards for the 
selected hospitals, and improving water access and sanitation, paediatric wards and blood banks 
in district hospitals as well as ensuring access to electricity across the facilities. 
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5.8.8 M&E 
The health M&E system before the FHCI was weak and it is clear that some improvements have 
subsequently been made, including more structured data collection, improved supervision of data 
gathering and an increase in the amount of data. However, overall the M&E work developed for the 
FHCI was not as effective as it should have been and there remain significant weaknesses. 
Although M&E was identified as one of the supporting pillars of FHCI, it was not given sufficient 
emphasis or resources. As a result, the activities of the M&E subcommittee quickly declined after 
2010. No baseline data were collected before the launch of the initiative and this has hampered the 
assessment of the impact of the FHCI. The M&E strategy that was developed did not cover key 
areas such as the quality and coherence of data or the use of the information and reporting. High 
levels of staff turnover within DPPI and a corresponding loss of institutional memory also affected 
progress. 
There were also problems with the quality of the health data and these remain. The database 
holding HMIS data does not contain data from before April 2011; this information has been lost. A 
review by Options Consultancy showed that there were large inconsistencies in the information as 
it is transferred from health facility to district level to MoHS. Our examination of the HMIS dataset 
showed that the level of missing data is high. The survey data also suffer from known quality 
problems. All these issues mean that health-related M&E work is likely to contain unknown errors 
and biases. 
The major factor underlying these problems is that there is a low demand for M&E and the 
information is rarely used. Increasing the demand for and use of data is one of the main ways of 
increasing incentives to data producers to improve and expand M&E outputs. 
The main outstanding challenges in this pillar are to develop a robust overarching health M&E 
strategy, consult users on their priorities for M&E, improve the quality and coherence of health 
data, and develop new and innovative ways of increasing the demand for, and use of, health M&E 
information. 
5.8.9 Communications 
A detailed communication strategy was drawn up in January 2010, along with materials targeted at 
different groups. There is evidence of widespread activity by government and civil society in 2010–
2011. A HFAC survey in 2011 found 95% awareness of the FHCI in general (with variation by 
district), but correct identification of target groups was lower (82%) and many thought the initiative 
was of finite duration.  
While an original budget of US$3 million was promised, it was not forthcoming and this hampered 
the breadth of communication activities. Since then, the energy to support communications 
initiatives has dwindled.  
Outstanding challenges include developing a more integrated and long-term approach to 
information, education and communication, with adequate budgets and a proactive approach. This 
would have been of obvious utility during the Ebola epidemic and could also have been deployed 
early with sectoral stakeholders such as health staff to prevent industrial action (e.g. during the 
run-up to the FHCI launch).  
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 107 
5.8.10 Overall 
The FHCI really was a systemic change, which was both its strength – the underlying health 
system prerequisites for the fee change to work were well identified and plans laid to address them 
across the health system pillars – but also of course a source of risk, in that the ambition to change 
was large. Addressing such a wide range of issues across a relatively weak health system has 
meant that, while the needs were well identified in most pillars, many reforms were partial or 
partially effective, that gaps remain, and that the challenges to sustainability are real.  
This raises an evaluative judgement of what the yardstick for success is. The FHCI aimed high and 
within the health system arena appears to have met many, but certainly not all, of its targets. The 
question of how these achievements compare to the investment is returned to in Section 9. 
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6 Unpacking effects – outputs 
6.1 Did the FHCI achieve improved service uptake, coverage and 
equity for the target groups?  
In this section, we examine the available evidence on changing uptake and coverage of key 
services for the target groups, including family planning, ANC, delivery care, PNC and care for 
children under five (preventive services and curative consultations). The focus is on examining 
trends and whether there is evidence of a shift around the time of the start of FHCI, both for overall 
coverage but also broken down by quintile, region and rural/urban residence. On the basis of this 
we can draw conclusions about whether the FHCI has contributed to changing coverage and 
equity of coverage of essential services. 
6.1.1 Family planning  
Family planning is argued to be one of the most cost-effective health interventions and became 
free as part of the FHCI. It reduces maternal mortality through enabling women to time their 
pregnancies – such that they do not get pregnant at too young or old an age or too soon after they 
have recently delivered. Spacing births also contributes to reducing child mortality by enabling 
women to leave at least two years between births (Smith et al., 2009). Global access to some form 
of modern contraception is close to 60%, with unmet need ranging from 6% in Europe to 23% in 
sub-Saharan Africa. It is estimated that 41% of pregnancies are unwanted, and that 22% result in 
induced abortion. If these estimates are accurate, between one-quarter and two-fifths of maternal 
deaths could be prevented just through avoiding unwanted pregnancies (Campbell and Graham, 
2006).  
Knowledge of family planning is widespread in Sierra Leone, with more than 95% of both men and 
women knowing about a contraceptive method. Moreover, the use of a modern method of 
contraception has been rising in recent years. Among all women aged 15 to 49, rates of use rose 
from 6% to 21% between 2008 and 2013. The most commonly used methods were injectables, the 
pill and implants. More than two-thirds of current users obtain their contraceptives from public 
sector sources. However, despite the increases in the use of contraception, around a quarter of 
currently married women have an unmet need for family planning. 
6.1.2 ANC 
ANC can contribute to reducing both maternal and child mortality. With respect to maternal 
mortality, ANC is valuable as it offers the opportunity to spot preclinical or early morbidity states 
and to promote healthy behaviour. The main causes of maternal mortality worldwide are 
haemorrhage, sepsis, eclampsia, obstructed labour and complications from induced abortions. 
Where malaria and HIV are endemic, they can also cause complications during delivery. The 
effectiveness of ANC in decreasing maternal mortality depends on the ability to spot the early 
warning signs of one of these conditions, and then do something about it. Monitoring for eclampsia 
risk (through urine, blood pressure and physical testing) and screening for malaria and HIV are the 
key mechanisms through which ANC could decrease maternal mortality (Oyerinde, 2013).  
With respect to child mortality, there is evidence that ANC has significant impacts on neonatal 
health. Tetanus toxoid immunisation during ANC is estimated to decrease all-cause neonatal 
mortality by 33% to 58%, as well as the incidence of neonatal tetanus by 88% to 100%. 
Intermittent presumptive treatment for malaria may reduce neonatal mortality by 32%. Pre-
eclampsia and eclampsia prevention may reduce the incidence of prematurity by 34%, calcium 
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supplementation may reduce the incidence of low birthweight by 31%, and the detection and 
treatment of asymptomatic bacteriuria may reduce the incidence of prematurity and low birthweight 
by 40% (Darmstadt et al., 2005).  
Basic ANC is now nearly universal among pregnant women in Sierra Leone (see Table 19). 
Coverage rates from the surveys were fairly high before FHCI at 88% in the period 2004 to 2009. 
Rates actually rose before the initiative started, reaching 95% in 2009/10, and by 2010/11 as many 
as 98% of pregnant women received at least one antenatal appointment from a skilled health 
provider. An independent before/after estimation analysis of the 2013 DHS confirmed that it does 
not reveal a statistically significant increase in the utilisation of ANC once existing trends are taken 
into consideration (Edoka et al., 2015). 
Table 19:  ANC before and after the FHCI 
 Before FHCI After FHCI 
 
2004  
to 2009 
2009 to  
April 2010 
May 2010  
to 2011 
2012  
to 2013 
ANC from a skilled provider* 88 95 98 97 
Four or more ANC visits 66 76 76 76 
Urine sample taken 45 77 72 72 
Blood sample taken 54 90 89 90 
Protected against tetanus** 80 86 88 87 
Notes: Percentage of women aged 15–49 who had a live birth in the five years preceding the survey, in relation to their 
most recent birth. 
* Skilled provider includes doctor, nurse, midwife and MCH aide. 
** Received two or more tetanus toxoid injections during last pregnancy. 
Sources: DHSBS 2009 and DHS 2013. 
This pattern of improvements in the period before the FHCI but little change after it is also present 
in other ANC indicators (e.g. the percentages of pregnant women that have four or more 
appointments), and also the figures for those that had urine and blood tests as part of ANC. We 
have not been able to identify a clear reason for these pre-FHCI improvements. 
The HMIS data also tell a similar story, with improvements before the FHCI and more gradual 
improvements in ANC coverage in the years after 2010. There were around 5,000 ANC 
appointments a month in the year before the FHCI, rising to 7,000 at the time of the launch (see 
Figure 58). By 2014, monthly ANC appointments were typically above 8,000. However, the onset 
of the Ebola virus saw some of the gains eroded. For tetanus toxoid vaccinations in pregnancy the 
improvements are more clearly visible after the introduction of FHCI (see Figure 59). 
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Figure 57: Total number of ANC consultations per month 
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Figure 58: Number of pregnant women receiving two doses of tetanus toxoid vaccine per 
month 
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In terms of equity, the gap in ANC coverage rates between different areas and wealth groups has 
virtually disappeared (see Table 20). All regions and wealth groups now have coverage rates of 
between 96% and 98% for women receiving ANC from a skilled health worker. The largest 
increases in coverage have been seen in rural areas, the Northern Region, and the lowest two 
wealth quintiles – with coverage rising from between 82% and 84% to match the levels seen in the 
best covered areas and groups. 
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Table 20: ANC: Equity issues 
 
Received* antenatal care 
from a skilled provider** 
Urine sample taken*** Blood sample taken*** 
 2004-2008 2009-2013 2004-2008 2009-2013 2004-2008 2009-2013 
Residence 
Urban 94 98 65 84 68 93 
Rural 84 97 30 69 38 88 
Region 
Eastern 90 98 22 63 23 88 
Northern 82 96 41 75 50 89 
Southern 90 98 28 69 36 89 
Western 94 98 81 93 82 96 
Wealth quintile 
Lowest 82 96 22 64 26 86 
Second 83 97 31 68 37 87 
Middle 86 97 37 71 46 89 
Fourth 89 98 44 79 51 91 
Highest 96 98 76 89 78 96 
 
* Percentage of women aged 15-49 who had a live birth in the five years preceding the survey, in relation to their most 
recent birth. 
** Skilled provider includes doctor, nurse, midwife and MCH aide. 
*** Percentage of women aged 15–49 who had an ANC visit in relation to their most recent birth in the last five years who 
received the selected service. 
Source: DHS 2008 and 2013 
For the components of ANC, the inequalities between different areas and groups have also closed. 
Coverage rates for the taking of urine and blood samples were much lower in the Eastern and 
Southern regions and in rural areas in 2008. For example, only 23% of Eastern Region women had 
a blood test as part of their care in the earlier period compared to 82% in Western Area. By the 
time of the later survey, however, the Eastern figure had risen to almost 90% and was thus much 
closer to the 96% that were now having a blood test in Western Area. The lowest two wealth 
quintiles have also shown large improvements in these coverage rates, although a gap still 
remains with those higher up the wealth ranking. 
Pregnant women in particular are encouraged to protect themselves and their babies from malaria 
to prevent anaemia, low birth weight and other complications. Take-up rates for this protection 
among pregnant women have improved greatly since the start of FHCI. Table 21 shows that rates 
more than doubled for the use of ITNs by pregnant women (from 21% in 2009 to 53% in 2013). A 
similar rise was seen in treatment with Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine (SP)/Fansidar to protect mother 
and child from malaria during pregnancy (from 24% to 62%). 
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Table 21: Malaria prevention during pregnancy 
 Before FHCI After FHCI 
 2009 2013 
Use of ITNs* 21 53 
Use of IPTp** 24 62 
* Percentage of pregnant women aged 15 to 49 who slept under an ITN the night before the survey. 
** Percentage of pregnant women aged 15 to 49 with a live birth in the two years preceding the survey who received any 
SP/Fansidar as intermittent preventative treatment (IPTp) to protect the mother and child from malaria during pregnancy. 
Sources: DHSBS 2009 and Source: DHS 2013 
6.1.3 Delivery and PNC 
Facility deliveries, assistance by skilled staff during delivery and PNC are important in reducing the 
health risks facing mothers and newborn children. In comparison with other countries, coverage 
remains extremely low in Sierra Leone, although there have been improvements in recent years. 
It is estimated that as many as two-thirds of maternal deaths occur between late pregnancy and 48 
hours after delivery. The potential reduction in maternal mortality from its four main causes 
(obstructed labour, eclampsia, sepsis and haemorrhage) through the assistance of skilled birth 
attendance has been modelled using available incidence rates, expert opinion and an assumed 
basic level of infrastructure and limited access. With universal access, between 16% and 33% of 
maternal deaths are considered to be avoidable (Graham et al., 2001). This represents the 
theoretical efficacy of this intervention; however, in practice its actual effectiveness may be quite 
different.  
Postnatal care is considered a good opportunity for a variety of education based interventions for 
mothers – in particular for providing advice on postnatal maternal danger signs, safe sex, nutrition 
and breast care. It is also an opportunity to distribute bed nets, contraception and iron folate 
supplementation, and to detect postnatal maternal complications early. Through these 
mechanisms PNC is expected to contribute towards preventing all cause maternal mortality and 
future unwanted pregnancies, as well as promoting well-being and general good health (Campbell 
and Graham, 2006). 
Care during delivery can also have an impact on neonatal health. Evidence suggests that the 
detection and management of breech (caesarean section) may reduce perinatal/neonatal deaths 
by 71%, labour surveillance (including partograph) by 40%, and clean delivery practices by as 
much as 58 to 78%. Clean delivery practices may reduce the incidence of neonatal tetanus by 55 
to 99% and antibiotics for pre-term premature rupture of membranes may reduce the incidence of 
infections by 32% (Darmstadt et al., 2005). 
For births taking place in a health facility, both the survey data and the administrative information 
show that there has been a significant improvement. The survey data show that there was a rise in 
the years up to 2009 from 36% of births to 49% (see Table 22). There was also a further modest 
increase to 56% following the launch of the FHCI.  
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Table 22: Delivery* 
 Before FHCI After FHCI 
 
2004  
to 2009 
2009 to  
April 2010 
May 2010  
to 2011 
2012  
to 2013 
Delivery in a health facility** 36 49 56 57 
Delivery assisted by a skilled 
health worker*** 
50 56 61 62 
Delivery assisted by a skilled 
health worker, excluding 
MCHAs**** 
35 43 48 47 
* Relates to women aged 15–49 who had a live birth in the five years preceding the survey, in relation to their most 
recent birth. 
** Percentage that delivered in a health facility. 
*** Percentage that were assisted in delivery by a doctor, nurse, midwife or MCH aide. 
**** Percentage that were assisted in delivery by a doctor, nurse or midwife. 
Sources: DHSBS 2009 and DHS 2013 
The HMIS trend rises steadily from around 9,000 births per month in a health facility just before the 
FHCI to levels that are typically close to 16,000 by early 2014 (see Figure 60). This fell toward 
14,000 in the second half of that year, most likely due to the Ebola virus situation. 
The rise of births in a health facility has, as expected, been overwhelmingly concentrated in 
government heath facilities. Births in a private health facility make up just 2% of all births and this 
proportion has remained steady from before FHCI. There is no evidence from these figures that 
women are switching from private to public facilities in significant numbers due to start of free 
heath care in the government sector. 
Figure 59: Number of deliveries, by place of delivery each month 
Before
FHCI
Ebola
period
Deliveries in a 
health facility
Deliveries in 
the community
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
April 2009 April 2010 April 2011 April 2012 April 2013 April 2014
Source: Health Management Information System
 
Source: HMIS 
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 114 
Despite the increases in facility births, women in rural areas and those in the bottom three wealth 
quintiles still have much lower rates of health facility delivery than others – at or below 50% (see 
Table 23). Furthermore, Northern Region has especially low levels with its rate of 16% in 2008, 
rising to only 37% in 2013. Within Northern Region, the two districts of Kambia and Koinadugu 
have rates of only 34% and 33% respectively. 
Table 23: Delivery and PNC: Equity issues 
 
Percentage* delivered in a 
health facility 
Percentage* delivered by 
a skilled provider** 
Percentage*** receiving a 
postnatal check-up within 
two days of their last 
birth 
 2004–2008 2009–2013 2004–2008 2009–2013 2007–2008  2012–2013 
Residence 
Urban 40 68 67 79 69 78 
Rural 19 50 33 53 53 71 
Region 
Eastern 29 73 50 77 72 80 
Northern 16 37 27 42 45 67 
Southern 34 60 53 64 58 74 
Western 35 61 64 74 77 75 
Wealth quintile 
Lowest 17 48 28 51 47 68 
Second 21 50 35 52 55 71 
Middle 23 49 39 53 55 72 
Fourth 28 60 49 67 60 78 
Highest 39 70 71 84 74 77 
* Percentage of women aged 15–49 who had a live birth in the five years preceding the survey, in relation to their most 
recent birth. 
** Skilled provider includes doctor, nurse, midwife and MCH aide. 
*** Percentage of women aged 15–49 who had a live birth in the two years preceding the survey, in relation to their most 
recent birth. 
Source: DHSs 2008 and 2013 
At the national level, there have been increases in the proportion of births that are assisted by a 
skilled health worker (the Sierra Leone definition for this includes doctor, nurse, midwife or MCH 
aide87). As with other aspects of reproductive health, the data show improvements in the years 
before the initiative, as noted in Edoka et al. (2015). But there was also a rise in assisted births in 
the period immediately after the FHCI from 56% to 61% (see Table 22).  
Rates of skilled attendance at birth are highest in urban areas, the Eastern and Western regions 
and among the highest wealth quintile – all with percentage rates in the high 70s or low 80s (see 
Table 23). Northern Region is the region with the lowest rate at 42% – and within that region it is 
Koinadugu district that has lowest proportion in the country at 33%. However, Moyamba district in 
Southern Region also stands out as an area with very low rates, with coverage of just 36%. 
The bottom three wealth quintiles have similar rates to one another at just over half of all births 
attended by a skilled health worker. This is sharply lower than the highest wealth quintile, which 
has a rate of 84%. 
                                               
87 The international definition of assisted birth excludes MCH aides and figures for this measure are also shown in Table 22. The 
general increasing trend remains the same, although levels are around 14 percentage points lower. 
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Caesarean section rates provide a rough indication of met need for emergency obstetric care, with 
rates expected to be in the range of 5–15% in most populations, according to WHO. The rates in 
Sierra Leone remain too low in general, indicating continued unmet needs for EmONC. Overall, 
3% percent of births were delivered by caesarean section in 2013; this is double the rate of 1.5% in 
2008. Caesarean sections were highest among births to mothers with secondary or higher 
education (5%), to mothers in the highest wealth quintile (6%), urban births (5%), and births in 
Western Area (6%) (DHS, 2013). 
PNC has the potential to have a substantial effect on infant mortality – greater than that of ANC 
and similar to that of intrapartum care but at lower estimated cost (Darmstadt et al., 2005). 
Resuscitation of a newborn baby may decrease mortality by 6 to 42%, breastfeeding by 55 to 87%, 
prevention and management of hypothermia by 18 to 42% and community-based pneumonia case 
management by 27%. Kangaroo mother care (for low birthweight infants in health facilities) may 
reduce the incidence of infections by 51% (Ibid.).  
For PNC, the survey data show there has been a moderate increase in the proportion of women 
receiving a postnatal check – up from 60% in 2009 to 73% in 2013. The administrative information 
from HMIS shows stronger growth, with 20,000 women a month receiving a first PNC check in 
April 2010 rising to 30,000 by early 2014 (see Figure 61). 
Figure 60: Number of women receiving first postnatal visit each month 
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In general, the gap has narrowed between the areas and groups that had the highest levels before 
the FHCI compared to the others. For example, a 32 percentage point gap between Northern and 
Western regions has now shrunk so that the Northern Region is only eight percentage points 
behind. Moreover, the lowest wealth quintile is only nine percentage points behind the highest, 
whereas in 2008 it was 27 percentage points behind. 
One of the aspects of PNC is information about breastfeeding and encouragement to use this 
method of feeding. In 2013, 54% of babies were breastfed within one hour of birth and 89% within 
one day. However, these rates were virtually unchanged from those in 2008. 
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6.1.4 Curative and preventive services for children under the age of five 
Curative and preventative services for children provide the setting for a variety of interventions. 
Important services for children include, among others, the treatment of sepsis or pneumonia with 
antibiotics, of diarrhoea with oral rehydration salts (ORS), of measles with vitamin A, of malaria 
with Artemesinin compounds, and of wasting and malnutrition with nutritional supplements 
(Spectrum System, 2015).  
The start of free health care for children under five brought a surge in the numbers of these 
children attending health facilities. In the months before the FHCI there were typically less than 
100,000 consultations for under-fives each month (see Figure 62). This rose dramatically so that in 
May 2010 there were almost 340,000 consultations. However, the high numbers were not 
sustained during the initiative’s first year and by April 2011 consultation numbers reached a low 
point of 120,000.  
Figure 61: Number of consultations for under-fives per month 
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The fall appears to be because people were put off using health services where these had become 
overwhelmed by the increase in numbers. However, in the following years the number of under-
five consultations steadily grew again, so that between mid-2012 and mid-2014 monthly numbers 
again approached the 300,000 mark.  
Regression discontinuity analysis of the 2011 SLIHS (Edoka et al., 2015) was used to look at 
health service utilisation by children under five compared with those over five during 2011. The 
expectation was that this would show a decrease in utilisation once children reached the age of 
five and were no longer eligible for free health care. However, the data did not demonstrate this. 
The explanation offered by the authors is that the boundary of eligibility for free health care is, in 
reality, fuzzy – and that children close to but above the boundary may still be included. In addition, 
we note that this analysis is based on data collection in 2011 when the HMIS data show that 
under-five consultations had reduced almost to pre-FHCI levels (see Figure 62). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that there is little difference in utilisation between under-fives and older children at this 
point in time. As noted above, the number of under-five consultations has steadily increased in the 
years since 2011. 
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Vaccinations are one of the key health services for young children. Only clean water performs 
better than vaccinations in reducing the burden of infectious diseases. The potential benefits of 
vaccination are widespread. For the individual, they protect against specific diseases and in many 
cases are very effective. In instances where correctly immunised individuals do contract diseases 
against which they have been immunised, the effects are often milder (Andre et al., 2007). 
Children should receive their basic set of vaccinations by the age of one year. This includes BCG, 
measles and three doses each of DPT and polio vaccine. 
The picture shown by the different sources of data for immunisation is not entirely consistent. The 
survey data show a large rise in fully vaccinated one-year-olds, from 41% in 2009 to 68% in 2013 
(see Table 24). Figure 63 shows the HMIS monthly data for fully vaccinated one-year-olds. The 
trend before FHCI is erratic and the picture is unclear. But after April 2010 there is a gradual rise 
from around 15,000 per month up to in the region of 18,000 a month between mid-2012 and mid-
2014. This is a more modest increase than that suggested by the survey data. 
Table 24: Disease prevention for children 
 Before FHCI After FHCI 
 2009 2013 
One-year-olds with full vaccinations* 41 68 
Use of ITNs by under-fives** 23 49 
* Percentage of children aged 12 to 23 months who received all basic vaccinations at any time before the survey. 
** Percentage of children under five who slept under an ITN the night before the survey. 
Sources: DHSBS 2009 and DHS 2013 
Figure 62: Number of children under one fully immunised each month 
Before 
FHCI
Ebola 
period
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
April 2009 April 2010 April 2011 April 2012 April 2013 April 2014
Source: Health Management Information System
 
Source: HMIS 
The analysis by Edoka et al. (2015) confirms a statistically significant increase in the rate at which 
access to a complete course of DPT is growing post-FHCI, which also suggests that the FHCI may 
have improved access to immunisations.  
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In terms of equity, immunisation coverage rates between wealth quintiles were almost identical 
before the FHCI (see Table 25). However, by 2013 coverage rates for the lowest quintile were 
higher than those in the middle and wealthiest groups. 
Table 25: Disease prevention for children: Equity issues 
 
Percentage of one-year-olds* with 
all basic vaccinations** 
Percentage*** who slept under an 
ITN 
 2008 2013 2004–2008 2009–2013 
Residence 
Urban 40 66 30 40 
Rural 40 69 24 52 
Region 
Eastern 47 79 25 49 
Northern 33 62 22 48 
Southern 45 75 35 63 
Western 42 56 26 27 
Wealth quintile 
Lowest 39 73 23 50 
Second 41 66 22 51 
Middle 39 67 26 53 
Fourth 41 69 32 51 
Highest 40 62 27 35 
* Percentage of children aged 12 to 23 months who received the vaccinations at any time before the survey. 
** BCG, measles and three doses each of DPT and polio vaccine. 
*** Percentage of children under five who slept under an ITN the night before the survey. 
Source: DHS 2008 and 2013 
The provision of vitamin A supplements is another service typically given to children under five. 
This has shown a steady increase from the launch of the FHCI, when around 30,000 received 
supplements each month, rising to typical levels of 50,000 a month in early 2014 (see Figure 64). 
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Figure 63: Number of under-fives taking vitamin A supplements per month 
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There has been a doubling of the number of children under five sleeping under ITNs – from a 
quarter of children in 2009 to half in 2013 (see Table 24). The rise is particularly noticeable in rural 
areas: coverage rates were previously below urban areas in 2008 but the situation had reversed 
five years later (see Table 25). 
Looking at rates by region shows that large increases have been made in children’s use of ITNs in 
Southern, Northern and Eastern regions. On the other hand, rates are low and unchanged in 
Western Area, at around a quarter in both periods. 
Analysis by wealth ranking shows strong growth in under-five ITN use among the bottom four 
quintiles, with much lower increases for the households with the highest wealth rankings. 
The DHS also provides measures that can be used to look at changes in the treatment of under-
fives for pneumonia, malaria and diarrhoea. As a proxy for pneumonia, the survey looks at children 
who had symptoms of ARI in the previous two weeks. Among those with ARI symptoms, the 
proportion receiving antibiotics rose from 22% in 2009 to 45% in 2013 (see Table 26). Increases 
were seen in both rural and urban areas, although rural areas still lag behind in the coverage of 
treatment with antibiotics (see Table 27). 
Table 26: Treatment for under-fives 
 Before FHCI After FHCI 
 2009 2013 
Received ARI* treatment** 22 45 
Received antimalarial drugs for fever*** 38 48 
Received treatment for diarrhoea*** 72 86 
* ARI symptoms (cough accompanied by short, rapid breathing which was chest-related or difficult breathing which was 
chest-related) are considered a proxy for pneumonia. 
** Percentage of children under five with symptoms of ARI in the two weeks preceding the survey who received 
antibiotics. 
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*** Percentage of children under five with a fever in the two weeks preceding the survey who received antimalarial drugs.  
**** Percentage of children under five with diarrhoea in the two weeks preceding the survey who received oral 
rehydration therapy.  
Sources: DHSBS 2009 and DHS 2013 
Table 27: Treatment for under-fives: Equity issues 
 
Percentage* with 
ARI*** symptoms who 
received antibiotics 
Percentage with 
fever* who took 
antimalarial drugs 
Percentage* with 
diarrhoea who were 
given oral 
rehydration therapy 
(ORT) 
 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013 
Residence 
Urban 41 59 35 45 79 87 
Rural 25 42 28 50 72 86 
Region 
Eastern 18 60 23 60 68 87 
Northern 25 40 26 46 74 84 
Southern 33 44 44 48 72 90 
Western 47 52 32 37 81 89 
Wealth quintile 
Lowest 26 38 27 49 61 89 
Second 20 50 29 47 74 87 
Middle 27 34 29 49 75 83 
Fourth 24 53 29 51 80 84 
Highest 56 64 37 44 80 88 
* Percentage of children under five with the stated symptoms in the two weeks preceding the survey who received 
treatment. 
** ARI symptoms (cough accompanied by short, rapid breathing which was chest-related or difficult breathing which was 
chest-related) are considered a proxy for pneumonia. 
Source: DHS 2008 and 2013 
At a regional level, Eastern Region has shown a dramatic increase from 18% receiving antibiotics 
in 2008 to 60% in 2013. This increase is far higher than other regions and has transformed it from 
the worst to the best performing region. The pattern appears to be driven by extremely high rates 
in Kono district, although the sample size at the district level is relatively small so this finding 
should be treated with caution. 
The presence of fever is considered a proxy for malaria. Among children under five years who had 
had a fever in the two weeks before the survey, the percentage who took antimalarial drugs 
increased from 38% in 2009 to 48% in 2013. In addition, rural areas have overtaken urban areas 
during this period (see Table 26).  
As with treatment for ARI, Eastern Region stands out as moving from the worst performer in 2008 
(23% receiving antimalarial drugs) to the best in 2013 (60%). Rates are high in all three of the 
Eastern Region districts: Kailahun, Kenama and Kono. 
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Variation in coverage is low between wealth quintiles in 2013, with all groups showing around half 
of children with fever taking antimalarials. 
Dehydration caused by severe diarrhoea is a major cause of morbidity and mortality among young 
children, although the condition can be relatively easily treated with ORT. Table 26 shows that the 
percentage of children with diarrhoea in the two weeks before the survey that were given ORT 
increased from 72% in 2009 to 86% in 2013. 
In the earlier period there were some variations between different areas and groups, with those in 
rural areas, in Eastern Region and in the lowest wealth quintile having lower rates than others (see 
Table 27). By 2013 the pattern was much more even, with all areas and groups showing rates 
between 83% and 90%. 
6.1.5 Summary  
There have been clear improvements in the coverage and uptake of services in recent years. 
Some of these appear to have started before the launch of the FHCI, but there have also been 
positive changes since the start of the initiative. In many cases the gap in coverage between 
geographical areas and wealth groups has closed significantly. 
Basic ANC is now near universal in Sierra Leone. The improvement in overall coverage appears to 
have been predominantly before the FHCI. ANC coverage is also now more equal, with 
improvements particularly seen in rural areas, the Northern Region and the lowest two wealth 
quintiles. The gap in coverage between groups has virtually disappeared in many aspects of ANC. 
Protection from malaria during pregnancy has increased greatly from before the FHCI. The 
proportions of pregnant women using ITNs and taking protective treatments for malaria both more 
than doubled between 2009 and 2013. 
Births in a health facility remain low by international standards but there have been improvements. 
These started before the FHCI, but there has also been growth in the numbers since 2010, 
reaching 57% of all births in the period 2010 to 2013. The picture is similar for births that are 
attended by a skilled health worker, with improvements both before and after the FHCI. However, 
in terms of equity, the lowest three quintiles and the Northern Region still lag behind in both health 
facility deliveries and those attended by a skilled health worker. 
Coverage of PNC has improved since the start of the FHCI, with the administrative data in 
particular showing strong growth: numbers of first PNC appointments rose by 50% between 2010 
and 2014. The gap between geographical areas and wealth groups has also narrowed. 
The FHCI brought a surge in the number of consultations for under-fives at health facilities. The 
numbers more than tripled immediately after the launch to over 300,000 consultations in one 
month in May 2010. Numbers then declined rapidly, probably because the facilities struggled to 
cope with the increased demand, but by 2014 the number of under-five consultations was once 
again approaching the 300,000 per month mark. 
The picture for child immunisation rates shows improvements, although the size of these is less 
clear. The survey data show strong growth in fully vaccinated children under one. On the other 
hand, the administrative data show more modest growth after the FHCI, although this data source 
is likely to be weaker than the survey. The lowest wealth quintile group has seen the most 
improvements: before the FHCI rates were fairly even across groups, but the latest figures show 
the bottom wealth quintile now has higher rates than others. 
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The use of ITNs by children under five years old more than doubled between 2009 and 2013. The 
growth was particularly noticeable among those in rural areas and the bottom four wealth quintiles. 
Treatment rates for children under five for pneumonia, malaria and diarrhoea all appear to have 
improved in the years following the FHCI. In particular, the proportion of children under five with 
symptoms of ARI (a proxy for pneumonia) that were treated with antibiotics doubled to 45% in 
2013 compared to just before the FHCI. Eastern Region in particular showed great improvements 
moving from the worst region to the best during this period. This pattern for Eastern Region was 
also seen in improvements in malaria treatment for these children. 
6.2 Has the FHCI improved quality of care? 
Quality of care can be defined broadly as including all needed inputs, good processes of care-
giving, and satisfactory outputs and outcomes of health care services, as well as strong 
relationships with the community using the care. This section focuses on processes of care 
provision, as all other topics have been examined in other sections of the report. Table 28 below 
shows the indicators we planned to examine (Witter et al., 2014). However, data to systematically 
document these were not available. We are therefore only able to present snapshots of information 
based on studies conducted in different areas of the country over the past five years, along with 
the community perceptions of quality of care from our FGDs.  
Table 28: Planned quality of care indicators  
Target group Quality of care marker 
Mortality 
Mothers 
 Total CFR by cause at all levels /types of service (BEmONC, Non-BEmONC, hospitals)  
And specifically examine:  
 Bleeding/haemorrhage 
 Sepsis 
 Miscarriage (total numbers + deaths – includes abortions) 
 Number of caesarean births as a proportion of all deliveries in a year 
 Referral time to hospital for haemorrhaging women (i.e. as part of the three delays) 
Newborns 
 Percentage of newborns dying in a 12-month period at all levels of service delivery (and 
disaggregated by service level) 
 Percentage of fresh stillbirths in a 12-month period at all levels of service delivery 
(disaggregated by service level) 
Children (< 5 
years) 
 CFR from diarrhoea, pneumonia, malaria for children under five at all levels of service 
delivery in a 12-month period  
Morbidity 
All three 
target groups 
 Adherence to clinical protocols  
 Assessment of service ‘enablers’ 
 Continuum of care/care pathways analysis 
 
A series of studies by NGOs and others highlight progress against the pillars – particularly in terms 
of improvements to staffing and infrastructure, as described above, and the development of the 
BPEHS for Sierra Leone in March 2010 to serve as a guide to implement FHCI (e.g. Save the 
Children UK, 2013; Amnesty International, 2011; Maxmen, 2013). The BPEHS provided a 
comprehensive list of services to be offered at all levels of health facilities within the health system 
(emphasising primary health care) up to and including the district hospital (first referral level) and 
the inter-linkages between them. There was also evidence of improved sanitation in some district 
hospitals (Save the Children UK, 2013).  
However, the same studies describe a number of important challenges, including continuing 
problems of drug supply, poor management of drugs, late disbursement of local council and PBF 
funds, shortages of staff, lack of equipment, continuing informal payments, poor staff attitudes, 
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 123 
access and referral problems, absence of water, electricity and blood supplies in facilities, and 
poor coordination. These are examined elsewhere but all clearly have some impact on quality of 
care. As there is no systematic information prior to the FHCI, it is hard to assess the changes that 
have taken place and the role of the FHCI. Most stakeholders and reports document improvements 
but also increased expectations and pressures, which come on top of an initially weak and still 
underfunded health care system. It is clear that, whatever the change, quality of care needs to be 
improved.  
A year after the inception of the FHCI, data collected by the Health Information System (UNICEF, 
2011) reflected a 150% improvement in maternal complications managed at health facilities, with 
12,000 more maternity complications dealt with in health facilities and a 61% reduction in the 
maternal CFR in that first year of the FHCI compared with the previous period. In the Freetown 
study (Bull, 2012), 89.2% of women delivering in health facilities had oxytocin administered to 
prevent PPH in 2011.The use of any uterotonic including oxytocin to prevent PPH was 95.5%. A 
maternal death review presentation of 2013 reported national maternal CFRs of 1.9%, which is 
clearly a drop from the 7% found in the 2008 EmONC assessment (UNFPA, 2008). 
Bull (2012) concludes from the overall maternal near-miss mortality ratio in Freetown (70:1) that 
the quality of care for life-threatening obstetric complications remained suboptimal despite slight 
improvements from 2009 to 2011, which were partly attributed to the contribution of the Making it 
Happen programme interventions as well as to the FHCI.  
In June 2012, 97% of all health facilities could test patients for malaria (Agenda for Change 
Progress Report, January 2011 to June 2012) and the CFR for malaria in public hospitals had 
fallen dramatically by approximately 90%. The proportion of children under five years of age who 
were treated appropriately for malaria with Artesunate nearly tripled. About 90% of the 1,288,828 
children under five who were diagnosed with malaria during the first 12 months of the FHCI were 
treated with Artesunate compared to 51% of the 682,539 diagnosed cases in the 12 months 
preceding the FHCI (UNICEF, 2011). 
Optimising quality of care remains a challenge. According to the National Recovery Strategy 2015–
2020, while 90% of health facilities provide MCH services the quality of these services remains 
suboptimal. Only 1% of health facilities had basic amenities,88 including standard measures for 
ensuring patient safety (WHO, 2012). Just 35% of facilities had basic equipment required for 
service delivery.89 As previously mentioned (see Section 4.5), an assessment conducted in July 
2014 suggested that not a single facility had been sufficiently upgraded to meet standards across 
the seven domains assessed (MoHS, 2014).  
6.2.1 Community views on quality of care 
Participants in district-level KIIs viewed the impact of the FHCI on the quality of care positively and 
generally remain committed to it. However, the increases in utilisation and the growing confidence 
between clients and providers have been negatively affected by the Ebola epidemic. 
“Before Ebola if you look at some of our health indicators we are not at 100%. We started 
achieving something – saw that we were making progress with the FHCI. With the Ebola 
breakouts some of the gains started going down...” (District KII, Western Area). 
                                               
88 Sanitation facilities, Emergency transport, Consultation room, Improved water supply, Communication, Power supply and internet 
connection. 
89 Thermometer, stethoscope, adult and child scales, BP apparatus and light source.  
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For child health, several respondents mentioned Integrated Management of Childhood Illness 
(IMCI) protocols and MCH training inputs. Generally speaking, health staff perceive there has been 
an improvement in the care provided and a reduction in maternal and newborn mortality since the 
introduction of the FHCI. 
“In terms of the nursing care, nurses and maternity staff frequently undergo training on 
different aspects, protocols etc. so there is an improvement there – especially in terms of 
eclamptic patients. We don’t have frequent maternal deaths – from 2010 till now we haven’t 
had more than 10” (District KII, Western Area). 
Participants across the various FGD groups and in all the four districts expressed the view that the 
FHCI is working, but there was widespread scepticism about the level of competency and 
efficiency. Most participants in all four districts overwhelmingly believed that the quality of health 
services for babies had improved greatly under the FHCI. However, a few participants in Western 
Area raised concerns about the storage of available vaccines in refrigerators. Most participants in 
the provinces, especially in Koinadugu, attested to an improvement in the health care provision for 
women, with a shift away from insanitary care by TBAs. However, some participants in Western 
Area expressed their dissatisfaction with the quality of health services offered to women. They 
reported that the services have remained the same as those offered prior to the FHCI. 
Participants from the different groups across the four districts mentioned the non-availability of 
services, non-availability of medicines, poor condition of health facilities and equipment, and the 
negative behaviour and attitudes of health care workers as the key aspects that were not working 
well under the FHCI. 
They pointed out that health care workers did not ‘take them seriously’ when they sought medical 
attention under the FHCI scheme. These participants thought the health care professionals viewed 
them as less important because the GoSL was doing them a favour by providing free health care 
services. Other participants were more concerned about the standards of sanitation of the 
surroundings of the health centre, which they described as unpleasant and as preventing them 
making a visit: 
“One of the main factors that blocks me [from using the FHCI services] is [that] the quality 
of service the government clinics have is very poor. [At] some hospitals the environment is 
very dirty. If you go behind the wards in Cottage Hospital you will not eat for the rest of the 
day [because of] the dirty things you will see there” (Adult female, Western Area). 
Most participants stated that if their children are treated badly or given inadequate drugs once they 
would not go to the health centre anymore. Similarly, they believed their neighbours would be 
discouraged from visiting the health centre because of such situations. A few participants believed 
that the wrong medication and a single tablet were most times given to them when they visited the 
hospital/health centre. 
The unavailability of health care services at night was seen as a major problem under the FHCI, 
while the time it takes to access the health services at night was also perceived as longer in 
comparison to seeking services during the day. 
6.2.2 Summary 
In Sierra Leone, the challenges to quality of care in the delivery of MCH services continue to be 
wide-ranging, with both supply- and demand-side factors as well as underlying social determinants 
(discussed in the next section) exerting influence. Some progress had been made prior to the 
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Ebola outbreak, largely catalysed by the FHCI but also by other programmes focusing on RMNCH, 
according to documentary evidence and KIIs. However, the health services remain weak and 
communities express mixed opinions, with some strong concerns. In addition, the evidence base to 
track changes to care-giving in facilities is exceptionally weak. Information on inputs and outputs 
have been collected, but to really examine the effectiveness of services more information is 
needed on indicators such as CFRs, re-admissions, sepsis and fresh still births, as well as on 
some of the influencers such as adherence to protocols and staff competences and 
responsiveness. 
6.3 Are there reduced barriers to service uptake?  
In order to understand not just whether uptake has increased but also why or why not, as well as 
the links to the FHCI, we examine here the extent to which some of the major hypothesised 
barriers to care have changed, and what challenges remain. We look at these 5 ‘A’s in turn: 
affordability, access, awareness (of the policy and danger signs for mothers and children), 
attitudes (toward health seeking) and accountability.  
6.3.1 Affordability 
In relation to financial barriers, we looked for evidence on changes to total OOP payments by 
household, overall and for different population groups. Clearly, the FHCI did not aim to remove all 
OOP payments, even for the target groups. However, we would expect to find a reduction, 
especially for service fees and drugs. We also examined the evidence for changes to informal 
payments, which, if they continued for the target groups and services, would be an indicator of 
problems with policy implementation and would represent a barrier to service use. This barrier is 
both financial and psychological (the lack of certainty about payments and the grievance when 
expectation of free care is met with illicit charges can both lead to reduced effective demand, 
among other things). Analysis based on survey data is cross-checked with qualitative evidence 
from our FDGs.  
6.3.1.1 Changes in overall OOP expenditure on health care 
As discussed in Section 4.1, extremely high OOP expenditure on health was a primary motivation 
for the introduction of the FHCI. In 2003/04, the average person had OOP expenditure on health of 
US$ 40 a year, equating to 15.6% of per capita consumption expenditure (SLIHS, 2003/04). Such 
high OOP expenditure on health made Sierra Leone an outlier even compared to other low-income 
countries (Xu et al., 2010). 
Unfortunately, the SLIHS was not repeated again prior to 2010, and so the 2003/04 SLHS 
represents the best available baseline for household OOP expenditure on health. Another SLIHS 
was then conducted in 2011.  
As Table 29 shows, the seven-year high inflationary period between the two surveys means that 
the distinction between nominal and real prices matters hugely to the findings on whether OOP 
expenditure per capita has gone up or down. If nominal prices are used, then the average person 
had higher OOP expenditure in 2011 compared to 2003/04, spending US$ 44.8 a year compared 
to US$ 40.0 a year (SLIHS, 2011). However, if both figures are converted to 2007 prices then, in 
real terms, OOP expenditure per capita went down between the two surveys. In 2007 money, the 
average person spent US$ 49.9 a year in 2003/04 compared to US$ 39.1 a year in 2011. Table 29 
also shows that OOP expenditure is a lower fraction of per capita consumption expenditure in the 
post-FHCI time period, with 15.6% of consumption being on health in 2003/04 and 11.3% in 2011.  
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Table 29:  Average per capita expenditure on health, 2003/04 and 2011 
 2003/04 2011 
SLL, nominal prices 100,486 192,674 
US$, nominal prices 40.0 44.8 
SLL, real (2007) prices 148,795 116,790 
US$, real (2007) prices 49.9 39.1 
As a proportion of per capita consumption expenditure 15.6% 11.3% 
Note: 2003/04 SLL/US$ average exchange rate.  
Source: SLIHS 2003/04.  
The NPSS was another household survey conducted in Sierra Leone in 2007, 2008 and 2011. Like 
the SLIHS, it also included questions on health facility utilisation and household consumption. 
Estimates from the 2011 survey indicate that households spent on average SLL 17,907 a month in 
2013 prices on medication and health services. Unfortunately, unlike the SLIHS, the NPSS was 
only conducted over three months (e.g. from July to October 2011) rather than a full year. This 
means that monthly expenditure can technically not be annualised to account for seasonality in 
health expenditure, which does vary over the year due to, for example, differences in morbidity and 
access to health facilities. Ignoring this, monthly expenditure of SLL 17,907 equates to annual 
expenditure of SLL 214,884 or around US$ 50 a year per household in 2013 prices. Converting to 
2007 prices for comparison, this is equivalent to SLL 99,319 or around US$ 33 a year per 
household. This is substantially less than US$ 44.8 a year per person (not per household); a 
potential reason for this is lower expenditure during the rainy season due to difficulty in accessing 
health facilities. However, morbidity is also higher during the rainy season because of illnesses like 
malaria and diarrhoea. The survey methodology is another likely explanation for the differences; 
the consumption module for the NPSS is much shorter than for the SLIHS and asks only about 
expenditure over the last month, which would both contribute to lower expenditure estimates. Most 
unfortunately, previous years of the NPSS did not include a consumption module and so we 
cannot compare the 2011 estimate to previous estimates from the same survey to see how 
estimates for health expenditure changed within the same survey. 
It is therefore hard to draw conclusions about the contribution of the FHCI to the modest reduction 
in real OOP payment expenditure over the time period and even harder to speculate about what 
difference the FHCI should have made. To shed a little further light on these questions, it helps to 
think about the mechanism through which the FHCI would in theory contribute to a reduction in 
OOP heath expenditure. Aside from second-order effects, this would be primarily through 
influencing the chance of payment and amount of payment of the FHCI target groups. These 
groups comprised 17% of consultation and 16% of prescription OOP expenditure in 2003/04. A 
reduction in OOP expenditure for the target groups would therefore be expected to contribute to a 
reduction in overall OOP payment expenditure, but not a dramatic one. This is also assuming that 
the policy did not have large unintended consequences on health-seeking behaviour or payment 
for non-FHCI groups. For example, if demand for health care for other groups had been 
supressed, then the FHCI could allow for increased utilisation (e.g. through freed-up funds) for 
these fee-paying groups. 
6.3.1.2 Changes in household OOP expenditure for FHCI groups 
The more nuanced impact question is therefore whether FHCI groups are paying significantly less 
for health care than they would have without the introduction of the FHCI.  
Table30 shows descriptive statistics on consultation payment at government outpatient facilities for 
children under 5 and lactating mothers, again using data from SLIHS 2003/04 and 2011. The 
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proportion of FHCI groups paying for consultation in outpatient health facilities reduced between 
the survey years for all groups. However, a significant proportion were still paying in 2011 for 
services that should have been free—particularly lactating mothers. In addition, of those who paid, 
the amount paid only reduced marginally in real terms for children under 5 and lactating mothers 
and increased for pregnant women. Mindful of data limitations, it appears that there is a bigger 
improvement for children under 5, than either pregnant women, who saw an increase in 
expenditure for those who did pay (although a substantial reduction in those who paid in the first 
place) or lactating mothers, who saw a smaller reduction in those who paid. 
Table 30: Out of pocket payments (OOP) for FHCI groups, 2003/04 and 2011  
 
Under 5s Pregnant women Lactating mothers 
2003/04 2011 2003/04 2011 2003/03 2011 
Proportion who 
utilised a 
government health 
facility in the last 
two weeks (if sick) 
Estimate 64.4 74.8 71.7 80.2 65.6 75.5 
N 1638 1580 276 150 287 105 
Of those, proportion 
who paid for 
consultation 
Estimate 76 20.2 79.7 41.7 65.9 50.6 
N 1028 1183 196 118 177 76 
Of those, average 
amount paid (2011 
USD) 
Estimate 3.1 2.8 5.2 14.2 3.2 2.9 
N 775 227 152 51 120 39 
Source: 2003/04 and 2011 SLIHS 
 
Data from other surveys and research do not find the same high proportions of FHCI groups 
paying as SLIHS, but still consistently shows that a small proportion of FHCI groups are still being 
charged. For example, Table 31 shows Health for All Coalition (HFAC) monitoring data for one 
quarter in 2012 and two quarters in 2014. Around 5% or fewer of FHCI groups sampled at the 
health facility had been asked to pay for drugs or treatment, with under 5 and lactating mothers 
who were paying for consultation in 2012 paying similar average amounts found in the 2011 
SLIHS. The small sample sizes for average amount paid make it difficult to draw firm conclusions 
here, however, for example about any trends over time. Although any amount of payment is not 
ideal, given the known implementation issues, this level is relatively low. 
That said, the Cordaid verification study of 2014 found that 12% of the target groups had made 
some payment. The average payment was SLL 7,881, ranging between SLL 200 and SLL 50,000. 
These payments were either for general consultations, MNCH services, medicines or the medical 
equipment needed to provide the care. There was found to be significant variations in the 
proportion of patients asked for payments between the different local councils. None of the patients 
in Bonthe Municipal Council or Makeni City Council were asked for payments, but 52% of those in 
Kailahun District Council, 35% in Koidu New Sembehun City Council and 22% in Kono District 
Council were asked to pay. 
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Table 31:  HFAC monitoring data on payment by FHCI groups, all districts 
 
Jun–Aug 
2012 
Mar–May 
2014 
Jun–Aug 
2014 
Children under five 
Proportion who paid for drugs 
Estimate 1% 4% 3% 
N 1385 1740 1921 
Average amount paid for drugs 
Estimate 2.2 1.9 1.8 
N 16 54 40 
Proportion who paid for treatment 
Estimate 3% 4% 4% 
N 1384 1730 1920 
Average amount paid for treatment 
Estimate 2.3 4.5 5.2 
N 36 72 40 
Pregnant women 
Proportion who paid for drugs 
Estimate 2% 5% 4% 
N 942 1315 1497 
Average amount paid for drugs 
Estimate 3.1 1.6 1.3 
N 23 58 55 
Proportion who paid for treatment 
Estimate 4% 4% 5% 
N 942 1309 1493 
Average amount paid for treatment 
Estimate 3.0 5.5 3.8 
N 33 34 21 
Lactating mothers 
Proportion who paid for drugs 
Estimate 5% 5% 6% 
N 111 690 897 
Average amount paid for drugs 
Estimate 2.4 1.9 1.6 
N 6 35 49 
Proportion who paid for treatment 
Estimate 5% 5% 6% 
N 111 686 896 
Average amount paid for treatment 
Estimate 3.0 4.9 5.2 
N 5 32 28 
Source: HFAC monitoring data, 2012 and 2014 reports  
However, these descriptive statistics still do not tell us the extent to which the FHCI contributed to 
these apparent reductions in chance of payment and amount of payment by FHCI groups.) Edoka 
et al. (2015) attempt to estimate the effect of the FHCI on OOP expenditure for children under five 
using impact evaluation techniques and find no statistically significant impact on OOP expenditure 
for children under five. This is in contrast to what we see in the descriptive statistics and suggests 
that there may be other factors at play in the reduction in payment for health care for children 
under 5. However, Edoka et al.’s study does assume that children just over five, because they are 
in principle not eligible for free health care, are a good control group for children just under five, 
who are. In reality, the policy was fuzzily implemented such that some children under five paid for 
health care and some children over five did not. The impact on OOP expenditure for pregnant 
women and lactating mothers could not be tested due to the lack of a credible control group. 
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In summary, the best available data show a modest reduction in real OOP expenditure from 
2003/04 to 2011. Data from various sources suggest that chance of payment and amount of 
payment has reduced for FHCI groups, although evidence also consistently shows that a small 
minority of those in FHCI groups are still paying for health care. The attribution of any of these 
changes to the FHCI is not possible. Much of the analysis of household expenditure here and 
elsewhere (e.g. in the NHA and Edoka et al.’s studies) relies on data from the SLIHS, which is 
problematic for a number of reasons. 
The community research we undertook supports the finding that free care at the point of use for 
the target groups is not always applied as intended, especially in Western Area and in towns. 
Moreover, this finding is also reinforced by the household life history interviews conducted by 
ReBUILD (Amara et al., 2016). 
Even though FGD participants were all aware that services under the FHCI were meant to be free 
for children under five, pregnant women and lactating mothers, about half of them across the four 
districts mentioned that FHCI beneficiaries continue to pay for health services or provide other 
non-monetary items to some health care professionals. Such views regarding payments and non-
monetary ‘gifts’ were more prevalent among participants from Western Area. 
Participants shared that even though payments may not be required for the direct services, they 
were being charged other fees for registration cards and entrance fees:  
“For me the only free services are ITNs and malaria drugs. I bought a registration card for 
SLL 2,000. When I gave birth, I paid SLL 5,000 for the nurses to see me. I received free 
ITN and malaria treatment” (Adult female, Bo). 
Participants from Bo, Kono and Koinadugu were more likely than those in Western Area to mention 
FHCI beneficiaries receiving free health services, and were also less likely to report experiences of 
paying for services or providing non-monetary ‘gifts’ to health professionals. However, even in 
these provincial districts, participants also believed that the FHCI gives priority health care services 
to children at no cost more so than for pregnant and lactating women, who are sometimes charged 
direct or indirect fees.  
Most participants, especially in Koinadugu, Bo and Kono, confirmed the availability of FHCI 
services in their communities. The services mostly associated with the FHCI were malaria 
treatment, including the distribution of ITNs at no cost, immunisation for children, and sometimes 
supply of food items such as corn flour and plumpy nuts. These all benefit from vertical programme 
support, which may explain why they are more reliably supplied.  
While participants across the districts and groups overwhelmingly noted that there are costs/fees 
associated with FHCI services, they also strongly emphasised that their overall expenditure on 
medical services had greatly reduced following the introduction of the FHCI. The majority of the 
participants mentioned that their personal health care spending was higher before the introduction 
of the FHCI. Similarly, most of the participants believed that the high cost of medical supplies, 
which was previously a huge challenge, had improved since the FHCI began. Men from all four 
districts were particularly very appreciative of the FHCI, as they felt that its existence had 
substantially saved them from spending more on the health of the pregnant women and young 
children in their families.  
On the other hand, however, a few participants mentioned that health service expenditures had 
increased for them since 2011. They mentioned that even though they were not directly paying for 
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the services received, the sum total of the all the other little payments, including those made to 
nurses, increased their overall expenditures. This was more a perception in the large towns: 
“The free treatment is just for villagers – in big towns we now spend more money” (Adult 
male, Bo). 
The majority of the participants cited that it was a common practice for nurses to say that certain 
services and supplies, especially drugs, are not available, when in actuality they have plans to sell 
them to beneficiaries: 
“Services are not always available because the nurses will tell you to go to the pharmacy, 
and when that occurs, another nurse will call you into a corner and tell you that she has that 
particular medicine for sale, which is in fact supposed to be free” (Adult female, Western 
Area). 
The issue of being asked to pay for services was persistent across each district, even for the 
beneficiaries. A premium was asked by nurses even for child delivery and the amount was based 
on the sex of the child. Not just limited to birth, payments were also demanded from lactating 
mothers and children under five for routine problem visits, such as malaria and fever. Failure to 
pay such charges resulted in no treatment or, in some cases, delivery of half the required 
medication doses with a prescription given for purchase of the remainder of drugs at a pharmacy:  
“Before, when a pregnant woman gave birth, we paid SLL 60,000 for boys and SLL 40,000 
for girls. It is still the same presently” (Adult female, Kono). 
Likewise, a female participant in Bo reported that when her delivery date was almost due she went 
to the health centre but the nurses refused to attend to her. They asked her to pay even though 
she was in critical condition and had no money. For that reason, she returned home and asked a 
TBA to help her instead.  
In addition, participants in KIIs pointed out that the unavailability of drugs at health centres was a 
major contributor to the FHCI not working well. Most highlighted that even when the drugs are 
available at the health centres, the nurses would most times split the tablets and distribute them to 
their intended beneficiaries. As such patients end up buying extra drugs since the ‘broken-up’ 
tablets given to them are perceived as insufficient to cure them. Even more disheartening for 
participants was the fact that some of the drugs they had to buy at the health centre were labelled 
‘Free Health Care’. 
Nearly half of the FGD participants in the four districts mentioned that the cost of the services 
hindered them occasionally when seeking health care services under the FHCI. Sometimes 
participants felt that they would not be attended to if they did not give money at the health centres. 
Likewise, they thought money was significant if they wanted proper treatment. 
Similarly, a few participants in the Western Area mentioned that pregnant women faced difficulties 
due to the cost they paid for their registration card and for medicines at the health centre. These 
participants said that after paying for such costs they became penniless and stranded at the health 
centre with no money for transportation to return home: 
“The officials only go on air and talk a lot about how the FHCI is available but when a 
pregnant woman goes to a health clinic they will keep asking you for money until you are 
broke to the extent that you cannot pay for transportation to go back home” (Adult female, 
Western Area). 
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6.3.2 Access  
Geographic inaccessibility, distance, lack of transport and socio-cultural factors (e.g. household 
decision-making, perceptions and beliefs) have been shown to be an effective deterrent to care-
seeking behaviour even when service-related financial barriers have been removed in Sierra 
Leone, as elsewhere (Treacy and Sagbakken, 2015). Remoteness and difficult terrain are not just 
barriers on the demand side but also affect service delivery and quality of care, with difficulty 
posting staff and ensuring supplies and supervision (Wurie et al., 2016). 
The FHCI did not focus on expanding infrastructure, but did aim to upgrade existing infrastructure 
and so should have some impact on improving access. Analysis of changing coverage of services 
by rural/urban area (see Section 5.1) does indicate a closing of the gaps for some essential 
services, although inequities still exist, particularly for skilled attendance at delivery. Socio-cultural 
factors are discussed in the following section, but here we examine evidence on changes to 
transport and the referral system in particular, which may be helping or hindering factors behind 
the changing outputs and outcomes seen to date. They highlight that physical access, transport 
and a well-functioning referral system remain important barriers for women and children in Sierra 
Leone, especially in remote areas like Koinadugu and riverine areas like Bonthe. 
In the NPSS 2011 report, 67% of respondents in rural areas reported having a health facility within 
one hour. This is a substantial increase from 2005, when only 48% had a health facility within one 
hour. However, it appears that most of the increase came before the introduction of the FHCI (see 
Table 32). 
Table 32: Access to government health facilities 
 
Source: NPSS 2011 
It may be that the decline was driven by improved roads and transport, more than changes in 
facilities. According to the NPSS 2011, in 2007 only 20% of rural villages had a PHU in the 
community. This was still the case in 2011 (see Table 33 below). 
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Table 33: Villages with clinics in the local community 
 
Source: NPSS, 2011 
This finding is corroborated by our FGD participants, who felt that distance may not really be a 
problem but rather it is the means of transportation is the biggest problem. This is particularly the 
case in areas like Koinadugu, Kono, and Bo because motorbikes are mostly used to seek health 
care services there, even when people are in a critical condition.  
Some young people in Koinadugu explained that the authorities would not allow pregnant women 
to be transported on motorbike, which they also felt worsened the situation, especially when there 
are no other vehicles available. These participants really stressed that the means of transportation 
is a serious problem, especially in such rough terrain. Some said that the Ebola epidemic made 
transportation to the health centre more difficult – after Ebola even a motorbike could not be found. 
Some TBAs mentioned that they still delivered babies because of the poor road network to the 
health centre. Likewise, a few participants thought that they would not want to travel a long 
distance in very rough terrain just to receive a small amount of medicine or delayed treatment. 
They preferred to buy medicine at the pharmacy instead or seek alternative care, which they 
thought saved them trouble. 
6.3.2.1 Referral system 
The FHCI policy states that a transport and communication system would be put in place in order 
to provide a suitable referral system (GoSL, 2009a). Referral can only be justified if the referral 
facility provides a reasonable level of quality of care, giving access to people with the skills to 
manage potentially life-threatening complications. In addition, there needs to be awareness of 
complications and danger signs at the community level and locally available resources for 
emergency transport and communication. 
One study of quality of care for pregnancy complications in Freetown (Bull, 2012) concluded that a 
significant increase in the cases referred from other health facilities shows increased access, and 
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suggested that this was possibly linked to the FHCI as well as to increased knowledge on the 
importance of early referrals and improved referral services. 
However, challenges with the ambulance services were documented after the FHCI across almost 
all of the 14 districts. According to a study in 2013, most had one or two functioning ambulances, 
while some districts had more than two but were unable to maintain and fuel them. There was a 
shortage of drivers and communities sometimes refused to give their support when there are 
breakdowns during a referral. In referral cases, patients were mostly transported on motorbikes. 
Koinadugu was the only district with four functioning ambulances, which is achieved with support 
from an NGO (Save the Children UK, 2013).  
“We have a real problem with ambulances: before the FHCI we didn’t have any 
ambulances, then we got two at the start of the FHCI, at some point there was a donation 
of another one – now all three ambulances have been grounded since 2014. All 
ambulances today in the system are focused on Ebola and they can’t be used for anything 
else – so there is no ambulance for MNCH” (District KII, Western Area). 
According to a nationwide monitoring exercise in 2014 (Save the Children and Health Alert, 2014), 
there was some improvement: 96% of the hospitals had a mechanism ‘to support emergency 
obstetric care services’. This monitoring visit was conducted in April 2014 and covered all public 
hospitals (all district hospitals and national referral hospitals) (see Figure 65 below).  
Figure 64: Review of referral situation in 2014 
 
**There were 12 functional ambulances in all 13 DHMTs with no functional ambulances in Pujehun, Kenema, Tonkolili 
and Kambia DHMTs at the time of the visit. 
This problem is ongoing. A more recent survey of Moyamba district, post-Ebola, by Medecins du 
Monde found that outreach activities were severely hampered by difficult terrain and lack of 
transport, which also prevents patients from attending clinics. The referral system is largely not 
functional for the same reason and only two (non-Ebola) ambulances serve the district. The 
majority of health staff surveyed agreed that lack of transportation was the single most important 
reason for maternal mortality. 
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Figure 65: On the way to a health facility in Koinadugu 
 
Source: OPM consultants, 2015 
FGD participants also mentioned that there was a big problem with referrals. The ambulance 
services worked well in most communities but mainly for Ebola-related cases. In some 
communities, patients had to buy fuel for the ambulance or pay some amount of money to the 
ambulance team to expedite the process. Some participants expressed frustration due to lack of 
proper coordination between the health care workers (nurses) and TBAs; they shared that health 
care workers exhibited no desire to cooperate when they are called upon by a TBAs to help with 
deliveries. 
“Most of the time when somebody in the interior requests an ambulance and they don’t 
have money for fuel, it will take a whole lot of time. This occurs because the ambulances 
are not monitored properly and maybe there is no proper logistical arrangement for these 
ambulances” (Adult male, Koinadugu). 
A few participants mentioned that they contributed money as a community in order to get fuel for 
the vehicle that would transport patients. Community support was rare in such a case. 
“We help by contributing money to buy fuel for the vehicle that will carry the pregnant 
woman or sick person to the hospital” (Community leader, Kono). 
Improvements to the availability of infrastructure and the transportation system (principally 
ambulances) was one of the FGD participants’ major requests to the government and partners. 
This was broadly echoed in district-level KIIs. Ambulances were the most frequently mentioned 
aspect of the referral system and they are often insufficient in number or poorly placed to maximise 
their usage. However, the fact that they are now free since the FHCI is much appreciated. The 
distances to a referral centre and the state of the transport network remain major constraints to 
timely referral, according to KIIs. 
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6.3.3 Awareness of the FHCI 
Awareness of the FHCI and awareness of entitlements under it are important determinants of the 
likelihood of households and communities changing their behaviour and accessing services. We 
therefore explore here the extent to which awareness was successfully extended.  
One year after the FHCI was launched, HFAC surveyed 100 people in each district to assess the 
public and stakeholder perception of the initiative (HFAC, 2011). Over 95% of those interviewed 
were aware of the initiative. The lowest levels of knowledge were in Kono (18%) and Port Loko 
(11%). Everyone surveyed in Pujehun and Western Area Rural had heard of the initiative. 
However, the number of people who could correctly identify the groups eligible to receive free 
health care was lower (82%). For example, 11% of respondents thought that it was only pregnant 
and lactating mothers that were eligible. Again, correct knowledge of beneficiary groups was 
highest in Pujehun and Western Area Rural and lowest in Kono, although respondents from 
Tonkolili and Western Area Urban also showed low levels of more specific knowledge. One 
particularly concerning finding was that only 4% of those interviewed knew that the initiative did not 
have an end date. The vast majority of respondents did not know or could not recall when the end 
date was, and a large number thought that it was due to end in 2015.  
The NPSS survey in 2011 also found high levels of awareness: the vast majority of respondents 
reported that they had heard of the FHCI, with awareness being lowest in Bombali and Koinadugu 
districts and highest in Koidu and Makeni towns. In that survey, 97% of respondents were able to 
identify at least one FHCI target group, 90% were able to identify at least two FHCI target groups 
and 69% were able to identify all three FHCI target groups (NPSS, 2011). 
Awareness not only affects changes to utilisation and health outcomes but also perceptions of 
public services and thus more intangible aspects, such as perceptions of fairness and confidence 
in public services. Misperceptions can also be damaging, for example when users expect free care 
erroneously and then feel cheated. This can erode relationships between clients and staff, as 
illustrated by our district KIIs: 
“At the start it was not clear to the beneficiaries exactly what services would be provided free. 
This led to a lot of wrong expectations. For example, many patients expected free ambulance 
transport to the health facility, food for sick people at health facilities and unrealistic quantities 
and types of drugs” (District KII, Bo). 
“Expectation management is an issue; both for FHCI groups, who want all costs to be covered 
such as transport and are upset when drugs are not available, and non-target groups, who feel 
entitled to free care as well” (District KII, Kono). 
“Patients initially misunderstood the FHCI. They thought it was free for all” (District KII, Bo). 
“At the start communities did not grasp what was to be provided free. This can still be a 
problem. However, awareness of the FHCI among the community is high” (District KII, Bo). 
“There was much misunderstanding at the beginning. Many thought it was free for all people. 
On the launch day itself there was a queue of more than 200 people (compared to around 40 
on a normal day). Staff worked 7am to 7pm without a break on that day” (District KII, Bo). 
In general, however, in the FGDs communities showed understanding that the FHCI is meant to 
provide essential health services to pregnant women, lactating mothers and under-five children: 
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“The FHCI provides free treatment for the three categories of people: pregnant women, 
lactating mothers and under-fives. These people suffer most and we believe they deserve 
it” (Youth, Bo District). 
Nonetheless, there were still some misconceptions voiced in the FGDs that the FHCI covers 
everyone, including men and anyone who is poor. Such misconceptions were consistent across all 
four districts – mostly among men and young people. For instance, men sometimes thought that 
GoSL instituted the FHCI to assist teenage mothers, especially those in a situation where there is 
no father for the unborn child who is culturally expected take up financial responsibilities for the 
pregnancy and welfare of the woman and child: 
“Yes I think government choose pregnant women because most of the pregnant women, 
especially teenagers, don’t have a husband to answer for the pregnancy and that is why 
the government has taken up the responsibility to take care of them” (Adult male, Western 
Area). 
The following services/benefits were most frequently cited as covered under the FHCI by all 
participants: provision of drugs/medications, immunisation services, and ANC.90 The female 
participants had better awareness about the specific beneficiary groups under FHCI as compared 
to men, young people and community leaders.  
Most participants – especially in Koinadugu, Bo and Kono – expressed a strong belief that the 
FHCI was operational in their community. However, some participants in the Western Area had a 
different view, and were more likely to express dissatisfaction with the initiative as compared to 
those from the provinces. It should also be noted that participants from Western Area were also 
more likely to hold misconceptions regarding ‘who’ and ‘what’ is covered under FHCI. There were 
many instances where some men perceived that their wives and all women are automatically 
covered under FHCI even when not pregnant or lactating. 
Participants in all groups and regions expressed widespread understanding of the FHCI through 
radio listening, health centres/health workers and health campaigns. Radio emerged as the most 
cited source of information regarding the initiative across all districts and categories of participants. 
The ReBUILD household life history interviews (Amara et al., 2016) also confirmed high 
awareness of the FHCI, with 23 out of 28 participants informed about it, roughly equally spread 
across the four districts (Western Area, Bonthe, Kenema and Koinadugu). 
6.3.4 Awareness of complications and danger signs 
It is essential that the household and community decision-makers are able to recognise the point at 
which an individual needs to be taken to a health provider and how to manage subsequent 
symptoms. Community-based formal and informal providers, such as TBAs and CHWs, can assist 
in raising awareness and in helping to link communities to providers. In the wake of the FHCI 
launch, campaigns were undertaken to raise community awareness of danger signs by NGOs and 
local and national actors. The FHCI may also have triggered changing relationships between 
providers close to communities and health services that help or hinder such awareness-raising.  
There are a variety of sources of information on the general public’s understanding of health risks, 
danger signs, responses and preventions strategies in Sierra Leone, particularly in regard to child 
                                               
90 This is interesting inasmuch as two of these three elements were already meant to be free before the FHCI – immunisation, for 
example, has been free since the early 1970s when the EPI programme was launched. 
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health. In terms of the large surveys, there are two in particular with relevant questions – the DHS 
and the MICS.  
As a means of estimating knowledge of health-related issues the DHS asks about knowledge of 
ORT for treatment of diarrhoea. In 2008, 91% of mothers had heard of ORT. This was slightly 
lower in the Northern Region (86%) than the other regions (94–97%). Even though only 47% of 
children with diarrhoea were taken to a facility, 86% were treated with some form of ORT or 
increased fluids and 68% were treated using a packet of ORS. By 2013, the proportion of children 
with diarrhoea that were treated with some form of ORT or increased fluids remained around 90%, 
but now 85% were treated with a packet of ORS. Moreover, while care was sought in only 65% of 
cases overall, it was much more likely when the diarrhoea was bloody than not, and knowledge of 
ORS packets had increased further to 98% with little variation across the regions.  
The MICS also asks extensive questions on use of ORT and gets similar results. It estimates that 
in 2005 60% of the children who had experienced diarrhoea in the previous two weeks received 
one or more of the recommended home treatments and that by 2010 this had risen to 78%. 
However, in 2005 only 23% received ORT and maintained feeding, as is the recommendation, and 
in 2010 this was still only 55%. 
In addition to this, the MICS asked about mothers’ knowledge of ARI danger signs. It estimates 
that in 2005 only 14% of mothers could identify the two key danger signs of pneumonia, with the 
lowest levels of knowledge in the Northern and Eastern regions. By 2010 this had dropped to 8% 
of mothers. In both surveys the most common reason for taking a child to a health facility was that 
they had developed a fever, which was identified by around 90% of mothers. Again, knowledge 
was lowest in the Eastern Region. 
These two sets of surveys do not tell us much about how knowledge of danger signs has changed 
since the implementation of the FHCI but they do give a sense of the level of knowledge and how it 
was changing in the run-up to 2010. Things such as ORT for diarrhoea were well known and 
widely practised, but that a child should also maintain feeding at the same time was not well 
understood. Knowledge of ARI danger signs was very low, and was getting worse between 2005 
and 2010. Knowledge that fever is a danger sign was high, and was the main reason to take a 
child to a facility. Knowledge of HIV/AIDS was growing, in some areas more than others. 
Knowledge of the syndrome, prevention strategies (including prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission) and where to get tested were growing far more rapidly than knowledge of common 
misconceptions, which remains below 25%. 
One peer-reviewed publication specifically assesses the knowledge and reported practices of 
women in relation to MCH in rural Sierra Leone after the implementation of the FHCI (Kanu et al., 
2014). The authors interviewed 244 women with at least one child under five in villages throughout 
Bombali during March 2012. They asked questions related to health knowledge and practice. 
Respondents were mainly farmers and traders and more than half had never attended school. 
From direct observations, the authors could see that nearly 90% of respondents had ITNs under 
which their child usually slept, but that nearly 95% had no form of well-defined place to wash 
hands. Only six did not have a latrine facility, while nearly 60% had a main source of drinking water 
from a tap. 
Respondents had on average 3.8 total pregnancies, 1.7 in the last five years, and three children in 
total. Also, 42% of deliveries were attended by a TBA, 41% by a nurse or midwife, 7% by a doctor 
and 8% by relatives and friends. Over 64% of respondents could not identify any danger sign that 
necessitates institutional delivery and less than 44% knew that a child with diarrhoea needs to be 
given more fluids to drink that usual. While 99% of mothers knew of ORS, only 19% could correctly 
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explain how to prepare it. Similarly, 26% could not give any correct ways to prevent diarrhoea and 
only 12% could give four correct ways; only 18% knew that a baby with diarrhoea should be given 
breast milk followed by ORS if necessary.  
Knowledge regarding fever was better, with 86% knowing that a child with fever should be dressed 
lightly and cooled with a damp cloth. However, regarding malaria specifically knowledge was again 
poor. While everyone had heard of malaria and 93% know that it could be caught through a 
mosquito bite, only one mother could identify four ways of preventing it and 7% could not give any 
prevention strategy. While 91% of the respondents had heard of pneumonia, 33% could not give 
any correct signs and only 13% could give three. In addition, 45% knew that antibiotics are used to 
treat pneumonia. The authors conclude that the sample of mothers’ knowledge on diarrhoea was 
poor, and while knowledge of malaria and pneumonia were high, more detailed knowledge on 
prevention was too low. Using simple linear regression, the authors find that people with higher 
education had better health knowledge. They also find that number of pregnancies influences 
knowledge, but to a lesser extent, and that the role of the husband did not have a statistically 
significant impact. While interesting, these findings, once again, do not tell us much about how 
knowledge has changed, as there is no pre-FHCI comparator. Further research therefore needs to 
be done on how knowledge of health-related practices is changing over time. 
Increased attendance at health centres has led to an increased knowledge of health rights and 
health messages, and an increase adherence to immunisation campaigns, according to HFAC/SC 
(2011). 
In our FGDs, it was clear that the majority of participants across the four districts understood 
danger signs for pregnant women, newly delivered women and young children; interestingly, the 
majority of the men, including community leaders, also understood these danger signs. They were 
able to mention important danger signs such as ‘bleeding’ and ‘swollen feet.’ They stated that their 
knowledge about danger signs and MCH has improved recently due to the fact that they are taught 
about these things on radio, through health campaigns and at the health centre, as well as from 
participants’ direct experiences with relatives and family members. 
6.3.5 Attitudes to health care seeking 
The DHS asks about health-seeking behaviour for children with ARI, fever and diarrhoeal disease. 
Mothers were asked if their children had experienced symptoms associated with any of these 
disease categories, and what their responses had been. In 2008, 46% of children with ARI 
symptoms, 44% of children with a fever and 47% of children with diarrhoea were taken to a health 
facility or provider. In 2013, 72% of children with ARI symptoms, 66% of children with a fever and 
65% of children with diarrhoea were taken to a facility. This suggests that health-seeking 
behaviour, at least in relation to young children, has increased since the implementation of the 
FHCI.  
There is also a growing body of smaller-scale literature looking at health-seeking behaviour in 
Sierra Leone. In 2005, due to a severe lack of HRH and a high child mortality rate, NGOs were 
allowed to deliver community case management with community health volunteers in rural areas. 
The objective was specifically to increase coverage of treatment for malaria, pneumonia and 
diarrhoea for children. In 2010 this was expanded to include two further districts and an extra 
treatment for diarrhoea (zinc). In order to plan for the expansion of this programme alongside the 
FHCI one academic study attempted to evaluate how such an intervention can be implemented in 
the context of a removal of user fees (Diaz et al., 2013). The authors conducted a baseline survey 
in the two additional districts (Kambia and Pujehun) plus two similar comparators (Kailahun and 
Tonkolili) between April and July 2010. This was prior to the expansion of the community case 
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management programme, but just as the implementation of the FHCI was starting. The authors 
assess health-seeking behaviour and treatment received for malaria, pneumonia and diarrhoea 
among children under five with danger signs in poor and rural areas within the districts.  
They found that the parents of 87%, 86% and 90% of children currently with symptoms of 
diarrhoea, fever and malaria respectively had sought health care for their children. Moreover, 75% 
of these children had been taken to a facility, regardless of their illness type, and 60% were treated 
by facility-based professionals. This is higher than was estimated by any of the national household 
surveys, and is suggested by the authors to be evidence that the FHCI was encouraging people to 
visit facilities. It highlights that this is corroborated by the MICS 2010, which finds that 74% of 
children with pneumonia danger symptoms were taken to a facility and, as we have outlined, the 
claim that health-seeking behaviour had increased before and after the implementation of the FHCI 
went on to be corroborated by the DHS 2013 (albeit to a lesser extent). However, it is also found 
that many of the children did not receive the recommended treatment, and that there was a high 
correlation between those that received some form of traditional treatments at home and those that 
were not brought to a government facility. 
A second publication compares health status and access to health care services between disabled 
and non-disabled men and women in urban and peri-urban areas of Sierra Leone, paying 
particular attention to reproductive and maternal health care for disabled women (Trani et al., 
2011). According to the 2004 National Census, 2.4% of the Sierra Leone population is disabled. Of 
this, 21% have limited function of legs, 19% have visual impairments and 7% are blind (2004 
Census; quoted in Trani et al., 2011). However, other studies have found a much higher 
prevalence of disability – suggesting that up to 23% of children are disabled and that prevalence 
varies widely across different areas, from 14% in the Western Area to 37% in the Southern Region 
(MICS 2005; quoted in Trani et al., 2011). 
The authors conducted a cross-sectional study in Freetown, Western Area Rural, Koinadugu, 
Bombali, Bo and Kono in 2009. Households were randomly selected, disabled respondents were 
interviewed and their answers compared to answers of a control group of randomly selected non-
disabled respondents. This study finds a disability prevalence of 17% (12% mild and 5% severe) 
and that 73% of households have at least one disabled person. Disabled people were more likely 
to be younger than 30, single, live in an urban area, and slightly more likely to have never gone to 
school. A disabled person was found to be more likely than a non-disabled person to belong to the 
lowest asset index group.  
Seventy-three percent of severely disabled respondents, compared to 89% of non-disabled 
respondents, described themselves as being in good health. Similarly, disabled people were found 
to be less likely to be fully immunised, have access to a managed water supply or be highly 
satisfied with their health care (although satisfaction is still high – 80% compared to 94% for non-
disabled respondents). In addition, 70% of disabled people, compared to 85% of non-disabled 
people, reported that they could access a hospital in the event of an accident, injury or health 
problem. People with a disability were also found to be more likely to use medicine from drug 
peddlers or from religious curers and prayers. Health expenses as a proportion of household 
income are higher for a disabled person than otherwise. While 92% of the non-disabled 
respondents reported being sexually active, 60% of those with severe disabilities and 70% of those 
with mild disabilities reported it. Interestingly, access to maternal care for disabled mothers was 
slightly higher than for non-disabled mothers. Access to ANC, an SBA, a facility for delivery, use of 
condoms and emergency obstetric care were all roughly equally accessible. However, knowledge 
about sex was lower among severely disabled respondents: 39% of people with severe disabilities 
reported that they had never received basic sexual health information, compared to 28% of non-
disabled respondents. Disabled people were more likely to get such information from a family 
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member or a teacher than non-disabled people. Mildly disabled mothers were the most likely to 
have large families (four or more), but 24% of severely disabled mothers had more than four 
children, 63% had at least one child, and 56% of all disabled women wanted another child. 
A second vulnerable group are the youth. Despite anticipated extra demand, young people are not 
using reproductive health care as much as expected (Restless Development, 2012). In order to 
investigate why this might be the case, Restless Development collected data in 2012 from 
quantitative questionnaires, FGDs and KIIs. They found that, on the whole, most young people had 
some general knowledge about contraception, STI transmission and HIV/AIDS, but that this was 
only superficial and was not translating into good healthy behaviour. While 89% had heard of 
modern contraception and, on average, could name two different methods and 96% had heard of 
HIV/AIDS, only 31% used a modern method of contraception during their last sexual experience. 
The NGO suggests that this is for a number of reasons beyond the usually mentioned cost, 
distance and quality. First is a lack of information – only 57% of young people interviewed had 
received sexual and reproductive health education at school, and 40% could not identify a 
common misconception about contraception. One reason young people were not searching out 
more information is that many were concerned about confidentiality if they asked certain questions, 
fearing that it would be revealed to their family members that they were sexually active if they did 
so. Another explanation of poor sexual health practices is suggested to be accepted sexual 
exploitation through power structures. There is economic pressure to have transactional sex. Much 
of the time the older family members condone this or turn a blind eye as it may be for the 
immediate good of the family. Moreover, young and poorly educated women sometimes consider 
transactional sex their best option to get someone to care for them and, especially if they have 
children, look after them as they grow older. With all this, those interviewed expressed a frustration 
that there are limited forums for young people to advocate for their rights, and that this is 
exacerbated for a young woman who becomes pregnant out of wedlock who is then socially 
marginalised even further. 
The Performance Audit Report on Anti-Malaria Interventions (based on data from February to 
August 2010) noted there was a lack of awareness on the use of SP among pregnant women and 
little community-level education on issues pertinent to the efficient delivery of IPTp, with some 
pregnant women not returning for the second dose of SP. There was also a shortage of SP at 
health facilities, with some having not received their supply of SP for months. The supply of 
artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) (used in the treatment of P. falciparum malaria) to 
health facilities was frequently irregular and inadequate. Effective treatment of severe malaria was 
hampered by the lack of microscopes, a poorly functioning referral system and inconsistent 
guidelines. The distribution of ITNs was often late and national guidelines were interpreted 
differently in different parts of the country. There was a lack of awareness of the need for 
preventive malaria methods among the population.  
Barriers to accessing care include traditional beliefs about illness, such as the belief that 
convulsions are caused by spirits, but also about health care. For example, some reports suggest 
that before the FHCI providers would give injections but these are not covered by FHCI, and so the 
community use ‘quacks’ instead. People strongly believe that injections are the most effective type 
of drug, and that a health worker will not ‘waste’ an injection on a child who is going to die.  
Another widely held belief in rural areas pre-FHCI (Amnesty International, 2009) was that obstructed 
labour was caused by a woman’s infidelity. This dangerous misconception values a women’s chastity 
more highly than her health or her life. Often, time and energy were wasted in trying to obtain a 
confession instead of ensuring that the woman, who was in agony as the baby failed to emerge, had 
access to the necessary emergency obstetric care. Female genital mutilation was also very common, 
which, according to WHO, greatly increases the risks for women during childbirth. The 2013 DHS 
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indicated that 89.6% of women surveyed had undergone female genital mutilation, a slight decline 
from 91.3% in the 2008 SLDHS. 
The factors which influence decisions about health care providers include proximity, associated 
costs, tradition, perceived effectiveness, and the way users are treated by providers. These factors 
are mediated by power relations within the household, which are also influenced by paternal 
grandmothers, who often live with their sons (ODI, 2014). It is often these women who encourage 
traditional remedies for illness that they used for their own children, when PHU facilities were 
scarcer and not free. However, some report that an interesting bi-product of the FHCI is that the 
increased attendance at health centres has led to an increased knowledge of health rights and 
health messages, and an increase adherence to immunisation campaigns (HFAC/SC, 2011). 
In summary, it is not possible to isolate the contribution of the FHCI but many of the socio-cultural 
barriers that are recognised as very important in influencing health and health care-seeking 
behaviour in Sierra Leone appeared to be improving over this period of study and the FHCI may 
have played a role by increasing the contact between users and services, as well as coverage with 
health education messages. The importance of social norms – such as trust and traditional 
practices – as well as the perceived risks and costs of services are crucial to its success, as was 
reinforced during the Ebola epidemic, when much of the progress was eroded. To rebuild that trust 
involves not just tackling traditional beliefs but also providing health care which reshapes and 
meets expectations, as well as being attractive and welcoming. 
6.3.6 Accountability  
Community engagement with services is an important link in the results chain, which is expected to 
increase user uptake and satisfaction, as well as ensuring that services are acceptable and 
effective. However, these are typically weak in fragile and post-conflict countries such as Sierra 
Leone. There is some fragmented evidence of interesting innovations in this respect under the 
FHCI, but these need more systematic development as the health system rebuilds post-Ebola. 
One of the innovations of the FHCI was to set up a network of community monitors, coordinated by 
HFAC, which provided regular monitoring information upwards and downwards, at least early on in 
the FHCI process. In addition, Evidence 4 Action reported that local communities in Sierra Leone 
were being encouraged to rate their clinics and demand more from their health care services,91 
although it is not clear the extent to which this was carried through. Reports from 2013 also noted 
that some district councils, like Koinadugu, had initiated dialogues with communities and service 
providers, creating a platform for service providers (DHMTs and INGOs) to present their health 
interventions to community members and provide an opportunity for people to ask their questions 
and comment on issues relevant to them (Save the Children/Health Alert, 2013).  
The ReBUILD household interviews also provide some evidence of local accountability 
mechanisms being used (Amara et al., 2016). One participant, who was chairman of his local 
community committee, was very active in disseminating the FHCI message and helping to support 
local people who are entitled to exemption. There was a robust drug process in place, whereby 
participants were summoned to witness and sign for each drug delivery, along with a nurse and the 
drug deliverer.  
In the FGDs, community members were eager to be involved in the monitoring and supervision of 
the FHCI because they deemed it necessary to minimise the theft rate and ensure that FHCI 
                                               
91 See www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/jul/12/sierra-leone-maternal-health 
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supplies meant for targeted beneficiaries would be equitably distributed. This suggests a low level 
of engagement in the health system as it is presently organised and an appetite for more. 
6.3.7 Summary 
In this section we have examined five barriers to health care utilisation and health gain – the 5 ‘A’s 
of affordability, access, awareness (of the policy and of danger signs for mothers and children), 
attitudes (to health seeking) and accountability. All show improvements over the period, though 
some are modest and the data that are available make it hard to link changes to the FHCI (for 
example, for the reductions in OOP spending overall and for the FHCI groups). Awareness of the 
policy is high among all population groups and there is evidence that the FHCI contributed to 
increased awareness of danger signs by the community, greater willingness to seek health care for 
children and, to a small extent, greater accountability of services. All of these barriers need 
continued focus and improvement as we move ahead. 
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7 Unpacking effects – outcomes 
7.1 Has the FHCI contributed to saving lives in target groups?  
7.1.1 Maternal mortality 
Maternal mortality levels are extremely difficult to measure accurately in many developing 
countries because these countries tend to lack the vital registration systems that can accurately 
record births, deaths and the causes of death. 
It is also difficult to measure maternal mortality through surveys. Even in countries where maternal 
mortality levels are high, the number of maternal deaths that will be recorded in a survey such as 
the DHS will be relatively small, even with large sample sizes. This means there is a great deal of 
uncertainty about the estimates produced. 
In addition to trying to measure maternal mortality itself, there are often a number of attempts to 
model maternal mortality levels. These use available variables that are thought to be related to 
maternal mortality such as place and attendance at birth, fertility levels, GDP and other factors. 
For Sierra Leone, Figure 67 shows three series of estimates for the MMR. The DHS aims to 
measure maternal mortality itself (indirectly using the sisterhood approach). The UN inter-agency 
group on maternal mortality produces regularly updated modelled estimates for all countries 
including Sierra Leone, while the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) also produces 
modelled estimates at the country level. 
Figure 66: Maternal mortality ratio 
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Two overall conclusions can be drawn from the information in the chart. First, Sierra Leone has 
had and still has extremely high levels of maternal mortality. For example, the UN estimate shows 
an MMR figure of 1,360 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 2015 – the highest ratio in the 
world. 
Second, the exact level and trend of maternal mortality levels in Sierra Leone is very difficult to 
measure with any certainty. Each of the series comes with wide margins of uncertainty and the 
mortality levels and the direction and shape of the trends are different between the three sources. 
As the IHME report (2010) notes, ‘The differences between global modelling efforts, which are at 
times substantial, emphasise the influence of each of the analytical steps used to estimates 
maternal mortality.’ 
DHS estimates 
The DHS asks women aged 15 to 49 about their siblings who have died, including when they died, 
and, for sisters, whether they were pregnant or had recently been pregnant at the time of death. 
Deaths to sisters who were pregnant or within two months of the birth or termination of a 
pregnancy are included in the estimates of maternal mortality. 
As the numbers of maternal deaths recorded in the surveys are small, the estimates relate to a 
period of seven years before each of the surveys. Thus, the chart shows the estimate centred at 
2009 for the 2013 DHS as it relates to the period 2006 to 2013 – and likewise for the 2008 survey. 
The estimates show MMRs of 857 from the 2008 survey and 1,165 from the 2013 DHS. However, 
because of the wide confidence intervals for both these estimates we are not able to say with 
certainty whether these estimates are different. They do not provide evidence that levels of 
maternal mortality have changed between the two periods. 
UN inter-agency group estimates 
The UN estimates are modelled and the explanatory variables include the following: GDP (rising 
since the end of the civil war); general fertility rate (declining slowly); skilled birth attendance levels 
(increasing slowly); and the measures of MMR from the DHSs.  
The central estimate shows a falling trend for MMR from 1,990 in 2005 to 1,360 in 2015. However, 
the uncertainty intervals are so wide that it is not possible to draw conclusions about the true 
direction of the trend over the last 10 years with any certainty. 
IHME estimates 
The IHME estimates were produced after testing a wider range of covariates. In addition to those 
used by the UN, IHME tested the inclusion of the following in their model: HIV death rates for 
women aged 15 to 49 years; neonatal death rates; coverage of four or more ANC appointments; 
and malnutrition in children under five. Not all covariates were retained in the models for each 
country. 
IHME produces the lowest figures for MMR of the three sources. However, the trend for the central 
estimate is gently rising from 521 in 1990 to 623 in 2013. As with the DHS and UN figures, the 
uncertainty intervals are so wide that we cannot draw conclusions about the size and direction of 
any change in MMR. 
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7.1.2 Child mortality 
Mortality in relation to children under five years is easier to measure than maternal mortality. 
Estimates are shown in Table 34 from the 2013 DHS, while Figure 68 compares the UN inter-
agency group estimates with those from the 2013 DHS. 
Table 34 shows the trends in neonatal, infant and under-five mortality over the last 15 years from 
the 2013 DHS. Mortality rates for all three indicators are falling, although the declines in neonatal 
mortality (i.e. deaths in the first month of life) are relatively small. For under-five mortality, rates fell 
by one-third between 1999 to 2003 and 2009 to 2013.  
Early neonatal deaths (within the first week) represented 81% of all neonatal deaths in the 2013 
DHS and this was unchanged from the 2008 survey. The perinatal mortality rate (which includes 
both stillbirths and early neonatal deaths) was 39 per 1,000 pregnancies in 2013 compared with 34 
in 2008. 
Table 34: Neonatal, infant and under-five mortality rates 
 Years 
 1999 to 2003 2004 to 2008 2009 to 2013 
Neonatal mortality* 48 46 39 
Infant mortality** 152 127 92 
Under-five mortality*** 227 194 156 
* Deaths under the age of one month per 1,000 live births. 
** Deaths under the age of 12 months per 1,000 live births. 
*** Deaths under the age of five years per 1,000 live births. 
Source: DHS 2013 
As for the estimates for maternal mortality, the UN inter-agency group uses additional variables to 
model under-five mortality including, in particular, mortality estimates from the MICS – the latest of 
which was conducted in 2010. The UN has also incorporated their own annual disaggregations of 
the 2013 DHS under-five mortality data into their model. Figure 68 shows both the modelled 
figures going back to the 1950s and the disaggregated DHS data for the years between 1997 and 
2012. 
The modelled data show that under-five mortality has clearly been declining gradually, from very 
high rates, for many years. This decline appears to have accelerated slightly from around 2000 
onwards.  
The annual estimates of under-five mortality from the 2013 DHS show a gradual decline from 1997 
to 2009. However, there is then a very sharp decline from 187 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2009 
to 147 in 2010. This coincides closely with the launch of the FHCI. The following years also saw 
continued declines to reach 126 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2012. 
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Figure 67: Under-five mortality 
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However, levels of neonatal mortality, especially early neonatal mortality, have not declined as 
rapidly. Neonatal mortality is often a more difficult problem to address, being affected by quality of 
care offered in the health system at primary and secondary levels. We have international evidence 
on what works in relation to saving newborn lives92 but less evidence on the extent to which these 
practices are present or have changed over time and with the start of the FHCI in Sierra Leone.  
7.2 Has the FHCI contributed to reducing morbidity in target groups?  
Information is available in the DHS for prevalence rates of ARI, fever and diarrhoea for children 
under the age of five. Overall, there was little change in the prevalence of these symptoms in 
under-fives comparing before and after the FHCI. In contrast, the nutrition indicators for these 
children did show large improvements, with the proportion of underweight children falling sharply. 
ARI symptoms are considered a proxy for pneumonia and it is one of the leading causes of 
childhood morbidity and mortality throughout the world. Between 2009 and 2013 the proportion of 
children with symptoms in the two weeks preceding the survey remained constant at 5% (see 
Table 35). There was little change in the rates at a regional level, except for Southern Region 
where prevalence fell from 7% to 2% (see Table 36). 
Table 35: Prevalence of symptoms for under-fives* 
 Before FHCI After FHCI 
 2009 2013 
ARI** 5 5 
Fever 22 25 
Diarrhoea 11 11 
* Percentage of children under five with symptoms of each condition in the two weeks preceding the survey. 
** ARI symptoms (cough accompanied by short, rapid breathing which was chest-related or difficult breathing which was 
chest-related) are considered a proxy for pneumonia. 
Sources: DHSBS 2009 and DHS 2013 
                                               
92 For example, evidence suggests that corticosteroids for pre-term labour decrease neonatal mortality by 40%, the detection and 
management of breech (caesarean section) may reduce perinatal/neonatal deaths by 71%, labour surveillance (including partograph) 
by 40% and clean delivery practices by as much as 58 to 78%. Clean delivery practices may also reduce the incidence of neonatal 
tetanus by 55 to 99% and antibiotics for pre-term premature rupture of membranes may reduce the incidence of infections by 32% 
(Darmstadt et al., 2005). 
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Table 36: Prevalence of symptoms for under-fives: Equity issues 
 
Prevalence* of ARI 
symptoms** 
Prevalence* of fever 
Prevalence* of 
diarrhoea 
 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013 
Residence 
Urban 4 4 25 27 11 12 
Rural 7 5 24 25 14 11 
Region 
Eastern 5 3 23 24 11 9 
Northern 8 8 24 27 16 14 
Southern 7 2 24 25 10 8 
Western 3 4 29 25 11 13 
Wealth quintile 
Lowest 7 5 24 25 13 11 
Second 7 5 24 25 15 12 
Middle 8 6 24 25 14 11 
Fourth 6 5 25 27 13 11 
Highest 4 3 28 27 9 11 
* Percentage of children under five with the stated symptoms in the two weeks preceding the survey. 
** ARI symptoms (cough accompanied by short, rapid breathing which was chest-related or difficult breathing which was 
chest-related) are considered a proxy for pneumonia. 
Source: DHS 2008 and 2013 
Fever is a major symptom of malaria and other acute infections in children. There was little change 
in the rates of fever in children under five measured by the surveys, with 22% of children reporting 
a fever in the two weeks preceding the survey in 2009 and 25% in 2013 (see Table 35). This 
reasonably consistent pattern was evident across all areas and wealth groups. 
Levels of diarrhoea among children were also unchanged: 11% of children under five had 
diarrhoea in the two weeks preceding the survey in both 2009 and in 2013 (see Table 35). Most 
areas and quintile groups showed little change. However, for rural areas as a whole prevalence fell 
slightly from 14% to 11%. 
In contrast to these indicators of morbidity, the nutrition indicators for children under five did show 
a general improvement between 2009 and 2013. This is what we might expect after the 
introduction of the FHCI, with higher immunisation rates, improved treatment for malaria and other 
conditions and better access to health care for under-fives all leading to overall improvements in 
health.  
The proportions of underweight and wasted children fell by around 40% during this period, while 
prevalence of stunting fell by a quarter (see Table 37). The administrative data from HMIS also tell 
a similar story, revealing a gradual reduction in the percentage of under-fives that were severely 
underweight from above 7% before the FHCI to below 5% by 2014 (see Figure 69). 
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Table 37: Nutrition indicators for under-fives* 
 Before FHCI After FHCI 
 2009 2013 
Underweight** 25 16 
Stunted*** 46 38 
Wasted**** 14 9 
* Percentage of children under five who were two or more standard deviations below the WHO standards for each 
indicator. 
** Low weight for age. 
*** Low height for age. 
**** Low weight for height. 
Sources: DHSBS 2009 and DHS 2013 
Figure 68: Percentage of under-fives that are severely underweight each month 
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7.3 Has the FHCI contributed to reductions in impoverishment? 
Although the FHCI ToC speculated that the FHCI might reduce poverty, it has to be acknowledged 
that this was an optimistic assumption, given the complexity of the relationship between spending 
on fees and drugs for one target group and this much larger goal. We do not have the data to 
examine this relationship directly. However, ReBUILD did study the effects of the FHCI on 
catastrophic health care expenditure at the household level, which by definition has implications for 
poverty levels of the household, either now or in the future. Although apparently quite a small 
reduction, Edoka et al. (2015) shows that the reduction in real OOP expenditure between 2003 and 
2013 makes a significant difference to the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure, defined as 
OOP expenditure in excess of 10% of household total expenditure. They find that it decreased 
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from 50% in 2003/04 to 32% in 2011. This is mostly due to a decrease in the incidence and effect 
of ill health. 
A catastrophic health expenditure incidence of 32%, while better than it was, still suggests that the 
living standards of many households are still being compromised due to the financial risk of 
unexpected health care costs. It also leaves open the question of interest to the evaluation team: 
did the FHCI contribute to the reduction from 50% to 32%? It is also not clear what our expectation 
of this policy reform should be in relation to the degree of reduction in catastrophic health 
expenditure to be expected from it. 
7.4 To what extent has the FHCI contributed to strengthening social 
cohesion (perceptions of policy fairness)?  
Social cohesion in this framework is interpreted in a very limited way as relating to the perceptions 
of fairness of the policy by the target groups and wider community. This will relate not only to 
agreement on the design (whether the target groups are indeed a social priority) but also the 
modalities of implementation, with poor implementation and perceived abuses causing a possible 
erosion of confidence in the public authorities. 
From the NPSS surveys, it appears as though satisfaction with health care in government facilities 
has increased significantly between 2008 and 2011 (see Table 38 below).  
Table 38: Satisfaction with health care at government facilities by local council 
 
 
An HFAC report one year after the FHCI launch found that 71.5% of respondents who had 
attended a government facility were satisfied with their service, with the remaining 28.5% 
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unsatisfied. It is hard to know what this statistic was before the FHCI, or what it is now, but it is in 
line with a ball park 70% of people using government clinics as their usual provider as found by the 
NPSS. In total 21% felt the services they received were very good, 49% good, 22% fair, 7% bad 
and 1% very bad (HFAC, 2011). The report raises the concern that individuals are not actually 
aware of their rights, and so their satisfaction is misleading. The HFAC finds that 238 people had 
to pay for their free health care services, and that of these 203 rated their care as very good (51), 
good (78) or fair (72), and 121 were satisfied with the services they received. If they were aware of 
their right to free health care they should not have been satisfied with having to pay. 
In 2013, a survey on the topic was completed, this time focusing only on women who were known 
to have used free health care services and parents of children who received vaccinations in 2012. 
It was conducted as part of the external verification of the country’s PBF scheme for primary health 
care. Roughly 20% of facilities were randomly selected for verification, and eight recipients of free 
health care from each of these facilities were randomly selected, traced and asked about their 
experience (Cordaid, 2014). In total 1,233 people were interviewed, spread across all districts. The 
average satisfaction score was 7.3 out of 10. It was lowest in Koidu New Sembehun City (4.1) and 
highest in Port Loko (9.9). The survey found that higher satisfaction was correlated with kind 
attitudes on the part of staff, short waiting times and availability of medicines. Cordaid also found 
that patient satisfaction was generally higher for care received at lower-level facilities.  
Most FGD participants in the provinces generally expressed satisfaction with the existence of the 
FHCI, mainly due to the following factors: free ITNs, free food supply, free delivery for pregnant 
women, free medication for malaria and other treatment, and regular vaccination of under-five 
children. The majority reported that they had benefitted directly from the FHCI or their family 
members had benefitted in some way. Generally, the perceived benefits from most of the 
participants included reduced death and sickness rates among women and children, improvement 
in some of the services, spending less for health services under the FHCI, and increased use of 
health and medical services. They mentioned that, before the introduction of the FHCI, many more 
women died due to complications during delivery as they were not managed properly by the TBAs. 
In addition, they reported that many more children died due to common childhood diseases and 
malnutrition. 
Support for the government was also expressed by one ReBUILD household interview participant:  
“I am very glad for what the Pa [the President] has done for them. I am glad because during 
those times, my own time, I did strain, but now many are able to give birth because the free 
health has come, so the Pa has really, really done well for them” (Western Area 103, 
female, > 50 years old) (Amara et al., 2016). 
However, there were other FGD participants – especially in Western Area – who expressed 
varying levels of dissatisfaction with the FHCI. They reported that they were very unhappy with 
how they were treated by health workers at the health facilities. Most of them complained about the 
long waiting time to access the services, limited space to accommodate patients, poor sanitary 
conditions of the facilities, and the unfriendliness of health workers. There were also concerns and 
dissatisfaction with the food supply. Participants were particularly dissatisfied with ‘hidden costs’ 
such as the payment for registration or entrance to the health facility:  
“I am not too satisfied because it can never be free when we are still paying for registration” 
(Adult female, Western Area). 
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Though most FGD participants across all groups and in all the districts expressed some 
disappointment that the FHCI does not target the entire population, they generally agreed with the 
FHCI’s mandate to specifically target the three categories of beneficiaries.  
However, some participants, especially the youth, were very unhappy with their exclusion from the 
FHCI. A few other participants like the elderly and people with disabilities also voiced their 
frustration about not being included. A few participants in the Western Area expressed the view 
that people in the provinces had benefitted more than them from the FHCI, the reason being that 
health care workers held beliefs that people residing the city were financially better off than those 
in smaller towns and villages and as such requested they pay for services that are meant to be 
free.  
A few participants believed that the FHCI was not working mainly because of corruption:  
“If things are not working well at the hospitals it is because the community leaders are 
supporting the corrupt practices of the hospital officials. This is my observation” (Adult 
male, Bo). 
In summary, the reaction to the FHCI is complex, depending on where in the country people live 
and what group they are part of. There is a general consensus that it targets a priority group, but 
naturally gives rise to heightened expectations from other population groups. At the same time, 
implementation failures undermine positive experiences and social perceptions.  
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8 Unintended effects 
With a complex reform like the FHCI it is clearly to be expected that some unintended 
consequences might ensue. The OPM team developed hypotheses about such consequences at 
the start of our evaluation and we have sought evidence to substantiate or refute them, which is 
presented briefly here. 
One concern expressed by informants was that the policy would contribute to a rise in teenage 
pregnancies, presumably because of falling costs in relation to delivery. An underlying concern is 
that teenagers may have less access to information and less power to negotiate sexual 
relationships (Restless Development, 2010). However, the DHS data do not back this up. Fertility 
rates for 15–19-year-olds fell from 146 per 1,000 women in 2008 to 125 in 2013. All other age 
groups showed much smaller reductions in fertility. The uptake of family planning is the same for 
15–19-year-olds as for all women, with 21% currently using a modern method of contraception. 
A second concern, and one which was expressed in some early reports on the FHCI, was that it 
had contributed to a drop in preventive services (through diversion of resources to curative care). 
This is something for which there is some evidence in other countries (Wilkinson et al., 2001). 
However, analysis of the DHS data suggests that this has not been sustained. It is possible that 
during the first months of the FHCI there was a reduction in attention to outreach and preventive 
care, but that is not supported as a longer-term problem by the 2013 DHS, as reported in Section 
6.1. 
It is also reasonable to monitor trends in utilisation of public services by non-targeted groups such 
as general adult outpatient visits and those for older children. However, while there might be some 
risk of providers focussing on target groups, it seems more likely that general utilisation is driven 
by demand-side factors, and here the FHCI might have positive effects too, if funds are liberated to 
pay for non-target group members (as the household data hints). The lack of HMIS data before 
April 2011 has made it difficult to assess this issue completely and we do not know how relative 
utilisation rates changed in the year after the start of the initiative. However the trends from 2011 to 
2013 appear to show that the number of outpatient consultations has been rising for both FHCI 
and non-FHCI groups. For children under five, outpatient visits in the year from April 2013 were 
50% higher than for the year starting in April 2011. This is the same percentage increase as for 
children aged 5 to 14 year olds. And, although the total number of visits for men is much lower 
than for children, the rate of increase for males aged 15 and over was faster at 75% during this 
period. 
On the positive side, it is possible that the FHCI could have a positive impact in terms of women’s 
empowerment. Women in Sierra Leone face discrimination in virtually every aspect of their lives, 
with unequal access to education, economic opportunities and health care. Given their low status 
and lack of economic independence, women were rarely able to decide for themselves to go to a 
health care facility, whether for family planning, ANC, deliveries or emergency services, as such a 
decision was normally in the hands of the husband and often dependent on his assessment of 
whether they had or could raise sufficient money.  
In the FGDs, the theme of ‘men as decision-makers’ was discussed within the context of power 
imbalance in health-seeking decisions. The majority of the participants across all groups strongly 
expressed the view that health care-seeking decisions are always or mostly done by the head of 
the family – who are mostly men:  
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“The care taker or the head of the family [makes the decision], for example as we are here 
now the chief is the head of the house; if somebody falls sick in this house, he makes the 
decision on that” (Youth, Koinadugu).  
This appears not to have changed with the FHCI, and remains a cause of delays in seeking care. 
However, a few participants mentioned that in the absence of the head of the house, the decision 
can be made by other respected members of the household such as wives or neighbours:  
“For me, in some cases, when the husband is dead. When someone is sick, the relatives 
will decide to take the child to the hospital” (Community leader, Bo).  
Overall, we have no evidence that a strong shift in gender roles has occurred. 
Other changes to the health care market might be expected to result from the FHCI. For example, 
private and faith-based facilities will have had to respond to changing prices in the public sector, 
although this is mediated through perceptions of quality and convenience. There is qualitative 
evidence that the private sector continues to be important for health seeking, especially in the 
Western Area. In the DHS, there is virtually no change between 2008 and 2013 in terms of private 
sector use for delivery care: just over 2% of births take place in a non-government health facility. 
In the informal sector, TBAs can no longer make the living they used to, although there is clear 
evidence from a number of sources that TBAs have been given the new role of linking 
communities and facilities, in part funded through the PBF funds at facility level. This is potentially a 
positive unintended consequence, as it follows a wider global pattern of changes to the role of TBAs. 
Participants in our FGDs expressed confidence in the skills of TBAs and also reported using alternative 
services like ‘traditional healers’ because, according to them, they are cheap and the medication they 
provide works effectively. It seems overall, therefore, that other sectors remain resilient. 
A number of potential unintended financial consequences were also explored. One was that there 
might be a crowding out of other budget lines in the MoHS budget by the increase in salaries 
awarded in 2010, which was linked to the FHCI. Looking at a breakdown of MoHS expenditure, 
there were significant decreases in HR management, secondary and tertiary expenditure in 2011, 
which was the first budget to include FHCI expenditure. This may reflect a declining non-payroll 
recurrent budget (with significant increases in the payroll budget). As noted in the section on 
sustainability, this is a risk that requires careful management, as expectations of continuing salary 
increases are easily established.  
Another concern was whether other programmatic areas were squeezed by the allocation of 
funding to the FHCI. There were large increases in funding to MCH in the 2011 budget, the first 
that included the FHCI. Although there was the potential for displacement of funding to vertical 
programmes through funding the FHCI, this does not seem to have materialised, and in any case 
may have been minimised by some of this funding being off-budget and subject to existing donor 
programmes. MCH expenditure increased from 8% of non-salary recurrent MoHS expenditure in 
2008 to 28% in 2014. Government prioritisation within the budget for drugs and medical supplies 
also increased greatly.  
Analysing NHA data by type of expenditure shows that there were significant expenditure 
increases in public health programmes in 2010 (even in real terms). This was most notably with 
respect to MCH, consistent with the FHCI, but also occurred in relation to malaria prevention. This 
latter finding is perhaps important giving the potential displacement effect of the FHCI on other 
health programmes. Inpatient expenditures have also reduced, potentially suggesting better first-
line treatment. 
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A third financial concern related to the increasing salaries of health workers was that other public 
servants would demand similar increases (wage increase contagion to other sectors). While it is 
extremely hard to link the causes of salary decisions, aggregate data suggest that there may be 
some cause for concern here. Wages have increased significantly in Sierra Leone since 2010, 
making up a growing share of the economy, from around 5% of GDP in 2009 to a projected 7% of 
GDP in 2015 (see Figure 70). Furthermore, the main change in education, by far the largest wage 
sector, occurred the year after the FHCI increases had been approved (see Figure 71). However, 
analysis of reports at this time (2011) of the potential teachers strike over wages did not link the 
issue to the FHCI-related increases. Later increases in the wage bill were driven by across-the-
board increases in the minimum wage, brought in in 2014, which appeared to be driven by factors 
other than relative wages in the health sector.  
Figure 69: Wages in Sierra Leone, 2007–2015 
 
Source: IMF data 
Figure 70: Wages by sector, Sierra Leone, 2007–2015  
 
Source: MoFED 
A final possible unintended consequence that was posited in advance as a risk was opportunistic 
responses by facility managers to the FHCI, which would include changing the prices for other 
services to cope with lower or more irregular funds for FHCI target groups. This was examined in 
the district KIIs, and no evidence was found to support its occurrence. The PBF funds have acted 
to buffer the losses from the FHCI; it they were to diminish or become more irregular, this risk 
would be likely to become more real again.  
In summary, we examined ten possible unintended consequences of the FHCI on the health 
system and society but only found evidence to support one of them, which was a squeeze on non-
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salary expenditure within the MoHS budget. This is discussed further in the section on the 
sustainability of the policy. 
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9 Other contributory factors 
Tracking the effects of the FHCI on the main outcome measures of interest has involved analysing 
available evidence on trends in these MCH outcomes, looking for discontinuities in these trends 
that coincide with the FHCI’s start, and analysing changes to processes and outputs that provide 
corroborating or uncorroborating evidence, based on our ToC. However, it is clear that other 
factors will also influence the health outcomes of the Sierra Leonean population across these 
years. In this section we describe some of the main other influences in order to inform our 
judgements about the plausible role of the FHCI. These include:  
 Other epidemiological factors, including the Ebola epidemic; 
 Social determinants of health, including education, water and sanitation, and fertility; 
 Independent projects and investments (investments which relate to clearly distinct components 
of the health system or which would have occurred in the absence of the FHCI); and 
 The evolution of the Sierra Leonean economy and poverty trends, which will have an impact on 
health-seeking behaviour and outcomes directly and indirectly. 
9.1 Ebola and other epidemiological factors 
According to the Health Sector Recovery Plan 2015–2020 (MoHS, 2015), Sierra Leone’s first 
cases of Ebola occurred in the Eastern part of the country in May 2014 and afterwards cases 
increased in number and distribution, affecting all 14 districts and outpacing morbidity and mortality 
in neighbouring Guinea and Liberia. By March 2015, there were more than 8,400 confirmed cases 
and 3,600 reported deaths, making it the worst affected country in the West African region and in 
the world. 
Several assessments conducted by GoSL and/or its partners revealed that the health sector was 
disproportionally affected by the Ebola outbreak (MoHS, 2015). At the sector level, the epidemic 
had direct and disproportional effects on the health sector, eroding recent progress toward the 
MDGs. As first responders, health workers became infected through the provision of routine care 
and support to sick patients. Poor early recognition of Ebola accompanied by inadequate Infection 
Prevention and Control (IPC) standards combined to fuel transmission in health facilities. The 
result was an erosion of community confidence in the sector and a reduction in the delivery of 
critical MCH services. In the case of nutrition, quarantine restrictions affecting food production and 
distribution coupled with a deepening of household poverty likely exacerbated acute and chronic 
undernutrition.  
There were a total of 296 Ebola infections among health care workers with 221 deaths, including 
11 specialised physicians (MoHS, 2015). The aforementioned reduction in community confidence 
in the health sector negatively affected utilisation – with a 23% drop in institutional deliveries, 39% 
drop in children treated for malaria and 21% drop in children receiving basic immunisation 
(penta3). The outbreak also led to the delayed implementation of key health programmes – 
including critical child health campaigns – as the country’s priorities shifted to focus mainly on the 
Ebola response. Essential health programme management staff were reassigned to help control 
the outbreak, campaign-based delivery of essential interventions was halted and routine health 
management and coordination meetings ceased. When services are constrained, there is a high 
risk of concurrent health vulnerabilities that must be immediately addressed. These include 
possible outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases (particularly measles), a surge in malaria 
cases and deaths, acute malnutrition, and maternal and newborn deaths due to a rise in home 
deliveries. Estimates suggest that, post-Ebola, the levels of under-five mortality returned to 1990’s 
levels. Moreover, although 96% of PHUs remained operational throughout the crisis, the outbreak 
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led to a marked decline in the utilisation of health care facilities for non-Ebola-related health needs, 
particularly in urban areas such as Freetown, with a much lower proportion of women reporting 
pregnancy-related care and as much as a 90% drop in family planning visits (GoSL, 2014). 
As the survey data we rely on for the FHCI evaluation tend to date from 2013, the losses reported 
above for Ebola are not visible there. However, we have reflected the interaction between the 
health system and Ebola in our assessment of the core interventions and analysis of HMIS data 
and other data sources for 2014/15. Our FGDs also reflect the ongoing legacy of Ebola. Almost all 
FGD participants from all groups and districts expressed concerns regarding Ebola and the safety 
of health facilities and health workers. They mentioned regular washing of hands and not touching 
and caring for the sick and dead as preventative ways they have been practising even as the 
Ebola epidemic was coming to an end. Most participants felt that the GoSL should continue 
sensitising people on Ebola safety measures in the communities to ensure people are not 
complacent about the disease. 
The other main disease outbreak during the 2010–2015 period was cholera. Sierra Leone is 
periodically subject to cholera outbreaks, which often occur during the rainy season (from May to 
October) and are related to heavy rains that cause flooding and contamination of water sources. 
During the period of study, there was a major outbreak in 2012, when Sierra Leone reported 
22,885 cases with 298 deaths (CFR=1.30) that reached 12 out of 13 districts. Western Area 
accounted for the majority of the cases (11,805 – 52% of all cases). This outbreak was linked to 
one in Guinea (WHO, 2013).  
9.2 Social determinants of health 
9.2.1 Education 
Analysis of the 2010 MICS shows a clear link between higher education levels and better health 
indicators and outcomes. It also finds links between education and reduced poverty, which in turn 
is known to lead to better health outcomes. The Education Country Status Report states: 
‘The net impact of education on human development is noteworthy. Many fertility and 
maternal and child health indicators improve with education: the average age at first 
childbirth rises, women have fewer children and the probability of at least one child dying 
drops. Gains are greater in urban areas, regardless of the availability of local health 
services. The probability of poverty also drops considerably. In spite of these positive 
impacts Sierra Leone ranks just 28th out of 37 SSA countries in terms of the impact of 
primary education on human development, which may be related to the comparatively low 
quality of education’. 
In terms of links with fertility indicators, the analysis found that women who had completed upper 
secondary school or tertiary-level education were more likely to use contraception, had their first 
child at an older age, and had fewer children. The average age at first birth for those with no 
education or only primary education was less than 19 years, compared to 21 years for those with 
secondary or higher education. 
Women with tertiary education were more than four times more likely to use contraception (40%) 
compared to those with no education (9%). The higher levels of education were also linked to 
smaller family sizes: 4.5 children for those with tertiary level, compared to more than six children 
for those without education. 
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MCH indicators also improved with increasing levels of education. Pregnant women with higher 
levels of education were more likely to receive components of antenatal care such as tetanus 
toxoid vaccinations and antimalarial preventative treatment. They were also more likely to deliver 
in a health facility. 
The probability of losing at least one child was almost double for uneducated women compared 
with the most educated: two-thirds of mothers without primary education had lost at least one child, 
whereas for those with the highest levels of education the proportion was just over one-third. 
As with the information for health, there are many weaknesses with Sierra Leone’s education data. 
The Education Management Information System provided no reliable data from 2005 to 2010. In 
addition, the 2010 information was found by UNESCO to be overestimated by 18% for primary 
school data and 12% for secondary schools, before being subsequently adjusted. UNESCO also 
used a range of surveys in their analysis, although the different sources of data are not always 
consistent with each other. 
Resources for education in Sierra Leone have been rising slowly. In relative terms, education 
spending rose from 3.3% of GDP in 2004 to 3.5% in 2011. However, these levels remain below the 
average of 3.9% for other low-income countries.  
Participation in education has risen dramatically since the end of the civil war. In 2002, the 
government removed fees for primary school and this led to a doubling of numbers from 650,000 
children in 2000 to 1,280,000 in 2004. However, since then numbers have remained broadly 
constant, with around 1,200,000 children in primary school in 2010. 
There have also been large increases at secondary level. Numbers in junior secondary school rose 
by a factor of four from 60,000 in 2000 to 244,000 in 2010. The relative rise for senior secondary 
school was even higher, with numbers moving from 23,000 to 108,000 in the same period. 
Despite these large increases in numbers, a significant percentage of children remain out of 
school. In 2003, 25% of children aged six to 14 were out of school and the figure was still 22% in 
2010. The overwhelming majority of these out-of-school children – more than 90% – had never 
been to school. 
Education outcomes for children in Sierra Leone are low. An Early Reading Assessment Survey 
was conducted among primary children in 2011. It found that more than half of children could not 
write their names after the first year of primary school. It also found that after three years of school 
the great majority had not yet mastered the alphabet and how it works. Reading and 
comprehension levels were also low for primary school-aged children. Other studies have also 
shown that there are weak education outcomes through both primary and secondary levels. 
In terms of adult literacy, Sierra Leone has low levels. Rates have risen from 35% in 2004 to 44% 
in 2012, but this is far lower than the average of 66% for sub-Saharan Africa. The gap between 
literacy rates for men (56% in 2012) and women (34%) has also not closed over this period. 
The picture for younger adults is better. For those aged 15 to 24 years, overall literacy rates were 
63% in 2012 and this represents a faster increase than for adults as a whole. Rates for young 
women are increasing faster than for young men: literacy rates for women aged 15 to 24 were up 
17 percentage points in the eight years to 2012 compared to only 12 percentage points for young 
men. However, although the gap is closing young men remain more literate than young women. 
In summary, education participation improved through the 2000s, albeit from very low levels and 
with serious constraints apparent to the quality of education. We have limited evidence from after 
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the FHCI with which to assess both how education contributed to better health outcomes and the 
reverse.  
9.2.2 Water and sanitation 
Access to clean water and adequate sanitation is another significant driver of better health for 
adults and children (Prüss-Üstün et al., 2008). Households in Sierra Leone have poor levels of 
access to improved water sources and sanitation (see Table 39). Access to an improved source of 
drinking water has been steadily increasing over the last two decades but at a very slow rate of 
about one percentage point a year. In 2010, 57% of households had access and this rose further 
to 63% in 2015. Rates were much higher in urban areas compared to rural: 85% compared to 48% 
respectively in 2015. 
The situation is worse for sanitation. In 2015, only 44% of households had access to sanitation that 
hygienically separated human waste from human contact (68% in urban areas; 28% in rural 
areas). The rate of improvement has also been extremely slow, with access typically increasing by 
only half a percentage point each year since 1990.  
Progress in access to clean water and sanitation is likely to have contributed to the gains noted in 
health, although given the slow rate of progress, especially in rural areas, it is unlikely to have 
been a major factor. 
Table 39: Trends in water and sanitation, 1990–2015  
 
9.2.3 Fertility trends 
As with education, fertility is both influenced by changing health indicators and is itself a determent 
of health. Fertility rates in Sierra Leone have been declining, but also very slowly. The total fertility 
rate (TFR) shown by the 2013 DHS was 4.9 compared to 5.1 in the 2008 DHS. 
Rates were much higher in rural areas at 5.7 compared to 3.5 in urban. Northern, Eastern and 
Southern regions all had high rates above 5, compared to Western at 3.2. 
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Women with higher education had lower fertility rates; those with at least secondary education had 
a TFR of 3.0, while for those without education it was 5.6. 
There was also a strong gradient by wealth quintile. The bottom three wealth quintiles all had rates 
above 5.5 compared to those in the highest wealth quintile who had a TFR of 3.0. 
9.3 Other investments in RMNCH  
It is important to recognise the role of other investments in the health sector that were independent 
of the FHCI or were likely to have occurred in its absence. In the health financing section (Section 
4.1), various approaches are taken to isolate FHCI from non-FHCI health expenditure. On the 
impact side, it is also important to assess the likely influence of other programmes or projects. 
Where known, these are mentioned in the relevant sections of the report.  
There was some impetus to improve quality of care in the lead up to the FHCI with the presidential 
endorsement in February 2008 of a RCH Strategic Plan to address MDGs 4 and 5 – to reduce 
maternal, under-five and infant mortality rates by 30% between 2005 and 2015. Other investments 
to strengthen the health system were also ongoing but were slow in implementation, in part due to 
delays in disbursement of funds.  
Important investments that contributed to outcomes are likely to have included the GAVI support 
for vaccines and the Global Fund support for malaria prevention and control, as well as the AfDB 
support for health infrastructure (see Annex G). Within the RMNCH field, DFID-supported 
programmes such as the Making it Happen project, UNFPA, UNICEF and the World Bank all 
invested directly in improving RMNCH outcomes over the period. Some part of these would 
undoubtedly have occurred in the absence of the FHCI. It is not easy to assess either what 
proportion would have been invested in the absence of the FHCI, nor the impact of that 
hypothetical proportion. All we can conclude is that they played a role in the outcomes 
documented. In general, the FHCI was seen by all study participants as having given a boost and 
coherence to the focus on RMNCH. 
9.4 The macroeconomic environment and poverty rates 
The economy influences health through resource availability but also by affecting all of the other 
drivers discussed above. It also affects poverty, which is of course a key factor in understanding 
changing household access and health seeking. It is therefore worth understanding the economic 
context of the period, although isolating influences on health is beyond the scope of this study. The 
context also affects health financing sustainability going forward. 
Sierra Leone has experienced sharp real growth over the past five years, averaging 8.7% per 
annum from 2010 to 2014.  Despite recent double digit growth and the per capita income rising 
from US$ 450 in 2010 to around US$ 800 in 2013, Sierra Leone remains a low-income country 
with a declining per capita income in 2014. As Figure 71 shows, economic growth rose to 20% in 
2013 before dropped sharply to -3.3% in 2014.  This sharp fall was a result of the Ebola outbreak 
and the drop in international mineral prices, especially iron ore.93 Moreover, these twin shocks are 
estimated to have reduced economic growth by even greater degrees in 2015. 
Economic activity is projected to rebound in 2016 as the Ebola epidemic is overcome. However, 
this will be limited as the mineral and mining sector in Sierra Leone has serious production 
                                               
93 IMF Article IV November 2015. 
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constraints.94 Iron ore mines have been closed (as low international prices make production 
unprofitable) and all other mining exports have declined due to slowing international demand and 
prices (diamonds, bauxite and rutile being the other main mineral exports). 
Figure 71:  Economic growth (nominal GDP US$ millions and real growth rate) 
 
Source: IMF 
The sector has a wider impact on the economy and raises particular difficulties for government 
revenues (thus compounding the problems caused by the Ebola epidemic). Tax revenues have 
declined directly through falling mining royalties (which are based on export values), and some 
mining companies are also struggling to pay income taxes. Indeed, the tax-to-GDP ratio – as 
shown in Figure 72 – had been rising from 9% in 2010 to 11% in 2012 but returned to 9% by 2014. 
Estimates for 2015 shown the ratio to remain at around 9% of GDP.95 The rate of domestic tax 
collection in Sierra Leone is low compared to other low-income countries, which averaged 12% of 
GDP in 2011.96 
The GoSL’s fiscal situation has therefore been constrained through declining revenues from mining 
and increased expenditures due to the Ebola crisis. The weak economic performance has added 
pressure to the fiscal deficit in 2014 – which was previously improving prior to the twin shocks – 
and this is expected to widen further in 2015 and 2016. 
This macroeconomic environment is expected to be further complicated by rising inflation, which 
had been brought down to single digit levels but will continue over the next few years. In sum, the 
GoSL has a challenging fiscal position to contend with. Fiscal space will be tight and much 
required tax reforms are being undertaken to mobilise domestic tax revenues for the rebuilding of 
                                               
94 Mining information comes from meeting with Bank of Sierra Leone, and IMF Article IV text. 
95 IMF Article IV Nov 2015. 
96 World Bank Development Indicators. 
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the economy.97 However, these systemic changes may take many years to bring in the increased 
incomes required. 
Figure 72:  Macroeconomic indicators as proportion of GDP 
 
Source: IMF 
Health will be seen as a budget priority throughout the near and medium term due to strong 
political support in Sierra Leone. There are short-term measures being put in place at present to 
help fund this, including a specific tax for health that is being proposed in the 2016 Finance Act. 
This is currently being read in Parliament and states that ‘A national health insurance levy shall be 
imposed at a rate of 0.5% on the value of all contracts relating to the supply of goods and services 
in support of the Free Health Care Programme’.98 How much revenue this will bring to the health 
sector and how it will be spent is discussed below in the fiscal space analysis. 
9.4.1 Poverty trends 
Sierra Leone’s most recent Poverty Profile (published in 2013) is based on the SLIHS surveys 
conducted in 2003/04 and 2011. In 2011, households were classified as below the poverty line if 
they reported adult equivalent consumption below SLL 1,625,568 per year, and in 2003/04 below 
SLL 750,326 – reflecting the monetary value of a minimum set of food and non-food items to fulfil 
basic needs. Overall, it is suggested that the incidence of poverty and inequality fell over the 
period, largely as a result of increasing poverty in the Western Area and growth in urban areas 
outside Freetown. Rural poverty rates were still much higher than urban rates, and falling more 
slowly (SSL, 2013). Key descriptive measures of 2011 including of poverty incidence and 
inequality are presented in Table 40 below.  
                                               
97 From meeting with National Revenue Authority. 
98 No 38 of the Finance Act 2016. 
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Table 40:  Poverty profile indicators in 2011 by district 
 
Poverty 
headcount (%) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Rural 
households 
(%) 
Net primary 
enrolment by 
district (%) 
Agriculture as 
main 
livelihood (%) 
Bo 50.7 0.33 55.1 77.6 49.4 
Bombali 57.9 0.42 67.7 70 60.5 
Bonthe 51.4 0.3 78.6 70 73.9 
Kailahun 60.9 0.25 87.5 67.9 89.4 
Kambia 53.9 0.23 77.5 52 78.4 
Kenema 61.6 0.28 59.1 60.5 46.5 
Koinadugu 54.3 0.28 91 55.5 84.2 
Kono 61.3 0.27 66.8 57.3 29.3 
Moyamba 70.8 0.25 92.2 64.3 70.7 
Port Loko 59.9 0.29 89 57.5 80.5 
Pujehun 54.1 0.4 87.1 60.7 79.3 
Tonkolili 76.4 0.21 84.2 60.3 76.4 
Western Area 
(Urban) 
20.7 0.27 0 83.3 2.6 
Western Area 
(Rural) 
57.1 0.28 54.1 66.1 26.2 
Source: SSL (2013) 
The proportion of households living below the poverty line was highest in Tonkolili and Moyamba, 
and lowest in Western Area Urban. Beyond these three districts, poverty incidence ranged 
between 50% and 62%. Inequality was highest in Bombali and Pujehun, and lowest in Tonkolili. 
The most rural districts were Moyamba and Koinadugu. The lowest education levels were in 
Koinadugu and Kambia, with the highest in Western Area Urban and Bo. Agriculture is the most 
significant source of income in Kailahun, and the least in the urban and rural Western Areas. 
9.5 Summary 
Ebola has clearly had a major impact on health outcomes, although this is masked in our 
evaluation by the fact that the main data sources analysed for health outcomes predate Ebola, 
unlike the qualitative tools that do capture part of the Ebola and post-Ebola story. Social 
determinants of health are all an important part of the picture too, though in general they have 
improved only slowly over the period and so are not likely to be major explanatory factors behind 
any health improvements seen. External investments have played a part, especially support to 
infrastructure and the major disease programmes such as malaria and vaccination. There have 
been some improvements in poverty rates and the overall economy, although subject to recent 
shocks. In addition to these areas there are no doubt other important influences, such as national 
road-building programmes that may have increased access to health care, for example. All these 
are part of the contribution story. 
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10 Value for money 
The assessment of VfM includes summative measures, which is why we have placed it at the end 
of this report. This section analyses the VfM of the FHCI by assessing the economy, efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness of the initiative. Our final section provides additional analysis in relation to 
equity, which build on the equity analyses of changing outputs and outcomes in sections 5 and 6. 
10.1 Economy  
Economy is taken to mean the extent to which inputs have been purchased at appropriate prices, 
and this is generally assessed by benchmarking costs against reasonable comparators. This 
section focuses assessment on the economy of two key inputs to the FHCI – HR and 
pharmaceuticals. 
Assessing the economy of HR is generally a complicated task. Job descriptions are not uniform, 
some cadres of the workforce are not internationally tradable, and it can be hard to compare the 
relative value of salaries in different countries on an annual basis. However, there is a growing 
body of research into HRH, with a significant component focusing on West Africa, and Sierra 
Leone specifically, including through the ReBUILD research. This research has explored the 
remuneration of health workers in a number of countries, and is used in this analysis. The relative 
cost of the public sector’s HRH, as well as its HR for other key sectors such as the military, the 
police and education, is also presented. 
Assessing the economy of drugs is simpler. Drugs are standard across the world, and are 
internationally tradable. This report uses the International Drug Price Indicator Guide, which has 
been published by Management Sciences for Health (MSH) annually since 1986 and in 
collaboration with WHO since 2000. It documents a range of prices from non-profit drug suppliers 
and commercial procurement agencies, using current catalogues and price lists (MSH, 2015). This 
report attempts to compare the unit costs of drugs procured for the FHCI with the low, median and 
high costs documented for the same drugs in the International Drug Price Indicator Guide. 
10.1.1 HRH 
In a recent attempt to compare health sector staff remuneration across five countries (Ghana, 
Nepal, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe), researchers identified a series of methodological 
challenges (McPake et al., 2013). First, health professionals are not always defined in consistent 
ways. For example, it can be hard to distinguish between junior specialists, general doctors in 
primary care and specialists working in tertiary institutions. Sometimes enrolled and registered 
nurses are considered separate categories, and sometimes not. Sometimes midwives are 
considered their own category, and sometimes not. Some categories of staff perform certain roles 
in some countries, but would not be considered qualified for the same tasks in other countries. Two 
key considerations for international comparisons of health worker remuneration from Sierra 
Leone’s perspective are that enrolled and registered nurses are considered separate categories, 
and that MCH aides do not meet WHO’s definition of a SBA but are nevertheless expected to fulfil 
this role. 
Second, ideally the value of salaries would be assessed relative to other salaries within their 
economies. However, good-quality data on income distributions are rare (including in Sierra 
Leone), so it is hard to get a sense of how health worker salaries fare relative to other salaries in 
the economy. McPake et al. (2013) attempt to negotiate this by expressing the salaries in relation 
to national income or national product per capita, but this does not capture anything to do with 
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inequality. This report faces the same problem and expresses salaries in terms of a national 
poverty line and GDP per capita, but is not able to comment on the income decile health workers 
fall into. 
This report thus proceeds by presenting the salaries of staff working in reproductive health and 
family planning in Sierra Leone by cadre and compares them to national income per capita and a 
national poverty line. It then looks at the total cost of the public sector’s health workers as a 
proportion of general government health expenditure and general government expenditure, as well 
as in relation to the total cost of other categories of public sector worker. Finally, it highlights that 
total remuneration of a health worker includes income from many streams (not just payroll), and 
compares estimates of this higher total remuneration across countries. Where possible, changes in 
these indicators are assessed, although the data do not always permit this. 
Further issues that have been highlighted in the HRH section (Section 4.3) and which are relevant 
to the economy and efficiency of HRH include changes to absenteeism, attrition and the difference 
between distribution and need for health workers (Witter et al., 2015).  
10.1.1.1 Health worker salaries 
In 2013, the salary for an obstetrician was SLL 19,958,400 per month, which is 68 times larger than 
the country’s average income (measured as GDP per capita). Primary care doctors/DMOs and 
specialist doctors (public health) received closer to SLL 15million, or 52 times the average, and 
generalist/medical officers and public health sisters received close to SLL 5 million, which is 18 
times the average. However, 78% of health workers providing reproductive or contraceptive 
services were either state enrolled community health nurses or MCH aides. They received 
between SLL 700,000 and 800,000 per month, between 2.4 and 2.8 times the average income 
(see Figure 74 below).  
Figure 73:  Health worker salaries in 2013, Sierra Leone 
 
Sources: MoHS, GoSL for health worker salaries. IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2015 for GDP  
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Sierra Leone’s Poverty Profile uses the 2003/04 and 2011 SLIHSs to measure consumption 
expenditure. They estimate that households with an adult equivalent consumption below SLL 
1,625,568 per year in 2011 fell below the poverty line (SSL, 2013). This is equivalent to SLL 
135,464 consumption per month. All relevant health workers earned between five and 150 times 
this. 
Based on these comparisons then, health workers are a relatively well-paid segment of the Sierra 
Leonean economy, earning well above average national income levels. Those that are particularly 
well paid (Obstetricians, DMOs and public health specialists) are clearly in a social elite, earning 
extremely large amounts of money. A similar analysis of health worker salaries in Ghana in 2005 
estimated that doctors earned 38.5 times the GNI per capita after supplementary sources of 
income were accounted for. It also found that a nurse received 12.09 times the GNI per capita 
(Witter et al., 2007). A direct comparison between Ghana in 2005 and Sierra Leone in 2013 shows 
that the relative wages in comparison to average national income were more spread out in Sierra 
Leone, with doctors receiving much more and nurses receiving much less in Sierra Leone than 
Ghana. 
It is also worth noting, however, that while extremely high within the context of Sierra Leone, the 
salary of an obstetrician was just below £3,000 per month, or £36,000 per year. A Gap Medics blog 
in 2013 reported that the average annual salary for an obstetrician or gynaecologist in the UK was 
£90,000.99 The UK’s National Health Service currently advertises that the basic salary of a 
specialist doctor is between £37,000 and £70,000.100 The scarcity of specialist doctors willing to 
work in Sierra Leone in combination with the financial opportunities doctors have throughout the 
world mean that relatively high salaries may be a necessity for keeping them in the country. 
10.1.1.2 Government total health sector wage bill 
In 2013, 60% of GGEH was spent on health worker remuneration – up from 35% in 2008. This also 
meant a growth from 5–10% of total government expenditure on wages and salaries, from 2–4% of 
general government expenditure (GGE) and from 0.2–0.5% of GDP (see Table 41). The health 
workforce is now the government’s second most expensive sector workforce (see Table 41). Since 
2002 the health sector has been in the top four spenders on government employees. With the 
introduction of the FHCI, and the pay reforms this came with, the health sector jumped over the 
military and the police. Only the public education sector workforce, which includes all the country’s 
teachers, is more expensive. 
In relation to this report’s estimates of the total cost of the FHCI (including non-government 
sourced funds), however, the wage bill shrunk from 20.0 to 18.9% of the total cost of the FHCI 
between 2010 and 2013.101 
                                               
99 See www.gapmedics.co.uk/blog/2013/12/30/obstetrics-and-gynaecology-career-guide-training-job-description-career-prospects/ 
100 See www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/about/careers-medicine/pay-doctors 
101 This total includes both GoSL and donor sources of health worker salaries 
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Table 41:  MoHS payroll in the wider context 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
MoHS personnel as % of GGEH 35% 26% 49% 46% 51% 60% 
MoHS personnel as % of GGE 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 4% 
MoHS personnel as % of total wages and salaries 5% 5% 12% 11% 10% 10% 
MoHS personnel as % of GDP 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 
MoHS personnel as % of FHCI expenditure 20.0% 19.3% 19.7% 18.9% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from MoFED, GoSL documents 
Figure 74:  Public sector payrolls, 2002–2013 actuals 
 
Source: MoFED, GoSL documents 
10.1.1.3 Other income streams 
Toward the end of 2012 researchers interviewed 312 health sector staff from the Western Area, 
Kenema, Bonthe and Koinadugu districts (12% of the total workforce in those areas). The idea was 
to get a sense of the working patterns, sources of remuneration and motivational factors for Sierra 
Leonean health workers (Witter et al., 2015). The study included questions on workload, working 
hours and different streams of income.  
An important finding was that health workers receive significant income in addition to their salaries. 
Figure 76 below shows average self-reported breakdowns of total income, disaggregated by type 
of health worker. Other than pharmacists, pharmacy technicians and doctors, all professions have 
their salaries topped up by at least 25% through non-salary sources of income. The amounts 
reported here are still related to the FHCI. All professions receive significant income through daily 
subsistence allowances and many also get income through PBF and rural allowances. The 
researchers also asked about incomes from non-FHCI-related activities (e.g. private practice and 
non-health sector activities), which are in addition to figures presented here. The importance of this 
is that basic health worker salaries (as discussed above) are an underestimate of the actual cost of 
health workers. 
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This finding has also been observed elsewhere. The above-mentioned 2005 survey of health 
workers in Ghana found that doctors received only 34% of their income from their basic salary, 
with the remainder coming from allowances/benefits and a small amount from user fees and 
private practice (Witter et al., 2007). A similar survey to that carried out in Sierra Leone was 
conducted in Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso and Morocco in 2012 (Witter et al., Forthcoming). Basic 
salaries accounted for less than 50% of total income for doctors, midwives and nurses in Burkina 
Faso, between 40% and 60% in Mali, between 55% and 75% in Benin and between 65% and 90% 
in Morocco.102 The remainder came from sources such as government allowances, daily 
subsistence allowances, bonuses and private practice activities. 
A more general attempt to investigate the pay structures of public sector health workers in sub-
Saharan Africa found an overall lack of quality data about salaries and incomes. However, where 
data did exist, they revealed significant variation across countries, with a generally high level of 
complexity (i.e. health workers generally receive multiple streams of income) (McCoy et al., 2008). 
The authors suggest such complex pay structures are administratively expensive and generate 
inconsistencies, feelings of unfairness and mistrust in the system, in turn dampening motivation.  
Figure 75:  Breakdown of health worker total incomes by source (%) 
  
Source: Witter et al. (2015) 
Once all sources of income are taken into account, it is possible to benchmark the total cost of 
health workers in different countries. According to self-reported total incomes and hours worked, 
Sierra Leonean midwives and nurses received US$ 1.58 per hour at 2012 rates. This was lower 
than Morocco (US$ 3.30 to US$ 3.46), higher than Benin (US$ 1.11 to US$ 1.31) and Mali (US$ 
1.35 to US$ 1.51) and between the rates for midwives (US$ 2.1) and nurses (US$ 1.08) in Burkina 
Faso. Doctors in Sierra Leone received US$ 4.76 per hour. This was very competitive – closely in 
between Morocco (US$ 5.03) and Benin (US$ 4.39) and far higher than Mali (US$ 1.23) and 
Burkina Faso (US$ 2.60) (see Figure 77) (Witter et al., Forthcoming).  
Overall then, Sierra Leonean doctors are extremely well paid and the other health cadres receive a 
good salary. It is important, however, to provide the circumstances in which doctors will want to 
work in Sierra Leone. This will be a difficult trade-off moving forward. 
                                               
102 Note that allowances and salaries were not disaggregated in Morocco in Witter et al. (Forthcoming). 
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Figure 76:  Benchmarking health worker pay/hour across five countries (2012) 
 
Source: Witter et al. (Forthcoming) 
10.1.2 Pharmaceuticals 
Comparing the price that you have paid for a pharmaceutical with those other prices available on 
the international market is the clearest indicator for assessing your pharmaceutical procurement 
economy (MSH, 2015). This report uses the MSH International Drug Price Indicator Guide to 
assess the economy of the FHCI procurement of drugs by comparing unit costs.103 DFID 
allocations to UNICEF for the procurement of FHCI drugs and medical consumables grew from 
SLL 32 million in 2010 to SLL 53 million in 2013. As a proportion of total expenditure on the FHCI, 
this started at 10.2%, fell to 8.3% in 2012, then rose again to 9.4% in 2013. The total 
pharmaceuticals bill was approximately 50% of the wage bill each year between 2010 and 2013.  
Section 4.4 has already outlined a number of significant concerns with the logistical management 
of pharmaceutical procurement and supply throughout Sierra Leone. Whatever the direct unit costs 
of the pharmaceuticals themselves, if they are not managed well and they are lost, spoiled or 
expire then money is wasted. When drugs do not make it to the patients or excessive money is 
spent getting them through the port, the effective unit costs increases. The missing and expired 
drugs alone suggest that nearly 40% more pharmaceuticals could have been delivered to patients 
without any extra expenditure on pharmaceuticals if operational management had been improved 
(BDO, 2015). 
10.1.2.1 Comparison of direct unit costs 
CHANNEL data include the unit costs of 237 drugs and medical consumables procured for delivery 
of the FHCI. These are the ‘buyer’ (as opposed to supplier) price, including cost, insurance and 
freight. One-hundred and eight of these items are medical consumables, which are not included in 
the MSH Drug Price Indicator Guide. Of the remaining 129 items, the guide enabled price 
comparisons of 83 against at least one reference price and 71 against a number of different 
sources, such that a high, median and a low comparator benchmark were possible.104 In the 12 
                                               
103 This can be accessed online at http://erc.msh.org/mainpage.cfm?file=1.0.htm&module=DMP&language=English 
104 2014 prices were used. This is because the CHANNEL cost data available is unclear on the date for which it is relevant, but is most 
likely for a more recent date (up to and including prices paid in 2015). At the time of writing, 2014 prices were the most recent available 
from MSH. 
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instances where only one comparator price was possible, it is here recorded as a median 
benchmark along with the 71 drugs for which a range of comparator prices was available. 
Thirty-eight (46% of the 83) of the drugs were procured at a higher cost than the median 
benchmark, 12 (17% of the 71) were procured at a higher cost than the high benchmark, and 54 
(76% of the 71) were procured at a higher cost than the low benchmark. Our analysis reveals that 
76% of the sampled drugs could have been bought at a lower unit cost from alternative suppliers, 
and 17% of the sampled drugs were bought at a higher unit cost than the highest cost found by 
MSH (see Table 42). 
Figure 78 shows a comparison of the FHCI drug unit costs and the MSH drug median unit costs. 
The vast majority of drugs have unit costs below US$ 0.25. The most expensive in both categories 
is closer to US$ 4 – but they are not the same drug. The most expensive FHCI drug per unit was 
1ml of injectable pethidine 50mg/ml, which is reported to have cost US$ 3.20. This needs to be 
verified, as the high benchmark for this drug was only US$ 0.41. However, the other drugs broadly 
become more expensive in line with each other.  
Table 42:  Benchmarking the unit costs of FHCI drugs 
 
FHCI lower than 
benchmark 
FHCI higher than 
benchmark 
% of drugs procured 
at a higher unit cost 
by the FHCI 
High benchmark 59 12 17% 
Median benchmark 45 38 46% 
Low benchmark 17 54 76% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CHANNEL data and MSH (2015) 
Figure 77: FHCI drug unit costs vs. MSH drug median unit costs 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CHANNEL data and MSH (2015) 
Without reliable quantities procured of these drugs it is impossible to estimate how much could be 
saved if drugs were procured from alternative suppliers.105 However, these proportions suggest 
significant savings are possible. It is important to highlight that lower unit costs are not necessarily 
                                               
105 CHANNEL data on quantities was considered to be too unreliable following the issues discussed in Section 4.4. However, CHANNEL 
data on costs was considered probably more reliable, as the mechanism for it become inaccurate was less clear and there was no 
evidence to suggest it was inaccurate. 
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better. While medical compounds should be the same, lower costs may reflect a compromise in 
quality control or different packaging. Nonetheless, these comparators are probably of good 
quality, as MSH comparison prices are from vetted sources (MSH, 2015).  
It is recommended that further work be done to validate the FHCI unit costs used in this analysis 
(in particular that drugs are recorded in their correct unit size), and to search further for data on 
medical consumables and reliable data on the quantities of drugs and medical consumables 
purchased. In addition, indicators such as the accuracy of needs estimation (i.e. were the correct 
drugs procured?), timeliness of drugs delivery and the quality of the drugs procured should also be 
assessed (MSH, 2014). At this stage, it appears that up to 76% of the drugs procured for the FHCI 
were available at a lower price elsewhere. Based on this, as well as the analysis presented in 
Section 4.4 suggesting poor management, storage and distribution of drugs, a significant 
expansion of the numbers of drugs and medical consumables available to the population is 
possible without increasing expenditure on pharmaceuticals. 
10.2 Efficiency 
Efficiency is taken to mean the overall relationship between inputs and outputs of the FHCI. The 
two particularly important inputs are the HR and pharmaceuticals, as analysed above and in 
Section 4.1. The main outputs for this analysis are the key services provided throughout the 
initiative: family planning, ANC, intrapartum care, PNC and preventative and curative services for 
children aged five and younger. 
Including a step of analysis focusing on the relationship between inputs and outputs (rather than 
going straight to outcomes) enables a clearer assessment of the initiative’s technical efficiency. 
Technical efficiency is concerned with the extent to which a chosen output is achieved to the 
maximum extent possible given an input, as opposed to allocative efficiency, which is concerned 
with the extent to which the optimal combination of outputs is achieved in order to attain the 
optimal outcomes (Smith, 2009). Given that the social and political decision has already been 
made to provide this specific set of services, it is important to understand how efficiently they are 
being implemented.  
10.2.1 Inputs 
Section 4.1 presents estimated total expenditure on the FHCI. This is disaggregated into 
expenditure on health workers, drugs and medical consumables, key activities for service delivery, 
PBF and other donor funds going to RCH. The total expenditure on the FHCI is estimated to have 
grown from SLL 316 billion in 2010 to SLL 563 billion in 2013. Of this, 20% was spent on HR and 
10% on pharmaceuticals.  
10.2.2 Outputs 
Total utilisation of the FHCI at primary health facilities is estimated to have grown from 2.6 million 
visits in the last nine months of 2011 (assumed to be 3.5 million visits throughout 2011106) to 4.6 
million throughout 2012 and 5.3 million throughout 2013 (see Table 43). 
                                               
106 2011 figures have been multiplied by 4/3 to account for the DHIS not including the first three months of the year. HMIS data is 
missing from before the FHCI, as previously explained. 
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Table 43:  Utilisation of services at PHUs, 2011–2013 
 Service 2011 2012 2013 
% change 
2011–2013 
ANC (first visit) 250,625 263,505 264,267 5.44% 
ANC (second visit) 220,779 223,292 225,325 2.06% 
ANC (third visit) 173,712 185,534 193,342 11.30% 
ANC (fourth visit) 141,255 183,327 197,321 39.69% 
ANC (fifth visit or more) 64,140 86,035 92,964 44.94% 
Intrapartum care (delivery) 153,579 166,723 181,956 18.48% 
PNC (first visit) 242,873 279,559 328,157 35.11% 
PNC (second visit) 196,931 248,541 293,454 49.01% 
PNC (third visit) 198,764 250,673 301,630 51.75% 
Clients on family planning 439,001 555,395 793,005 80.64% 
Fully immunised children 179,711 194,620 214,864 19.56% 
Child outpatient visit 0–28 days, 
female 
48,537 62,993 70,290 44.82% 
Child outpatient visit 0–28 days, male 47,681 57,221 63,257 32.67% 
Child outpatient visit 1 month–59 
months, female 
569,581 931,685 1,048,502 84.08% 
Child outpatient visit 1 month–59 
months, male 
571,341 907,144 1,015,696 77.77% 
Total visits 3,498,511 4,596,247 5,284,030 51.04% 
Source: Sierra Leone DHIS (2011 figures multiplied by 4/3 as they only include data from April onwards) 
However, not all of these services take the same amount of time and resources to deliver. 
Intrapartum care (delivery) in particular is a much more demanding service to provide than any of 
the others. The WHO’s One Health Tool has built into it estimated staff time necessary to provide 
each of these services. These are presented in Table 44.  
Table 44:  Staff time necessary to provide key health services 
Intervention number (One 
Health) 
Service 
Minutes per measure of 
utilisation 
01–11 Family planning 45 
15 Complete ANC package 20 
25 
Labour and delivery 
management 
390 
35 Preventative PNC 20 
50–60 Child outpatient visits 20 
99–701 Immunisations (8) 16 
Source: One Health (2013) 
Using these weightings to estimate the amount of time spent providing services tells a slightly 
different story to that seen in Table 43. Child outpatient visits and clients on family planning do not 
demand significant time from health workers, and the quantity of these visits increased 
dramatically (by around 80%). Delivery takes a lot of time, but the quantity of health facility-based 
deliveries did not increase by as much (just over 18%). While the overall quantity of visits 
increased between 2011 and 2013 by over 51%, if the One Health Tool assumptions are 
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applicable then the amount of time spent by health workers providing services actually increased 
by 35% (see Table 45 below). 
Applying the standards assumed by the One Health Tool also enables an analysis of the relative 
time assumed to be spent on each service. It would imply that in 2011 nearly 60% of health worker 
time was spent on delivery, followed by outpatient visits for children (14%) and clients on family 
planning (11%). By 2013 these proportions are different. The proportion of time spent on delivery 
decreases, as does the proportion of time on ANC and immunising children. The proportion of time 
spent on PNC increases slightly, but the real shifts in time are to more family planning and more 
child outpatient care (see Table 46).  
Table 45:  Total estimated minutes of service delivery, 2011–2013 
Service 2011 2012 2013 
% change, 
2011–2013 
ANC (first visit) 5,012,507 5,270,100 5,285,340  
ANC (second visit) 4,415,573 4,465,840 4,506,500  
ANC (third visit) 3,474,240 3,710,680 3,866,840  
ANC (fourth visit) 2,825,093 3,666,540 3,946,420  
ANC (fifth or more) 1,282,800 1,720,700 1,859,280  
Intrapartum care (delivery) 105,969,280 115,038,870 125,549,640  
PNC (first visit) 4,857,467 5,591,180 6,563,140  
PNC (second visit) 3,938,613 4,970,820 5,869,080  
PNC (third visit) 3,975,280 5,013,460 6,032,600  
Clients on family planning 19,755,060 24,992,775 35,685,225  
Fully immunised children 2,875,371 3,113,920 3,437,824  
Child outpatient visit 0–28 days, 
female 
970,747 1,259,860 1,405,800  
Child outpatient visit 0–28 days, male 953,627 1,144,420 1,265,140  
Child outpatient visit 1 month–59 
months, female 
11,391,627 18,633,700 20,970,030  
Child outpatient visit 1 month–59 
months, male 
11,426,827 18,142,880 20,313,920  
Total minutes 183,124,111 216,735,745 246,556,779 34.64% 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
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Table 46:  Relative time spent on key interventions, 2011–2013 
 2011 2012 2013 
Change 
2011–2013 
ANC (first visit) 2.74% 2.43% 2.14% -0.59% 
ANC (second visit) 2.41% 2.06% 1.83% -0.58% 
ANC (third visit) 1.90% 1.71% 1.57% -0.33% 
ANC (fourth visit) 1.54% 1.69% 1.60% 0.06% 
ANC (fifth or more) 0.70% 0.79% 0.75% 0.05% 
Intrapartum care (delivery) 57.87% 53.08% 50.92% -6.95% 
PNC (first visit) 2.65% 2.58% 2.66% 0.01% 
PNC (second visit) 2.15% 2.29% 2.38% 0.23% 
PNC (third visit) 2.17% 2.31% 2.45% 0.28% 
Clients on family planning 10.79% 11.53% 14.47% 3.69% 
Fully immunised children 1.57% 1.44% 1.39% -0.18% 
Child outpatient visit 0–28 days, female 0.53% 0.58% 0.57% 0.04% 
Child outpatient visit 0–28 days, male 0.52% 0.53% 0.51% -0.01% 
Child outpatient visit 1 month–59 months, female 6.22% 8.60% 8.51% 2.28% 
Child outpatient visit 1 month–59 months, male 6.24% 8.37% 8.24% 2.00% 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
It is possible to compare the number of visits and the assumed time spent providing health 
services to the estimated expenditure on these services. Total expenditure on HR and 
pharmaceuticals is also highlighted in Table 47 below. Total expenditure on the FHCI per visit fell 
from SLL 151,164 to SLL 106,606. This was equivalent to a fall from £22 to £16 per visit. However, 
using the One Health Tool’s assumed standards, expenditure per minute of care increased from 
SLL 2,166 to SLL 2,285 (£0.31 to £0.34). This is equivalent to an increase in expenditure from 
£18.90 to £20.50 per hour. 
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Table 47:  Basic efficiency measures, 2011–2013 
  2011 2012 2013 
Total visits 2,623,883 4,596,247 5,284,030 
Total minutes 183,124,111 216,735,745 246,556,779 
  
HR cost (SLL millions) 76,376.00 89,361.14 106,217.56 
Drugs cost (SLL millions) 37,909.57 37,682.40 52,822.65 
TOTAL costs FHCI (SLL millions) 396,636.30 452,776.34 563,307.50 
  
Expenditure on HR per visit (SLL) 29,108 19,442 20,102 
Expenditure on drugs and medical consumables per visit 
(SLL) 
14,448 8,199 9,997 
Expenditure on HR and drugs and medical consumables 
per visit (SLL) 
43,556 27,641 30,098 
Expenditure on FHCI per visit (SLL) 151,164 98,510 106,606 
  
Expenditure on HR per minute (SLL) 417 412 431 
Expenditure on drugs and medical consumables per minute 
(SLL) 
207 174 214 
Expenditure on HR and drugs and medical consumables 
per minute (SLL) 
624 586 645 
Expenditure on FHCI per minute (SLL) 2,166 2,089 2,285 
  
Expenditure on FHCI per visit (£) 21.98 14.43 15.93 
Expenditure on FHCI per minute (£) 0.31 0.31 0.34 
Expenditure on FHCI per hour (£) 18.90 18.36 20.48 
  
SLL/£ exchange rate (using www.oanda.com) 6,877.31 6,825.26 6,692.58 
Source: Section 4.1, HMIS and MSH (2015) 
The surveys of health workers in Sierra Leone and other West African countries also attempted to 
address this question of efficiency. That similar surveys have been completed in a number of 
countries enables a comparison between them. As well as pay and hours worked (discussed in 
Section 9.1), health workers were asked about the number of patients they saw. It is estimated that 
midwives and nurses in Sierra Leone were paid US$ 0.68 (2012 rates) per patient they saw in 
2012. This was significantly less than nurses and midwives in Burkina Faso (US$ 1.95–US$ 2.59), 
Benin (US$ 2.48–US$ 3.79), Mali (US$2.60–US$ 2.90) and Morocco (US$ 2.38–US$ 7.27). Sierra 
Leonean doctors, however, were paid much more per patient they saw, receiving US$ 15.04. This 
was nearly triple (or more) than that received by doctors in Burkina Faso (US$ 3.72), Benin (US$ 
5.55), Mali (US$ 2.26) and Morocco (US$ 4.36) (see Figure 79) (Witter et al., Forthcoming). 
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Figure 78:  Benchmarking health worker pay per patient seen across five countries 
 
Source: Witter et al. (Forthcoming) 
Overall, it is too early to comment on the relative efficiency of the FHCI; there are simply not 
enough data available to comprehensively compare it to something else, either over time within 
Sierra Leone or with other countries. A much higher-level analysis of total health sector efficiency 
comparing health expenditure and overall health outcomes globally ranks Sierra Leone as very 
inefficient (Zeng, 2014). However, this is taking into account the overall health system, not focusing 
on the delivery of the FHCI as we do. Future analysis should build the work presented here – 
tracking what happens to expenditure per visit and expenditure per estimated minute of care 
provided. What appears to have happened between 2011 and 2013 is that the number of visits 
increased slightly faster than expenditure, meaning that the cost per visit decreased. However, the 
type of visits also changed. Crucially, deliveries became a smaller proportion of total visits, and 
deliveries are the most resource-intensive service provided within the FHCI. On the other hand, 
family planning and child outpatient services grew as a proportion of total visits. Assuming One 
Health Tool standards, visits were converted into time providing services. Under these 
assumptions, expenditure increased faster than time spent delivering care – this means that a 
minute of care got more expensive. However, it should be underlined that this is not necessarily a 
bad thing. Whether it is US$ 0.60 to US$ 15 per patient seen or £20 per hour of services, 
expenditure on health is still very low. Increasing expenditure per minute of care may enable 
increases in quality. In order to monitor this, measures of quality need to be given more attention. It 
is also important to highlight that the One Health Tool’s assumed standards have not been 
validated in the specific case of Sierra Leone, so actual time distributions may differ. 
In summary, the health sector needs to be aware of the changing patterns of utilisation – delivery, 
ANC and immunisation of children represent decreasing proportions of total visits and time spent 
providing care while child outpatient visits, PNC and family planning are increasing their footprint. 
The cost per visit is decreasing, but at the same time the average visit may be shortening, if WHO 
time estimates apply in the Sierra Leonean context.  
10.3 Cost-effectiveness 
Effectiveness – the extent to which the FHCI generated the desired outputs and outcomes – has 
been investigated in sections 5 and 6 above. In health systems across the world, and in particular 
in developing countries, the allocation of health care resources across competing interventions 
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requires evidence of not only effectiveness but also more specifically cost-effectiveness. In the 
context of the FHCI, we are interested in determining whether the marginal costs and marginal 
health outcomes of the FHCI have been such that it represents a cost-effective scenario compared 
to the counterfactual scenario of the policy not being implemented. Have sufficient MCH gains 
been realised to justify the additional cost of the policy? This counterfactual is the obvious 
alternative; the option of investing in other services instead is not real as they are all core elements 
of the public health package. 
The key cost-effectiveness metric resulting from our analysis is the cost per life year gained of 
the FHCI. This is obtained by converting modelled estimates of maternal, newborn and child lives 
saved through the implementation of the policy to life years gained using estimates of life 
expectancy in Sierra Leone and some standard assumptions. To assess whether this cost per life 
year gained means that the FHCI achieved cost-effectiveness, this key metric is then compared to 
commonly accepted cost-effectiveness thresholds. As a secondary analysis, we are also interested 
in determining whether the decision to fund the FHCI was a cost-effective one for DFID. For details 
on the methods used for CEA, see Annex F.  
10.3.1 Marginal costs of the FHCI 
For the marginal cost side of the equation, we use the estimates of the additional expenditure 
directly associated with the FHCI given in Table 11. There are two estimates of the increased 
funds going to FHCI target groups in 2010–2013 compared to previous years. Table 11 shows that 
there was an additional US$ 250 million expenditure directly associated with the FHCI over the 
period 2010–2013 if all donor financing to RCH is included and US$ 124 million if it is excluded. 
Donors have provided around 65% to 80% of this funding, depending on whether the financing to 
RCH is included or excluded. The CEA uses the first estimate to ensure that we are not excluding 
expenditure on the cost side that is contributing to better outcomes on the effects side.  
10.3.2 Marginal effects of the FHCI 
For the marginal effects side of the equation, we use data from sections 5 and 6 on increased 
coverage of key MCH interventions around the introduction of the FHCI as well as estimates of 
maternal and child mortality. We necessarily go further than those earlier sections in attempting to 
model the marginal effect of the FHCI; that is, what intervention coverage and mortality would have 
been without the policy. This is because CEA is a comparative analysis and requires a 
counterfactual scenario on both the cost and effects sides of the equation.  
Our modelling uses the LiST, which is a software tool that uses country-specific coverage data 
combined with data on causes of death and secondary evidence on the effectiveness of 
interventions to model the impact of increased coverage on maternal and child mortality (Avenir 
Health, 2015). A key feature of LiST is that it allows for a package of interventions to be assessed 
together without double counting (Walker et al., 2013). LiST is therefore ideal for our analysis as it 
allows us to define the FHCI as a package of interventions and to model how increased coverage 
over the period 2010–2013 has translated into mortality reduction. An important caveat here is that 
LiST uses systematic review evidence to model the link between increased coverage and reduced 
mortality. It therefore assumes that quality of care is the same as in the studies included in the 
review evidence. The extent to which this assumption holds is questionable but unknown, given 
the lack of data on how quality of care in Sierra Leone has changed over the time period. Another 
important caveat is that these results should be interpreted within the context of the increased 
family planning coverage that Sierra Leone experienced over the time period; see Annex F for 
further explanation of these limitations. 
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10.3.2.1 Maternal and newborn health 
This section presents our results for how increased post-FHCI coverage is modelled to reduce 
maternal and newborn deaths compared to a counterfactual. 
Coverage of maternal health interventions 
As discussed further in Section 5, systematic review evidence suggests that a number of key 
antenatal, childbirth and postnatal interventions are effective in preventing or treating the leading 
causes of maternal death and thereby contributing to reductions in deaths of pregnant woman or 
those who have just given birth. Sierra Leone experienced positive changes in the coverage of 
some of these interventions in recent years.  
Figure 80 shows the trends in key indicators from 2003 to 2013of comprehensive ANC, delivery in 
a health facility and by an SBA, and PNC within 48 hours of delivery. All interventions are directly 
related to the FHCI; that is, they are interventions for which user fees were charged before the 
introduction of the policy.  
Figure 79:  Coverage of key maternal health interventions  
 
Source: 2008 and 2013 DHS data, disaggregated by year if possible. Only point estimates available for those indicators 
shown with a dashed line. 
Figure 81 shows three possible counterfactuals for the percentage of pregnant women attending 
four or more ANC visits over the post-FHCI time period as an illustration of how we constructed the 
counterfactual for other indicators. The first is a simple, no change scenario of coverage remaining 
at its 2009 value. The second fits a trend line to the pre-2009 data and extrapolates this to the 
FHCI time period. The third is a no change from the 2008 DHS point estimate. From the three, the 
pre-2010 extrapolated trend is preferred in attempting to take into account improvements that were 
happening anyway and is therefore more conservative; however, the 2009 value counterfactual 
has the advantage of being simpler and using just data from the better quality 2013 DHS.  
In the absence of a control group and acknowledging the data limitations discussed in Section 1.6, 
this gives us a range of counterfactuals to use in the analysis. Counterfactuals for the other 
maternal interventions are constructed similarly, except for IPTp and PNC indicators; for these two 
indicators it is not possible to disaggregate data and thus the 2008 DHS value is necessarily used. 
Because we are interested in isolating the effect of the interventions linked to the FHCI on 
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mortality, the coverage of all other interventions is assumed to be the same between the FHCI and 
counterfactual scenarios.  
Figure 80:  Post-FHCI actual trend in ANC4+ and three possible counterfactuals 
 
Maternal deaths averted 
Table 48 summarises the estimated number of maternal deaths averted between 2010 and 2013 
due to coverage of key maternal health interventions being higher than it would have been if it had 
remained at 2009 values or if the pre-2009 trend line had continued. We estimate a likely marginal 
effect of between approximately 1,500 and 1,600 maternal deaths averted over this four-year 
period. Assuming no change from 2008 DHS coverage values is more generous and results in an 
estimate of 1,900 maternal deaths averted.  
Table 48:  Summary of maternal deaths averted, 2010–2013 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
FHCI compared to coverage remaining at 
2009 values 
323 374 377 396 1,470 
FHCI compared to coverage  
at pre-2009 extrapolated trend 
384 417 398 398 1,597 
FHCI compared to coverage remaining at 
2008 DHS values 
436 490 495 516 1,937 
Source: LiST modelling using DHS data 
Table 49 shows which specific interventions are contributing most to the total maternal deaths 
averted. Most maternal lives are being saved through increased coverage of childbirth 
interventions, particularly labour and delivery management interventions. This shows that even the 
relatively modest increase in the percentage of women delivering in a health facility is modelled to 
translate into a substantial number of lives saved. ANC interventions are comparatively less 
important in this context because the differential between the actual trend and the counterfactual is 
minimal, reflecting the gains in ANC coverage that occurred before the introduction of the FHCI. 
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Table 49:  Maternal deaths averted by intervention, 2010–2013 
 N % 
Pregnancy-related interventions 60 4% 
Tetanus toxoid vaccination 4 0% 
IPTp 51 3% 
Hypertensive disorder case management 3 0% 
Malaria case management 0 0% 
Management of pre-eclampsia 2 0% 
Childbirth interventions 1536 96% 
Clean birth practices 137 9% 
Labour and delivery management 853 53% 
Antibiotics for pPRoM (preterm premature rupture 
of the membranes) 
61 4% 
MgSO4 management of eclampsia 231 14% 
Active management of third stage labour 254 16% 
TOTAL 1596 100% 
Source: LiST modelling using DHS data 
Newborn deaths averted 
Key maternal interventions such as delivery at a health facility by an SBA and postnatal care are 
also very important for chance of survival within the first month of life. Table 50 summarises the 
estimated number of newborn deaths averted between 2010 and 2013 due to coverage of key 
maternal and newborn health interventions being higher than it would have been if it had remained 
at 2009 values or if the pre-2009 trend line had continued. We estimate a likely marginal effect of 
between 6,300 and 7,600 newborn deaths averted over this four-year period. Assuming no change 
from 2008 DHS coverage values is much more generous, resulting in an estimate of 10,400 
newborn deaths averted.  
Table 50:  Summary of newborn deaths averted, 2010–2013 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
FHCI compared to coverage remaining at 
2009 values 
1,263 1,638 1,632 1,730 6,263 
FHCI compared to coverage  
at pre-2009 extrapolated trend 
1,869 2,067 1,860 1,778 7,574 
FHCI compared to coverage remaining at 
2008 DHS values 
2,405 2,405 2,801 2,815 10,426 
Source: LiST modelling using DHS data 
Table 51 shows which specific interventions are contributing most to the total newborn deaths 
averted. Most newborn lives are being saved through interventions that are available at health 
facilities, either during childbirth (44% of deaths averted) or after birth (39%). Interestingly, 
interventions during pregnancy are relatively more important for newborns (10% of deaths averted) 
than for pregnant women (4% of deaths averted). 
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 182 
Table 51:  Newborn deaths averted by intervention, 2010–2013 
 N % 
Pregnancyinterventions 753 10% 
Tetanus toxoid vaccination 172 2% 
IPTp 571 7% 
Syphilis detection and treatment 10 0% 
Childbirth interventions 3396 44% 
Clean birth practices 240 3% 
Immediate assessment and stimulation 142 2% 
Labour and delivery management 2320 30% 
Neonatal resuscitation 493 6% 
Antibiotics for pPRoM 201 3% 
Preventive 623 8% 
Clean postnatal practices 623 8% 
Curative after birth 3030 39% 
Full supportive care for prematurity 1681 22% 
Full supportive care for sepsis/pneumonia 1247 16% 
ORS 102 1% 
TOTAL 7802 100% 
Source: LiST modelling using DHS data 
10.3.2.2 Child health 
Coverage of child health interventions 
As discussed further throughout Section 5, systematic review evidence suggests a key set of both 
preventative and curative interventions can be effective in reducing under-five mortality. Sierra 
Leone has also generally experienced positive changes in the coverage of these interventions in 
recent years. However, unlike many of the maternal and newborn health intervention indicators, 
the child health indicators cannot be disaggregated over the years preceding the survey because 
the recall periods are too short. This means that our child heath modelling is less nuanced than 
that for maternal and newborn health. 
Figure 82 shows the trends in key indicators of preventative (ITN ownership, vaccinations) and 
curative (ORS and zinc for diarrhoea, antibiotics for dysentery, vitamin A for measles and 
antimalarials) interventions that can be directly or indirectly linked to the FHCI, assuming a linear 
trend between the 2008 and 2013 DHS surveys.  
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Figure 81:  Coverage of key child health interventions 
 
Although the surge in under-five consultations following the introduction of the FHCI arguably 
meant that more children were being vaccinated or receiving an ITN, these interventions were 
actually free before the introduction of the FHCI. We therefore model first the effect on those 
interventions for which user fees were previously charged (i.e. the curative interventions) on child 
mortality and then include these interventions more indirectly linked with the FHCI (i.e. the 
preventative interventions). The counterfactual is necessarily assumed to be simple, with no 
change from 2008 DHS coverage values. 
Child deaths averted 
Table 52 summarises the estimated number of child (1–59 months) deaths averted between 2010 
and 2013 due to coverage of key MNCH interventions being higher than it would have been if it 
had remained at 2009 values or if the pre-2009 trend line had continued. We estimate a likely 
marginal effect of between 13,600 and 13,800 child deaths averted over this four-year period if 
only child interventions directly linked to the FHCI are included (i.e. curative interventions for which 
user fees were previously charged). The estimate is even higher at between 18,200 and 18,400 
child deaths averted if ITN ownership and vaccinations are included (i.e. interventions that more 
under-fives receive because of increased health facility utilisation but that were actually already 
free).  
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Table 52:  Summary of child (1–59 months) deaths averted 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Curative interventions only (directly linked to FHCI) 
FHCI compared to coverage remaining at 
2009 values 
2,106 2,964 3,885 4,868 13,823 
FHCI compared to coverage  
at pre-2009 extrapolated trend 
2,044 2,902 3,831 4,830 13,607 
FHCI compared to coverage remaining at 
2008 DHS values 
2,003 2,839 3,741 4,712 13,295 
Curative interventions, ITN ownership and vaccinations 
FHCI compared to coverage remaining at 
2009 values 
2,806 3,976 5,185 6,442 18,409 
FHCI compared to coverage  
at pre-2009 extrapolated trend 
2,744 3,914 5,131 6,404 18,193 
FHCI compared to coverage remaining at 
2008 DHS values 
2,703 3,851 5,041 6,286 17,881 
Source: LiST modelling using DHS data 
Table 53 shows which specific interventions are contributing most to the total child deaths averted. 
Curative interventions dominate; in particular, 38% of deaths averted are due to increased 
coverage of antimalarials and 35% to increased coverage of ORS for diarrhoea. 
Table 53:  Child deaths averted by intervention, 2010–2013 
 N % 
Pregnancy interventions 62 0% 
IPTp  58 0% 
Promotion of breastfeeding 4 0% 
Preventive 1544 10% 
Vitamin A supplementation 1544 10% 
Curative after birth 13207 89% 
ORS  5113 35% 
Antibiotics for treatment of dysentery 63 0% 
Zinc for treatment of diarrhoea 52 0% 
Oral antibiotics for pneumonia 1986 13% 
Vitamin A for treatment of measles 393 3% 
Antimalarials  5600 38% 
TOTAL 14813 100% 
Source: LiST modelling using DHS data 
10.3.3 Life years saved 
Our estimates of maternal, newborn and child deaths averted can be converted to a common 
metric – i.e. life years saved – using estimates of life expectancy in Sierra Leone and some 
standard assumptions (WHO, 2001; UN, 2015). The converse of life years saved – i.e. years of life 
lost (YLL) – is one part of the DALY calculation that combines YLL with years of life lived with 
disability (Fox-Rushby and Hanson, 2001). We cannot calculate full DALYs because the LiST tool 
only produces incidence estimates for a few diseases (Walker 2015: pers. comm., 17 November).  
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Table 54:  Estimates of life years saved  
 Newborn Child Maternal Total 
FHCI compared to coverage remaining at 
2009 values 
239,400 290,700 31,400 561,500 
FHCI compared to coverage  
at pre-2009 extrapolated trend 
270,100 288,300 35,800 594,200 
Source: Modelling using WHO rapid spreadsheet-based tool for DALY calculation 
As expected, the number of life years saved is much higher for the newborn and child categories; 
this is because there are more lives saved in these categories as well as the life expectancy of a 
newborn (or child) being longer than that of a woman of reproductive age. 
10.3.4 Cost-effectiveness estimates 
Finally, our estimates of marginal costs and marginal effects are combined to produce an estimate 
of cost-effectiveness. The actual calculation is straightforward: marginal costs are divided by 
marginal effects. Table 55 shows that the cost per life year saved of the FHCI is between US$ 420 
and US$ 444. This estimate uses the marginal cost including the increase in all donor financing to 
RCH and the more conservative assumptions for the maternal and newborn intervention coverage 
counterfactuals. 
Table 55:  Cost per life year saved of the FHCI 
 
Marginal costs 
(millions, US$) 
(A) 
Marginal effects 
(life years saved) 
(B) 
Cost per life year 
saved (US$) 
(A/B) 
FHCI compared to coverage remaining at 
2009 values 
249.56m 561,500 444 
FHCI compared to coverage  
at pre-2009 extrapolated trend 
249.56m 594,200 420 
Source: Section 4.1, LiST modelling using DHS data and modelling using WHO rapid spreadsheet-based tool for DALY 
calculation 
Though with acknowledged limitations, interventions are typically judged as cost-effective using 
standard thresholds. WHO uses those suggested by the Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health: interventions that avert one DALY for less than average per capita income for a given 
country or region are considered very cost-effective; interventions that cost less than three times 
average per capita income per DALY averted are still considered cost-effective; and those that 
exceed this level are considered not cost-effective. 
In 2013, the World Development Indicators suggested that GDP per capita in Sierra Leone was 
US$ 680. On these thresholds, our estimates of cost per life year saved indicate that the FHCI was 
a very cost-effective intervention.107 
It is helpful to compare our modelled estimates of lives saved to the number of deaths a year 
implied by the maternal and child mortality estimates discussed in Section 6. 
 Maternal deaths: The high LiST estimate of 1,900 maternal lives saved over four years – 
or an average of 475 a year – equates to around 16% of all maternal deaths being averted 
by the FHCI. This is based on a figure of around 3,000 maternal deaths a year in Sierra 
                                               
107 Cost per DALY is necessarily lower than cost per life year saved because it includes morbidity. 
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Leone, calculated from an estimate of 230,000 live births in 2010 and a UN central estimate 
for the MMR of 1,360 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. 
 Newborn and child deaths: Using the high estimates above, over a four-year period the 
LiST model indicates 10,400 newborn lives saved and 18,400 lives saved for children aged 
one month to five years. This is a total of 28,800 lives or an average of just over 7,000 a 
year.  
The under-five mortality rates in Figure 68 show a decline from 187 under-five deaths per 
1,000 live births in 2009, to 147 in 2010, 131 in 2011 and 126 in 2012. So on average over 
this three-year period the fall in deaths is in the region of 50 under-five deaths per 1,000 
live births. Using this combined with the estimate of 230,000 live births in 2010 indicates 
that under-five deaths reduced by around 11,500 a year. 
Given the uncertainties attached to both estimates, the LiST figure of 7,000 under-five deaths 
averted a year compares well with that calculated from the DHS mortality rates of 11,500, 
particularly given that the LiST model is estimating the marginal improvement from the FHCI rather 
than the total reduction in under-five deaths. This gives us some confidence that our LiST figures 
are credible in terms of their level. It is harder to comment on the comparability of the maternal 
death figures, given the uncertainty around the maternal mortality rate estimates, although again 
the estimates appear to be of the right level and of a reasonable reduction in deaths averted.  
As individual interventions and as part of a broader package of MNCH interventions, these 
interventions directly or indirectly linked to the FHCI have previously been found to be cost-
effective interventions (e.g. Stenberg et al., 2014). In some sense it is therefore not surprising that 
the FHCI, in so far as it increased coverage of these acknowledged ‘best buys’, is cost-effective 
compared the counterfactuals of coverage remaining at its previous level or previous trends in 
coverage changes continuing. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the additional cost is 
only being compared to the additional effect in terms of life years gained—so not taking into 
account improvements in morbidity and other, less quantifiable improvements resulting from the 
FHCI. In that sense the estimate is a conservative estimate of the full value for money of the policy. 
10.3.5 DFID contribution 
DFID has been a main funder for the FHCI, with its contribution estimated at between 40% and 
55% of new direct FHCI funding. These contributions are primarily to drugs (along with ECHO) and 
salaries (along with Global Fund). Taking a simple relative spend approach, in which the proportion 
that is contributed to costs is applied to the outcomes achieved, this would indicate that additional 
DFID funding of the FHCI has saved 40% to 55% of the estimated maternal, newborn and child 
lives saved. This is shown in Table 56.  
Table 56:  DFID contribution to lives saved, 2010–2013 
 Lives saved FHCI 
Lives saved FHCI from 
additional DFID 
funding 
Lives saved from total 
DFID funding to MNCH 
Maternal  1,500–1,900 600–1,000 1,400 
Newborn (under 1 
month) 
6,300–10,400 2,500–5,700 5,400–6,000 
Child (1 to 59 months)  13,300–18,400 5,300–10,100 20,900–21,600 
Source: LiST modelling and Friberg et al. (2015). Note: Friberg et al estimates are for 2010–2015. The estimates are 
scaled to 2010–2013 for comparison purposes. 
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Our estimates of lives saved by additional DFID funding of the FHCI are lower than estimated in a 
recent analysis of lives saved by DFID programming globally, which conducted country-level 
estimates for all DFID focus countries including Sierra Leone (Friberg et al., 2015). These 
estimates, scaled to the time period 2010–2013 for comparison purposes, are also shown in Table 
56. They are substantially higher, but the analysis asked a different question: suppose DFID had 
not funded any MNCH programmes in Sierra Leone? Our analysis looks at the additional effect of 
additional funding – overall and particularly for DFID – and so we would expect our estimates to be 
lower. 
The relative spend approach has its advantages, primarily in being a straightforward and 
transparent way of attributing results in the absence of better quantitative data, but qualitative 
evidence does suggest that to some extent DFID had a catalytic role to play in the funding of and 
support for the FHCI. For example, DFID’s strengthening of payroll systems meant that the Global 
Fund was more confident in channelling funds directly to GoSL. However, it should be 
acknowledged that the MoHS was talking to the Global Fund before DFID’s intervention; the role 
was therefore more about where the money was spent than whether money was spent. Although 
impossible to quantify, such evidence suggests that DFID’s contribution is perhaps somewhat 
higher than suggested by its straightforward relative spend. 
10.4 Equity 
In sections 5 and 6 we assessed changing coverage and health outcomes by quintile, region and 
rural/urban status. Equity considerations are also built into the assessment of implementation of 
core interventions (e.g. the distribution of staff across regions), as well as our assessment of 
changing barriers (Section 5.3). Here we are not reassessing those aspects but are adding on two 
equity dimensions: 
 Geographic equity, by analysing both distribution of public expenditure and utilisation by 
district, and changes associated with the FHCI, where data permit. 
 Age and gender utilisation equity. Lack of HMIS data pre-2010 means that assessing 
differential changes in utilisation due to the FHCI by age and gender was not possible. The 
available HMIS data (2011–2014) could, however, be disaggregated by age (0–28 days and 1–
59 months) and gender for children’s services. 
As part of the ReBUILD project, Edoka et al. [2015] use the SLIHS to estimate the impact of the 
FHCI on OOP expenditure on children under five, pregnant women and lactating mothers by 
wealth quintile. Edoka et al. [2015] also analyse health service utilisation for the FHCI target 
groups by quintile. However, the sample sizes are quite small, rendering the results insignificant. 
Due to lack of HMIS data pre-2010, and therefore lack of comprehensive service utilisation data, 
we were not able to conduct a benefits incidence analysis to analyse the impact of the FHCI on 
who benefits from public expenditure on health care. 
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10.4.1 Distribution of public health spend by district  
Notwithstanding data limitations,108 equity of health spending to local councils shows a relatively 
equal distribution of expenditure with some outliers.109 Figure 83 below shows expenditure by 
district per capita,110 not including the major hospital expenditure in each district.111 
Kenema seems to be consistently under-resourced with Koinadugu over-resourced.112 More 
importantly for this evaluation, there does not appear to be a major change in the distribution of 
resources following the FHCI. 
Figure 82:  Per capita health expenditure through local councils by district  
(excluding hospital expenditure) 
 
 
Source: MoHS actual estimates  
The other main transfer that goes to districts to fund public health care is PBF. The figure below 
shows the PBF funds that were requested by MoHS for MoFED to pay PHUs in each district 
(converted to per capita amounts). This is not the amount that was actually transferred and there 
are some irregularities in that process but we do not have data for actual transfers. There are 
some anomalies (Bothe is very sparely populated), but overall the sums are relatively equal per 
capita. One study of staff remuneration in Sierra Leone (Bertone and Witter, 2015) found that 
                                               
108 Attribution of any reduction in inequalities in health spending across districts to the FHCI is even more complicated than the usual 
attribution issues because the allocation rules for government funding to districts changed at the same time as the introduction of the 
FHCI. This is also a fairly crude estimate with some public expenditure in hospitals (not included in this figure) also being used to treat 
FHCI target populations, as well as donor programmes operating (including RCHP, PBF and DSPS) at this level being excluded. 
109 It is not clear if this is a limitation with the data or evidence of changes. 
110 Including primary and secondary with tertiary expenditure at hospitals excluded. 
111 It is not clear if the outlier results in 2011 result from data issues or were caused by specific policy decisions. 
112 Likely a reflection of the size of the district, with low population density.  
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 189 
differential NGO support for the core RMNCH activities across districts drives differences in the 
PBF received (but that study focused on the individual health worker level). 
Figure 83: PBF per capita, by district, 2012 
 
Source: Cordaid (2014) 
Notwithstanding evidence of relatively equal financial transfers, we should bear in mind that other 
resources, such as staff, are far from equally distributed across the districts (see Section 4.3). 
10.4.2 Service use by district 
Using HMIS and census data, in 2011 between 20% and 40% of women of child-bearing age were 
registered users of family planning. National levels for this indicator have since grown significantly, 
but, as shown in Figure 85, this progress has not been uniform. Moyamba, Koinadugu and 
Western Area have reported the most significant increases in family planning uptake. However, by 
2013, Bombali, Bonthe, Kailahun, Kambia, Kenema and Port Loko reported only minor 
improvements.  
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Figure 84:  Number of women registered on family planning as a proportion of women of 
child-bearing age113 
 
Source: Sierra Leone HMIS 
Uptake in the proportion of pregnant women making four or more ANC visits has grown throughout 
the country, but still varies significantly (see Figure 86). Bombali, Kono and the Western Area show 
lower rates than other districts, with Bo, Tonkolili and Moyamba achieving the highest. In each of 
these three districts more than 120% of women are estimated to make four or more visits. This 
illustrates problems with the data, as the theoretical maximum, and optimistic target, is 100%. This 
may be due to problems with HMIS data and census projections but may also be a result of 
movement of people. If people have moved since the 2004 census the expected number of 
patients will be different. 
Figure 85:  Number of women reaching at least four ANC visits as a proportion of pregnant 
women 
 
Source: Sierra Leone HMIS 
                                               
113 Maternal indicators are all empty for Pujehun in 2012 in the DHIS. 
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Facility deliveries as a proportion of expected deliveries is again highest in Moyamba, but this time 
lowest in the Western Area (see Figure 87). All districts have experienced improvements but 
utilisation remains unequal. Scepticism over the data should again be encouraged, as proportions 
approach 200%. As already mentioned, both HMIS and census projections should be treated with 
caution. 
Figure 86:  Number of facility deliveries as a proportion of pregnant women 
 
Source: HMIS 
The number of pregnant women who go on to make at least three PNC visits is largest in 
Moyamba and Tonkolili, but lowest in Kailahun (see Figure 88). Kono reports the smallest 
improvement over the three years, and improvement between 2012 and 2013 is generally small. 
Figure 87:  Number of women with at least three PNC visits as a proportion of pregnant 
women 
 
Source: HMIS 
There has been general improvement in the proportion of children fully immunised before they turn 
one. Once again, Moyamba and Tonkolili show the highest utilisation and Kono shows the lowest 
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(see Figure 89). The same is true for the number of child outpatient visits per child under five, 
although the Western Area has made significantly less progress than the other districts (see Figure 
90). 
Figure 88:  Children fully immunised under 11 months as a proportion of total population 
under one year 
 
Source: HMIS 
Figure 89:  Under-five outpatient visits per child114 
 
Source: HMIS 
Combining analysis from the Poverty Profile with reported utilisation rates from the DHIS suggests 
interesting dynamics. In 2011, Moyamba was the second poorest district with one of the highest 
proportions of rural households. However, it is generally reporting the largest use of PHU services. 
This needs further investigation before it is concluded that the FHCI is well targeted. It is possible 
that data inaccuracies and movement of people are behind these numbers, particularly as some 
figures suggest greater than 100% coverage. However, the already discussed analysis of the DHS 
                                               
114 The number of girls under five visiting a PHU in Tonkolili in 2013 is replaced with a number equal to the number of boys. The number 
in the DHIS is too large to be possible. 
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2013 and the SLIHS 2011 have suggested more significant improvements in MCH care utilisation 
in rural areas than urban ones (Edoka et al., 2015). The Western Area Urban shows the lowest 
level of poverty but, when combined with Western Area Rural, also some of the lowest levels of 
PHU service use – a finding corroborated by the FGDs, in which participants from Western Area 
express a feeling of not benefiting as much from the FHCI. In addition to poor data quality and the 
movement of people, this may be a result of the very high population (making high utilisation rates 
much harder), more focus on secondary than primary care in urban areas, and higher use of 
private clinics. Furthermore, the Princess Christian Maternity Hospital and Ola During Children’s 
Hospital are both in these districts, and service use at these centres is not captured in the HMIS.  
10.4.3 Child service use by gender 
It is also possible to use HMIS data to look at the equality of utilisation by gender of child under 
five. Overall, the ratio of girls to boys visiting a PHU for outpatient care grew from 0.997:1 in 2011 
to 1.03:1 in 2013. In 2011, girls in Bonthe visited facilities far less than boys (0.9:1) and in 2012 the 
same was true in Koinadugu (0.85:1). However, by 2013 more visits were by girls than boys in all 
districts other than Bombali (see Figure 91). 
Figure 90:  Outpatient visit to PHUs by children under five – ratio of girls to boys 
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11 Sustainability 
This section is more forward-facing, as it is focused on the need to sustain the FHCI in the future. It 
starts with a fiscal space analysis, which provides the projections for FHCI expenditures, resource 
needs and the resultant financial gap over the next 10 years (for more details of the methods and 
assumptions underpinning this component, see OPM, 2016b. It will then go on to discuss a 
number of domestic financing options to close the gap. Finally, we discuss more briefly the political 
and institutional requirements for sustainability. 
11.1 FHCI resource needs 
A normative costing exercise was carried out for Sierra Leone’s FHCI using the WHO OneHealth 
Tool.  Figure 92 provides the estimated resources required to deliver the FHCI in Sierra Leone. 
These average US$ 154 million a year over the 10 years, accounting for 2.3% of GDP and 11.2% 
of GGE. This would provide US$ 70 per FHCI beneficiary in 2015, rising to US$ 115 in 2025. 
Figure 91:  FHCI resource needs (US$ millions and as proportion of GDP and GGE) 
 
Source: 2015–2020 – OneHealth Tool; 2021–2025 – Authors’ calculations 
11.2 Available expenditures for the FHCI 
This is an area of particular importance in Sierra Leone as there is a lack of general 
comprehension of what FHCI expenditures are. For example, a meeting with MoFED provided the 
first row of data in Table 57, outlining their view of what constitutes actual government funding of 
the FHCI. This includes expenditures on drugs and medical supplies (FHCI drugs), supervision 
(M&E), and cost-recovery (for drugs). The second row provides an estimation of government 
spending on FHCI if staff salaries, Reproductive, Maternal and Child Health (RMCH) activities, and 
any indirect or overhead costs relating to running the FHCI are included. Comparing these shows 
that the MoFED calculations for the FHCI may be underrepresenting the actual expenditures on 
the FHCI by around US$ 10 million a year when salary rises and capital expenditures associated 
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with the FHCI are included. This equates to 1.5% of GGE – i.e. the total national budget – on 
average between 2010 and 2013. 
Table 57:  Government spending on the FHCI (US$ millions) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
MoFED quoted actual expenditures 1.3 1.6 1.4 3.2 
Evaluation report estimated government 
expenditure 
8.4 10.5 8.5 19.4 
Source: MoFED; FHCI Evaluation Report 
While it is difficult to isolate these costs – for example, how to divide medical staff time between 
lactating mothers and other patients, or the cost of electricity for different patients – there is a 
crucial budgeting and planning point to be made from this. Neither MoFED nor the MoHS seem to 
have a strong grasp on the financing of the FHCI. Not knowing what level of expenditures the 
initiative currently consumes – regardless of a benchmark resource need – has a direct impact on 
the ability to plan and implement services. In turn, this will adversely affect utilisation rates and so 
health outcomes. In essence, this implies a risk to financial sustainability. 
Using the evaluation team estimates for the current expenditure on FHCI (see Section 4.1), we 
project official expenditure on the FHCI (public and donor spend, without taking OOP and private 
spend into account) ahead over 2015 to 2025. Our findings show that official FHCI expenditures 
are estimated at US$ 97 million in 2015 and projected to rise to US$ 136 million in 2025. The 
sector is heavily donor-dependent, with 80% of financing coming from external sources in 2015. 
The methodology assumes a slowdown in donor funds and rise in ability of the GoSL to pay for 
these services, which results in this dependency declining to 50% by 2025. Over the 10 years the 
official FHCI expenditures account for 1.8% of GDP and 9.1% of GGE.  
Figure 93 and Figure 93 show the breakdown of the FHCI for GoSL and for external donors. 
Salaries account for the largest share in both, especially if PBF is included in the external funds. In 
total, the GoSL is projected to spend two-thirds of its GHE on the FHCI, while of total external 
funds to health around one-third goes to the FHCI. While keeping in trend with past donor support 
to FHCI vis-à-vis general health support, the model expects the government to increase its support 
to the FHCI from the current one-third of GHE. 
It is estimated that of the US$ 63 spent per FHCI beneficiary in 2015, US$ 12 comes from GoSL 
and US$ 51 from external sources. By 2025 the total spend is projected to rise to US$ 77 with US$ 
38 from GoSL and US$ 39 from donors. This is in line with the assumptions for rising GoSL 
financing and slowly declining international assistance in the FHCI. 
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Figure 92:  Government FHCI expenditures (SLL millions and as proportion of GHE) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The sharp dip in the proportion of funds to the FHCI compared to GHE in 2017 is due to a large rise in budgeted 
capital expenditure for non-FHCI investment. The above-trend expenditures are not projected to be sustained over the 
longer term. 
 
Figure 93: Externally financed FHCI (SLL millions and as proportion of external health 
expenditure) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The sharp dip in the proportion of funds to the FHCI compared to donor funds in health for 2016 and 2017 is due to 
substantial rises in capital expenditures for non-FHCI health investments. Nominally there are higher than average FHCI 
capital expenditures funded by donors in 2016 and 2017, hence the rise in actual expenditure. Both of these above-trend 
expenditures are not projected to be sustained over the longer term.  
  
11.3 FHCI ‘business as usual’ financing gap 
Taking the FHCI’s available expenditures and comparing them to the resource needs provides a 
projected financial gap for FHCI, which is shown in Figure 95. This shows a widening financial gap 
over the 10 years from US$ 8 million in 2015 to US$ 66 million in 2025. Per FHCI beneficiary this 
means an average of an additional US$ 22 is required each year. This gap equates to 0.5% of 
GDP on average each year, and 2.2% of GGE. In sum, these projections suggest that if the current 
FHCI financing were to continue there will be inadequate funds to meet FHCI beneficiary needs. 
Figure 94:  FHCI business as usual financing gap (US$ millions and as proportion of GDP 
and GGE) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
11.4 Maximising fiscal space for the FHCI 
This section provides alternative options for closing the FHCI financing gap that has been 
projected above. A revised gap showing the potential impact of these policies will be aggregated 
into one combined resource gap for the FHCI. 
11.4.1 Funding options 
There are four sub-groups of domestic funding options: 1) official government revenues (budget 
and mandatory health insurance (MHI)); 2) earmarked taxes for health; 3) efficiency savings; and 
4) borrowing. Each will be assessed in turn in the Sierra Leonean context. Private contributions by 
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households and firms are not included in this search for financing the FHCI. Inasmuch as 
household contributions are OOP, they are regressive and constitute a financial barrier to 
accessing health services; thus, while they may contribute to the financing of health services, they 
are at odds with the notion of free health care. 
Option 1: Government funding: budgetary allocation and MHI 
Public spending is the most important source of health – and so FHCI – funding from a 
sustainability perspective (in a predominantly tax-funded system). It is essentially a factor of the 
size of the economy (GDP) and the tax-to-GDP ratio (which provides the basis for government 
revenue). There are three main subcategories for public spending: 
 Budget allocation from the treasury for FHCI sector expenditures at the central (or national) 
level. 
 In a decentralised fiscal system where, in addition to central transfers, districts have authority 
to collect funding and allocate this according to specified mandates. 
 The government’s contribution to the upcoming MHI scheme, the Sierra Leone Social Health 
Insurance (SLeSHI). 
Allocations from government revenue (central or district) to the FHCI are conceptually similar to 
raising resources for the FHCI through MHI. Both mechanisms levy resources from economic 
actors to finance health care services, just through different modalities (i.e. the tax system/budget 
and the health insurance fund).  
All together these make up public health spending. The target for public spending on health set in 
the Abuja Declaration is 15% of total government expenditure. The Director of Budget in MoFED 
stated that this was a goal that the GoSL was serious about and, in his view, should be achieved 
by 2025. This would entail possibly rising to 10% of GGE in the next five years, and then on to 
15% over the subsequent five years.115 We therefore assume that the total health budget will rise 
to reach the Abuja target and the internal allocations within health sectors will remain unchanged. 
In this way, the FHCI will automatically gain extra budgetary funding. 
The National Social Security and Insurance Trust (NASSIT) committee state that pilot plans for 
SLeSHI will start in the last quarter of 2016 and will last six to 12 months.116 The pilot will involve 
the security sector (police, prisons, military) and thereafter all formal economy sectors, which will 
be about 5% of the population. Premium rates are being considering at 6%, i.e. 3% from 
employees and 3% from employers. This is what was set out for the business as usual scenario 
above. Within this new scenario, FHCI beneficiaries become – in the words of a NASSIT 
committee member during the KIIs – ‘a subset of UHC’. The current idea is that the FHCI could 
change from a system of paying no fees to being a SLeSHI member with premiums paid by a 
government subsidy. NASSIT consider that within about five years external financing to the FHCI 
may bottom out and then SLeSHI will take up the funding gap. 
                                               
115 Stakeholder interview, January 2016. 
116 Stakeholder interview January 2016. 
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Figure 95:  Projections for increasing the budget allocation to the FHCI (US$ millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Figure 96:  Projections for increasing allocation to the FHCI and incorporating MHI (US$ 
millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
As these are such early stages in the ideas of the NASSIT Committee, this analysis presents two 
alternative scenarios for public sector funding to the FHCI: 
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 The first is represented in Figure 96, wherein all FHCI public funding comes from budgetary 
allocation. As the 2016/17 budget is already set, the model begins the move toward the Abuja 
target in 2018 and this is achieved by 2025. The increased share to the FHCI would average 
an additional US$ 63 million a year (from this rise in health allocation of 15% of GGE). This 
policy change alone would close the financing gap for the FHCI in Sierra Leone by 2021. 
 The second projection for public spending is shown in Figure 97. This looks at MHI in isolation. 
If NASSIT plans go ahead, from 2021 the FHCI will be delivered through SLeSHI with GoSL 
providing full subsidies to FHCI beneficiaries. The premium levels that are estimated for the 
FHCI are clearly less than the potential budgetary share as in Figure 96. This projection may 
bring an additional source of funding to the FHCI, but by 2025 the financing through SLeSHI is 
providing little more than the business as usual scenario. 
It must be noted that these are cautious estimates and the GoSL would be advised to look more in 
depth into actuarial assessment of long-term premium and benefit packages for developing 
SLeSHI in general and for the FHCI specifically. 
Finally, it is important to note that the ability of the government to raise the budgetary allocation is 
not only linked to the political will to do so, e.g. deciding to move its spending priorities from roads 
to health. It is also a function on the wellbeing of the economy – the government would not need to 
move as much in nominal terms if the entire budget envelop rose. For this to happen the Sierra 
Leonean economy would need to show solid economic growth and the tax-to-GDP ratio will have 
to move considerably higher than the current 9.2%. This is a low taxation rate even for a low-
income country such as Sierra Leone. This model assumes (somewhat optimistically) that 
emphasis on tax system reforms could bring the ratio up to the low income average of 14% by 
2020, and possibly reach 20% by 2025 if there was serious dedicated effort. While tax reforms are 
underway, these take time. Public sector financing may be a long-term goal for Sierra Leone but, 
as the financing gap for FHCI shows, money for RMCH is needed in the near term. 
Option 2: Earmarked taxes 
As we have seen from the subsection above, the incremental rise in budget allocation to health 
makes for a significant reduction in the resource gap by 2025 but over the short to medium term 
Sierra Leone simply does not have the capacity to raise the financing required. However, Sierra 
Leone is not operating at the optimal taxation incidence; there is fiscal space to increase taxation 
and this can be done in the near term by implementing earmarked taxes. Indeed, Sierra Leone has 
already shown strong political commitment to the FHCI by adding a clause in the Finance Act of 
2016 whereby a share of withholding taxes collected on government contracts will be set aside for 
the FHCI. This in essence is an earmarked tax. 
The main arguments against earmarked taxes and levies are that they may lead to inefficient 
allocation of resources by removing spending decisions from broader public resources allocation 
processes, can introduce additional distortions into economic decision-making, and may 
undermine parliamentary/democratic control of public finances. Nevertheless, there are some 
arguments in favour of specific taxes and the earmarking of spending. Earmarking can play an 
important role in ensuring the political acceptability of additional taxes and levies. This is 
particularly the case where the taxes are used to fund a clearly defined social benefit (such as 
health services) or linked to particular social dis-benefits (e.g. sin taxes). 
The financing of health in general – and the FHCI in particular – is characterised by the need for 
sustained expenditure well into the future, high donor dependency and uncertainty around future 
donor support caused by a tight fiscal climate globally. Many governments are therefore confronted 
with the certainty of important expenditure for health into the future but uncertainty about how to 
finance their programmes. Sierra Leone currently does not have the economic growth levels to 
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translate into a wider tax base whereby revenues can cover expenditures. In the previous 
subsection we have seen that, over time, Sierra Leone can be expected to self-fund through 
general taxation measures as growth and tax reform continue. However, in the short term the 
current tax systems cannot sustain the needs of the sector. Within the context of dwindling external 
resources Sierra Leone needs to take ownership of the sector. Given the limitations of the general 
taxation system it is therefore essential that the FHCI increases fiscal space and investment for 
RMCH outcomes through alternative funding sources.  
The GoSL is currently examining a number of initiatives in this area, such as a mobile phone 
airtime levy (specifically for Ebola), sin taxes (on alcohol and tobacco), a remittances levy or 
diaspora bond, and petroleum tax.117 While the petroleum (and mining) sectors are a potentially 
solid stream of financing for the FHCI these ideas have been put on hold due to the collapse of 
these industries, with international mineral prices remaining subdued.118 
From a large list of potential sources of earmarked revenues, the fiscal space analysis involved us 
looking at five different potential earmarked taxes and levies for Sierra Leone. The full list is set out 
in Table 58 in order of their score within selection criteria to assess their effectiveness as sources 
of funding for UHC. Each has been measured on a five-point scale: 1) sustainability of resource 
flows over time; 2) stability of funding; 3) progressiveness (i.e. impact on equality); 4) 
administrative efficiency (how costly it would be to set up and maintain the levy); and 5) any 
potential side effects. 
The table shows that the top-scoring types of levy are airline and sin taxes (dormant funds are not 
relevant in Sierra Leone according to the Bank of Sierra Leone). While remittances and airtime 
levies do not score well they have been discussed in country and so will be put forward for 
consideration here. One new element not included in the table is using funds from withholding 
taxes for the FHCI. This is something currently being discussed in Parliament in Sierra Leone and 
will be considered here. 
Table 58:  Overview of the costs and benefits of innovative funding mechanisms – 
experience from other countries 
Source: Adapted from Lievens (2012) 
Note: Summarises findings from countries that have implemented or carried out analysis on these earmarked taxes. 
                                               
117 Discussed in meetings with various stakeholders including officials in the Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, and MoHS. None are yet 
implemented. 
118 Stakeholder discussions mentioned that the GoSL is prioritising the reintroduction of mining production and so do not wish to 
increase costs to mining firms at this time. 
Mechanism Sustainability Stability Progressivity
Administrative 
Efficiency
Side Effects Total
Airline levy 4 4 5 4 4 21
Dormant funds 4 4 5 3 4 20
Tourism levy 4 4 5 3 3 19
Sin taxes – Alcohol 
& Tobacco
4 4 2 4 3 17
Remittances levy 4 3 2 4 3 16
Private sector 
contributions
3 3 3 3 4 16
Airtime levy 4 4 2 4 1 15
Health bonds 1 5 3 1 4 14
Health lottery 2 2 1 2 4 11
General Findings
Total 
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The findings from other countries have been applied to the Sierra Leone macro-health framework 
for the five chosen options. The analysis suggests that Sierra Leone could gain an additional US$ 
28 million a year over the projection period if various earmarked taxes were implemented (see 
Figure 98 below). This would be the equivalent of raising an additional 0.4 percentage points of tax 
to GDP, and would close the financing gap for the FHCI by 65% over the projected time period. 
However, it is unlikely that these five taxes would all be implemented to fund the FHCI. Therefore, 
the arguments for and against each type will be examined below. 
Figure 97:  Projections for earmarked tax revenues for the FHCI (US$ millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Withholding tax 
A clause has been included in the Finance Act 2016 that states: ‘A national health insurance levy 
shall be imposed at a rate of 0.5% on the value of all contracts relating to the supply of goods and 
services in support of the Free Health Care Programme’.119 In a meeting with the architect of this 
fund for the FHCI it was clear that the main operational elements were not yet fully considered and 
agreed.120 As it is in its developmental phase, there is therefore space to improve the 
arrangements. To date, the following is what is known about this potential source of funds for the 
FHCI: 
 It stems from the understanding that the FHCI is too donor-dependent and needs dedicated 
domestic revenues. 
 0.5% of additional tax will be taken from withholding taxes. There is no estimation of the 
magnitude of the flow of funds expected. 
 The funds will be placed in a dedicated account; they will not go into the general budget and 
the normal budget allocation to health will not be reduced. As a result, MoHS planning and 
                                               
119 MoFED (2016) Finance Act 2016, Clause 38, page 16. 
120 This section draws from the meeting with the MoFED Revenue and Tax Policy Division Director. 
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budgeting will no longer include the FHCI. Indeed, it was suggested that the MoHS annual 
plans would be split between one to MoFED and one to the FHCI account. 
 The modalities are still under discussion, but a Ministerial Committee is preferred to oversee 
the fund; this would include MoFED, MoHS, and the Ministry of Works. 
Funds from withholding tax are likely to provide a stable revenue source. The government will 
always outsource goods and services contracts underpinning the flow of funds, while roads and 
energy contracts will be larger one-offs. It would score well on progressivity in that those bidding 
on and winning government contracts are not poor. Administrative efficiency would also be high as 
this tax already exists and it does not cost much to set up a separate account. 
However, there are major concerns about what this would mean for the current organisation of the 
FHCI in terms of planning, budgeting and financing systems. Indeed, the suggestion as it stands 
states that the MoHS would relinquish control of the FHCI and be required to run RMCH policy and 
plans separately from the FHCI, with two separate planning and financing systems. This would be 
far from an ideal position in terms of planning and implementing health care programmes. Side 
effects may be substantial when considering the risk of non-delivery of FHCI services to vulnerable 
children and women. 
Moreover, there is no costing. There is no comprehension of the actual costs of the FHCI and no 
concept of how much this 0.5% tax could generate in revenues. When discussing this tax, MoFED 
did not know if it would cover the basic government FHCI costs, i.e. salaries, drugs, etc. 
We have made a ‘back of the envelope’ attempt at estimating the size of this fund. If this 
initiative were to move forward, our projections show that the withholding tax revenues 
could be in the region of US$ 0.7 million a year over the 10 years. This would account for 
only 1.6% of the FHCI financing gap.  
In sum, while this shows strong political support for the FHCI there is much work to be done in 
clarifying the organisational elements and ensuring that this will work in favour of the FHCI. 
Airline levy 
The summary table above shows that the airline levy gets the highest score in the subset of levies 
we have assessed. The key benefit to highlight here is the fact that the majority of the Sierra 
Leonean population is not being taxed under this option– air travel being a luxury good which 
primarily tourists will pay – and this should make such a tax politically acceptable to most 
taxpayers. 
An airline levy can be implemented with relative ease as the levy would make use of the 
infrastructure already in place to collect indirect taxes on the sale of aeroplane tickets. There is 
strong international evidence of the success of such a levy. UNITAID, the International Drug 
Purchase Facility, was established specifically to oversee the use of aviation solidarity levies. 
UNITAID’s mission is to provide people in the developing world with long-term access to quality 
drug treatment for diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS at the lowest price 
possible. Since its creation in 2006, on the initiative of Brazil, France, Chile, Norway and the UK, 
there are now 34 member countries – the majority of these contribute through aviation solidarity 
levies.  
Some argue that such a levy reduces the demand for plane tickets and therefore might not 
generate the expected revenue. However, there is evidence that the price elasticity on demand for 
plane tickets is low and that the airline industry is not affected by this additional tax (WHO, 2007). 
Tourism is a significant contributor to GDP and foreign exchange in Sierra Leone and must be 
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protected as a growth source. The levels of the levy suggested here are far from any additional 
cost that would discourage people from travelling to Sierra Leone. Thus, it is important to note that 
this levy is seen as a solid contender for alternative financing due to the relatively small charge on 
the cost of an airfare and the fact that it is not a tax on the poor. 
On average, countries have found they can raise 0.06% of GDP through an airline levy. This 
would mean that Sierra Leone could gain something in the region of US$ 4 million a year 
over the next 10 years, which would cover 9.4% of the FHCI resource gap. 
There are various pricing options the GoSL could take to increase the revenue flow, such as using 
a sensitivity analysis to see how far they could raise the levy and it not affect demand (these 
projections are based on cautious estimates for levy values). A US$ 5 to 10 charge is a very small 
proportion of the total cost of the average ticket price, and US$ 40 is charged by UNITAID on 
international business class flights. Raising the levy could more than double the projected 
revenues mentioned above, depending on bundle of levies for class of seats chosen. Other 
possibilities are disaggregating the charges further, between economy, premium economy, 
business and first-class travel passengers. 
In conclusion, this option could provide a significant proportion of funding in terms of the gap that is 
projected, and is a sustainable income flow that does not constitute a regressive tax. A levy on 
airline tickets is both long term and predictable in nature, as air travel is growing and is expected to 
continue to grow in years to come. Moreover, it could be easily administered and there are strong 
country experiences to build on. It is therefore seen as a viable option for Sierra Leone. GoSL 
would need to consult with the tourism and airline industries to ensure that this move would be 
accepted. 
Sin taxes 
There is an established link between alcohol and tobacco consumption and health and hence a 
plausible argument that funds raised from a levy on these goods should be devoted to health and 
indeed RMCH through the FHCI. This taxation measure is simply a rise in the taxation on alcohol 
and tobacco that is earmarked for the FHCI. It penalises drinkers and smokers and is not paid by 
people who do not consume these goods. This type of taxation is referred to as a ‘sin tax’ because 
such taxes are attempting to regulate the consumption of a product that society deems 
undesirable. The revenue generated by sin taxes can be used for special projects. For example, in 
Sweden the proceeds of a tax on gambling are used to help people with gambling problems 
(European Commission, 2006). 
One possible side effect of a sin tax is that there may actually be some improvements in health as 
a result of the imposition of sin taxes. A recent analysis of 112 studies on the effects of alcohol tax 
increases affirmed that, when taxes go up, drinking goes down, including among problem drinkers 
and young people (Wagenaar et al., 2009). Arguments against sin taxes include such reasoning as 
a belief that rising taxes trigger a rise in the black market and that such taxes are regressive in 
nature.  
A sin tax with proceeds earmarked for the FHCI is administratively similar to any other indirect tax. 
It should be relatively straightforward to collect the tax and to separate out the revenue for 
allocation to health programmes. Moreover, experiences in developed countries suggest that 
excise taxes cost less to administer than many other taxes.  
If Sierra Leone was to implement sin taxes, projections show a rise in the tax take of US$ 18 
million a year over the projection period. This would account for 42% of the FHCI financing 
gap.  
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To conclude, sin taxes may be easier to digest for taxpayers in as much as they are taxing socially 
undesirable goods. If further analysis proved that the market could absorb a tax in these industries 
the sustainability of resource flows to health would be achieved. This is because there would be 
little pressure to reduce the taxation of these goods from a social standpoint. Furthermore, there 
would be little administrative cost in setting up this levy as the taxation systems are already in 
place for both alcohol and tobacco. There are concerns that this type of tax is not progressive in 
that lower-income households will pay proportionally more of their incomes on this tax. Yet it has 
been argued that the higher you raise this tax the more the poor are priced out of the market, 
meaning their health risks are taken out of the equation. In a sense then, this type of sin tax can 
also be viewed as a luxury goods tax. 
Airtime levy 
There has been prior interest in this type of levy in Sierra Leone. At the time of the Ebola outbreak 
there was talk of setting up a levy to pay for Ebola health needs, and thereafter this idea has been 
discussed in terms of earmarking the funds for other health needs.121 A levy sufficiently small not to 
distort demand could in principle be imposed on mobile phone calls. However, the mobile phone 
industry in Sierra Leone affects a large and diverse population. The mobile phone market is young 
and developing quickly and it is therefore uncertain how consumer demand might change in 
response to a tariff on calls. 
It is not just outreach that is expanding. In many countries there are plans to develop services 
accessed through mobile phones, such as mobile money (Mohapatra and Ratha, 2011). In other 
countries’ experience, once it is available demand for this type of service grows exponentially. As 
and when the mobile phone market covers more than just phone calls there will be increased 
concerns about this type of levy. If new financial services develop on the back of mobile phone 
penetration, the introduction of an additional cost to using these services may have a detrimental 
impact on these services and thus more widely on the country’s economic development.  
Nonetheless, if Sierra Leone were to implement a tax on mobile phone airtime this could 
raise US$ 5 million over the next 10 years. This would account for 11% of the FHCI 
financing gap.  
In sum, this levy could represent a source of financing for the FHCI. The industry is expected to 
continue to grow rapidly over the next few years and so revenues could be relied upon in a 
consistent manner. However, lower-income households spend proportionally more of their income 
on airtime than higher-income households. This, as well as the idea that new services such as 
mobile money could benefit the poor, suggests that this could be a regressive rather than 
progressive tax.  
Further research into the plans for mobile banking services should be carried out before a decision 
to increase the tax on this industry is made. This should also include analysis of the potential side 
effects of raising taxes on airtime for businesses, the financial sector and other industries.  
Remittances levy 
Imposing a levy on international remittances has been identified as a potential revenue source for 
funding the FHCI. This would be achieved by adding a small fee onto all money transfers from 
abroad. The IMF estimates that remittances to Sierra Leone are around US$ 100 million a year.122 
As a proportion of GDP this is 2% and as such they constitute an important source of funds within 
                                               
121 In multiple stakeholder interviews in country, we found this topic to be a very common one throughout the information-gathering visit. 
122 IMF Article IV 2015. 
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the economy, comparable with external on-budget support which has been around 4% (averages 
for 2010 to 2014). Therefore, any taxation on this flow of money must be considered carefully. 
Remittances can be made through both formal and informal channels, and this levy would relate to 
formal remittances only. Formal, or official, cash flows make up the majority of remittances. 
However, it must be noted that the data from the Bank of Sierra Leone involve an estimate as to 
the size of informal remittances as no data are available; the true size of informal remittances into 
Sierra Leone is therefore not known. The difference between formal and informal flows is 
described below. 
Formal channels include domestic and international banks and service providers. Providers in 
Sierra Leone include international firms such as Western Union. Factors affecting their use include: 
 High transaction costs, which are believed to dampen the scope of money transfers;  
 Banking requirements often excluding potential users from accessing banking services;  
 Clearance times for money transfers being notoriously long; and 
 Stringent exchange controls.   
Informal channels include money carried by migrants themselves and remittances carried by 
friends and family or sent via taxis and buses. These are believed to have a number of advantages 
and disadvantages, including the following: 
 Their costs are typically lower; 
 They provide an opportunity to avoid government taxes;  
 They do not require documentation and thus facilitate transfers from illegal immigrants; and 
 They are less reliable and extremely difficult to monitor.  
The fact that such a levy could only affect formal sector transactions may lead to a move from 
formal to informal channels, with consequent externalities associated with this. It is possible that, if 
the diaspora is made aware that the extra charges are channelled to health programmes, they will 
be sympathetic and this could mitigate the shift toward informal remittances. However, the 
importance of fully researching this policy option cannot be overstated, as remittances are a key 
flow of funds to developing countries: 
Remittances are the second biggest source of external financing after foreign 
direct investments for developing countries. ... Remittances represent almost 2.5 
times the volume of ODA [overseas development assistance]. Due to lack of data, 
this amount is considered by the [World] Bank as grossly underestimated, since it 
only reflects transfers through official channels (Lamontagne and Greener, 
2008:9). 
International findings provide further evidence for treating any policy change to remittances with 
caution (Ibid.). Research has shown that remittances can: 
 Act as a safety net in times of hardship; 
 Be used to support families in the face of unexpected health care expenditures; and 
 Protect poor families from slipping into extreme poverty. 
It is clear that remittances provide a crucial source of income for the population. They can be spent 
on health services and in doing so will contribute to the financing of health (mostly probably 
through OOP payments).  
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If a levy was placed on remittances, Sierra Leone could expect annual revenues of US$ 0.1 
million. Over the projection period this would cover just 0.3% of the FHCI financing gap. 
For the amount of effort required to implement this type of taxation system and given the fact that 
these remittance resource flows are essential for low-income families such an approach is not to 
be recommended as a long-term solution to the health financing gap. Moreover, in Sierra Leone 
there is an understanding that remittances play an important role in maintaining a stable macro 
economy.123  
To conclude, although remittances provide a sustainable and rising base from which to raise health 
funds they are not progressive; they are effectively a tax on those receiving remittances and these 
are usually the poor in a society. If this funding mechanism was chosen new administrative 
measures would have to be put in place to monitor and audit revenue flows, which would be costly. 
Given the important contribution that remittances make to economic development and poverty 
reduction, and the limited understanding of the behavioural effects that any policy change may 
cause, much more research would be needed before this could be a recommended funding 
source. 
Summary of earmarked taxes for Sierra Leone 
The withholding tax for the FHCI currently has the most traction in Sierra Leone. For this to work in 
the favour of those implementing the FHCI, it would be advised to work with MoFED to develop 
this to work optimally with current financing arrangements and FHCI needs. However, the 
projected values are very small and would only cover around 1.6% of the total financing gap for 
FHCI. 
More effort may be best used in further research into an airline levy or sin taxes in terms of the 
value of revenues flows projected. The airline levy is the most pro-poor example discussed and 
has the added benefit of being paid by the international population rather than citizens. 
Additionally, the example given here is based on cautious estimates; a closer assessment of the 
industry could bring greater funds. The sin taxes have the most health-relevant factors and may be 
an easier argument to put to GoSL and the public. The mobile phone tax would not be 
recommended as it is regressive and risks endangering potential growth in new financial services. 
Finally, the remittances levy brings in very limited funds and is a risk to the economy and so this 
would not be advised. 
For the longer term, when the mining sector returns to strength and petroleum becomes viable 
there should be an idea to re-evaluate the potential of earmarked funds from these sectors’ 
earnings. It could be a valid longer-term source of finance as a recent study finds that natural 
resource revenues could cover 82.7% of the health financing gap in Sierra Leone (Witter et al, 
2015).124  However, the report does conclude that extractive industries are sensitive to price 
fluctuation and the GoSL may be unable to smooth expenditure and revenue flows. 
3) Efficiency savings 
For this particular strand of the financial gap analysis, the focus is on estimating the potential 
savings from efficiency gains in Sierra Leone. The methodology used to estimate the magnitude of 
potential savings from imposing efficiency measures is based on international comparative 
performance. This was carried out for Sierra Leone in terms of the entire health sector and no data 
exist for the FHCI sector alone. However, some efficiency challenges for the FHCI have been 
                                               
123 According to our discussions with Bank of Sierra Leone officials. 
124 Note however that these estimates were based on extractive industry prices before their recent decline. 
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discussed above. The key areas for focus would be drugs (procurement and supply chains) and 
HR management. 
In this case, we assume the average efficiency levels for the FHCI are similar to those of the entire 
health system. The results of the Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) carried out by Zeng (2014) show 
that Sierra Leone is relatively inefficient: 80% less efficient compared with those countries 
producing at the production frontier. If Sierra Leone was to continue on an efficiency improvement 
path it is projected to be only 67% less efficient by 2025, meaning the country would be 33% as 
efficient as the most efficient countries. This supports the idea that the health system is 
constrained by great inefficiencies.125 
The impact of reducing inefficiencies would be that the volume of resources needed for health 
could be reduced if the same amount was spent more effectively; this would then bring down 
health resource needs by an average of US$ 33 million a year, as shown in Figure 99. This would 
reduce the financing gap by 65% over the time period. This value is a cautious estimate as it does 
not assume any new focus on reducing inefficiencies; it simply projects the recent past trends in 
reducing inefficiencies. 
Figure 98:  Projections for efficiency savings in the FHCI (US$ millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
In sum, Sierra Leone would need to investigate the bottlenecks in efficiency most pertinent to 
delivering the FHCI. This process would not be a one-off exercise; finding and implementing 
efficiency savings is an ongoing task as processes, health packages and technologies change 
over time. 
                                               
125 Discussed by stakeholders in a number of meetings, January 2015. 
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4) Borrowing  
The last option available to a government to close the resource gap domestically is to borrow. 
However, if the GoSL makes some domestic policy choices as mentioned above borrowing would 
not be needed over the long term to close the FHCI gap. 
The most recent DSA from the IMF and The World Bank puts Sierra Leone at a ‘moderate risk of 
debt distress’126.  However, this does not take into account the Ebola outbreak and iron ore price 
collapse.  The latest IMF Article IV states that these duel factors have caused a “deterioration in 
macroeconomic performance [which has] have moved Sierra Leone close to being at high risk of 
debt distress”127.  It goes on to say that the government’s policy is to use grants and concessional 
financing for critical projects.  In this light it is unlikely that there would be much support for 
borrowing for FHCI.  As such borrowing would not be recommended as a sustainable financing 
plan. 
11.4.2 Revised financing gap 
Taking all of the prioritising activities discussed together we are left with the scenario set out below 
in Figure 100 for the FHCI resource gap. This includes the expenditures from government and 
donors only in trying to achieve sustainable non-catastrophic financing. The developments 
projected in order to maximise fiscal space for the FHCI can be explained in the following steps: 
1. The original financing gap (the red bar chart) is the resultant gap under the ‘business as usual’ 
scenario, which was set out in Figure 95. By 2025 the gap is projected to reach US$ 66 million, 
which is 0.6% of GDP. 
2. The next bar chart (orange) shows how the gap can be reduced through government funding. 
Raising the budget for the FHCI – in line with the total health budget moving toward the 15% 
Abuja target – would close the gap in its entirety by 2021. (A second option of including FHCI 
beneficiaries into SLeSHI may reduce the gap by only 2% in 2025.) A gap remains in the medium 
term and short-term financing options are required. 
3. The third bar chart (gold) shows the sum of the government’s actions (in point 2 above) with the 
potential resources from earmarked taxes. These innovative funding mechanisms could reduce 
the financing gap by 65%. In the unlikely situation that the GoSL implemented all new taxes on 
top of raising budgetary allocations, the financing gap would decline in 2017 and would be closed 
by 2020. 
4. The final bar chart (yellow) takes the situation in point 3 above and adds in renewed efforts on 
the part of the government to improve efficiency. Efficiencies can be made but can take some 
time to implement; however, choosing the right areas to target could close the financing gap. 
                                               
126 Quoted in IMF (2015). 
127 Ibid page 3. 
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Figure 99:  Maximising fiscal space to address the FHCI financing gap (US$ millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
In sum, with a reprioritised focus on FHCI financing policy the resource gap can be closed. Longer-
term budgeting needs should be considered and implemented soon for the impact to be felt post-
2020. Medium-term earmarked taxes and efficiency savings should be further researched, planned 
and implemented for their introduction in the near term before economic growth can support 
greater budgetary allocation to the FHCI. 
There are two current financing propositions being discussed in Sierra Leone: a) including the 
FHCI within the SLeSHI and b) having a fund financed by revenues from withholding taxes. As 
things stand both options would add more complexity to the situation and would undermine the 
MoHS’s leadership in regard to the financing, planning, implementation and M&E systems of the 
FHCI. However, as yet neither are formally structured and so the MoHS has the opportunity to 
mould these initiatives, strengthening organisational structures so as to improve the efficiency of 
financing and capacity to plan for service delivery. 
It is important to note that external financing remains in the FHCI system over the next 10 years in 
this scenario, albeit at a lower level than currently seen. This support is crucial for the longevity of 
the FHCI in the foreseeable future. However, recently more external financing has moved off-
budget, which is a suboptimal financing arrangement for implementing a policy that is highly donor-
dependant. 
To help gain continued support for the FHCI, and potentially on-budget support, the GoSL should 
be equipped with a more detailed comprehension of FHCI financing than exists at present. 
Extensive plans and policies should include financing as well as implementation and expected 
outcomes. Showing policy plans against available funds can act as an advocacy strategy for 
continued external support for the FHCI. Donors can be assured of political will and see that it is 
underpinned by a firm strategy, costed goals and a dedication to longer-term sustainability. This, 
alongside improvements in PFM, could bring more donors back on-budget, which is a more 
sustainable financing method when domestic resources are insufficient to cover the gap. 
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 211 
What is the cost of not doing so? If the FHCI is not reprioritised the gains in MCH over the past few 
years will not be sustained and Sierra Leone will continue to have one of the worst child and 
maternal mortality rates in the world. The FHCI could falter due to insufficient funds in totality or 
lack of attention to crucial areas such as the risk of losing PBF at PHU level. So far, the FHCI has 
been successful in reducing maternal and child health-related OOP payments but total health OOP 
expenditure has only reduced ‘modestly’ with the introduction of the FHCI. Thus, more clearly 
needs to be done to reduce the number of families at risk from catastrophic health expenditure. 
The overarching goals of the GoSL are to reduce OOP expenditures and to move toward a 
nationally inclusive health system to reduce the high level of OOP spending, i.e. toward UHC. The 
FHCI can be viewed as a first step toward this goal. As such it is important to understand that 
although a lowincome country, Sierra Leone can provide sustainable domestic funding within the 
current and future economic context, but that external funding will be required to optimise chances 
of success. 
From a political point of view, the focus in the past couple of years has been in enshrining the 
FHCI into law. Indeed, as long as the FHCI remains a presidential decree it runs the risk of being 
eliminated when the next president comes in (although this is highly unlikely). The upcoming 
elections in 2018 seem to have hastened the importance of this law. The draft constitution includes 
a provision for free health care. This would ensure the sustainability, at least politically, of the 
initiative.  
There is broad social support for the FHCI, as our qualitative research has shown – indeed, there 
is a demand for it to be extended to other beneficiary groups, all with valid needs (for example, the 
elderly). However, it is important to consolidate the existing programme before extending it. 
Moreover, this evaluation has raised some important concerns about institutional weaknesses (as 
evidenced by the implementation challenges highlighted in Section 4). These need to be 
addressed as the FHCI moves ahead, alongside the financial planning and additional resources 
highlighted by the fiscal space analysis.  
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12 Conclusions 
Answers to the specific evaluation questions, cutting across the different domains of the ToC, are 
found in the summary at the start of this report. Overall, and despite the difficulties with data and 
counterfactuals, we can say with confidence that the FHCI responded to a clear need in Sierra 
Leone, was well designed to bring about needed changes in the health system to deliver services 
to the target beneficiaries (under-fives, pregnant women and lactating mothers), and did indeed 
bring funds and momentum to produce some important systemic reforms. Underlying this 
achievement was strong political will, which has been sustained, enhanced donor cooperation, the 
deployment of supportive technical assistance and consensus among stakeholders that the FHCI 
was significant and worth supporting. However, weaknesses in implementation have been evident 
in a number of core areas, such as drugs supply, and these are partly but not exclusively related to 
under-funding.  
We conclude with reasonable confidence that the FHCI was one important factor contributing to 
improvements in coverage and equity of coverage of essential services for mothers and children. 
Other important contributors have probably been other RMNCH investments that would have 
continued in the absence of the FHCI and broader economic changes. Clearly, Ebola also plays a 
major role in eroding gains in 2014/15. 
Whether the FHCI’s contribution fed through into improved health is less clear from the data, 
although there was a very sharp drop in under-five mortality associated with the start of the 
initiative. Modelled cost-effectiveness is high. However, it is important that efforts are made to 
monitor and very likely improve the quality of care provided in public facilities. In addition, there 
needs to be continued efforts to overcome residual barriers, including lack of transport and socio-
cultural barriers, so as to ensure gains are fairly distributed. On the supply side, efforts to improve 
the economy and efficiency of key resources – especially staffing and drugs – will be critical, as will 
addressing some of the harder-to-reach underlying systemic challenges, such as strengthening the 
MoHS and the devolved health functions at district level and improving PFM. The sustainability of 
the FHCI is not assured without such improvements, and increased public investment in health 
care in general. This requires the efforts of all stakeholders, including the development partners, to 
enhance performance and accountability in the sector. 
It is instructive to compare the FHCI with similar policies adopted in post-conflict countries in 
Africa, such as Burundi, and neighbours such as Ghana. Both have prioritised free care for 
mothers and under-fives over the past decade. In the case of Burundi, like Sierra Leone, it used 
PBF funding to replace resources lost at facility level,128 with some success (at least until recent 
unrest), although the policy has not been systematically evaluated. In the case of Ghana, the use 
of a VAT levy to support the National Health Insurance Scheme enabled free care to be extended 
to all pregnant women in 2008 (Witter et al., 2013). This provides some insights for Sierra Leone 
as it considers future financing options, although Ghana as a middle-income country is in a 
somewhat different position to Sierra Leone.  
What Sierra Leone attempted was more ambitious than both of those countries, in that it did not 
approach fee exemption as a ‘vertical programme’ focused solely on finance but understood that, 
for fee exemption to work, the whole health system had to be upgraded. This ambition and the 
weak starting point are part of the context in which our evaluation findings have to be situated, 
along with the subsequent shock of the Ebola epidemic.  
                                               
 128 See http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/12/19/heapol.czu132.full.pdf?keytype=ref&ijkey=YxuFZG6c5vPmJYS 
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13 Recommendations 
The FHCI was a concerted effort to strengthen the overall health system, focusing on particular 
vulnerable target groups but potentially benefiting all. In this respect, there can only be one central 
recommendation, which is to renew and deepen that commitment by continuing the reforms 
that were started in 2010. The investment that is coming in to Sierra Leone – not just in financial 
terms but also wider political and technical support – can be harnessed to take this forward from 
both government and development partner sides. 
More specifically, we make the following recommendations, based on the evaluation findings. A 
number of these dovetail with recent plans, such as the Health Sector Recovery Plan 2015–2020 
(MoHS, 2015). 
13.1 Cross-cutting recommendations 
Bring a relentless focus to bear on quality of care. Quality of care drives perceptions of 
services as well as their effectiveness, and this review has highlighted the failure to focus on 
quality of care in the original FHCI, as well as before and since.  
 All recommendations here link to quality of care, which should be specifically built into each 
pillar.  
 Clear standards and protocols for the basic package should be developed and incorporated 
into training and supportive supervision.  
 Indicators to monitor technical quality of care are lacking and should be built into routine 
systems.  
 Indicators of responsiveness and respectful treatment should also be incorporated into 
surveys. 
 It would also be useful to repeat the EmONC needs assessment carried out in 2008 (UNFPA, 
2008) in order to assess progress in key domains. 
Address wider barriers to access. While there has been some reduction in household costs and 
some improvements in the supply of care, this review highlights the need to address other barriers 
too, such as engaging communities in supporting transport to facilities, spreading information 
about entitlements and the benefits of health services, and raising awareness of danger signs for 
women and children. A stronger inter-sectoral collaboration with other ministries such as the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs would be 
fruitful here. 
Deepen decentralisation. This includes long-term work around some of the structural PFM issues 
for funding of districts, including timeliness and capacity to report on funds. Strengthening the 
decentralised components could include both work to consolidate and improve PBF (with an 
examination of the governance roles at different levels), as well as strengthening capacity of 
DHMTs to plan, supervise and monitor donor and public programmes and close the policy-to-
practice gap. 
13.2 Governance and planning 
Invest in institutional development of the MoHS to steward the policy and health system. 
Short-term measures, crises and Ebola have reduced the ability of the MoHS to be able to provide 
long-term leadership. While delivering on priority outputs for the population, all stakeholders should 
ensure they support institutional development in the MoHS and not undermine it through parallel 
HEART (Health & Education Advice & Resource Team) 214 
programmes and systems. This balance is of course difficult, perhaps most apparent in the supply 
chain, where the necessity to get life-saving drugs to those in need confronts the more messy 
requirement of trying to work through GoSL procurement systems and the challenges these 
provide. However, while donors should continue to balance these concerns, there are easier 
actions that could also be achieved, for example through boosting planning capacity and the 
staffing, capacity and role of the health financing unit and the key directorates.  
The development of a health financing strategy is desirable to provide coherence between 
the FHCI and other policy strands. This should look at risk pooling, revenue raising and strategic 
purchasing, as well as how to improve the volatility of funding and institute mechanisms for funding 
facilities. Moreover, clear guidelines on residual charging policies at facility level, among other key 
areas, also need to be provided. 
Specifically on the FHCI, there needs to be better communication and planning between the 
Cabinet, MoFED and the MoHS, including clear leadership on the policy, estimates of its 
resource needs and financing, and a plan for taking the policy forward (including ensuring it is 
rooted in more than the 2002 Presidential Decree). Conversations have been held but not in a 
joined-up way with all of the key stakeholders in government. How the policy will be extended, 
whether it will be rolled out to other groups, whether other sectors (such as NGO providers) will be 
included in the future – all of these matters require a clear forward plan, based on projected needs 
and resources, for which our fiscal space analysis can serve as a starting point. 
Introduce greater accountability. The focus for all parties should be on implementation and 
delivering agreed outputs. This applies to donors that have not delivered on their promised 
investments as much as NGOs, districts and government. Parties should agree plans and 
commitments, with incentives and sanctions incorporated. Information on funding and performance 
should be made open and transparent in order to encourage good performance. 
Strengthen community engagement. Community engagement is an important part of this 
process and has hitherto been weak. Our research indicated that there is a demand for this and a 
limited sense of engagement by communities at present in terms of the running of public health 
services. To ensure that future spending is well used, the mechanisms of local accountability 
should be reviewed and reinforced. The use of civil monitors was a useful innovation in the early 
days of the FHCI but appears, like many of the reforms, to have lost momentum since. There is a 
chance now for the lessons learned from communities’ engagement in the Ebola response to be 
applied to more mainstream health interventions, including to the FHCI. 
13.3 Health financing 
Provide additional funds to the health sector to reduce OOP spending. Sierra Leone is a low-
income post-conflict fragile state. Health is essential for strong economic growth and social 
development. The scale of household OOP expenditures is incredibly high and the risk of 
catastrophic health expenditure must be brought down. Addressing the systemic problems with HR 
and provision of drugs and supplies are among the important ways to reduce the need for 
household OOP spending. 
Tax revenue collection is a priority and will continue to require reform over the next 10 
years. However, there is not expected to be a short-term fix for the lack of general domestic tax 
revenues for budgetary allocation to health and the FHCI. 
There is some evidence that earmarked taxes could be supported by the Sierra Leone public 
to fund health initiatives. Levies in support of the FHCI could be implemented as near-term 
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solutions to the funding gap (there is certainly fiscal space for this, with a current tax-to-GDP ratio 
of 9%, compared to the low-income average of 17% or even the fragile state average of 14%). Five 
types have been analysed and three have potential in Sierra Leone: sin taxes, withholding taxes 
(in this case taxes on contracts) and an airline levy. More focused research would need to be 
carried out to provide country-specific industry risks and sensitivity analysis on the levels of tax 
deemed appropriate before one was chosen to be implemented. As it stands, however, the 
withholding tax being considered for implementation will not cover FHCI costs. The issue of how it 
is to be managed and used also requires more discussion and agreement between stakeholders. 
There are not enough domestic resources to pay for the requirements of the FHCI, or UHC, 
in the next 10 years so continued and increased donor support is needed. Over the next 
decade Sierra Leone is projected to remain a low-income country. Trends suggest that Sierra 
Leone’s proportion of donor monies to GDP is less than the average low-income country receives. 
As serious health plans have been established, the implementation of these will require external 
funding over the foreseeable future. Without external support the FHCI is unlikely to continue 
effectively. 
However, there is also a strong argument for improving PFM to encourage on-budget 
external funding. Notwithstanding fiduciary concerns regarding MoHS systems, given the extent 
of external funding over the foreseeable future efforts must be made to build local financial 
management systems where possible. If this does not mean actually putting funds through the 
GoSL budget, other hybrid solutions such as using common and mutually agreed indicators for 
release of funding and using GoSL supply and procurement systems for donor-financed goods 
should proactively be explored. 
Provide more flexible financing to the local level. Issues with central MoFED/MoHS allocations 
and weaknesses in drug supply have meant that local facilities struggle to access enough flexible 
resources to be able to ensure continuous service delivery. PBF is a good start in terms of 
enhancing this flexibility and autonomy at local level, and despite difficulties should be 
strengthened, sustained and eventually expanded. However, plans to expand the number of 
indicators significantly seems risky, and represent an added burden on weak monitoring systems.  
There is a need for investment in improving data on health financing so these 
recommendations for sustainable financing can be fine-tuned to the Sierra Leone health and fiscal 
environment. In particular, two areas stand out: 
 Improved M&E for capturing the true costs of the FHCI; and 
 Improved methods for measuring OOP payments. 
13.4 Planning, monitoring and evaluation 
The FHCI belongs in the MoHS and while its scope does warrant a whole health system – and 
hence MoHS – approach, this policy should continue to be led at the RCH Directorate level or 
be clearly housed in a MoHS directorate that takes ownership of it. This ownership is essential 
considering the complexity of the policy and the difficulties in its implementation. The renewed 
coordination with health implementation partners and donors brought about by the Ebola outbreak 
could support the MoHS in its effort to lead the continued and renewed support for the FHCI.  
The main challenge in terms of M&E is to develop and implement a robust and 
comprehensive M&E strategy for health. This should include the monitoring of the whole results 
chain (inputs, outputs, outcomes) and also specifically those strategic areas where data have been 
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weak until now, i.e. quality of care, staffing, drugs and financing. The M&E strategy should cover 
the following key areas: 
 Consultation with key data users on what to collect and how frequently; 
 Improving the quality and coherence of the various data sources; 
 Publishing and distributing health data analysis in user-friendly formats such as dashboards of 
indicators, regular health bulletins and more extensive research and analysis; and 
 Increasing the demand for and use of health information, particularly through health sector 
reviews and accountability processes. 
13.5 HR 
Improve the management of the payroll, bringing people who are recruited into the system in a 
more timely way and ensuring that the payroll remains up to date without the need for periodic 
externally led cleaning exercises, such as have happened repeatedly over the last decade. 
External consultants have been tasked with making the payroll more locally manageable – this 
needs to be a priority. 
Decentralisation of HR functions to the district level is needed to ensure greater 
responsiveness to district needs and a greater ability to performance manage staff effectively. 
At the same time, HR management capacity at central level should urgently be 
strengthened to allow the MoHS to lead the process of reforms that are planned (including new 
HR strategies, modelling of HR needs, development of a scheme of service, an HR information 
system, improved communication with staff and review of training needs and standards). The HRH 
Directorate has very few staff and remains dependent on external support. 
Given the inequalities in distribution of staff and staff shortfalls in some key cadres, the MoHS 
should develop integrated and sustainable packages to retain qualified staff in remote 
areas and in shortage cadres (or those with high attrition levels, such as midwives), including 
accommodation, remote allowances and access to training opportunities.  
There also needs to be a clearer definition of the role and funding of the different types of 
staff and close-to-community providers such as TBAs and CHWs, whose role and 
remuneration is being managed in an ad hoc way at facility level. As a part of this, there needs to 
be clarity on how they function in relation to existing cadres such as MCH aides. 
Revising training curricula (including to improve staff ability to control infectious diseases, as 
illustrated in the Ebola epidemic) is another challenge facing the MoHS; this was put on the back-
burner during the launch of the FHCI and work during Ebola around IPC should continue to be 
prioritised. Linked to this could be an assessment of staff competences and support for 
continuous professional development, which are lacking to date. This would help to rebuild 
confidence in the health staff and system among communities. 
Supportive supervision should be promoted and resourced, not only to motivate and support 
staff but also to ensure they are responsive and respectful to their clients – this would address a 
complaint that was frequently made in our community research, especially in relation to nurses. 
Streamlining supervision and reporting will also be important, given the limited staffing at facilities, 
and the time that such reporting takes. 
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13.6 Infrastructure, drugs and supplies 
Urgent investment is needed to bring key health infrastructure up to acceptable standards 
and maintain it – not just in terms of capital spend, which has been highlighted as low in recent 
years, but also to enable flexible funding at facility level to cover routine maintenance costs. This 
should include continuing to increase the number of EmONC facilities and upgrading PHUs, as 
well as addressing all seven ‘enablers’ – especially water and electricity.  
Connect rural health posts with district hospitals and improve the referral system by 
reconditioning dozens of Ebola ambulances donated by aid agencies, and continuing to 
explore the feasibility of a national ambulance service. 
Implement a ‘pull’ system across all hospitals and PHUs to reduce the likelihood of stock-outs 
of drugs and medical supplies. This should be complemented by a timely delivery of commodities 
from the port to CMS and from CMS to DMS. Even with a ‘pull’ system in place, stock-outs will still 
occur if commodities are not available at key distribution points and transport systems do not work. 
Support the simplification of forms to be filled in by hospitals and PHUs. CHAI has designed 
forms for each type of facility (MCHP, CHP, CHC and hospitals), so that they reflect the drugs and 
medical supplies for the type of services they provide. A new LMIS system (‘M Supply’) is also 
being piloted, which seems to be addressing some of the issues identified in CHANNEL. 
Investment in developing an effective monitoring system is essential for an adequate 
management of the supply chain at all levels. 
Build adequate storage facilities and ensure the SOP Manual is implemented. The Manual 
developed by UNICEF is comprehensive and although it would need to be updated to reflect 
changes in the LMIS system it follows WHO standards for drugs storage and for stock and quality 
monitoring. A first step could be enforcing the FEFO policy so as to minimise wastage. 
Allocate a fixed budget for the supply chain. Lack of or sporadic funding leads to variability in 
the timeliness of procurement and, ultimately, to stock-outs. Both GoSL and donors (until GoSL 
has sufficient capacity) need to make fixed financial commitments to fund the supply chain and 
ensure a continuous supply of commodities to hospitals and PHUs. Budget allocations from 
government will eventually allow for the new NPPU to fully take over. The new NPPU will require 
transparent governance and sufficient human and financial capacity to function effectively. 
13.7 Communications 
Since a lack of communication can have a negative impact on the success of any policy, it is 
recommended that a communications budget is allocated at the very start of any future 
reform. While an original budget of US$ 3 million was promised, it was not forthcoming and this 
hampered the breadth of communication activities. Since then, the energy to support 
communication has dwindled.  
Communications need to be integrated across all initiatives and a longer-term approach to 
information, education and communication developed. The understanding of communication 
activities as linked to a specific activity that has been seen so far in relation to the FHCI neglects 
the need for broader communication capacity at national and DHMT levels to address disease 
outbreaks and chronic health challenges, such as non-communicable diseases.  
Engaging the implementers and addressing their concerns should always precede 
communication to the public. The FHCI was communicated to the population before it was 
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communicated to health workers. This was a grave mistake because, as a result of this misstep 
and due to a lack of understanding of the reform, health workers went on strike – such a situation 
would not be repeated were communications initiatives given due importance. 
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Annex A Terms of reference 
 
Evaluation of the impact of the Free Health Care Initiative on maternal and child 
mortality in Sierra Leone 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
  
Sierra Leone is rebuilding its health sector, which collapsed following the civil war. Whilst there 
have been measurable improvements, the health situation remains dire with key health indicators 
below the Sub-Saharan average: 
 
Indicators Sierra Leone129 Sub-Saharan 
Africa130 
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) 857 900 
% institutional deliveries 42% 46% 
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate 8% 22% 
Unmet need for family planning 28% 25% 
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 140 144 
Doctors per 10,000 population 0.25131 2 
 
In 2008, DFID Sierra Leone committed to a significant scale-up of its support to the health sector 
focusing on the delivery of the National Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) Strategy (2008–
2010). In November 2009, the President launched Sierra Leone’s first National Health Sector 
Strategic Plan (2010–2015), which brings together all the various sub-sector strategies and polices 
including the RCH strategy, the free health care policy for vulnerable groups, and the commitment 
to deliver a Basic Package of Essential Health Services. The NHSSP now provides a 
comprehensive framework for a coordinated approach to strengthening the entire health sector. 
 
In April 2010, with significant support from DFID and partners, the President launched the Free 
Health Care Initiative (FHCI) for pregnant and nursing women and children under five years old 
within the context of delivering commitments made in the NHSSP. The aim of the FHCI is for up to 
230,000 pregnant women, 230,000 lactating women and 1 million children under the age of five to 
receive free essential health care services every year. After the first year and despite many 
challenges, the results were impressive:132 
 
 2,926,431 under-5 consultations, a tripling compared to the year before; 
 1,288,828 million of these young children received life-saving treatment for malaria;  
 126,477 women delivered their babies in a health facility, 39,100 more women than the 
year before;  
 20,135 maternity complications were managed in health facilities, with a 60% drop in the 
fatality rate in these cases;  
 140% increase in the number of new users of modern family planning. 
  
The FHCI is a potentially valuable intervention and one against which future plans for investment 
are being made (in terms of the GoSL’s planned second phase of universally free-of-charge health 
care and the plans of funders such as DFID. However, the relationships between the changes in 
uptake of services and the FHCI have not yet been fully researched or evidenced. Furthermore, 
there is no concrete evidence that the initiative is leading to the anticipated health outcomes or 
having an impact on reducing maternal, newborn and child mortality, nor how changes have been 
achieved if this is found to be the case. The FHCI-focused MoHS Health Information Bulletin 
                                               
129 2008 Sierra Leone DHS. 
130 United Nations Statistics Division (2007–2009), unless otherwise indicated. 
131 MoHS, May 2010, based on recruitment from April 2010 following health workers’ substantial pay rise. 
132 MoHS (2011). ‘Scaling up maternal & child health through Free Health Care Services, one year on.’ Vol. 2, No. 3, April 2011 
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issued in April 2011133 also raised a number of challenges associated with the first year of 
implementation but to date it has not been feasible to formally and independently review the 
operational processes required to deliver the FHCI (many of which have been acknowledged as 
challenges for implementation). Nor has it been feasible to look at the quality of care provided 
during the first year. 
 
DFID is committed to working with the GoSL and its partners to ensure the FHCI is a success. We 
will do so by substantially scaling up our support for proven, cost-effective and evidence-based 
interventions, as well as increasing demand for their use, and accountability for their delivery. This 
includes strengthening the evidence base and tracking the results to determine the impact and 
outcomes of the interventions, and of the UK’s investment in the sector. 
 
2. EVALUATION AIM AND QUESTIONS 
 
The FHCI was designed as an emergency response to the dire maternal and child mortality rates 
and was implemented within a very short timeframe. As a result, the mechanism for evaluating the 
impact of the programme was not put in place at the start, nor was baseline data collected in a 
systematic manner. Whilst a number of countries in Africa and Asia have offered free health care 
packages to vulnerable populations there appears to be no evaluation of the impact of such 
schemes on health outcomes and mortality. The evaluation will therefore offer the opportunity to 
undertake a robust and credible assessment of the relationship between free-of-charge health care 
at the point of service delivery and health outcomes and impact on mortality, and will provide 
important information and lessons that will be useful to Sierra Leone and elsewhere. 
 
The aim of this project is to conduct a rigorous evaluation of the FHCI over a four-year period 2010 
to 2015 so that evidence can be gathered to determine whether the FHCI has contributed to 
improved health outcomes and reducing maternal, newborn and child mortality in Sierra Leone and 
represents VFM. 
 
The FHCI evaluation programme commenced in July 2012 with the inception phase implemented 
by the DFID Human Development Resource Centre. It was concluded and agreed during the 
programme inception phase that an experimental or quasi-experimental design that compares the 
impact of the FHCI on maternal and child mortality and health outcomes cannot be conducted for 
feasibility and ethical reasons. As such, the concept of an impact evaluation of the FHCI has been 
discarded and the focus is now on an evaluation of the FHCI’s impact.  
These Terms of Reference apply to the programme implementation phase, which will be awarded 
as a 30-month contract. The project must be implemented in line with DFID’s ethical principles and 
guidelines (see Annexes 2.B and 2.C), as well as other such guidelines in Sierra Leone. 
 
The evaluation will therefore seek to answer the following questions: 
 
Results: 
i) What contributions to health outcomes, among the target groups, did the FHCI 
make and how were these achieved? 
ii) Does the FHCI represent VFM? 
 
Operationally: 
iii) How and to what extent were the six priority interventions that were put in place 
effective in enabling the FHCI to be operationalised? 
iv) Are the six priority interventions the right ones to ensure continued and increased 
utilisation of services by the target beneficiaries? 
v) What are the socio-cultural issues that affect the uptake of free health care amongst 
the target beneficiaries? 
                                               
133 Government of Sierra Leone. Ministry of Health & Sanitation Health Information Bulletin. Volume 2, Number 3. FHC Edition (April 
2010 – March 2011). 
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vi) Did the FHCI have a differential impact on different socio-economic groups or 
marginalised groups? 
vii) Were there any unintended consequences of the FHCI? 
 
3. RECIPIENT 
 
The main recipients of this piece of work are the MoHS and the DFID Sierra Leone MDG Team, 
particularly DFID’s Health Adviser and programmes in DFID Sierra Leone’s Health portfolio. There 
are a number of secondary recipients of this work, including DFID’s Aid Effectiveness, VFM and 
Evaluation departments, and externally other key partners supporting or considering supporting the 
FHCI. 
 
4. SCOPE OF WORK 
 
The scope of the evaluation work is structured around the questions identified above and will 
include the following issues: 
 
i. Did the FHCI contribute to improving health outcomes? This will require robust 
demonstration of additional results achieved. This is a key element of the evaluation and 
requires the review and confirmation that the counterfactual identified in the inception phase is 
plausible and credible. This element of the evaluation is focused on establishing rigorously that 
the results and health outcomes achieved as a consequence of the introduction of the FHCI 
were greater than would have been achieved without the FHCI.  
 
The service provider is expected to confirm in their first progress report how this question would 
be approached, building on the work carried out during the programme inception phase.  
 
ii. Does the FHCI represent good VFM? This will require analysis of inputs versus outputs and 
outcomes, and ultimately impact. The service provider will be expected to draw lessons on the 
cost-effectiveness and VFM of investment in the FHCI. This should include, but not be limited 
to, robust data for the unit costs for the results specified and comparisons with other 
approaches. The service provider would also be expected to address: 
 
 Issues of contribution, i.e. assessing if the results achieved arose due to the removal of fees 
for health care services at the point of delivery or were part of the counterfactual or a result 
of other interventions, e.g. the World Bank Performance-Based Financing programme that 
commenced in April 2011. 
 
 Including all aspects of value. This would involve identifying ways of capturing the value of 
other intended and unintended benefits of the programme beyond the direct effect on the 
numbers of pregnant and nursing women and children under five utilising health care 
services. 
 
iii. What were the processes that led to these additional results? In particular, this will require 
a qualitative assessment of the six priority interventions, and whether these were and continue 
to be effective. It is expected that the evaluation should identify and document any good 
practices in the implementation of the priority interventions. 
 
iv. What does ‘a lack of finance’ as a barrier consist of? The 2008 National Service Delivery 
Perception Survey showed that a lack of finance was by far the biggest barrier to accessing 
healthcare by the targeted group. Does this just refer to direct costs (e.g. charges for treatment, 
for drugs) or does it also include indirect costs (e.g. transport to/from health facilities; costs of 
accommodation for relatives; food for in-patients)? 
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v. Did socio-cultural issues impact on the utilisation of FHCI services by the target 
beneficiaries? What were these and what actions could be taken to address these. This would 
require assessing the role of influencers in the household and wider community. 
 
vi. What were the unexpected consequences? Unintended consequences, both positive and 
negative, that might be purposively sought need to be identified, for example: 
 
 Diversion of existing financial resources away from other sectors, e.g. education. It is 
recognised that this will be difficult to assess rigorously; however, this is an issue that has 
been suggested anecdotally and should be considered by the evaluators, even if this is 
only to exclude it as a matter of concern. 
 Negative effect on patients that are outside of the FHCI’s beneficiary group. 
 Effects on the current Health Management Information System (HMIS). 
 Effects on accountability to citizens, including, for example, the role of civil society bodies 
(such as Health For All Coalition – HFAC – which was instructed by the President to 
monitor drugs distribution and management, and healthworker attendance and patient 
relations, in delivering the FHCI). 
 Any unexpected effects on aid relationships, particularly between GoSL and DFID Sierra 
Leone but also capturing effects on and perceptions of other development partners. There 
is particular need to assess whether conditionalities and transaction costs have changed in 
ways other than those expected and what effects, if any, those changes have had. 
 Any effects on observation of partnership principles (poverty reduction and achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals; respecting human rights and other international 
obligations; strengthening financial management, strengthening accountability and tackling 
corruption). 
 Effects on financial management, accountability and corruption. DFID is interested in 
knowing how FHCI funds are used and whether they have any effect on financial 
management systems, including providing incentives (both positive and negative) for 
corruption. 
 
In addition, it is expected that the service provider will: 
 
a. Compare experience from the FHCI with experience of other such programmes, e.g. in 
Burundi (a country with a similar context) and Ghana (a regional neighbour), as part of the 
discussion of the findings in Sierra Leone. 
b. Ensure that evaluation expertise, data and evidence are disseminated widely and 
especially to the MoHS (centrally and at local council level) and for the management and 
implementation of all aspects of the FHCI. This will involve the service provider in an 
ongoing relationship with DFID Sierra Leone and the MoHS, advising how the evaluation 
could and should shape programme design, management and implementation. This will be 
particularly important for making adjustments and corrections to the FHCI during its 
implementation.  
 
5. METHODS 
 
DFID Sierra Leone expects that the service provider would review the existing programme 
inception report and then confirm to DFID the methods to be followed. The final methods would be 
agreed upon submission of a pre-implementation phase report by 10 December 2013 and approval 
of the report by DFID.  
 
It is expected that the method for the evaluation would include a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
methods and the following elements: 
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i. The provision of support and advice to the MoHS, DFID Sierra Leone and its health 
implementing partners on issues associated with the FHCI data analysis, data collection and 
use of the data arising from this evaluation.  
ii. Baseline qualitative assessment of current resourcing levels to the health sector and tracking 
over time of health sector resourcing by central government and local councils. 
iii. Rigorous quantitative assessment of the health results achieved against a credible 
counterfactual. 
iv. Assessment of the elements identified under the scope above. It is envisaged that this would 
involve review of FHCI and related documents, interviews with individuals and groups of FHCI 
stakeholders and beneficiaries, and development of a method of tracking change over time. 
 
6. DELIVERABLES 
 
The associated overarching objectives are: 
 
 The creation of an evidence base on how the FHCI is contributing to a decrease in maternal, 
newborn and child mortality including modelling a baseline as well as the counterfactual. 
 Improved utilisation of information and data to inform the effective management of the FHCI 
within the context of the National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP) through the Joint 
Programme of Work and Financing (JPWF). This will include the FHCI evaluation programme 
feeding into the annual health sector performance review process. 
 Improved transparency and accountability between the state and its citizens, and between the 
state and its financing partners in relation to the FHCI. 
 
Specific deliverables are: 
 
 A pre-implementation phase report by February 17 2014 would include: 
I. Confirmation of the evaluation framework that outlines what methods will be used, 
and how the different elements of the qualitative and quantitative data will be 
brought together; 
II. Programme management structure and arrangements; 
III. Final programme logframe; 
IV. Jointly agreed 26-month work plan with a detailed year one work plan and key 
performance indicators in line with the finalised logframe;  
V. A strategy to transfer ownership and skills for analysing health data with the 
Department of Planning at the MoHS; and 
VI. Programme budget for the 26-month project duration. 
 
 Quarterly narrative and financial reports. 
 Presentation of a brief quarterly progress report against results/deliverables and expenditure at 
the DFID Sierra Leone health quarterly progress meetings. 
 Annual narrative and financial reports in preparation for the annual programme reviews. In line 
with results-based management principles, the annual reports will highlight in particular 
outcomes where progress to date is above or below target to an unexpected degree. 
Strategies to build on strengths and address weaknesses will then be identified. 
 A final draft narrative report submitted by 1 March 2016 detailing progress against the 
deliverables. The final narrative and programme financial reports detailing overall programme 
progress against the logframe and expenditure of all project funds submitted by 30 April 2016. 
 
Anticipated activities will include: 
 
Pre-implementation period:  
 To finalise the design, work plan, logframe, budget, financial plan and risk assessment for the 
project.  
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At the end of the Pre-Implementation Period there will be a break point to review Inception 
Outputs. Progress to the Implementation Phase will be subject to the satisfactory delivery and 
review of the programme report.  
 
Year 1 (March 2014 – December 2014):  
 Agree final design approach and work plan with MoHS. 
 Plan and implement strategy to gather baseline data as required. 
 Plan and implement the initial evaluation looking retrospectively at the period April 2010 to 
February 2014 and disseminate the findings: 
1. Identify, formulate and test appropriate methodologies in collaboration with the key partners 
and technical working group; 
2. Undertake the evaluation, the scope of which (in Year 1) will include: 
 Analysis of results achieved at the different levels of the health system, in comparison 
with established MoHS milestones and the baseline. 
 Analysis of the effectiveness of the implementing systems and processes. 
 Assessment of the level of quality of care provided (subject to available data). 
 Assessment of contribution of the FHCI to health outcomes including deaths. 
 Assess the value of the results in helping to improve understanding of the impact and operational 
effectiveness of the FHCI. 
 
 Plan 2015 annual evaluation. Annual evaluation to include review and revision of the 
methodologies used as appropriate for the initial evaluation to ensure they are relevant to 
ongoing annual process and for the expanded scope, which will include in Year 2: 
 Exploring relations between poverty reduction and the FHCI; 
 An assessment of the effectiveness of providing equitable access to free health care 
services for all potential end users; and 
 An assessment of the VFM of the FHCI and the long-term funding viability. 
 Participate in DFID’s Programme Annual Programme Review process.  
 Develop and work on an Exit Strategy. 
 Collaborate with DFID Health Implementing Partners to expand the evidence base for maternal 
and child health programming. 
 
Year 2 (January – December 2015): 
 Implement annual evaluation and disseminate findings.  
 Execute research into the socio-cultural considerations of the uptake of health care amongst the 
FHCI target group in Sierra Leone and disseminate the findings.  
 Collaborate with DFID Health Implementing Partners to expand the evidence base for maternal 
and child health programming. 
 
Year 3 (January – April 2016): 
 Implement final evaluation and disseminate findings.  
 Implement Exit Strategy. 
 Participate in an external evaluation of the FHCI Impact Evaluation programme. 
 Produce a Final Report within three months of the end of the project. 
 Collaborate with DFID Health Implementing Partners to expand the evidence base for maternal 
and child health programming. 
 
At the end of the two-month pre-implementation period, the service provider will provide a pre-
implementation programme report for DFID. On the basis of this and discussion, the project design 
and milestones will be finalised and approved. 
 
In addition to standard mandatory annual reviews, DFID may carry out an external evaluation of 
the FHCI evaluation programme towards the end of Year 3 to assess performance against the 
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contract deliverables and logframe, the process of programme implementation, and the added 
value of the FHCI evaluation programme. 
 
The implementation of the programme will be governed by the conditions of the contract and the 
deliverables outlined in the TOR and project documentation (logframe and approved programme 
report). The service provider will be expected to maintain the agreed protocols for: 
 
 Provision of leadership to ensure effective financial management, communications and key 
stakeholder management; 
 Procurement of goods and services; 
 Reporting, including financial reporting and planning; 
 Processes for ensuring that technical excellence, quality of care and free-of-charge services 
are monitored; 
 Risk identification and management; and 
 All other agreed protocols. 
 
7.  INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Within DFID the project will be managed by the DFID Sierra Leone MDG Team. Technical 
oversight will be provided by the Health Adviser, whilst day-to-day issues regarding reporting 
requirements will be provided by the MDG Assistant Programme Manager. Any contractual issues 
will be dealt with by the DFID Sierra Leone Contracts Officer. 
 
In order to ensure robustness of methodology and quality of reports produced, a programme 
Steering Committee will be established that meets quarterly. The Steering Committee will report to 
the M&E subcommittee of the Health Sector Steering Group, in conformity with the co-ordination 
structure articulated in the Sierra Leone Health Compact. Members will be drawn from DFID head 
office and Sierra Leone under the Health Adviser’s leadership, the MoHS’s DPI who lead on M&E 
for the Ministry, the Health Sector Steering Group M&E Subcommittee, and other relevant external 
stakeholders. The service provider will act as secretariat for this committee. 
 
The Steering Committee will ensure that the project is aligned with the management framework for 
the health sector as articulated in the international Health Partnership Plus Compact for Sierra 
Leone. The project will be incorporated into the MoHS’s three-year rolling JPWF, which will sustain 
the project beyond DFID funding, and report to the Health Sector Steering Group through 
participation in its multi-stakeholder Integrated Service Delivery and M&E working groups as 
appropriate. 
 
8. TIMEFRAME 
 
The project is scheduled to commence in December 2013 and continue through to 31 March 2016. 
The first two months will constitute the pre-implementation period and it is anticipated that, subject 
to approval, the main programme will commence immediately after this period. 
 
Subject to satisfactory progress as evidenced by execution of agreed deliverables and approval of 
programme reports, the project will run for 28 months (inclusive of the pre-implementation period). 
 
During the project, the outputs required are those articulated in no. 6 above (Deliverables). The 
final evaluation reports should be produced and submitted within one month of the end of the 
contract, i.e. by April 2016. 
 
CEA limitations 
 
There are two key limitations to the cost-effectiveness analysis. Firstly, drawing boundaries around 
what interventions—and their associated costs and outcomes—are, or are not, linked to the FHCI 
is challenging. Our approach is to try to ensure that what is included on the cost side is matched 
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on the effect side; however, this is inevitably determined to some extent by the available cost and 
outcome data. 
Secondly, limitations to data sources on both the costs and outcomes of the FHCI means that the 
true incremental costs and effects of the FHCI are difficult to isolate. The lack of 2011 and 2012 
NHA data is the key limitations on the cost side. On the effect side, coverage data is used to model 
the effect on maternal, newborn and child mortality using the Lives Saved Tool (LiST). It is 
important to acknowledge that LiST is a tool that allows for the modelling of impact, not the actual 
estimation of impact using data on the impact variables and an appropriate impact evaluation 
technique. The conclusions that can be drawn from such an exercise are different from those that 
could be drawn from an actual impact evaluation. It is also worth highlighting a few key limitations 
of LiST: 
 LiST uses inbuilt assumptions about the effectiveness of MNCH interventions to convert 
increased coverage estimates to mortality reductions. These are based on international 
literature. In the absence of evidence from Sierra Leone, we have used these. However, 
they may overstate gains if the quality of care provided is below expected levels to ensure 
effectiveness.  
 Family planning is a difficult intervention to model in terms of maternal lives saved. This is 
essentially because of lack of data on abortion practices. We take the approach of 
modelling maternal deaths averted in the context of the increased CPR of Sierra Leone 
from 2008 to 2013. To the extent that FHCI contributed to the increase in FP over the 
period (FP was free before 2010 but increased utilisation of health facilities by women of 
reproductive age likely increased its use), we are therefore underestimating the 
demographic impact of the FHCI on maternal deaths.  
Finally on the effect side, there are important limitations to the DHS data that is used to estimate 
increases in coverage due to the FHCI. Incremental trend analysis cannot be undertaken for the 
child interventions and a few maternal and newborn interventions. This is because the recall 
variable for the indicator is too short to allow for annual disaggregation of the data. When 
incremental trend analysis is possible, the gradient of the projected counterfactual line is very 
sensitive to the jump in coverage estimates between 2008 and 2009. This is the point between the 
two rounds of the DHS and is more likely a product of data quality problems in one or both surveys 
and not a real increase at this point. 
There is therefore inevitably uncertainty around our estimates. A sensitivity analysis is performed 
to understand how the estimate changes when some key assumptions are varied. Comparison 
with other reductions in mortality estimates are also made to understand whether the modelled 
estimates are credible in terms of their level. However, it should be acknowledged that not all our 
assumptions can be tested, and the point estimates for the cost-effectiveness ratio should 
therefore be interpreted within this understanding. 
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Annex B Evaluation matrix 
Stage 
in 
results 
chain 
Research question Indicator Methods Data source 
Where the 
questions are 
answered in 
evaluation 
report 
 
 
 
 
 
INPUTS 
 
 
 
Was there relevant, 
effective and 
sustained technical 
assistance to support 
capacity of the 
implementation of 
the FHCI over the 
period? 
Type and volume of 
technical assistance 
(assess at episodic 
points over the 
period). 
Qualitative 
assessment of 
relevance and quality 
of technical 
assistance by 
stakeholders. 
Document review 
+ KIIs. 
 
MoHS (including 
Donor Liaison 
Office)  
Across core 
intervention 
process analysis: 
Section 4 
To what extent was 
there ‘political will’ 
supporting the FHCI 
and what 
contribution/role did it 
play over time? 
 
Qualitative 
assessment of 
changing political 
support. 
Document review  
+ KIIs 
 
Members of the 
Parliamentary 
Health 
Committee and 
State House 
Preparation for 
launch (Section 
3) and process 
analysis (Section 
4) 
 
To what extent did 
the FHCI contribute 
to new resources for 
the target groups and 
the wider sector (by 
internal and external 
actors)? 
- Marginal changes in 
total public 
expenditure on health 
care in Sierra Leone 
from 2010 onwards. 
- Marginal changes in 
household 
expenditure on health 
care in Sierra Leone 
from 2010 onwards. 
- Comparison of 
public health 
expenditure post-
FHCI with what it 
would have been 
if pre-FHCI trend 
had continued. 
- ReBUILD 
analysis of OOP 
expenditure 
using a 
regression 
discontinuity 
design.  
- NHA and 
government 
budgets 
- Living 
Standards 
Survey 
 
Health financing 
analysis (Section 
4.1) and analysis 
of changing OOP 
spending 
(Section 5.3.1) 
 
Did the FHCI achieve 
economy? 
- Unit costs of key 
inputs, such as drugs 
and salaries. 
- Staff pay-to-GDP 
per capita ratio. 
- Cost per working 
hour and cost per 
patient across 
different professional 
groups. 
Trend analysis 
and/or 
benchmarking if 
appropriate and 
feasible. 
- UNICEF for 
drugs data 
- Living 
Standards 
Survey for HRH 
data 
Economy 
analysis: Section 
9.1 
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Stage in 
results 
chain 
Research 
question 
Indicator Methods Data source 
Where the 
questions are 
answered in 
evaluation report 
 
 
 
 
 
PROCESS 
To what extent 
was there 
effective 
implementation 
and scale-up of 
six key 
intervention areas 
(i.e. NHSSP pillar 
areas, including 
finance), and 
specifically (see 
below): 
 
 
 
- What were the 
challenges prior 
to the FHCI? 
- What changes 
did the FHCI 
bring? 
- How effective 
were they? 
- What other 
independent 
developments 
contributed to 
change in this 
domain? 
- What 
challenges 
remain? 
Qualitative 
research: 
- Documentary 
review 
- KIIs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4: 
implementation of 
core interventions 
To what extent 
was the 
community aware 
of the FHCI? 
- Awareness of 
right to free care 
for specific 
population 
groups, 
including 
understanding 
of which 
components are 
exempted and 
which not 
Analysis of trends 
in awareness 
indicators. 
Thematic analysis 
of qualitative 
sources. 
 
HFAC surveys 
 
FGDs 
Section 5.3 on 
barriers to uptake, 
particularly 5.3.3 
on awareness of 
FHCI and 5.3.6 on 
accountability 
How and why has 
the FHCI changed 
target users’ 
health-seeking, 
attitudes and 
involvement with 
health services?  
 
 
Community 
confidence in 
public health 
system and 
willingness to use 
it. 
Community 
involvement in 
health services, 
e.g. via health 
facility 
management 
committees – 
increased or 
decreased? 
Health facility ‘exit’ 
surveys, 
FGDs  
ReBUILD 
interviews with 
households, 
FGDs 
 
HFAC data (uses 
structured 
questionnaire), 
KIIs 
Section 5.3 on 
barriers to uptake 
Did the FHCI 
achieve 
efficiency? 
Qualitative 
assessment of 
processes of 
resource 
management. 
Qualitative 
research: 
- Document 
review 
- KIIs 
 
Section 4: 
analysis of 
implementation of 
core interventions; 
see also efficiency 
analysis (9.2) and 
analysis of overall 
efficiency of 
health section in 
Section 10 
(sustainability) 
Pillar 1: Drugs 
Continuous 
availability of 
drugs and other 
essential 
commodities 
Availability of 
funding 
 
 
 
MoHS records: 
PET forms 
 
UN records 
 
 
UNICEF records 
MoHS records 
 
 
The NPPU is 
expected to take 
over this function 
from UNICEF as 
soon as it is 
established. 
Crown Agents 
have been 
identified for this 
purpose.  
Section 4.4: drugs 
and supplies 
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Timely and 
appropriate 
external 
purchasing 
 
 
 
Effective internal 
distribution 
 
 
Delivery of drugs 
and supplies 
matches specified 
need 
 
MoHS records: 
stock issues and 
reception reports. 
 
 
 
This is monitored 
through the 
CHANNEL 
software and 
supported by 
CSOs, e.g. HFAC, 
whose 
representatives 
are present in 
government 
health facilities. 
 
KIIs and 
document review. 
Pillar 2: HRH 
How did the FHCI 
affect availability 
of health workers? 
2008–13: 
 
Changes to staff 
numbers, type and 
distribution, by 
level of system 
and district. 
 
Changes to 
percentage of 
posts unfilled, by 
type and district 
post. 
 
Changes to 
percentage of 
absentee staff, by 
type and district. 
 
Changes to delays 
in getting on to 
payroll. 
 
 
Changes to 
numbers of ghost 
workers and 
volunteers and to 
processes of 
recruitment and 
management. 
Calculate trends 
over time in posts, 
staff numbers and 
vacancies 
(reviewed against 
guidance on 
required staffing 
levels), and 
exploration of 
patterns of staff 
transfers (e.g. 
rural-to-urban 
shifts), 
disaggregated by 
district if possible. 
 
Thematic analysis 
of qualitative 
information: 
HR Payroll, 
MoHS, Booz & Co 
report. 
 
 
Human 
Resources 
Management 
Office (HRMO)  
 
 
HRMO – reports 
on absenteeism 
 
KIIs 
 
 
ReBUILD survey  
 
Health for All exit 
interviews and 
research 
The first three 
indicators should 
be available from 
routine data within 
the MoHS. 
 
This should be 
added to KIIs 
conducted by the 
evaluation team. 
 
The ReBUILD 
survey and in-
depth interviews 
with health 
workers can be 
mined for 
information 
relevant to the 
FHCI. The tools 
are cross-
sectional but have 
a retrospective 
component. 
 
We can also draw 
on other studies, 
such as the DFID 
evaluation of 
health worker pay 
uplift (2012). 
 
 
Section 4.3: HRH  
Pillar 3: 
Governance 
Signalled by: 
 
 
Documentary 
analysis 
 
Health Sector 
Review meetings 
Section 4.2: 
governance; 
Section 4:1 for 
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To what extent 
was there country 
ownership of 
FHCI 
implementation – 
and what 
contribution did it 
make? 
- Function of 
COMPACT 
2011 
- Government 
responsiveness  
- Trends in 
percentage of 
public spend on 
the FHCI 
 
KIIs 
 
 
Financial 
plots/summaries 
 
HMIS 
 
Government and 
donor informants 
 
GoSL financial 
data 
public/donor 
financial 
contributions 
How effective was 
governance (i.e. in 
terms of 
responsiveness, 
accountability, 
learning lessons)? 
- Management 
response to 
problems 
identified 
- Functioning of 
governance 
structure/system  
Documentary 
analysis  
 
 
KIIs 
Annual health 
sector reviews, 
COMPACT 
agreement, etc. 
 
Key stakeholders 
 
Section 4:2 
governance 
 
Pillar 4: 
Communication 
Has there been 
effective 
information, 
education and 
communication to 
stimulate 
demand? 
An effective 
publicity 
programme in 
place. 
 
 
Media support to 
help disseminate 
the publicity. 
 
General public 
have high levels of 
FHCI awareness, 
and how it affects 
them. 
 
Effective 
complaints 
systems in place 
for when the 
programme fails in 
its stated 
objectives. 
 
Document 
review/KIIs 
 
Secondary data 
analysis 
 
Community 
research – 
thematic analysis 
 
 
 
 
Appraisal of the 
communication 
strategy for launch 
and rollout of the 
FHCI, MoHS 
2010. 
 
NGO surveys of 
awareness post-
FHCI. 
 
Health for All exit 
interviews and 
research (e.g. 
patient satisfaction 
of users). 
 
ReBUILD in-depth 
interviews. 
 
FGDs. 
 
MoHS call centre 
records. 
Section 4.7: 
communications; 
also Section 5.3.3 
on awareness of 
policy 
 
Pillar 5: 
Infrastructure 
Was infrastructure 
adequate to offer 
services to the 
target population? 
 
Physical buildings 
are ‘fit for 
purpose’. 
 
Adequacy of 
utilities (lighting, 
electricity, water, 
sanitation, etc.). 
 
Furniture and 
other large 
equipment, e.g. 
refrigerators, 
beds, etc. 
 
Ambulances 
(availability). 
Proportion of 
health facilities 
providing EmONC 
services. 
 
KIIs/document 
review 
 
DHIS 
 
HFAC data 
 
FIT reports 
 
EC/UNICEF 
programme 
 
AfDB 
AMDD 
assessment? 
Section 4.5: 
infrastructure 
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Stage in 
results 
chain 
Research question Indicator Methods Data source 
Where the 
questions are 
answered in 
evaluation 
report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OUTPUTS 
 
Was there an 
adequate and 
reliable supply of 
drugs over time? 
 
 
 
Percentage of drug 
stock-outs in a 
specified period – 
tracked over time 
 
 
- Trends over 
time 
 (disaggregated at 
district level) 
HMIS 
 
HFAC data 
 
GoSL service  
 
 
Section 4.4: 
drugs and 
supplies 
 
Pillar 6: M&E 
What M&E 
framework was 
developed and 
was this 
appropriate? 
What M&E was 
undertaken? 
How has the M&E 
been used to 
assess progress 
and shape the 
FHCI’s 
development?  
How relevant has 
the M&E work 
been?  
Is the M&E 
system working 
and how has it or 
should it be 
developed to 
make it more 
effective? 
Timeliness 
 
Reliability 
 
 
Consistency 
(across time and 
space) 
 
Coverage 
 
 
Policy relevance 
 
Levels of public 
trust 
Review of 
Working Group 
terms of reference 
and minutes 
 
Assessment of 
M&E framework 
 
Assessment of 
delivery of M&E 
against framework 
 
Assessment of 
use of M&E 
system and its 
impact 
 
KIIs/document 
review 
 
 
HMIS data 
 
HFAC data, for 
triangulation 
 
NGO services 
 
Key informants 
Section 4.6: 
monitoring and 
evaluation  
 
Other 
contributory 
factors 
What other major 
contextual 
changes have 
occurred, 
independent of 
the FHCI, which 
may have 
influenced the 
outputs, outcomes 
and impacts 
documented 
below? 
Economic 
changes, affecting 
family 
expenditures and 
ability to pay for 
health. 
 
Disease outbreaks 
and natural 
shocks. 
 
Major investments 
in other sectors, 
e.g. roads, 
affecting access. 
 
Political changes. 
 
Health sector 
investments 
decoupled from 
FHCI. 
Document review 
 
KII 
Government 
economic reports 
 
Media reports 
 
Budget analysis 
 
 
Section 8: other 
contributory 
factors 
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Stage in 
results 
chain 
Research question Indicator Methods Data source 
Where the 
questions are 
answered in 
evaluation 
report 
 
 
 
 
Availability and 
readiness report 
(SARA, 2011) 
 
Assessment 
reports 
 
LMIS 
Have more patients 
been treated as a 
consequence of the 
FHCI, and if so to 
what extent? 
 
 
 
 
Patient throughput 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Calculate 
throughput by 
target groups 
(pregnant 
women, 
lactating 
mothers, 
children under 
five) by service 
level by region 
and district 
- Sub-analyses: 
By area of care 
(e.g. ANC, 
supervised 
deliveries, 
PNC, 
caesareans); 
By disease area 
(malaria, 
diarrhoea, 
malnutrition, 
ARI), 
contraceptive 
uptake 
HMIS 
 
HFAC data 
 
DHS/MICS 
 
ReBUILD 
survey data 
analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 5.1: 
increased 
utilisation and 
coverage 
Are adequate 
numbers of health 
staff available and 
performing 
adequately to 
enable the delivery 
of FHCI-related 
services? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changes to pay and 
motivation of staff 
 
Staff views on 
effects of the FHCI 
on their work 
 
Changes to informal 
charging by health 
workers 
 
Perceptions of 
quality of care by 
patients 
 
Measures of 
technical quality of 
care by staff 
- Calculate 
trends over 
time in posts, 
staff numbers 
and 
vacancies 
(reviewed 
against 
guidance on 
required 
staffing 
levels) and 
exploration of 
patterns of 
staff transfers 
(e.g. rural-to-
urban shifts), 
disaggregated 
by district if 
possible 
 
MoHS payroll 
data 
HRMO  
ReBUILD in-
depth interviews 
HFAC data 
Fred Martineau 
PhD 
Absenteeism 
reports 
KIIs 
Technical 
measures still 
outstanding 
Section 4.3: 
HRH; also 5.2 
on quality of 
care; and 5.3.1 
on charging of 
patients 
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Stage in 
results 
chain 
Research question Indicator Methods Data source 
Where the 
questions are 
answered in 
evaluation 
report 
(looking for data 
sources) 
 
 
 
 
 
OUTPUTS 
 
To what extent are 
there increased 
levels of health 
finance (amount, 
regularity, flexibility) 
to support the 
FHCI? 
 
 
 
 
Volume, regularity 
and flexibility of fund 
disbursement at 
service delivery level 
 
 
 
 
 
- Trend analyses, 
overall and by 
district 
- KIIs 
 
 
- Budget 
tracking 
survey (by 
Save the 
Children) 
- Key 
informants 
(e.g. facility 
staff, DHMTs, 
central MoHS, 
etc.) 
- Local 
government 
finance 
department 
 
Section 4.1: 
health 
financing 
To what extent is 
there a 
strengthened and 
functioning referral 
system and to what 
extent has the FHCI 
contributed to this? 
Availability of 
ambulances, fuel 
supply, maintenance 
schedule 
 
Changed community 
awareness of danger 
signs and support for 
emergency transport 
  
Descriptive data 
analyses and 
trends over time 
 
Qualitative 
analysis 
LMIS  
 
 
FGDs & district 
interviews 
Section 5.3.2: 
access; and 
Section 4.5: 
infrastructure; 
also 5.3.4: 
awareness of 
danger signs 
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Stage in 
Results 
chain 
Research 
question 
Indicator Methods Data source 
Where the 
questions are 
answered in 
evaluation 
report 
 
 
 
 
 
OUTCOMES 
Has the FHCI 
achieved improved 
service coverage 
and equity for the 
target groups 
(disaggregated by 
quintile and 
district)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tracking changes in 
coverage: 
(a) Tracer 
conditions: 
malaria, 
pneumonia, 
ANC and PNC, 
percentage of 
facility deliveries 
and caesarean 
sections 
disaggregated 
by quintile, by 
education level 
(b) Explore 
switching 
behaviour 
between the 
private and 
public sectors 
Trends over time 
1.1 Percentage 
of pregnant 
women attended 
at least four 
ANC visits 
1.2 Proportion of 
institutional 
deliveries 
1.3 Number of 
caesarean 
sections as a 
proportion of all 
deliveries in a 
year 
1.4 Proportion of 
women and 
newborns 
receiving 
postnatal care in 
first 24–48 hours 
after birth at 
government 
facility 
1.5 Pneumonia – 
% of children 
aged 0–59 
months with 
suspected 
pneumonia 
received 
antibiotics 
1.6 Malaria – % 
of children aged 
0–59 months 
diagnosed with 
malaria and 
treated with ACT 
 
 
DHS, MICS 
ReBUILD 
survey analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 5.1: 
utilisation and 
coverage by 
group, region 
and quintile; 
district analysis 
in 9.4: equity 
Are there reduced 
barriers to service 
uptake 
(affordability, 
transport, 
attitudes)? Have 
the main barriers 
been addressed? 
What substantial 
barriers remain 
from users’ 
perspectives? 
Changes to 
affordability 
Indicators for 
physical access and 
how these have 
changed 
Altered health-
seeking behaviour, 
including for 
vulnerable sub-
groups, e.g. 
adolescents 
-percentage seeking 
care for sick children 
-change in delivery 
practices 
Document 
review 
Analysis of 
secondary data 
DHS + 
ReBUILD LSS 
analysis; 2008 
OPM study for 
baseline figures 
 
FGDs 
 
National Service 
Delivery 
Perception 
Survey  
 
ReBUILD 
qualitative 
interviews 
Section 5.3 on 
barriers to 
uptake 
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-reduction in informal 
care-seeking 
 
To what extent has 
the FHCI 
contributed to 
strengthening 
social cohesion? 
Defined as trust in 
public institutions, 
social capital and 
solidarity, 
perceptions of policy 
fairness  
Qualitative 
analysis 
FGDs 
Secondary 
studies 
/documents/KIIs 
Section 6.4: 
social cohesion 
Improved quality of 
care 
Proportion of deliveries by SBAs 
Proportion of mothers receiving parenteral oxytocin or 
misoprostol after delivery as part of AMTSL/adherence to 
third stage management protocol 
CFR for PPH  
Proportion of women with obstetric complications treated in 
EmONC facilities 
Proportion of newborns breastfed within one hour of birth 
(facility) 
% of children aged 0–59 months with watery diarrhoea 
treated with ORS/zinc 
Section 5.2: 
quality of care 
(though many 
data are 
missing) 
Improved 
/strengthened 
health system 
 
 
This is a product of all other domains and spans the entire 
results chain 
 
Section 4.8: 
summary of 
effects on health 
system 
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Stage 
in 
results 
chain 
Research 
question 
Indicator Methods Data source 
Where the 
questions are 
answered in 
evaluation 
report 
 
 
 
 
 
IMPACT 
 
Has the FHCI 
contributed to 
saving lives in 
target groups? 
If so, how and 
to what extent? 
Reduced MMR, neonatal, infant 
and child mortality rates  
Pre/post 
comparison 
adjusting for 
confounders  
Explore use 
of LiST to 
model 
impact of 
changing 
coverage of 
key 
interventions 
DHS 
MICS 
 
INGO sources  
Section 6.1: 
changing 
health 
outcomes; and 
Section 9.3: 
cost-
effectiveness 
Did the FHCI 
achieve cost-
effectiveness? 
- Incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratio  
- Broader effects on and 
perceptions of communities 
- Broader health system effects 
 
Calculated 
from 
marginal 
effect data 
(in terms of 
lives saved) 
and 
marginal 
cost data (in 
terms of 
public and 
household 
expenditure 
on health) 
- Qualitative 
community 
research 
- KIIs and 
document 
review 
- NHAs/ 
government 
budgets for cost 
data 
- DHS and/or 
HMIS and LiST 
for effect data 
(modelling) 
 
Section 9.3: 
cost-
effectiveness; 
Section 11: 
conclusions 
Has the FHCI 
contributed to 
reducing 
morbidity in 
target groups? 
If so, how and 
to what extent? 
Lower prevalence of tracer 
conditions in target groups 
Malaria  
Pneumonia 
PPH 
Neonatal tetanus 
Child vaccine-preventable 
conditions 
 
 
Pre/post 
comparison 
adjusting for 
confounders  
DHS 
MICS 
Section 6.2: 
changing 
morbidity 
Has the FHCI 
contributed to 
reduction in 
inequalities in 
health 
spending 
across districts, 
Explored through disaggregated 
analysis of public health 
expenditure across districts over 
the period, judged against 
population and need, as well as 
changes to uptake 
Changes in 
values over 
time 
Geographically 
disaggregated 
data on 
expenditure and 
utilisation 
Section 9.4.1: 
changes to 
public spend 
across districts 
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and to what 
extent? 
Has the FHCI 
contributed to 
reductions in 
health 
inequalities 
among target 
groups, and to 
what extent? 
Explored through disaggregated 
analysis of mortality and 
morbidity  
Trend 
analysis 
pre/post  
DHS; HMIS 
Sections 6.1 
and 6.2 on 
changes to 
mortality and 
morbidity 
Has the FHCI 
contributed to 
reductions in 
impoverishment 
/poverty 
reduction – how 
and to what 
extent? 
Changes in health-related 
expenditure by quintile and 
different groups (mothers, under-
fives) 
Econometric 
analyses 
 
Living Standards 
Surveys 2003/04 
and 2011 – 
working with 
ReBUILD study 
Section 6.3: 
impoverishment 
How 
sustainable is 
the FHCI? 
 
Analysis of composition of donor 
expenditure versus public 
expenditure on health over time 
Fiscal space analysis to assess 
future funding options 
Analysis of political, social and 
institutional support 
Modelling of 
needs and 
resources 
going 
forward 
Thematic 
analysis of 
qualitative 
sources 
Financial 
records; 
documentary 
analysis; KIIs 
Section 10: 
sustainability 
 
Has the FHCI 
resulted in any 
unintended 
consequences?  
For example:  
 Birth rates and uptake of 
contraception (including for 
teenagers) 
 Health seeking for other 
patient groups (general 
outpatient department) 
 Trends for preventive 
services 
 How has the FHCI impacted 
on health managers and 
facilities? 
 How has the FHCI impacted 
on private/informal services 
uptake? 
 Changes to informal 
payments 
Trend 
analyses 
 
 
 
Qualitative 
analysis 
 
HMIS, DHS, 
MICS 
Peer reviewed + 
 grey literature 
KIIs with 
stakeholders 
DHS  
FGDs 
Possible PhD 
thesis  
Section 7: 
unintended 
consequences 
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Annex C List of KIIs 
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List of institutions and key people met  
Institution Name Role  
MoHS 
Miatta Kargbo Previous Minister of Health 1 
Dr Abubakarr Fofanah Previous Deputy Minister of Health 2 
Foday Sawi Previous Deputy Minister of Health 3 
Bernard Dugba Previous Planning Coordinator DPPI 4 
Emile Koroma Previous HR Manager 5 
Brima Kargbo Current CMO – previously Director of National AIDS Secretariat 6 
Dr Daoh CMO at the time of FHCI launch 7 
Sahr Hemore Programme Manager, Health Education Department 8 
Dr Sarian Kamara Reproductive Health/Family Planning Manager 9 
Mohamed Jalloh Previous M&E Officer, DPPI 10 
Foday Sawi Deputy Minister of Health 11 
Abu Bakarr Fofana Minister of Health 12 
Yayah Conte Director Donor Liaison 13 
SAS Kargbo Director DPPI, previously Director RCH 14 
Dr Kamara Previous Director DPPI 15 
Dr Santigie Director of Reproductive and Child Health 16 
Mariatu Charlie Head of Health Financing Unit 17 
Alex Jones Previous ODI Fellow, Health Financing Unit 18 
Noemi Schramm ODI Fellow, Health Financing Unit 19 
Tanya Philipp ODI Fellow, Health Financing Unit 20 
Fanta Musu Amara Health Education Officer, Health Education Department 21 
Johnson W.S. Kargbo Deputy Chief Registrar, Births and Deaths Division 22 
Simeon Kuyembeh Senior Registrar in Charge of Deaths, Births and Deaths Division 23 
Dausy Wurie MoFED, seconded to MoHS 24 
David Ibrahim Bangura 
Asst Registrar in Charge of Maternal Deaths, Births and Deaths 
Division 
25 
Richard Konie Store and Logistics Manager, Births and Deaths Division 26 
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Alhaji Samuka Nallo Senior Registrar in Charge of Births, Births and Deaths Division 27 
Wogba Kamara M&E Manager, HMIS Team at DPPI 28 
Samuel Sesay Health Education Officer, Health Education Department 29 
Dr M. Musa M&E Director of DPPI 30 
Thekeka Conti HMIS Team at DPPI 31 
Tamba John Performance-Based Finance, HMIS Team at DPPI 32 
Zara Kargbo HMIS Team at DPPI 33 
Dr D.A. Bash-Taqi Director of Hospitals and Lab Services 34 
Lansanah Conte Communications 35 
Dr Kandeh Health Services Strengthening Manager 36 
Joseph Kandeh Director PHC 37 
Regina Bash-Taqi Health Policy and Information Specialist, HSS Hub 38 
Claudia Shulemani HSS Hub Director 39 
Haja Mariatu Koroma HRH Director 40 
Emil Koroma HR Manager 41 
Dr A Sandi HRH Manager (2002–2010) now: DMO Koinadugu 42 
Prince Cole Former Director, HRH 43 
Amara Jambai Director Disease Prevention and Control 44 
Sidie Y. Tunis Director ICT 45 
Dr Bassie Turay Director, Directorate of Drugs and Medical Supplies 46 
Samuel Smith Manager, National Malaria Control Programme 47 
Dr Kenneh Child Health Team, Expanded Immunisation Team (EPI) 48 
Mohamed Kanu ICT CHANNEL office 49 
Mohamed A. B. Kamara Manager of ICT CHANNEL Office 50 
Betty Lemor Head of HR Payroll 51 
Dr Arthur Williams HSC Commissioner – Former CMO (2007–2009) 52 
Dr Michael Amara Previous Health Economist at DPPI 53 
Sorie Kamara Previous Director of Finance 54 
Mabel Carew Previous Chief Nursing Officer 55 
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Husainatu Kargbo Chief Nursing Officer 56 
Dr Joseph Edem-Hottah Hottah Dean, Faculty of Nursing, COMAHS 57 
Mohamed Massaquoi Manager, Office of CMO 58 
Dr Mohamed Samai 
Directorate of Research and Training, MoHS, Head of Pharmacology, 
COMAHS 
59 
State House 
Yabom Sesay Health Adviser to President 60 
Ali Redhead Governance Adviser 61 
SSL 
Mohamed King Koromer Statistician General 62 
Peter Bangura Director, Demographic and Social Statistics 63 
Abu Bakarr Turay Director, Economic Statistics 64 
MoFED 
Adams Kargbo Director, Local Government Finance Department 65 
Mathew Dingie Director of Budget 66 
Idrissa Kanu Director, Revenue and Tax Policy Division 67 
Mohamed Salisu Economist, Revenue and Tax Policy Division 68 
Dausy Warie Budget Directorate 69 
Abu Bakarr Tarawalie Assistant Director, Economic Policy and Research Unit 70 
Lansana Fofanah Senior Economist, ERPU 71 
Sellu Macarthy Senior Economist, ERPU 72 
Mohamed Deen Sankoh 
Economist, Inter-Governmental Fiscal Affairs Local Government 
Finance Department 
73 
Ajayi Nicol Development Aid Coordination 74 
NPPU Dr Michael Lansana Deputy Director 75 
Pharmacy Board 
Bassie S R Touray Chairman 76 
Wiltshire Johnson: Registrar 77 
National HIV AIDS secretariat 
Abu Bakarr Koroma Communications Specialist 78 
Dr Momodu Sesay Programme Manager, HIV/AIDS Control Programme 79 
NASSIT Committee Amara Kuyateh Deputy Director General 80 
Bank of Sierra Leone Morlai Bangura Assistant Director, Research Department 81 
National Revenue Authority Alfred Akibo-Betts Deputy Commissioner, Domestic Tax Department 82 
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Civil society 
HFAC 
Alhassan B. Kamara: Programme Manager 83 
Charles Mambu Director 84 
MSF B Jose Hulsenbek Head of Mission 85 
Health Alert 
William B.M. Sao Programme and Communications Director 86 
Koroma Victor Director 87 
MSI Anna Macauley Clinical Services Manager 88 
HPA 
Ibrahim Touray Programme Manager 89 
Regina Bash-Taqi Country Director 90 
Save the Children 
Sembia Johnson Policy and Advocacy Coordinator 91 
Amie Kamara Health Adviser 92 
Joanna Tomkargbo Campaign Coordinator 93 
IRC 
Saffea Senessie Country Director 94 
Laura Miller  95 
Concern 
Emily Cummings Operations Research Adviser for Child Survival 96 
Kristen Cahill Senior Programme Manager – Innovations 97 
Rosie Davis National Health Coordinator 98 
E4A 
Dr Mohamed Yilla Country Director 99 
Sowoh Lebbie  100 
SFCG Ambrose James Director 101 
MRC Dr Heidi Jalloh Vos Programme Manager 102 
Donor community 
World Bank 
Sheikh Alhaji Yayah 
Sesay 
Country Operations Officer 103 
UNICEF 
Yaron Wolman Chief of Child Survival and Development 104 
Dr Ngozi Kennedy Senior Health Specialist, FHCI Coordinator 105 
Dr Augustine Kabano Health Manager 106 
Rajesh Patnaik M&E Specialist 107 
WHO Teniin Gakuruh Health Systems Specialist 108 
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Dr Wondi Alemu Head of Office 109 
Dr Sebora Kamara Health and Environmental Officer (former HRH Officer) 110 
UNFPA 
Sonia Gilroy Programme Coordinator 111 
Angela Msosa Technical Assistance on the DHS 112 
Saffiatu A. Foday Regional Family Planning Coordinator 113 
Dr Jarrie Kabba-Kebbay National Reproductive Health Manager 114 
Hashina Begum Reproductive Health Specialist 115 
Aiah Sosso Kohne FHCI Key Person 116 
Ibrahim Kamara OIC 117 
Global Fund Abu Kamara Programme Coordinator 118 
DFID 
Rob Yates Health Adviser at the time of FHCI launch 119 
Susan Mshana Health Adviser at the time of FHCI launch 120 
John Paul Fanning Economist 121 
Uzo Gikpin Health Adviser (2014) 122 
CHAI 
Madisyn Lu Programme Manager 123 
Dan Gwinnell Country Director 124 
EU Tom Ashwanden Head of Governance and Institutional Support 125 
JICA Kiyomi Mokoma In-house Consultant 126 
Consultancies and consultants 
Options 
Delips Allieu: M&E / Research Coordinator 127 
Sara Nam Technical Adviser 128 
Ladi Sotimehin Country Director 129 
Derek Reynolds Public Finance Consultant 130 
Crown Agents Maurice Juma Managing Director & Team Leader 131 
Freelance Carole Green Independent Consultant 132 
Center for Economic Research and Capacity 
Building 
Samuel Jibao Chief Executive Officer 133 
Academic institutions 
ReBuild Joseph Edem-Hotah Head 134 
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LSTM 
Betty Sam Senior Technical Officer 135 
Moses Bockarie Director of Centre for Neglected Tropical Diseases 136 
Mselenge Mdegala  137 
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Annex D Explanation of FHCI costing 
Actual costs associated with FHCI Calculations explained 
 2010 2011 2012 2013  
TOTAL costs FHCI 
(SLL, millions) 
316,433 396,636 452,776 563,307  
TOTAL costs FHCI 
(SLL, millions) without 
'other donor funds' 
120,211 155,960 157,575 201,229  
      
Donor FHCI cost (SLL, 
millions) 
256,937 325,069 389,508 452,559  
Payment of health 
workers’ salary 
supplement as part of 
FHCI 
19,413 33,811 36,601 12,112 
Made up of DFID and Global Fund funding. 
Used figures provided by GoSL budget 
documents and Stevenson et al. (2012), 
which coverts external funding into Sierra 
Leone’s fiscal year. 
Drugs and medical 
consumables  
32,424 37,910 37,682 52,823 
Largely DFID funding captured through NHA 
questionnaire, although included funding by 
ECHO in 2011. 
Key activities for 
service delivery 
8,878 11,725 13,374 14,752 
Not clear what types of expenditure this 
captures but was used by MoHS as estimate 
of direct expenditure to FHCI, adjusted for 
inflation from 2010 estimate. 
PBF (World Bank) - 947 6,649 10,794 
Actual disbursement figures provided by 
MoFED. 
Other donor funds 
going to RCH  
196,222 240,676 295,201 362,078 
From the NHA 2013 calculated the proportion 
of donor funds that went to three FHCI groups 
and subtracted other known donor 
expenditure in the line items above. 
 
For Years 2010 to 2012 used the same 
proportion of RCH expenditure as a 
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percentage of total donor funds in 2013 and 
applied to 2010–2012 total donor funds (given 
these years did not breakdown RCH 
expenditure in as much detail as 2013). 
 
The use of this methodology also reflects the 
poor data on off-budget donor expenditure ein 
the development budget. 
 
GoSL FHCI cost (SLL, 
millions) 
59,496 71,567 63,269 110,749  
Salary expenditures 
of GoSL as recurrent 
expenditures 
43,984 42,565 52,760 94,105 Based on MoHS data on actual expenditures. 
Drugs and medical 
consumables  
- - - - 
Discussions with MoHS and evidence from 
CMS suggests all FHCI drugs are donor-
financed. This changed in 2014 with the use 
of GoSL funds through NPPU. 
Key expenditures for 
service delivery 
2,995 2,776 8,673 13,500 
Based on MoHS data on actual expenditures 
(2010 is called ‘Reproductive care in MoHS 
budget’). 
Domestic funded 
capital expenditure  
12,517 26,226 1,836 3,143 
Based on MoHS figures (for domestic funded 
development expenditure). 
Incremental costs associated with FHCI 
 2010 2011 2012 2013  
TOTAL incremental 
costs FHCI (SLL, 
millions) 
148,688 228,891 285,031 395,562  
TOTAL incremental 
costs FHCI (SLL, 
millions) without 
'other donor funds' 
91,870 127,619 129,235 172,889  
 
Donor FHCI cost (SLL, 
millions) 
117,533 185,664 250,103 313,154  
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Payment of health 
workers salary 
supplement as part of 
FHCI 
19,413 33,811 36,601 12,112 
Salary uplift taken as ‘new’ funding, thus 
same as above. 
Drugs and medical 
consumables  
32,424 37,910 37,682 52,823 
FHCI drugs assumed to be all funded by 
donors and while some were probably funded 
by donors before, the large increase is viewed 
as ‘new funding’. 
Key activities for 
service delivery 
8,878 11,725 13,374 14,752 
New FHCI-specific funding so same as 
above. 
PBF (World Bank) - 947 6,649 10,794 
New FHCI-specific funding so same as 
above. 
Other donor funds 
going to RCH  
56,818 101,271 155,796 222,673 
Using NHA methodology above to estimate 
average spend on RCH before FHCI as a 
baseline and then calculating difference post-
FHCI (minus other known donor expenditure).  
 
GoSL FHCI cost (SLL, 
millions) 
31,155 43,227 34,928 82,408  
Salary expenditures 
of GoSL as recurrent 
expenditures 
20,739 19,320 29,515 70,860 
Using average GoSL salaries 2008/09 before 
FHCI as baseline and then calculating 
difference post-FHCI. 
Drugs and medical 
consumables  
0 0 0 0 
Assumed that government only spends 
money on cost-recovery drugs as per 2013 
CMS report. 
Key expenditures for 
service delivery 
0 -218 5,678 10,506 
Using average GoSL expenditure 2008/09 
before FHCI as baseline and then calculating 
difference post-FHCI. 
Domestic funded 
capital expenditure 
(incremental) 
10,416 24,125 -265 1,042 
Using average GoSL expenditure 2008/09 
before FHCI as baseline and then calculating 
difference post-FHCI. 
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Annex E Note on health services and outcomes data sources 
and quality 
The main report gives brief details of how and why we used different sources of quantitative data in 
our analysis. This annex sets out further information about these sources of data. The main 
sources are as follows: 
1. The HMIS, which collects monthly data from all health facilities; and 
 
2. Household surveys, including two rounds of the DHS in 2008 and 2013 and the DHSBS of 
2009. 
 
There was no specific baseline data collection exercise for the FHCI. This appears to have been 
because there were insufficient time and resources to do this given the speed at which the FHCI 
was launched. 
E.1 The HMIS 
The HMIS collects regular administrative data from each health facility in the country. MoHS 
officials have developed a series of forms that facility staff complete each month. These are then 
passed to the DHMT to collate and validate the information at district level before being sent to the 
ministry using the DHIS2. 
The system existed in the years before 2010 but it was strengthened considerably as the FHCI 
was launched. In particular, the forms were redesigned and extended, the data transfers from 
district to ministry moved to an electronic system, and supervision of facility staff by DHMT staff 
was improved. 
Like other administrative data systems, HMIS has some particular potential strengths: 
 It should, in theory, provide complete coverage of all health facilities in the country; 
 The frequency of the information is high, with forms completed each month; and  
 Analysis can be conducted for small geographical areas. 
However, there are also several factors that present quality problems for HMIS data, and these 
have restricted the extent to which we have been able to use this source in our assessment. 
First, although data collection started in the years before the FHCI, all the microdata from before 
April 2011 was lost during the upgrade to DHIS2. Therefore, in order to compare the picture before 
and after the start of the FHCI, we are restricted to using the few tables that had already published 
by MoHS, for example in their series of health bulletins. 
Second, a review by Options and Dalan Consultancies in 2015 showed that there were significant 
inconsistencies between the information in health facility registers, the collated data in the district 
tally sheets and the final dataset in the DHIS2. This points to weaknesses in the recording of 
information by facility staff, insufficient supervision by district staff and poor quality control 
procedures overall. 
Third, as part of our work on this assessment of the impact of the FHCI, we examined the 
information in DHIS2. We found that, although overall response rates show that around 90% of 
health facilities supply information each month, the variables we looked at typically had missing 
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values for between 20% and 40% of health facilities. This is likely to lead to biases in the HMIS 
analysis. 
E.2 Household surveys 
The two DHSs and the DHSBS are sample surveys of the country’s population. These sources 
have the following strengths: 
 Like other sample surveys, sampling errors and confidence intervals can be calculated to show 
the likely precision of the estimates; 
 The surveys are representative of all households and therefore cover both those that do and 
those that do not interact with the health system (in contrast to the HMIS information, which 
typically covers only those who visit a health facility); and 
 Analysis can be conducted to examine equity issues such as variations between different 
wealth groups. 
The surveys too are not without their problems, particularly the 2008 DHS. Analysis of the ages of 
children and females in the survey points toward the following quality weaknesses. 
First, the distribution of children born in the years before the 2008 survey shows that there is a 
bulge in births for those aged six at the time of the data collection. A bulge is even more noticeable 
for deaths of those children born six years before the survey. It is thought that the reason for this is 
because interviewers tended to encourage births and deaths to be recorded outside the five-year 
reference period (especially where there was doubt in the respondent’s mind of the exact date) so 
that fewer questions needed to be asked of the respondent.  
In the 2008 DHS there were 120% more deaths of children born six years before the survey 
compared to the average of the years either side. For the 2013 DHS, fieldwork checks and 
supervision were improved and the issue was not so prominent, with only around 40% more 
deaths for this cohort. 
Second, the population pyramids for women in the survey do not match those from the census. In 
particular, there appear to be more females just below and just above the 15–49 year age range. 
Again it is thought that interviewers may have encouraged women to say they were outside this 
reproductive age range in order to reduce the number of questions that needed to be asked. 
Both these issues back up the general consensus of those involved in conducting and analysing 
the surveys that the 2013 DHS is of significantly higher quality than the 2008 round. This almost 
certainly arises from the tighter monitoring and supervision of the fieldwork in 2013. For example, 
consistency checks were done on the early weeks of data collection in 2013 as the information 
was being collected. This led to the interviewers being recalled for re-training. The fieldwork teams 
were also then restructured and reduced from 24 to 18. 
The 2009 DHSBS used an almost identical questionnaire and method to the 2008 DHS. Some of 
the quality issues from the 2008 survey are also likely to be present in the 2009 survey. 
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Annex F CEA methods 
Our analytical aim is to estimate the costs and effects of the provision of free health care for 
children under 5, pregnant women and lactating mothers—and the accompanying health system 
strengthening reforms—over the time period 2010-2013. The resulting cost-effectiveness ratio is 
then compared to standard thresholds to arrive at a judgement of cost effectiveness. 
There are two key challenges to the analysis. Firstly, drawing boundaries around what 
interventions—and their associated costs and outcomes—are, or are not, linked to the FHCI is 
challenging. Secondly, limitations to data sources on both the costs and outcomes of the FHCI 
means that the true incremental costs and effects of the FHCI are difficult to isolate and there is 
inevitably uncertainty around our estimates. 
To address these issues, we aim to take a structured, transparent and reproducible approach to 
the CEA. As with all economic evaluation, modelling requires assumptions be made and these are 
varied in a sensitivity analysis. In line with this approach, in this annex we articulate the following 
elements that structure the CEA:  
a. the target population for the interventions;  
b. the healthcare interventions included;  
c. the timeframe for the analysis; 
d. the counterfactual; 
e. the costs and effects included; and 
f. the perspective taken. 
F.1 Target population 
Our target population is the target groups for the FHCI—children under 5, pregnant women and 
lactating mothers. It could be argued that other groups are also affected by the FHCI, either 
positively and negatively. However, these knock-on effects are difficult to incorporate into the 
analysis and likely much smaller and so our focus is the FHCI target groups.  
F.2 Interventions included 
As mentioned, defining what interventions are, or are not, linked to FHCI is challenging. Our choice 
is determined to some extent by the available cost and outcome data, with an emphasis on 
ensuring that what is included on the cost side is matched on the effect side. For example, we 
would not want to include the costs of wider health systems strengthening and then compare to 
only a limited set of intervention-level effects.  
We use the Lives Saved Tool (LiST) to model the effect of the FHCI on maternal, newborn and 
child mortality. LiST is a software tool used to model the impact of scaling-up health interventions 
aimed to reduce the mortality of mothers, newborns and children under 5. Country-specific 
coverage data is combined with data on causes of death and the secondary evidence on the 
effectiveness of interventions. A key feature of LiST is that the modelling techniques allow for a 
package of interventions to be assessed together without double counting (Walker et al. 2013). 
Analysis was conducted using version 4.31 of the OneHealth Tool, an integrated tool that includes 
LiST as one of its components. 
There are several options for defining the FHCI package: 
 The first is to include interventions that are directly related to the FHCI; that is, interventions 
for which user fees were charged before the introduction of the policy. For pregnant 
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women, these include antenatal, childbirth and postnatal interventions; for newborns, case 
management of prematurity and severe infection; and for children under 5, treatment of 
diarrhoea and other infectious diseases.  
 The second is broader and includes interventions that were previously free but the 
increased uptake of which has been catalysed by the introduction of the policy. These 
include contraception and provision of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) for malaria.  
Table 59 gives a summary list of interventions included in the different scenarios.  
Table 59: Interventions included in the LiST modelling of the FHCI 
 
Interventions directly 
related to the FHCI 
Interventions directly 
and indirectly related to 
the FHCI 
Pregnancy 
* Antenatal care Yes Yes 
Tetanus toxoid vaccination Yes Yes 
IPTp  Yes Yes 
Syphilis detection and treatment Yes Yes 
Hypertensive disorder case management Yes Yes 
Diabetes case management Yes Yes 
Malaria case management Yes Yes 
MgSO4 – management of pre-eclampsia Yes Yes 
Child birth 
Skilled birth attendance Yes Yes 
Health facility delivery Yes Yes 
Preventative 
Clean postnatal practices  Yes Yes 
ITN/IRS  No Yes 
Vaccines 
BCG  No Yes 
Polio  No Yes 
Measles  No Yes 
Curative 
ORS - oral rehydration solution  Yes Yes 
Antibiotics - for treatment of dysentery  Yes Yes 
Zinc - for treatment of diarrhoea  Yes Yes 
Oral antibiotics for pneumonia  Yes Yes 
Vitamin A - for treatment of measles  Yes Yes 
Source: List of interventions from LiST;  
  
LiST is therefore ideal for our analysis as it allows us to define the FHCI as a package of 
interventions and to model how increased coverage over the period 2010-2013 has translated into 
mortality reduction. The FHCI scenarios use actual coverage data, primarily from the Demographic 
and Health Survey. When possible disaggregated annual data is used to construct a time series for 
how coverage of the intervention has changed in Sierra Leone from 2010 to 2013. In the absence 
of such data, we linearly interpolate the indicator between 2008 and 2013. 
However, it is important also to acknowledge that LiST is a tool that allows for the modelling of 
impact, not the actual estimation of impact using an appropriate impact evaluation method and 
data on the impact variables. The conclusions that can be drawn from such an exercise are 
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different from those that could be drawn from an actual impact evaluation. It is worth also 
highlighting a few key limitations of LiST: 
 LiST uses inbuilt assumptions about the effectiveness of MNCH interventions to convert 
increased coverage estimates to mortality reductions. These are based on international 
literature. In the absence of evidence from Sierra Leone, we have used these. However, 
they may overstate gains if the quality of care provided is below expected levels to ensure 
effectiveness. Furthermore, LiST can only model the impact of interventions for which 
coverage data is available. 
 Family planning is a difficult intervention to model in terms of maternal lives saved. 
International evidence suggests that when FP coverage increases from a low level, the 
proportion of women with an unmet need for contraception also increases initially because 
demand outstrips supply in the short term. It is further hypothesised that a certain 
proportion of women who had an unmet need for contraception and became pregnant will 
have an abortion (because by definition the pregnancy was unwanted). Abortion is one of 
the main causes of maternal death internationally and so LiST yields an unexpected result 
of increased maternal deaths due to FP coverage increases. This is unlikely to reflect 
reality. We therefore take the approach of modelling maternal deaths averted in the context 
of the increased CPR of Sierra Leone from 2008 to 2013. To the extent that FHCI 
contributed to the increase in FP over the period (FP was free before 2010 but increased 
utilisation of health facilities by women of reproductive age likely increased its use), we are 
therefore underestimating the demographic impact of the FHCI on maternal deaths. 
F.3 Timeframe 
The timeframe for the analysis is that for cost and effect data is available—2010-2013.  
F.4 Counterfactual 
To understand the effect of the FHCI, we need some understanding of what coverage of these 
interventions would be in the absence of the policy. In the absence of a control group, we construct 
several different counterfactuals to produce a range of credible estimates: 
 The first counterfactual is a simple, ‘no change’ counterfactual. We assume that in the 
absence of the FHCI, there is no change in coverage values over the period 2010-2013 
from 2008 DHS estimates. This has the advantage of being straightforward and an easily 
recognised  
DHS data can be disaggregated for most maternal and newborn interventions. For these:  
 The second counterfactual is another simple, no change counterfactual, this time using the 
2009 coverage value 
 The third fits a trend line to the pre-2009 data and extrapolates this to the FHCI time 
period. It should be noted that the gradient of the projected counterfactual line is very 
sensitive to the jump in coverage estimates between 2008 and 2009. This is the point 
between the two rounds of the DHS and is more likely a product of data quality problems in 
one or both surveys and not a real increase at this point.  
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F.5 Costs and effects 
13.7.1 Costs included  
On the costs side, our objective is to estimate the marginal cost of the FHCI compared to the 
counterfactual of what expenditure would have been without the policy. Our primary analysis relies 
on the estimate of the incremental expenditure on FHCI as given in Table X of the Health 
Financing section. This has the advantage of being our best estimate of expenditure on the policy 
itself. However, it may miss out broader changes in the health financing of interventions and 
reforms that affect coverage and quality of MNCH interventions. 
13.7.2 Effects included 
Our LiST estimates of maternal, newborn and child lives saved can relatively easily be converted 
into life years saved. The calculation first requires a disaggregation of lives saved by age and sex. 
This is an output of LiST for children under 5. For mothers, however, unfortunately the maternal 
health part of LiST is not linked to the demographic component of the OneHealth Tool and so we 
use age-specific fertility rates to estimate the age distribution of maternal deaths. This means that 
we are accounting for the differential fertility rates but not mortality risks of women of reproductive 
age. With this age-sex breakdown of deaths, we convert into life years saved using the Years Life 
Lost (YLL) calculations with the WHO rapid spreadsheet-based tool for DALY calculation. We use 
standard values for key parameters, shown in Table 60: 
Table 60: YLL parameters 
Parameter Value used Explanation 
Discount rate (r) 0.03 Standard discount rate (Murray and Lopez 1996) 
Beta (b) 0.04 Standard age weights use b=0.04 
Constant (c) 0.1658 Standard age weights use c=0.1658 
K 
1 Full age weights (as recommended for base case by 
Murray and Lopez 1996) 
 
 
Life expectancy estimates for Sierra Leone are taken from United Nations, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015).  
F.6 Perspective 
Our analysis takes a perspective that includes government and donor expenditure on the cost side 
of the equation. Household expenditure is not included given the data quality issues. If expenditure 
from a household perspective were included, this would increase the cost-effectiveness ratio from 
the societal perspective given that our best estimate is that OOP household expenditure modestly 
decreased as a result of the FHCI. On the effect side, the perspective is more a societal one, given 
that life years gained are of value to households, government and donors. 
In terms of other standard economic modelling decisions, costs are not discounted while effects 
are discounted using a standard discount rate of 3%. Costs are expressed in nominal terms and, 
as in the rest of the report, IMF exchange rates used to convert Sierra Leone Leones to US dollars. 
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Annex G Selected development partner health investments, 
2008–2015, Sierra Leone 
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Programme/ Project 
name 
Donor Topic/focus Budget 
Years of 
support 
Reproductive and 
Child Health Project 
in Sierra Leone 
Phase 1 
World 
Bank 
To assist the recipient in 
addressing immediate constraints 
to reducing longer-term maternal 
and under-five mortality. 
US$ 6 million 2006–2008 
Health system 
strengthening  
(HSS 1)  
GAVI 
PHU training in IMNCI, BEmONC, 
provision of ambulances to all 
districts, outreach allowances for 
health staff. 
US$ 1,161,447 2008–2009 
Vaccine support GAVI 
Immunisation services support 
and vaccines (pneumo & penta 
largest). 
About US$ 
40,000,000 
2008–2014 
Malaria prevention 
and control 
GFATM 
Scaling up of community-based 
interventions for malaria 
prevention and control with 
special reference to children 
under the age of five and 
pregnant women. 
US$ 12,317,290 2008–2011 
UNFPA Fourth 
Country 
Programme Action 
Plan 
 
 
Multiple 
Across all UNFPA components, 
including reducing maternal 
mortality, improving the quality of 
reproductive health services, 
fostering better access to 
reproductive health information 
and services for youth and other 
vulnerable groups and ensuring 
reproductive health commodity 
security.  
US$ 9.4 million 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Making it Happen – 
Liverpool of Tropical 
Medicine (LSTM)  
 
 
 
 
 
DFID 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three main components: 
- competency-based training 
packages in EmONC 
- strengthening of data 
collection and use in the 
facilities and for research 
- introduction of a Quality 
Improvement methodology. 
Multi-country 
with total around 
£18 million  
2009–2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Assistance 
Strategy (with World 
Bank & IFC) 
AfDB 
Improved access to basic health 
services. 
37% of US$ 45 
million in 2009 
2009–2012 
RMNH DFID 
To support the implementation of 
the FHCI for under-fives, 
pregnant and lactating women 
and provide expanded family 
planning services, and to reduce 
the maternal mortality rate to 
600/100,000 live births by 2015.  
£13.7 million 2010–2011 
Reproductive and 
Child Health Project 
Phase 2 (restructured 
to include Ebola 
response) 
World 
Bank 
To increase utilisation of a 
package of essential health 
services by pregnant and 
lactating women and children 
under the age of five. 
US$ 20 million 2010–2016 
Multiple UNICEF 
Child survival and development. 
 
US$ 35 million 
 
 
2010 
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4th Country 
Programme 
Extension 
UNFPA 
As above, now includes neonates 
and infants. 
 
US$ 8.34 million 
 
2011–2012 
Malaria prevention 
and control 
GFATM 
Scaling up malaria control 
interventions toward universal 
coverage in Sierra Leone. 
US$ 39,351,791 2011–2015 
RMNH DFID ...including support to the FHCI. £2.1 million 2011–2012 
RMNH DFID ....including support to the FHCI. £5.150 million 2012–2013 
Multiple UNICEF 
Across all UNICEF sectors 
including support to IMCI. 
US$ 36 million 
 
2012 
Multiple UNICEF Across all UNICEF sectors. US$ 45 million 2013 
Health system 
strengthening  
(HSS 2) 
GAVI 
Medical equipment management 
and maintenance, outreach using 
the RED approach, and supply 
chain management for drugs, 
vaccines and other health 
commodities (implementation 
delayed due to response to report 
of misappropriated US$ 523,000 
from HSS). 
US$ 2,723,058 2013–2014 
RMNH DFID ...including support to the FHCI. £14.5 million 2013–2014 
Reproductive and 
Child Health 2 Project 
– Second Additional 
Financing 
World 
Bank 
To increase the utilisation of a 
package of essential health 
services by pregnant and 
lactating women and children 
under the age of five. 
US$ 13 million + 
US$ 5 million 
grant 
 
2013–2016 
UNFPA 5th CPAP  
Contribute to achievement of 
universal access to sexual and 
reproductive health, promote 
reproductive rights and reduce 
maternal mortality and morbidity, 
including increased access and 
utilisation of quality maternal and 
newborn health services. 
US$ 18.8 million 
 
2013–2014 
 
